

The background of the book cover is a deep red color with a series of diagonal, wavy lines that create a sense of movement and depth, resembling a draped fabric or a liquid surface.

Thucydides

The Peloponnesian War

OXFORD WORLD'S CLASSICS

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OXFORD WORLD'S CLASSICS



THUCYDIDES

The Peloponnesian War



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With an Introduction and Notes by
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OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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ABBREVIATIONS

For texts of ancient works, including modern collections of text, and for classical journals, we follow the list of abbreviations in the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Note also the following:

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
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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BOOK ONE

Thucydides of Athens wrote this history of the war fought against 1
each other by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.

He began his work right at the outbreak, reckoning that this would be a major war and more momentous than any previous conflict. There were two grounds for this belief: both sides were at the full height of their power and their resource for war, and he saw the rest of the Greeks allying with one or the other, either immediately or in intent.

This was in fact the greatest disturbance to affect the Greek and a good part of the non-Greek world, one might even say the majority of mankind. Accurate research into earlier or yet more ancient history was impossible given the great gap of time, but I have enquired as far into the past as I can, and on the evidence which I can trust I think there was nothing then on a large scale, either in wars or in anything else.

It is clear that what is now called Greece was not originally a country

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of stable settlements. In earlier times there were constant migrations, any group readily moving on from its present land each time they were forced out by others who happened to be superior in numbers. There was no trade, no secure communication with each

other by land or sea. Each group grazed its own land for subsistence, not building up financial reserves or farming the land, as it was never known when someone else might attack and take it from them—besides, there were no walls. In the belief that they could acquire the daily necessities of food anywhere else, it was easy enough for them to uproot. For that reason they lacked the strength of large cities and all other kinds of resource. The best land always had the most changes of population—what is now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese apart from Arcadia, and the finest soil elsewhere. It was the quality of the earth which led to an imbalance of power and the resulting internal quarrels which destroyed communities, as well as the greater risk of aggression from outsiders. Certainly the thin soil of Attica kept it largely free of such internal strife, so the original population remained. And here is substantial proof of my argument that migrations prevented comparable development elsewhere: the most powerful of those forced out of the rest of Greece by war or civil strife resorted to Athens as a stable society. These new arrivals, admitted to citizenship, directly increased the population of the city from its original size, so that later, with Attica no longer able to support them, colonies were sent out to Ionia.

This again I see as significant proof of the weakness of the ancient

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population: before the Trojan War there is no evidence of any previous enterprise undertaken in common by Greece. Even the

very name 'Hellas' was not, I believe, applied to the whole country: and before Hellen the son of Deucalion this appellation did not even exist. Before then the various tribes took their own names, with the Pelasgians the foremost. When Hellen and his sons grew to power in Phthiotis, and were called in as allies to aid the other settlements in the region, these other peoples began one by one to be known as Hellenes, by association: but it was a long time before this name prevailed over all others. The best evidence for this is Homer. He lived much later, born long after the Trojan War, and yet nowhere does he apply this name to the whole Greek force, confining it to Achilles' contingent from Phthiotis, the original Hellenes: in his poems he calls the Greeks Danaans, Argives, or Achaeans. Indeed there is no mention of 'barbarians' either, the reason being, it seems to me, that there had not yet evolved any equivalent generic term for the Greeks. However that may be, these various peoples who came to be called Hellenes—either individually, as understanding of a common language gradually spread from people to people, or, later, collectively—by reason of their weakness and their isolation from each other undertook no combined action before the Trojan War. But they could only make this joint expedition because by now they had acquired greater experience of the sea.

Minos is the earliest of those known to tradition who established a
4
navy. He took control of most of what is now called the Hellenic Sea, and ruled over the Cyclades islands, in most of which he

founded the first colonies, driving out the Carians and installing his own sons as governors: and naturally he set about clearing the sea of piracy, as far as he could, to protect his own increasing revenues.

As soon as traffic in ships developed between them, piracy was the

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recourse of the ancient Greeks and of the barbarians occupying coastal regions of the mainland and the islands. The leaders were powerful men motivated both by personal gain and by the provision of food for the weak. They fell for their plunder on unwalled communities with the population scattered in villages, and this was much of their livelihood. Such occupation did not yet carry any stigma: rather it even brought some glory. Further illustration is given by some of the mainlanders even now, who take successful piracy as a compliment, and by the ancient poets: the regular question put to all who arrive by sea is ‘Are you pirates?’, with no expectation of denial by the questioned or criticism from the questioner.

They robbed each other on land also. Even to the present day much of Greece maintains the old ways—among the Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and the mainland thereabouts. These mainlanders still retain the habit of bearing arms from the old days of robbery. There was a time when all of Greece carried arms: with

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their settlements unprotected and travel dangerous, arms were a regular part of their lives, as among barbarians now. The fact that

those parts of Greece which I have mentioned still live like this is an indication of what was once a universal practice.

The Athenians were the first to abandon weapons and relax their lifestyle into something more luxurious. Affectation lingered long: it is only recently that older men of the wealthier families stopped wearing linen tunics and tying their hair in a topknot fastened with golden cicadas—hence the same fashion which prevailed for some time among the older of their kinsmen in Ionia. It was then the Spartans who first adopted simple dress and set the present style: in other ways also the wealthier among them conformed their habits to those of the common people. They were the first, too, to strip naked for the games, to take off their clothes in public and to rub themselves with oil after exercise. Originally—even in the Olympic games—contending athletes took part with loincloths covering their genitals, and it is not many years since this practice ceased. Some barbarians even now, especially in Asia, hold boxing and wrestling bouts in which loincloths are worn. There are many other resemblances one could point to between the old Greek and the present barbarian ways of life.

The more recent foundations—when navigation was more
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common and there was greater capital resource—were of cities built with fortifying walls right on the coast, commanding the isthmuses in each case both for trade and for defence against neighbouring peoples. The old cities, both in the islands and on the mainlands, were established away from the sea because of the prevalence of

piracy—and the pirates plundered not only one another but also any coastal dwellers who lacked sea power. These cities are still in their inland locations.

The islanders were pirates no less. They were Carians and 8
Phoenicians, the peoples who colonized most of the islands. The evidence is that when Delos was purified by the Athenians in the course of this war and all the graves of those buried in the island were opened, over half of the bodies were seen to be Carians—identified by the style of armour buried with them and the method of burial, which is still in use among them.

After Minos had established his navy communication by sea became safer—in the process of colonizing most of the islands he also drove the malefactors out of them. People living by the sea could now build up greater wealth and lead a more secure existence: with their new affluence some even surrounded themselves with walls. Desire for profit was the motivation both for the weaker to tolerate the domination of the stronger and for the more powerful to use their economic advantage for the subjection of lesser cities. This sort of development had progressed some way by the time of the expedition to Troy.

I am inclined to think that it was Agamemnon's pre-eminent 9
power at the time which enabled him to raise this fleet, and not so much that he was followed by the suitors of Helen, bound by the oaths they had sworn to Tyndareus. Those who have preserved most clearly the traditional lore of the Peloponnese say that first of all

Pelops acquired such power from the vast wealth which he brought with him from Asia to a poor country that the whole land took its name from him, despite his foreign origin. Thereafter his descendants grew yet more prosperous. Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the sons of Heracles, but as he set out on that expedition he had entrusted Mycenae and its rule, out of kinship, to his maternal uncle Atreus, who had been banished by his father for the murder of Chrysippus. When Eurystheus failed to return, at the Mycenaeans' own request (they were frightened of the sons of Heracles) Atreus took over the kingship of Mycenae and all else that Eurystheus had ruled: he had the reputation of a powerful man, and he had cultivated the common people. So it was that the line of Pelops established supremacy over the line of Perseus. This was Agamemnon's inheritance, and, with greater naval power than any other, it seems to me that his gathering of the expeditionary force depended more on fear than on good will. He evidently brought the largest number of ships to Troy and, in addition to his own, provided a fleet for the Arcadians—so Homer declares, if he is sufficient authority. And in the description of the sceptre he inherited Homer speaks of Agamemnon as 'king over many islands and all of Argos'. Now as a mainland ruler Agamemnon could not have controlled any islands other than the relatively few close by if he did not possess a substantial navy. From this expedition we can make conjectures about the nature of those before it.

The fact that Mycenae was a small place—or that the buildings of

any town of that period do not now seem very impressive—would not be a valid argument for doubting the scale of the expedition as related by the poets and maintained in the tradition. For example, if the city of Sparta were to become deserted, with only the temples and the foundations of buildings left to the view, I imagine that with the passage of time future generations would find it very hard to credit its reputed power. And yet the Spartans occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnese and lead the whole, as well as many external allies: but their dispersed settlement, devoid of temples or expensive buildings, more a collection of villages in the old Greek way, would seem rather disappointing. If the same happened to Athens, people would assume from the overt appearance that the city's power was twice what it is. So there is no cause for disbelief, nor should we judge cities by their appearance rather than their power. It is reasonable to think that that Trojan expedition was greater than all in previous history, but still short of the modern scale. If once more we can trust Homer's poems in this respect—and it is likely that, being a poet, he would exaggerate—even so Agamemnon's forces seem less than those of the present day. Homer gives a total of twelve hundred ships, with the Boeotian ships carrying a hundred and twenty men and Philoctetes' ships fifty, thereby indicating, it seems to me, the largest and the smallest: at any rate there is no other mention of complement in the Catalogue of Ships. That all were fighting men as well as rowers is clear from

his description of Philoctetes' ships, where he has all those at the oars archers too.

It is unlikely that there were many non-rowing passengers apart from the kings and the highest other commanders, especially since they had to cross the open sea with all their military equipment and in ships without fenced decking, built in the old piratical style. So to take the mean of the largest and the smallest ships the numbers embarked do not seem very great for a combined expedition from the whole of Greece.

The reason was not shortage of men so much as shortage of money.

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Lack of supplies made them limit the expeditionary force to the number of troops they thought would be able to live off the land they were fighting in: and even when they had secured the initial victory on arrival (clearly—otherwise they would not have been able to fortify their camp), they did not bring to bear their full force, but were diverted to cultivation of the Chersonese and pillage to supply the lack of food. This dispersal of the Greek troops contributed to the Trojans' ability to hold out against them for those ten years—they could match whatever proportion of the Greek army remained in the field. If the Greeks had come with plentiful supplies and prosecuted the war in full numbers without the interruptions of pillage and cultivation, they would easily have prevailed in the field and taken the city, given that even in less than full numbers they could hold the enemy with whatever sections

they had at their disposal: and if they had settled down to a siege they could have taken Troy in shorter time and with less difficulty. But the reason was shortage of money, which had kept all previous campaigns small-scale. Even this one, which became the most famous of them all, is seen to be less impressive in fact than in reputation and in the prevailing tradition established by the poets.

Even after the Trojan War Greece continued in a state of upheaval

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and resettlement, with no opportunity for peaceful growth. The long delay of the Greek return from Troy caused many changes: internal strife developed widely in the cities, and those who were driven into exile founded settlements elsewhere. For example, in the sixtieth year after the capture of Troy the present Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians and founded what is now Boeotia but was earlier called Cadmeïs (there had been a contingent of them in this country before, which contributed to the Trojan expedition): and in the eightieth year the Dorians occupied the Peloponnese with the descendants of Heracles. After a long period of difficulty Greece eventually reached a stable state of peace, when the shifts of populations ceased and they began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized Ionia and most of the islands: the Peloponnesians founded the majority of the colonies in Italy and Sicily, and some in other parts of Greece. All these colonies were established after the Trojan War.

As Greece became more powerful, and the accumulation of wealth

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exceeded previous levels, the growth of revenues led in most cities to the establishment of tyrannies in place of the earlier hereditary kingships with fixed prerogatives: and Greece began to fit out navies and make increasing use of the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the first to have managed shipbuilding in something close to the present way, and that the first triremes in Greece were built in Corinth. A Corinthian shipbuilder, Ameinocles, is known to have built four ships for the Samians, and his visit to Samos was about three hundred years before the end of this present war. The earliest sea-battle of which we have record was that between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans about two hundred and sixty years before the same date.

Situated as it is on the Isthmus, the city of Corinth was always, from the very beginning, a commercial centre. In earlier times when traffic was more by land than by sea, the Greeks within and without the Peloponnese had to pass through Corinthian territory to trade with each other, and Corinth was an economic power—witness the epithet ‘wealthy’ applied to the place by the ancient poets. When the Greeks took more to sea transport, the Corinthians acquired a fleet and set about eliminating piracy: able then to offer commerce on both elements, they kept their city powerful on the revenues thus received.

Later substantial naval power developed among the Ionians. This was in the time of Cyrus, the first King of Persia, and of his son Cambyses, and in war with Cyrus the Ionians controlled for some time the whole of their own sea. Then Polycrates, tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses, used his naval strength to subject a number of the islands, including Rheneia, which he captured and dedicated to Delian Apollo. The Phocaeans too, when they were colonizing Massalia, won a sea-battle against the Carthaginians.

These were the most powerful navies of the time. And yet it is ¹⁴ clear that, though operating many generations later than the Trojan War, they employed few triremes and were still equipped with the penteconters and long ships of that much earlier age. Shortly before the Persian Wars and the death of Dareius (King of Persia after Cambyses), triremes came to be used in numbers by the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans: these were the last navies of any significance in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes. The Aeginetans and the Athenians, and a few others, had acquired small fleets, which consisted largely of penteconters. It was only recently, when Athens was at war with Aegina and the barbarian invasion was in prospect, that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build the ships in which they subsequently fought their great sea-battle: and even these did not yet have full decking.

Such then was the state of the Greek navies of both earlier and more

recent times. Yet those who concentrated on their navies acquired considerable power through financial revenue and the domination of others: islands were subjugated by naval expeditions, especially by those who were short of territory. There was no land war which resulted in any shift of power. Such wars as took place were all local affairs between contiguous states, and the Greeks did not undertake distant expeditions for foreign conquest. The big cities had not yet formed leagues of subject allies, nor did they choose to make common cause in any joint expedition: rather all wars were fought individually between neighbours. The main exception was the war fought long ago between Chalcis and Eretria, when alliance with one side or the other split the rest of Greece.

There ensued a range of obstacles to the progress of the various
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Greek states. The Ionians, for example, had been developing strongly, but then Cyrus and the Persian kingdom destroyed Croesus, invaded the area between the river Halys and the sea, and subjugated the mainland cities—Dareius later doing the same to the islands with the
power of his Phoenician fleet. As for the tyrants in the Greek cities,
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whose only concern was for themselves, for their own physical safety and the aggrandizement of their family, security was as far as possible their greatest political aim, and nothing notable was done by any of them, other than perhaps in a campaign against their neighbours: and in Sicily the tyrants did indeed increase their power greatly in this way. The result was that all over Greece there was a

long paralysis preventing any clear common action or individual initiative in the cities.

Eventually the Spartans deposed not only the Athenian tyrants¹⁸ but also those in the rest of Greece, which for the most part had fallen under tyrannies earlier than Athens—at least they deposed the majority of them: with the exception of those in Sicily these were the last of the tyrants. Sparta itself, after the arrival of the present Dorian inhabitants, went through the longest period of unrest in recorded history, yet even so its system of good order is very ancient and it has never been subject to tyrants. The Spartan constitution has remained unchanged for somewhat over four hundred years dating to the end of this war—a source of strength, enabling their political intervention in other states.

Not many years after the deposition of the Greek tyrants the battle of Marathon was fought between the Persians and the Athenians. Ten years later the barbarians returned with their huge armament for the subjection of Greece. With great danger impending, the Spartans, as the leading power, took command of the Greeks allied for the war, and in the face of the Persian invasion the Athenians decided to abandon their city: they decamped, took to their ships, and became sailors. A joint effort had driven away the barbarians, but not long afterwards the Greeks—both the allied combatants and those who had revolted from the King of Persia—split into two groups, favouring either the Athenians or the Spartans. These were now conspicuously the greatest powers, the

one strong on land, the other by sea. The defensive alliance held for a short while, but then differences broke out and the Spartans and the Athenians, together with their allies, were at war with each other—any other Greeks who might have disputes now joining one side or the other. So from the Persian War to the present conflict there were alternating periods of truce and war, either against each other or caused by revolts among their allies. As a result both sides were well prepared militarily and had acquired the added experience of drills tested in real danger.

The Spartan hegemony did not involve the imposition of tribute¹⁹ on their allies, but they took care to ensure oligarchic rule exclusively in their own interest: whereas the Athenians in time came to deprive all subject cities of their ships and require payment of tribute, with the exceptions of Chios and Lesbos. The resources of Athens alone for this present war were greater than those at the height of the combined power when the alliance against Persia was intact.

Such are my conclusions about the past, though in this investigation

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it was difficult to rely on every one of a whole series of indications. All men show the same uncritical acceptance of the oral traditions handed on to them, even about the history of their own country. Most Athenians, for example, think that Hipparchus was tyrant of Athens when he was killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: they do not know that Hippias was the ruler as the eldest of the sons of

Peisistratus, with Hipparchus and Thessalus his younger brothers. In fact on that very day Harmodius and Aristogeiton had a sudden suspicion that Hippias had been informed by some of the conspirators: so they kept clear of Hippias, thinking him forewarned, and, wanting to take their chances with some bold action before they were arrested, found Hipparchus organizing the Panathenaic procession by the shrine called Leocoreium and killed him.

I could point to many other false beliefs—about the contemporary world, not the long-forgotten past—in the rest of Greece too: for example, that the Spartan kings do not have one vote each, but two; and that at Sparta there is a company of troops called ‘the Pitana division’, which in fact has never existed. This shows how little trouble most people take in their search for the truth—they happily resort to ready-made opinions.

Nevertheless anyone accepting the broad facts of my account on²¹ the arguments I have adduced will not go wrong. He will put less faith in the glorified tales of the poets and the compilations of the prose chroniclers, whose stories are written more to please the ear than to serve the truth, are incapable of proof, and for the most part, given the lapse of time, have passed into the unreliable realms of romance. He will conclude that my research, using the clearest evidence available, provides a sufficiently accurate account considering the antiquity of the events. As for this present war, although men always think that any war they are engaged in is the

greatest of all wars, and then when it is over return to their awe of past conflicts, this war will even so prove itself, to those who examine the pure facts, a greater war than any in previous history.

Of the various speeches made either when war was imminent or in

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the course of the war itself, it has been hard to reproduce the exact words used either when I heard them myself or when they were reported to me by other sources. My method in this book has been to make each speaker say broadly what I supposed would have been needed on any given occasion, while keeping as closely as I could to the overall intent of what was actually said. In recording the events of the war my principle has been not to rely on casual information or my own suppositions, but to apply the greatest possible rigour in pursuing every detail both of what I saw myself and of what I heard from others. It was laborious research, as eyewitnesses on each occasion would give different accounts of the same event, depending on their individual loyalties or memories. It may be that the lack of a romantic element in my history will make it less of a pleasure to the ear: but I shall be content if it is judged useful by those who will want to have a clear understanding of what happened—and, such is the human condition, will happen again at some time in the same or a similar pattern. It was composed as a permanent legacy, not a showpiece for a single hearing.

The most extensive action in previous history was the Persian 23

War: yet even that was brought to a swift conclusion by two battles at sea and two on land. This war far exceeded the Persian War in length, and over its course the suffering that resulted for Greece was unparalleled in such a timescale. Never before were so many cities captured and desolated, some by barbarians, others through internal conflict (and in some a change of population followed their capture); never so many refugees or such slaughter, both in the war itself and as a consequence of civil strife. The phenomena in the old stories, more often told than attested, now became credible fact: earthquakes, which affected large areas with particular intensity; eclipses of the sun, occurring more frequently than in previous memory; major droughts in some parts, followed by famine; and, one of the most destructive causes of widespread death, the infectious plague. All these had their impact along with this war.

The war was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians when they broke the Thirty Years Treaty which they had established after the capture of Euboea. I have set out first the grievances and disputes which led to this breach, so that nobody in future will need to look for the immediate cause which brought such a great war on the Greeks. In my view the real reason, true but unacknowledged, which forced the war was the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fear of it: but the openly proclaimed grievances on either side causing the breach of the treaty and the outbreak of war were as follows.

The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right as you sail up the

Ionian Gulf: it is bordered by the Taulantians, a barbarian people of Illyrian descent. Epidamnus was colonized by the Corcyraeans, though the founder-colonist was a Corinthian, Phalius the son of Eratocleides, of the Heraclid family: as was the old custom, the founder was invited from the original mother-city. A number of other settlers joined from Corinth and the rest of the Dorian peoples.

As time went on Epidamnus grew in power and population: but then, it is said, after many years of internal strife the Epidamnians were destroyed in a war with their barbarian neighbours and lost most of their power. Most recently, just before this great war, the people of Epidamnus drove out the men in political control: these then joined forces with the barbarians and began to attack the city people in raids by land and sea. When the Epidamnians in the city found themselves beleaguered, they sent representatives to Corcyra, as their mother-city, appealing for intervention: Corcyra should not stand by and see them destroyed, but should broker a settlement with the exiled party and put an end to the war waged by the barbarians. They made this appeal sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera: but the Corcyraeans rejected their supplication, and sent them away empty-handed.

When the Epidamnians learnt that they had no support from 25
Corcyra they were uncertain how now to proceed. So they sent to Delphi and enquired of the god whether they should hand over their city to the Corinthians as the ultimate founders, and try to obtain

some support from them. The god's oracular answer was that they should hand over their city and make Corinth their champion. The Epidamnians went to Corinth and handed over the colony as the oracle had instructed. They pointed out that the founder-colonist was from Corinth; they revealed the oracular response; and they appealed for help, asking that Corinth should not stand by and see them destroyed, but rather come to their aid.

The Corinthians undertook to support their cause, partly in assertion of their own rights, taking the view that Epidamnus was as much a Corinthian colony as a Corcyraean, and partly also out of antagonism to the Corcyraeans, resentful that their own colony paid them little regard. In their common festivals Corcyra did not grant the customary privileges to the founder-city or allow, as the other colonies did, a Corinthian to take the first honour at their sacrifices. They looked down on the Corinthians: at that time their wealth compared with that of the richest Greek states; in military resources they were more powerful than Corinth; they would boast of substantial naval superiority, even basing their claim on the nautical fame of the island's original inhabitants, the Phaeacians (this did indeed encourage them to build up their fleet, and they were a substantial force: at the outbreak of the war they had a hundred and twenty triremes).

With all these grievances the Corinthians were glad to send help
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to Epidamnus. They called for volunteer settlers, and raised supporting troops from Ambracia, Leucas, and Corinth itself. This

force made its way on foot to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, deterred from the sea passage by fear of a Corcyraean interception.

When the Corcyraeans learnt of the arrival of settlers and troops at Epidamnus, and the handover of the colony to Corinth, their reaction was angry. They immediately set sail with twenty-five ships, and another fleet soon after. In the most abusive terms they demanded that the Epidamnians should both reinstate the men driven into exile (these exiles had come to Corcyra, pointing out their ancestral tombs and advancing the claim of kinship in their appeal for restoration) and also dismiss the new settlers and the troops sent by the Corinthians.

The Epidamnians rejected these demands, and the Corcyraeans then began operations against them with forty ships: with them were the exiles they intended to restore, and they had also recruited the Illyrians to the cause. They took up position in front of the city, and proclaimed an amnesty allowing any Epidamnian who so wished and all foreigners to leave the city unharmed: if they did not leave, they would be treated as enemies. There was no response, and so the Corcyraeans began a siege of the city—it lies on an isthmus.

When messengers from Epidamnus reached Corinth with the 27 news that their city was under siege, the Corinthians made preparations for an expeditionary force. At the same time they announced a new colony at Epidamnus, with equal rights and shares for all volunteers: those unwilling to join the immediate convoy

could still, if they wished, reserve a share in the colony and stay behind, on payment of a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmas. There were many ready to sail at once: many too paying the deposit. They asked the Megarians to join them with escort ships, in case the Corcyraeans tried to block the convoy. Megara fitted out an escort of eight ships, and Pale in Cephallenia a further four. Similar requests were made of others: Epidaurus provided five ships, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. They asked the Thebans and Phliasians for money, and the Eleans for unmanned ships as well as money. The Corinthians themselves equipped a fleet of thirty ships, and three thousand hoplites.

When the Corcyraeans learnt of these preparations, they came to Corinth with spokesmen from Sparta and Sicyon in support, demanding that the Corinthians should withdraw their troops and settlers from Epidamnus, as they had no claim on Epidamnus. Should Corinth dispute this, they were prepared to refer the matter for arbitration by Peloponnesian cities acceptable to both parties, and the colony would belong to whichever side the arbitrators decided. They were also prepared to entrust judgement to the oracle at Delphi. But they cautioned Corinth not to start a war: otherwise, they said, with Corinth forcing the issue they themselves would be obliged in their own best interest to go beyond their present alliances and make friends where they would rather not.

The Corinthians replied that they would hold discussions if the Corcyraeans withdrew their ships and the barbarian forces from

Epidamnus: before that it made no sense to go to arbitration with the city still under siege.

The Corcyraeans countered by saying that they would do this if the Corinthians too would withdraw their presence in Epidamnus.

Alternatively, they were willing for both sides to remain in position, with a truce declared pending the result of arbitration.

The Corinthians rejected all these proposals. By now their 29 ships were manned and their allies ready, so they sent in advance a herald to declare war on the Corcyraeans, then set off and sailed for Epidamnus with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites to confront them in battle. The commanders of the fleet were Aristeus the son of Pellichus, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes. In command of the land force were Archetimus the son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

When they had reached Actium in Anactorian territory at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, where there is the temple of Apollo, the Corcyraeans sent over a herald in a small boat with the warning not to sail on against them. At the same time the Corcyraeans were manning their ships: they had braced the old ships to make them seaworthy and fitted out the others. As the herald reported no peaceful intent on the part of the Corinthians, and by then their ships were fully crewed—eighty of them in all (a further forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus)—they sailed out for battle, formed line, and engaged. The result was a decisive victory for the Corcyraeans, with fifteen Corinthian ships destroyed. It so happened

that on the same day the forces besieging Epidamnus brought the city to surrender. The terms agreed were that the recent arrivals should be sold as slaves, and the Corinthians among them held in prison until a further decision was taken.

After the battle the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leucimme, ³⁰ promontory of Corcyra, and executed all the captives they had taken, apart from the Corinthians: they were kept imprisoned.

When the Corinthians and their allies returned home after their naval defeat, they left Corcyra in complete control of the sea in that area: and the Corcyraeans did send a fleet to Leucas which laid waste some of the land in this Corinthian colony, and they set fire to the Eleans' dockyard at Cyllene, as they had supplied ships and money to the Corinthians. So for most of the time after the sea-battle the Corcyraeans, controlling the sea as they did, kept up destructive attacks on the allies of Corinth. These lasted until the beginning of the next summer, when the Corinthians, in response to complaints from their allies, sent out a fleet and troops and took up positions at Actium and around Cheimerium in Thesprotia, for the protection of Leucas and the other states friendly to them. The Corcyraeans took up an opposing position at Leucimme with ships and land forces. Neither fleet made any attack, but they stayed there watching each other throughout this summer, and it was only at the onset of winter that both sides went back home.

There was anger at Corinth over the war with Corcyra. For the ³¹

whole of the year following the sea-battle, and the year after that, the Corinthians were building ships and making preparations for the strongest possible navy, buying in crews of rowers both from the Peloponnese and from the rest of Greece. News of these preparations alarmed the Corcyraeans. They had no defensive treaty with any other Greek state, and had not enrolled themselves in either the Athenian or the Spartan alliance. They decided therefore to approach the Athenians, to join their alliance and try to secure some assistance from Athens. When the Corinthians learnt of this they too came to Athens to present their case: their fear was that a combination of Athenian and Corcyraean naval power would prevent them from bringing the war to the outcome they desired. An assembly was convened, and the cases argued. The Corcyraeans spoke first, as follows:

‘Men of Athens, it is only right that those who come to others 32 asking for their help, as we do now, with no record of major service rendered or existing alliance on which to base their claim, should demonstrate firstly that what they ask is in fact to the others’ benefit (or at least not to their harm), and secondly that there will be gratitude expressed in concrete form. If they do not convince on either count, they should not resent the failure of their appeal. The people of Corcyra have sent us here in the confidence that in asking for your alliance they can also offer you firm assurances on both these issues.

‘Our past policy has proved doubly unfortunate—inconsistent towards you when we now have need of your support, and against our own interests in our present situation. Having never yet in any previous time made deliberate alliances with anyone, we are now here to ask for outside help as this very policy has left us isolated in our present war with Corinth. What we once thought of as prudent self-containment—not exposing ourselves through any external alliance to the risks of others’ policies—has now proved our mistake and our weakness. Yes, we did defeat the Corinthians unaided in the last battle. But now that they are poised to attack us with greater resources drawn from the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we can see no possibility of surviving that attack with only our own forces (but can see the depth of our plight if we go under), we are obliged to ask for assistance, from you or anyone else: and we trust you will understand that this is no faint-heartedness, but rather the acknowledgement of a mistaken policy which emboldens us to go counter to our previous isolationism.

‘If you accept our case it will prove a good opportunity for you³³ in many ways to your advantage. First, you will be giving aid to an injured party, not an aggressor; then, in welcoming a people in extreme danger you will establish a debt of gratitude which, more than any other, will be paid in everlasting remembrance; and we have a navy second in size only to yours. And consider this. Could there be any benefit more extraordinary (or less welcome to your enemies) than to have a power which you would have paid much,

and gratefully, to gain on your side offering itself to you voluntarily, without risk or expense? Moreover, this would bring you the admiration of most other people, the gratitude of those you will be helping, and an increase in your own strength. Few indeed, in the whole of history, are those who have been presented with all these opportunities at one and the same time: few too the requests for alliance when the postulants come to the state whose help they ask offering as much security and prestige as they will receive.

‘We would be useful to you in war. And if any among you do not think that war is coming, they are deceiving themselves. They do not see that fear of your power is fuelling Spartan desire for war, or that the Corinthians, influential in Sparta and hostile to you, are intent on crushing us now with a view to a subsequent attack on you. The Corinthians do not want us to come together in a common stance of hostility to them, nor do they want to lose the advantage they could gain one way or the other—either destroying us or taking over our forces to bolster their own. Our task on this side is to forestall them with our offer and your acceptance of this alliance: then our counter to them can be proactive rather than reactive.

‘If the Corinthians say that you have no right to extend a welcome

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to their own colonists, they need to understand that any colony well treated will honour its mother-city, but a colony wronged will look elsewhere. Colonists are sent out on the basis of equality with their fellows left at home, not in subservience to them. That Corinth

wronged us is clear. They were invited to arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus, but determined to pursue their complaints by war rather than fair dealing. And this—the way they behave to us, their own kinsmen—should be a warning to you not to be seduced by their duplicity or give an immediate ear to their demands.

Concessions to one's opponents lead to regret: and the fewer regrets, the safer the future.

‘A further point is that in accepting us you will not be breaking the

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treaty with the Spartans. We are not allied to either side: and the treaty states that any Greek city with no alliance elsewhere is free to join whichever side it wishes. It is monstrous if the Corinthians are to be allowed to crew their ships not only from their allies but also from the rest of Greece and not least from your own subjects, and yet will block us from the alliance which is open to us and from help in any other quarter, then claiming it a crime if you accede to our request. In fact it is we who will have the far greater cause for complaint, if we fail to persuade you. We are in danger, we are not enemies of yours, and in rejecting us you will not only be failing to stop those who are your enemies and the aggressors, but also acquiescing in their build-up of power from your own empire. This is not right. You should either put a stop to their recruitment of mercenaries from states in your control, or give us too whatever help you can be persuaded to send: better still to aid our cause by accepting us in open alliance.

‘As we suggested at the beginning, we can point to much that serves your own interests. The greatest consideration, and the surest guarantee of our loyalty, is that you and we have the same enemies, and powerful enemies too, quite capable of crushing defectors. And when the alliance offered you is with a naval rather than a land power, the consequences of refusal are quite different. Your ideal, if that were possible, would be to prevent anyone else acquiring a navy: failing that, your best course is to make friends with the strongest other naval power.

‘Some of you will recognize the advantages of which we speak,³⁶ but still fear that acceptance of our case will break the treaty. Such among you should realize that, when you have the added power of an alliance with us, what to you is an anxiety will be a greater source of fear to your enemies, whereas any boldness you might show in refusing our offer will in fact weaken you and make you less of a threat to a strong enemy. You should bear in mind too that your decision affects Athens as much as Corcyra. When all immediate thoughts are on the coming war—a war which is virtually on us now—it is no foresight for Athens’ best interests to dither over welcoming to your side a country whose friendship or hostility is fraught with consequence. Corcyra lies nicely on the route of the coastal voyage to Italy and Sicily, in a situation to prevent any fleet from there reaching the Peloponnese and to block any convoys in the reverse direction. And there are other major advantages as well.

‘To give the briefest summary of the main thrust and the detail of our case, this is what should convince you not to abandon us. There are three significant navies in Greece: yours, ours, and the Corinthians’. If you stand aside to see two of these amalgamated when Corinth takes pre-emptive control of us, you will find yourselves fighting the combined fleets of Corcyra and the Peloponnese. If you accept us, you will enter the contest with our ships added to your own.’

Such was the speech of the Corcyraeans. After them the Corinthians spoke as follows:

‘The speech of the Corcyraeans here was not confined to the question

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of your acceptance of their offered alliance, but they also alleged that we are the aggressors and they the victims of an unjust war. Before we move on to our main argument, then, we too must address these two points, to establish beyond doubt in your minds the basis of what we ask from you, and to give you good reason to reject the Corcyraean demand.

‘They speak of “prudent self-containment” as the reason for never yet accepting an alliance with others. In truth, the motives for this policy were more sinister than virtuous: they did not want any ally as witness of their crimes, or to embarrass them if called in aid. Moreover the geographical independence of their location, such that the volume of incoming traffic obliged to put in at Corcyra is much greater than their own commerce with their neighbours, allows

them to be their own judges in any criminal action rather than submitting to arbitration under treaties. This specious neutrality of theirs is no wish to avoid implication in the misdeeds of others, but rather a pretext for their own unimpeded misdoing—violence where they have the power, cheating if they can get away with it, no shame at any advantage gained. Yet if they were the honourable folk they claim to be, their very immunity to outside influence would have enabled them to give the clearest demonstration of their honesty by inviting the give and take of judicial arbitration.

‘But they are not honourable either to others or to us. They are
our

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own colonists, but always estranged and now at war with us. They say that they were not sent out to Corcyra to suffer ill-treatment: and we for our part say that we did not settle them there to be abused by them, but to retain our leadership and their proper respect. Certainly our other colonies show us due honour, and Corinth is held in greater affection by her colonists than any other city. Clearly, then, if the majority are satisfied with us, Corcyra can have no good cause for its unique dissatisfaction: it is clear too that we are not now campaigning against them without reason, without some signal injustice done to us. Even supposing we were at fault, the proper course for them was to concede our anger, and then it would have been wrong for us to answer their conciliation with force. But in their arrogance and the licence they take from their wealth they have constantly offended us, and most particularly over

Epidamnus, which is our colony. When it was in trouble they exercised no claim to it, but as soon as we came in support they took it by force and hold it still.

‘They say of course that they were willing in the first place to go to arbitration. But arbitration proposed when you have the upper hand and a secure position is an empty pretence: such proposals should be made before hostilities begin, when you can assimilate what you do to what you say. No word of this from the Corcyraeans before they laid siege to Epidamnus: it was only when they realized our likely involvement that they put forward this specious talk of arbitration. They are come here now, culprits themselves in Epidamnus, asking you not so much for an alliance as for complicity in their crimes, and to accept them when they are in dispute with us. They should have approached you when they were at their most secure, not now when we have been wronged and they are in danger, when any help you grant will not be in requital for any previous share of their power, when you took no part in their offences but in our eyes will be held equally responsible. They should have joined their forces with you from the start if they want you to join in the consequences.

‘So far we have shown both that we are here before you with genuine grievances and that the Corcyraeans are violent and grasping: now we should explain why you would be wrong to accept them. Although the treaty does make provision for any non-signatory state to join whichever side it wishes, this article of

agreement is not there for those whose purpose in alliance is the injury of other states, but for those looking for security who will not be defecting from others, nor likely to bring their sponsors (if they think about it carefully) war rather than peace: and this could now be the consequence for you, if you do not heed what we say. In giving aid to them you would also change your relations with us from treaty partners to enemies: if you join with them we shall be forced to include you in our counter-attack.

‘Yet the right course for you is either, and preferably, to take a neutral stance, or else to join us against them instead. You are after all treaty partners with Corinth, but have never had any relations, not even a truce, with Corcyra. And you should not establish the precedent of accepting defectors from other alliances. Neither did we. When the Samians revolted from you we cast our vote in your favour. The other Peloponnesian states were divided on the issue of support for Samos, but we made our opposition plain, arguing the right of the individual state to bring its own allies under control. If you accept and champion malefactors, you will find just as many of your own side coming over to us, and the precedent you set will be more to your detriment than to ours.

‘These then are the claims of right which we present to you, and⁴¹ according to the accepted Greek norms they are sufficient for our case. Our relations with you are neither hostile to the point of aggression nor friendly enough for easy dealing, but we would add this advisory claim on your gratitude and propose that now is the

time for its repayment. When you were short of warships for your war against Aegina, before the Persian invasion, Corinth let you have twenty ships. This service rendered to you, followed by the service we gave over Samos in preventing Peloponnesian aid to the island, gave you the conquest of Aegina and the crushing of the Samian revolt. And this support was given at those critical times when people intent on their enemies are most oblivious of all considerations other than victory: at these times any helper is considered a friend, even if he was an enemy before, and any contrary view, even from friends, is taken as hostility, when the immediate urge to win displaces familiar relations.

‘Do reflect on these points. The younger among you should ask⁴² their elders what we are talking about, and then realize that it is only right to repay us with like treatment: they should not think that, although they see justice in our case, their interests lie elsewhere if they are to be at war. Best interests are consequent on fewest errors of judgement: and the war whose alleged imminence the Corcyraeans use to frighten you into immoral action is still far from certain. It is not worth your while to allow this scare to leave you with the open and immediate hostility of Corinth. Better and wiser is to reduce the pre-existing tension caused by your treatment of Megara—a late but timely service, small though it may be, can dispel a greater grievance. Nor should you be seduced by their offer of a great naval alliance: fair treatment of your equals is a surer

guarantee of power than the opportunistic pursuit of some immediate but risky advantage.

‘There is now a reversal of roles. At the congress in Sparta we 43 argued that individual states should have the right to control their own allies, and we now expect you to accord us the same right: our vote helped you then, and your vote should not harm us now. Give us in fairness what we gave you, recognizing that this is one of those critical times when help is friendship and opposition is enmity. Do not ignore our claims and accept these Corcyraeans as allies, and do not assist them in their crimes. To do as we ask is both the right course of action and the best policy in your own interests.’

Such was the speech of the Corinthians in their turn. The Athenians 44

listened to both sides and held two assemblies. At the first assembly the Corinthians’ arguments won at least equal favour, but on the next day opinion swung to an alliance with Corcyra: not a full offensive and defensive alliance (which would cause a breach of their treaty with the Peloponnesians, if the Corcyraeans required them to join a naval attack on Corinth), but they did make a purely defensive alliance providing for reciprocal help if any attack was made on Corcyra or Athens or the allies of either. Their thinking was that they would face war with the Peloponnesians in any case, and they did not want Corcyra and its powerful navy to pass to Corinth: rather, they intended to engineer as far as possible a full

collision between the two sides, so that, if the need came, they would enter the war with both Corinth and the other naval powers weakened. At the same time they thought that the island of Corcyra lay nicely on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.

With such thoughts in mind the Athenians concluded an alliance⁴⁵ with the Corcyraeans, and, shortly after the Corinthians had left, sent a squadron of ten ships to support Corcyra, under the command of Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. Their instructions were not to engage with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra and were about to land on Corcyra itself or any territory belonging to it: in that case they should do what they could to prevent them. The purpose of these instructions was to avoid a breach of the treaty.

So these ships arrived at Corcyra, and when the Corinthians had⁴⁶ completed their own preparations they sailed for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these ten came from Elis, twelve from Megara, ten from Leucas, seventeen from Ambracia, and one from Anactorium: Corinth itself sent ninety ships. Each contributory state had its own commander, and the Corinthian contingent was commanded by Xenocleides the son of Euthycles, together with four others.

Sailing on from Leucas the fleet reached the mainland opposite Corcyra, anchoring at Cheimerium in Thesprotia. There is a harbour, and above it, lying some way from the sea, is the town of

Ephyre in the Elaeian district of Thesprotia. Near Ephyre the Acherousian lake discharges into the sea: it takes its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotia and feeds this lake. The other river is the Thyamis, which forms the border between Thesprotia and Cestrine. The promontory of Cheimerium juts out between these rivers. It was here that the Corinthians anchored off the mainland and made their encampment.

When the Corcyraeans learnt of the approach of the Corinthian⁴⁷ fleet, they manned a hundred and ten ships, under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and made camp on one of the pair of islands called Sybota. The ten Athenian ships were with them. Their land forces were positioned on the promontory of Leucimne, with the reinforcement of a thousand hoplites from Zacynthus. The Corinthians too on the mainland had a substantial force of support from the barbarians of that area, who have always been friendly to Corinth.

Their preparations complete, the Corinthians took three days' ⁴⁸ provisions on board and put out for battle from Cheimerium at night. As they sailed on through the dawn they caught sight of the Corcyraean fleet already on the high sea and bearing down on them. At sight of each other both sides formed into battle array. The Athenian ships were on the right of the Corcyraean line, which consisted of their own fleet divided into three squadrons, each under the command of one of the three generals. This then was the Corcyraean formation. On the Corinthian side the ships from

Megara and Ambracia occupied the right wing, their other allies were variously ranged in the centre, and the Corinthians themselves took the left wing with their fastest ships, opposite the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. Then, signals given on each side, they engaged and

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began battle, both fleets still employing the old-fashioned and unsophisticated mode of naval warfare, with large numbers of hoplites, archers, and javelin-throwers on deck. The fighting was fierce but far from skilful, more like a land-battle at sea. Whenever they collided in attack, it was difficult to break free for the very number and close crowding of the ships, and any confidence of victory resided more in the hoplites on the decks, who fought a pitched battle across stalled ships. There were no attempts to break through the enemy's line, and the battle owed less to science than to pure courage and physical strength. It was, then, a disorderly engagement with a great deal of confusion all round. The part played in this by the Athenian ships was to come up in support of the Corcyraeans wherever they were under pressure. This was an effective deterrent to the enemy, but the commanders would not take overtly aggressive action for fear of exceeding the mandate they had been given by the Athenians.

The right wing of the Corinthian line came into severe trouble. A squadron of twenty Corcyraean ships routed them, drove them back scattered to the mainland, then sailed right up to their camp, landed, set fire to the empty tents, and plundered the goods they

found. So here, then, the Corinthians and their allies suffered a defeat and the Corcyraeans had the upper hand. But where their own ships were, on the left wing, the Corinthians were having far the better of it, as the Corcyraeans, in any case the smaller fleet, now lacked the twenty ships engaged in the chase to the mainland. Seeing the Corcyraeans in difficulty, the Athenians now began to intervene more openly. At first they held back from any actual ramming: but when a rout was clearly developing as the Corinthians pressed their advantage, it then became a free-for-all with no more distinctions made. And so it came to the point where Corinthians and Athenians were forced to attack each other.

There was indeed a rout. After their victory, instead of towing ⁵⁰ away the hulls of the ships they had disabled, the Corinthians turned to the men in the water, sailing up and down to kill rather than capture. In this process they unwittingly began killing their own friends, not realizing the defeat on the right wing. With so many ships engaged on each side and covering a wide expanse of sea, it was difficult, once battle was joined, to see clearly who was winning and who was losing. This was in fact, in terms of the number of ships deployed, the greatest sea-battle ever fought up till then by Greeks against Greeks.

When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans back towards land, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, managing to bring most of them in to Sybota (this Sybota is an uninhabited harbour in Thesprotia, and it was here that the land army of their

barbarian allies had been positioned in support). This operation completed, the Corinthians re-formed and sailed out once more to attack the Corcyraeans.

For their part the Corcyraeans, fearful of an attempted landing on their own island, put out to meet them with all ships still seaworthy from the first battle and any others they had left: and the Athenian ships were with them.

It was now late in the day, and the paean for attack had already been sung when suddenly the Corinthians began to back water. They had caught sight of the approach of a further twenty Athenian ships, which the Athenians had sent out subsequently in reinforcement of the original ten, fearing (as proved to be the case) that the Corcyraeans would lose and their own ten ships would be insufficient protection.

Seeing these ships in the distance, and supposing that there were yet ⁵¹ more ships from Athens than those in sight, the Corinthians began to withdraw. The direction of their approach kept the Athenian ships invisible for a while to the Corcyraeans, so they were amazed to see the Corinthians backing water: but eventually they were sighted and men called out 'Ships approaching over there!' Then the Corcyraeans too began to turn back: it was already growing dark, and the Corinthian retreat had broken off the action. So the two sides parted, and night stopped battle. The Corcyraeans encamped on Leucimme, and shortly after they had been sighted these twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon the son of

Leagrus and Andocides the son of Leogoras, picked their way through the wrecks and corpses and came up to the camp. It was night, and the Corcyraeans feared they were enemy ships: but then they were recognized, and came to anchor.

On the next day the thirty Athenian ships and all the Corcyraean⁵² ships still seaworthy put out and sailed to the harbour at Sybota where the Corinthians were anchored, to see if they would fight. The Corinthians left shore and ranged their ships in open water, but stayed there without moving. They had no intention of starting battle, when they could see the reinforcement of a fresh fleet from Athens and had many difficulties of their own to contend with—the custody of the prisoners they held on board, and the lack of facilities to repair their ships in such a desolate place. They were yet more exercised by the means of securing their voyage home: they feared that the Athenians would consider the treaty broken by the fact that they had come into conflict, and would block their departure.

So they decided to put some men in a cutter and send it out to⁵³ the Athenians, without a flag of truce, to test the situation. This is what their emissaries said: ‘Athenians, you are at fault in starting a war and breaking the treaty. We are pursuing a grievance against our own enemies, and you have taken arms to stand in our way. If it is your decision to prevent us sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and are thereby breaking the treaty, you should make us here your first prisoners and treat us as enemies.’ That was

their message, and those in the Corcyraean armament who could hear it shouted back 'Take them now and kill them!' The Athenians, though, replied as follows: 'Peloponnesians, we are not starting a war nor are we breaking the treaty. The Corcyraeans here are our allies, and we have come to help them. If you wish to sail anywhere else we offer no hindrance. But if you sail against Corcyra or to any other place in its control, we shall intervene to our best ability.'

With this reply from the Athenians the Corinthians made preparations

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to sail home, and set up a trophy in mainland Sybota. The Corcyraeans for their part salvaged the wrecks of their ships and took up their own dead, all that were carried towards them by the current and a wind which got up in the night and scattered everything far and wide. They then set up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota, claiming victory.

The reasons on each side for claiming the victory and setting up a trophy were as follows. The Corinthians had prevailed in the sea-battle until nightfall, with the result that they were able to bring in their dead and most of the wrecks; they held at least a thousand prisoners; and they had disabled about seventy enemy ships. The Corcyraeans had destroyed some thirty ships; after the arrival of the Athenians they had taken up their own dead and salvaged their wrecks; on the previous day the Corinthians had backed water and retreated from them on sight of the Athenian ships; and after the

Athenians had arrived, the Corinthians would not sail out of Sybota to face them. So both sides considered they had won. 55

In the course of their return journey the Corinthians took Anactorium (at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf) through treachery—Anactorium was a joint Corcyraean and Corinthian foundation. They installed Corinthian settlers there, then left for home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they sold the eight hundred who were slaves, and kept two hundred and fifty others in custody, taking very good care of them, in the hope that when returned to Corcyra they might bring the island over to their side: and in fact most of these prisoners were leading men of influence in the city.

Corcyra, then, had worsted Corinth in this campaign, and the Athenian ships now left the island. This was the first of the grievances the Corinthians had which made for war with Athens: while the treaty was still in force the Athenians had joined Corcyra in naval battle against them.

Immediately after this there arose another dispute contributory⁵⁶ to war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. It was as follows. With Corinthian policy bent on retaliation against them, the Athenians, wary of this antagonism, took precautionary measures in Potidaea, a city on the Pallene peninsula which was a Corinthian colony but now a tribute-paying member of the Athenian alliance. They required the Potidaeans to demolish the wall on the Pallene side, to provide them with hostages, to expel the Corinthian magistrates and refuse in future to accept the annual replacements

sent from Corinth. Their fear was that the combined influence of Perdiccas and the Corinthians might persuade the Potidaeans to revolt, and that this could spark further revolts among their other allies in the Thraceward region.

The Athenians planned these precautions at Potidaea directly 57 after the Corcyra battle. The Corinthians were by then openly hostile, and Perdiccas, the son of Alexander and king of Macedonia, who had previously been a friend and ally, was now turned into an enemy of Athens. The reason for this reversal was that the Athenians had made alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were joined in opposition to him. Alarmed by this, Perdiccas began to negotiate. He sent envoys to Sparta hoping to foster war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, and tried to win over the Corinthians to a Potidaean revolt. He made overtures also to the Thraceward Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans, inciting them to join the revolt. His thought was that if he could make allies of these states which bordered his own, he would be better placed for war with their support.

The Athenians heard of his doings, and were keen to forestall the defection of these states. They were just about to send out against Macedonia a force of thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes and two other generals. They now instructed the commanders of this fleet to take hostages from the Potidaeans, to demolish the wall, and to keep watch on the neighbouring cities to prevent their revolt.

The Potidaeans sent representatives to Athens, hoping to persuade

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the Athenians not to make any change in their relations. They also went to Sparta with Corinthian delegates to lay the ground for support if that were needed. Since long negotiation produced nothing helpful from Athens, since the ships destined for Macedonia were being sent just as much against themselves, and since the Spartan authorities promised that they would invade Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidaea, they seized the opportunity to revolt, making sworn cause with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans.

Now Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and destroy their towns on the coast, and to move inland to Olynthus, making that a single secure centre of population. To those people who abandoned their towns he gave, for the duration of the war with Athens, a part of his own territory to cultivate, in Mygdonia around lake Bolbe. So they demolished their own towns, moved inland, and prepared for war.

When the thirty Athenian ships arrived in the Thraceward region, they found Potidaea and the others already revolted. The commanders took the view that it was impossible with their present forces to undertake simultaneous warfare against Perdiccas and against the areas combined in revolt, so they turned to Macedonia (the original objective of their expedition), established their base, and began a campaign in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, whose army had invaded from the interior.

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With Potidaea revolted and the Athenian ships off Macedonia,
the

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Corinthians now feared for the place and saw this as a crisis which struck at their own interests. They therefore sent out a force of volunteers from Corinth itself and mercenaries from the rest of the Peloponnese, a total of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light troops. In command was Aristeus the son of Adeimantus, who had always been a good friend to the Potidaeans: and his popularity was in most cases the main reason for the Corinthians volunteering to serve in the expedition he would lead. These troops arrived in the Thraceward region forty days after the revolt of Potidaea.

The Athenians too received immediate intelligence of the revolt
of

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these cities. And when they heard also of the relief troops on their way under Aristeus they sent out their own force against the areas in revolt, two thousand hoplites and forty ships under the command of Callias the son of Calliades and four other generals. Their first destination was Macedonia. On arrival they found that the original force of a thousand troops had just taken Therme and was now besieging Pydna. They joined in the investment of Pydna for a while, until the siege was lifted when the Athenians reached an agreement and made an alliance of convenience with Perdiccas, pressed to this by the urgent need to deal with Potidaea and the arrival there of Aristeus.

They left Macedonia, then, and came to Beroea. From there they went on to Strepsa, and after failing in their initial attempt to take the place they proceeded by land to Potidaea. They had three thousand of their own hoplites, and in addition a good number from their allies and six hundred Macedonian cavalry on the side of Philip and Pausanias. The seventy ships kept pace with them along the coast. In short marches they reached Gigonus on the third day, and made their camp there.

Expecting the Athenians, the people of Potidaea and the 62 Peloponnesians under Aristeus had made camp on the Olynthus side of the isthmus and set up a market outside the city to provision the troops. The allies had chosen Aristeus to command all the infantry, and Perdiccas the cavalry (Perdiccas had once again summarily broken with the Athenians and was now siding with Potidaea: he gave the command to Iolaus as his deputy). Aristeus' strategy was to keep his own troops camped on the isthmus in readiness for an Athenian attack, while the Chalcidians, the allies from outside the peninsula, and the two hundred cavalry sent by Perdiccas stayed in Olynthus: then, when the Athenians attacked on the isthmus, these other troops would come in support from the rear, pinning the enemy between two forces. On the other side the Athenian general Callias and his fellow commanders dispatched their Macedonian cavalry and a few allied troops towards Olynthus to block any intervention from there, while they themselves struck camp and marched on Potidaea. When they reached the isthmus and saw the

enemy making preparation for battle, they too formed in battle order and shortly thereafter the engagement began. Aristeus' own wing, where he had with him the pick of the Corinthian and the other troops, routed their immediate opposition and followed up in pursuit for some distance. But the rest of the Potidaean and Peloponnesian army was losing to the Athenians, and took refuge behind the city wall.

When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw the rest of his ⁶³ forces defeated, he faced a difficult choice, with danger either way: should he make a move towards Olynthus, or into Potidaea? In the end he decided to crowd his troops into the smallest possible space and force his way into Potidaea at the run. With difficulty, and under a constant barrage, he succeeded by going alongside the breakwater and through the sea. He lost a few, but brought most of his men through safely.

As for those troops in Olynthus ready to bring reinforcement to the Potidaeans, they set out in support when the signals were raised at the onset of battle (Potidaea is about seven miles distant, and visible from Olynthus). They were just a short way on their march, and the Macedonian cavalry deployed to stop them, when the signals were lowered after the quick Athenian victory. They then returned to the walls of Olynthus, and the Macedonians went back to join the Athenians. There was no cavalry operation on either side.

After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and allowed a truce for the Potidaeans to recover their dead. The casualties on the side of Potidaea and its allies were nearly three hundred. The Athenians themselves lost a hundred and fifty, including their commander Callias.

The Athenians immediately built a wall on the isthmus side of 64 Potidaea and kept it under guard. The south side, facing Pallene, was left without a wall. They did not think they had sufficient numbers to maintain their guard on the isthmus while at the same time crossing over to Pallene to build a wall there. Their fear was that such division of their forces would encourage an attack by the Potidaeans and their allies.

When it was learnt in Athens that the Pallene side was unwalled, some time later the Athenians sent out a force of sixteen hundred of their own hoplites with Phormio the son of Asopius as general in command. On his arrival at Pallene Phormio made his base in Aphytis, then advanced his army on Potidaea in short stages, ravaging the land as he went. And as none came out to oppose him in battle he walled off the city on the Pallene side. So Potidaea was now in the grip of a full siege on both sides, and blockaded too by the Athenian ships offshore.

With the city walled off and no hope of rescue, barring some action

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from the Peloponnese or other unlikely event, Aristeus advised the Potidaeans to evacuate all but five hundred, so that the food would

last longer: the others should watch for the right wind and then escape by sea. He himself volunteered to join the group staying behind. They would not follow his advice: so, intent on taking the measures that were now necessary and establishing the best chance of external support, he slipped past the Athenian guard and sailed away from the city. He remained in the area, helping the Chalcidians prosecute the war. In particular he set an ambush near the town of Sermyle which killed a good number of Sermylans. At the same time he was in contact with the Peloponnese, trying to secure some help.

Meanwhile, after completing the investment of Potidaea, Phormio used his sixteen hundred troops to ravage the land in Chalcidice and Bottice: he also took some of the towns.

These, then, were the grievances thus far existing between the 66 Athenians and the Peloponnesians. The Corinthians complained that the Athenians were blockading their colony Potidaea, with Corinthians and Peloponnesians caught in the siege. The Athenian grievance against the Peloponnesians was that they had incited the revolt of an allied and tributary city, had arrived in open support of the Potidaeans, and were fighting on their side. This, though, was not yet the outbreak of the war, and they were still in a state of truce. Corinth had so far been acting alone.

With Potidaea under siege and some of their own people inside 67 the Corinthians would not let matters rest: they were fearful now of losing the place. They immediately invited the allies to meet at

Sparta, and their own delegation launched an invective against the Athenians, insisting that they had broken the treaty and were committing an offence against the Peloponnese. The Aeginetans did not send envoys openly, for fear of the Athenians, but in secret collaboration with the Corinthians they played a major part in instigating the war, claiming that they had lost the autonomy guaranteed under the treaty. The Spartans extended the invitation to those of their allies and anyone else who alleged mistreatment by the Athenians, and gave them audience at a regular meeting of their own assembly. Several came forward to make their various charges, not least the Megarians: among a good number of other complaints they declared that, in contravention of the treaty, they were being barred from all ports in the Athenian empire and from the Athenian market itself. The Corinthians were the last to come forward. They let the others do the preliminary inciting of the Spartans, then followed with this speech:

‘Spartans, the trust you place in your own constitution and society

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makes you less trusting of others when we have something to say to you. This character of yours may produce the virtue of restraint, but it also leaves you largely ignorant in the way you handle external affairs. Many times we have warned you of the harm we anticipated from the Athenians, and every time you would not learn from the lesson we urged on you, but instead you took the suspicious view that the speakers were simply airing their own grievances, of

interest solely to them. That is why this conference of the allies is too late—you did not invite us before the harm was done, but only when we are in the middle of it. We have as much justification to speak as any of the allies, in that we have the most serious charges to make—aggression from the Athenians, and neglect from you.

‘Yes, if the Athenians were somehow covering up their crimes against Greece, you might not know of them and we would have to instruct you. But as it is there is no need for lengthy exposition: you can see for yourselves that the Athenians have already enslaved some states, with designs now on others (not least our own allies), and that they have long laid preparations for eventual war. Why else would they steal Corcyra and hold it now in defiance of our claims? Why else would they be besieging Potidaea? Potidaea is the crucial base for the control of the Thraceward area, and Corcyra could have brought huge naval power to the Peloponnesians.

‘And you are responsible for all this! First you allowed the Athenians

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to fortify their city after the Persian Wars, and later to build the Long Walls: and to this very day you have continued denying their freedom not only to the states already enslaved by Athens, but now to your own allies also. The true denial of freedom is not that of the enslaving power, but rather that of the people who have the ability to end the subjection but choose to do nothing about it—yet more so if they make a virtue of their reputation as the liberators of Greece.

‘So now we are convened at last, and it was not easy. Even now we have no clear agenda. The time is past for debating whether or not there is aggression against us: the question now is how to resist it. Men of action have their plans laid, and if their opponents are still dithering they move against them without further warning. And we know the Athenians’ way, how they gradually encroach on their neighbours. While they think they can get away with it because of your own lack of attention, they proceed rather cautiously: but once they realize that you know and do not care, they will press on at full strength. The fact is that of all the Greeks you Spartans are the only ones who sit quiet and do nothing, with your defence policy not force but procrastination. You are the only ones who wait for your enemies’ power to double, rather than curbing its initial growth. And yet you used to be called “reliable”—which turned out to be more reputation than fact. We all know that the Persians, coming from the ends of the earth, reached right to the Peloponnese before meeting any opposition worth the name from you: and now you are choosing to ignore the Athenians, who are not some distant enemy like the Persians, but close to home. Rather than take the offensive yourselves, you prefer to defend only when attacked, thus leaving to chance your eventual conflict with an enemy grown much stronger. You are well aware that Xerxes’ failure was largely his own fault, and that with these very Athenians what has saved us so far has been for the most part their own mistakes rather than any support from you. Indeed one could say that the hopes they placed in you have been the ruin of several before now, people who

trusted in your help and made no preparations of their own. And please understand that there is no animosity in what we say to you: it is more by way of remonstrance. People remonstrate with friends who are going wrong: animus is for enemies who have done wrong.

‘Yet at the same time we consider we have as much right as any to

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find fault with our neighbours, especially when there are such profound differences involved, which in our view you do not appreciate. You have never worked out what sort of people these Athenians are who you will have to contend with, how far and how completely they differ from you. They are revolutionaries, quick with new ideas and quick to put their thoughts into action: you are conservatives, keeping things as they are with no initiative and incapable of action even on the bare essentials. Again, they will dare beyond their means, take risks defying judgement, and stay confident in adversity: whereas your way is to act short of your power, diffident even in the strengths of your policy, and convinced that there is no escape from adversity. Further: they are unhesitant, while you are dilatory; they go abroad, while you stay firmly at home. They think that their ventures away from home can bring them gain, whereas your view is that any enterprise risks harm to what you already have. In victory they press their advantage over the enemy as far as they can: in defeat they fall back as little as they must. And although they give their bodies to the service of the city as if they were not their own property, their minds are very

much their own and they cultivate them for the civic benefit they can bring. If they set an aim and fail to achieve it, they take that as a personal loss: if they succeed and make a gain, they regard this as only a minor achievement compared with what comes next. And if they do happen to fail in some attempt, another hope is born to fill the gap. For them, uniquely, in any project hoping and having are the same thing, so quickly does action follow thought. This is their lifelong labour, a constant round of work and risk. They have no time to enjoy what they have as they are always acquiring more. Their only idea of holiday is to do what they have to do. For them the quiet of inactivity is a greater affliction than the burden of business. It would be a fair summary to say that it is in their nature to have no quiet themselves and to deny quiet to others.

‘Yet faced with the opposition of a city such as this, you Spartans⁷¹ are still hanging back. You do not realize that the most lasting peace and quiet is secured by those who use their power only in a just cause, but clearly demonstrate their resolve not to yield to any injustice. Your notion of a balanced policy is to keep out of harm’s way—no provocation of others, and no risk to yourselves even in self-defence. Such a policy would hardly work even with a neighbouring state of like mind: but in the present situation, as we have just pointed out, your ways are old-fashioned compared to the Athenians’. In politics as in technology the new must always prevail over the old. The established traditions may be best in a settled society, but when there is much change demanding a response there

must be much innovative thinking also. This is where the Athenians have great experience, and why their systems have undergone more reform than yours.

‘So you have been slow long enough: let us here and now have an end of it. To support your allies and especially to redeem your promise to the Potidaeans you must now make all speed to invade Attica. Otherwise you will be abandoning friends and kinsmen to their worst enemies, and forcing the rest of us to turn in desperation to some other alliance. And if we did this it would be no offence in the eyes of the gods who witnessed our oaths or of men who see how things are. Treaties are not broken by abandoned parties who apply elsewhere: they are broken by those who will not help their sworn partners. If you are prepared to commit yourselves we shall stay with you. In that case it would not be right for us to change allegiance, and we would not find other friends as compatible as you.

Think carefully, then, and look to be the leaders of a Peloponnese as great as that which you inherited from your fathers.’

Such was the speech of the Corinthians. Now there happened to⁷² be a delegation of Athenians already staying in Sparta, come there on other business. When these delegates heard what the Corinthians were saying, they decided that they too should appear before the Spartans, not to make any specific answer to the charges laid against them by the allied cities, but to show why, in the whole context, they should take more time over their deliberations and not

rush to a decision. At the same time they wanted to indicate the extent of their own city's power, reminding their older listeners of what they already knew and instructing the younger in matters outside their experience. They thought that what they said would be more likely to incline the Spartans to keeping quiet than to starting war. So they approached the Spartans and said that they too would like to address their assembly, if there was no objection. The Spartans invited them to appear, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:

‘Our delegation was not sent here to engage in dispute with your⁷³ allies, but on a separate mission from Athens. Nevertheless we are aware of considerable outcry against us, and we come before you now not to rebut the charges made by your allied cities—neither we nor they have to make forensic speeches as if your assembly were a court of law—but to ensure that you are not too readily influenced by your allies into making a wrong decision on matters of great importance. At the same time, with regard to the general criticism of us now prevalent, we wish to make it clear that the gains we have acquired are rightfully held, and that you need to take account of our city.

‘There is no point in speaking of ancient history, for which the only evidence is stories rather than eyewitness among the audience. But we must make mention of the Persian War and other events within your own experience, even if you find this constant rehearsal tedious. In our actions then we faced those dangers for the common

good. You had your share in the benefit gained, and we should not be denied all reference to it when that can help our cause. What we shall say now is not an attempt at deflection. It is more a matter of the evidence to show you with what sort of city you will find yourselves in conflict, if you do not take the right decision.

‘Our claim is that at Marathon we stood out alone against the barbarians. And when the second invasion came, without sufficient forces to resist on land we took to our ships with our whole citizen body and joined in the battle of Salamis, which prevented the Persians from sailing on against the Peloponnese and destroying it city by city—since you could not have helped each other against that number of ships. The best witness to this is Xerxes himself: once defeated at sea he realized that his power was diminished and quickly retreated with the bulk of his army.

‘That outcome happening as it did clearly demonstrated that the ⁷⁴ fortunes of Greece depended on her navies. And to that outcome we contributed the three most telling factors—the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most fearless determination. We provided nearly two-thirds of the total of four hundred ships, and we provided Themistocles as commander, who was instrumental in ensuring that the battle was fought in the narrows: this without doubt was our salvation, and for this service you gave greater honours to Themistocles than to any other foreigner received in Sparta. As for our determination, this was displayed in the most exceptionally courageous form. When there was no one to

help us by land, when all others right up to our borders were already enslaved, we took the decision to leave our city and sacrifice our homes and possessions, determined that even so we should not abandon the common cause of our remaining allies or fail them by our own dispersal, but should take to our ships and risk the fight—and not resent your failure to support us sooner.

‘We claim, then, that we did you at least as great a service as we received. Your help was given when you feared more for yourselves than for us: certainly there was no sign of you when we were still intact. You came from cities still inhabited and with the aim of ensuring their continued occupation: we set out from a city which no longer existed, and in fighting for its small hope of survival we saved ourselves and took our part in saving you. If we had gone over to the Persians at the beginning, as others did, out of fear for our land, or if later we had thought ourselves done for and had not found the courage to take to our ships, there would have been no point then in your attempting a sea-battle with your inadequate navy, and Xerxes would have gone on to achieve his object at leisure.

‘We put this question to you, Spartans. Given the determination⁷⁵ and decisiveness we showed then, do we not deserve better than to be so violently hated by the Greeks for possessing an empire? We did not acquire this empire by force. It came about because you were not prepared to stay on to deal with the remnants of Persian power, and the allies approached us of their own accord and asked

us to become their leaders. The very fact of this hegemony was the initial spur to the expansion of the empire to its present extent: the motives driving us were, first and foremost, fear, then prestige, and later our own interests. There came a time when we realized that we could not safely run the risk of letting it go: most of our allies had come to hate us; some had already revolted and been subdued; your relations with us were no longer as friendly as they had been, but had turned to suspicion and grievance; and of course any of our subjects defecting from us would go over to you. No one can be blamed for looking after their own best interests when the stakes are so high.

‘Certainly you Spartans have ensured that the Peloponnesian 76 cities in your own hegemony are governed to suit your interest. And we have no doubt that if at that time you had stayed on in command long enough to be resented, as we did and were, you would have become just as burdensome to the allies and would have been forced to rule harshly or risk your own security. So too we have done nothing surprising or contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and refusing to give it up, under the domination of the three most powerful motives—prestige, fear, and self-interest. Nor again did we start anything new in this, but it has always been the way of the world that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And we think we are worthy of our power. There was a time when you thought so too, but now you calculate your own advantage and talk of right and wrong—a

consideration which has never yet deterred anyone from using force to make a gain when opportunity presents. It is something worthy of credit when men who follow the natural instinct to rule others then show more justice than they need to in their position of strength. Certainly if others were to take our place we think it would become abundantly clear how moderate we are. But with us our very fairness has unfairly been turned more to criticism than to credit.

‘For example, finding ourselves disadvantaged against our allies in

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lawsuits regulated by treaty, we transferred judgement in such cases to Athens under our own impartial laws—and this is viewed as an addiction to litigation. None of our critics enquires why this charge is not laid against other imperial powers elsewhere whose treatment of their subjects is less moderate than ours. The reason is that those who can get their way by force have no need for the process of law. Our subjects, on the other hand, are accustomed to dealing with us on equal terms, so if any decision or exercise of our ruling power brings them even the slightest disadvantage compared to what they consider their rights, they are not grateful for the limitation of their loss but resent the shortfall yet more than if we had abandoned law and were openly exploiting them. Were that the case even they would not dispute that the weaker must give way to the strong. It seems that men are more angered by injustice than by enforcement: they see the one as advantage taken by an equal, the other as the

compulsion of a superior. They had put up with worse treatment under the Persians, and now they regard our rule as oppressive. That is as expected: the present is always the hard time for those subject to others. But without doubt if you were to remove us and make your own empire, you would quickly lose the good will you have gained through others' fear of us, especially if you show the same attitude as you did earlier in your brief command against the Persians. Your own norms are incompatible with those of the outside world: and further, when any of you goes abroad he ignores both your own standards and those observed by the rest of Greece.

‘Be slow, then, in reaching a decision: these are matters of 78
great importance. And do not let other people's opinions and complaints persuade you to incur troubles of your own. Give thought now to all the incalculable elements of war before you find yourselves in it. When war is prolonged it tends to become largely a matter of chance, in which we are both equally far from control and both face the danger of an uncertain outcome. And as they enter on their wars men take to action first, which should come later, and only have recourse to words when things go badly for them. Neither we nor you, as far as we can see, are in any danger yet of this mistake. So we urge you now, while we both still have the freedom to make the best decisions, not to break the treaty or contravene your oaths, but to let our differences be resolved by arbitration under the agreement. Otherwise we shall call in witness the gods by whom you swore, and hold you responsible for starting the war. We

shall do our best to defend ourselves by matching any offensive you may launch.'

Such was the speech of the Athenians. When the Spartans had 79 heard the allies' charges against the Athenians and the Athenians' response, they required all other parties to withdraw and debated the situation in closed session. The majority tended to the same view, that the Athenians were already guilty and there should be war at once.

But their king Archidamus, who had a reputation as a man of intelligence and good sense, came forward and spoke as follows:

'Spartans, I am old enough myself to be experienced in many 80 wars, and I see some of you here of the same age: none of them will share the longing for war felt by most who have never known the reality, nor will they think that there is any virtue or security in war. A sober analysis of the war you are now debating will reveal its potential scale. Against other Peloponnesians and our neighbours our forces are of similar type and can quickly reach any area of conflict. But against Athens we face a distant enemy and moreover a people who have outstanding skill at sea and the best resources in every other way—private and public wealth, ships, horses, armament, and a population greater than in any other single Greek territory: and they have as well numerous allies who pay them tribute. Why then should we lightly undertake a war against these people? What could give us the confidence to plunge into it unprepared? Our navy? We are inferior, and to train and build up to

equality will take time. Our finances, then? Here we are yet more deficient, and by some way. There is no money in a common treasury, and we do not readily make contributions from our private means.

‘Some might take comfort in the superior armour and numbers of

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our infantry, so we can regularly invade and ravage their land: but they have much other land in their empire, and will be able to import the supplies they need by sea. Then again if we try for a revolt of their allies, we shall have to extend our naval defence to them too, as most of them are islanders. So what sort of war shall we be fighting? If we can neither defeat them at sea nor stop the revenues which sustain their navy, we shall have the worst of it: and that would not even allow us an honourable peace, especially if we are thought the authors rather than the victims of the dispute. At all events we should not entertain the hope that the war will soon be at an end if we devastate their land. My fear is rather that we shall bequeath this war to our children. Such is the Athenians’ pride, they are not likely to become slaves to their own land or take fright at war as if they were novices.

‘Now I am far from asking you to stand by unconcerned, letting

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them cause harm to our allies and make their designs without fear of detection. My advice is that we should not yet take up arms, but should first send envoys to complain, giving no unambiguous indication either of war or of acquiescence, and in the meantime

make our own preparations. We should look to acquire further allies, Greek or barbarian—wherever they might be—who can supplement our naval or financial resources. Like all others on whom the Athenians have their designs, we cannot be blamed if for our own preservation we bring in help from barbarians as well as Greeks. And at the same time we must build up what we already have. If they pay some heed to our representations, fine and good. If not, in two or three years' time we shall have stronger defences if we then decide to attack them.

‘It may well be that they will be more inclined to hold back when they can see our preparations and a diplomatic policy giving the same signals, when their land is still intact and their decision is made in the enjoyment of their present prosperity, rather than after its destruction. You must look on their land simply as a hostage, the more valuable for the care with which it is cultivated: you should spare it for as long as possible, and not stiffen their resistance by driving them to desperation. If we are pressured by our allies' complaints into ravaging Attica before we are ready, you must consider the potential shame and difficulty for the Peloponnese. Complaints can be resolved, whether they are made by cities or by individuals: but a war undertaken by a whole confederacy in pursuit of individual grievances, with the outcome impossible to tell, cannot easily be settled on honourable terms.

‘And no one should think it any lack of courage if many confederate

states are slow to attack a single city. They too have just as many allies, and their allies bring them revenue: and war is not so much a matter of armament as of the finance which gives effect to that armament, especially when a land power meets a sea power. So let us first see to our finances, and not be carried away in advance of that by our allies' arguments. We shall bear most of the responsibility for the outcome either way, good or ill, so we should take our time over a calm review of the prospects.

'The slowness and delay for which they like to blame us are nothing

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to be ashamed of. If you were to go to war unprepared, a hasty start could mean a drawn-out finish. And the city which we administer has always been free and always held in high regard: so this very slowness could well be called intelligent restraint. This quality has kept us, uniquely, from arrogance in success and from the surrender which others make to adversity. We are not seduced by the pleasant flattery of those who urge us to dangerous action against our judgement, and if anyone tries to provoke us with accusations, this is no more successful—we are not goaded into agreement. Our discipline makes us both brave in war and sensible in policy: brave, because restraint is the greater part of shame, and shame the greater part of courage; sensible, because our tough training leaves us too naive to question the laws and too controlled to disobey them. We are not schooled in that useless over-intelligence which can make a brilliant verbal attack on the

enemies' plans but fail to match it in consequent action. Rather we are taught to believe that other people's minds are similar to ours, and that no theory can determine the accidents of chance. It is always our principle to make practical plans on the assumption of an intelligent enemy, and not to let our hopes reside in the likelihood of his mistakes, but in the security of our own precautions. We do not need to suppose that men differ greatly one from another, but we can think that the strongest are those brought up in the hardest school.

‘These then are the practices which our fathers handed down to us

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and which we still maintain to our constant benefit. Let us not abandon them, or be rushed in the brief space of one day to a decision affecting many lives, much expenditure, many cities, and our own reputation. We must be calm about it: and we can afford that, more than the others, because of our strength. And now you should send envoys to Athens to make representations about Potidaea, representations too about the wrongs alleged by our allies. This is the more important in that they have said they are willing to go to arbitration, and when such an offer is given it is not lawful to proceed pre-emptively as if guilt were already established. At the same time you should prepare for war. What I advise will be the best policy in your own interests and also the most intimidating to your enemies.’

Such was the speech of Archidamus. Then finally Sthenelaïdas, one of the ephors at that time, came forward and spoke as follows:

‘I cannot understand all this talk from the Athenians. They spent⁸⁶ a lot of time blowing their own trumpet, but nowhere answered the charge of doing wrong to our allies and the Peloponnese. They may have acquitted themselves well against the Persians in the past, but, if they are now behaving badly to us, they deserve a double penalty for turning from good to bad. But we are the same now as we were then, and if we have any sense we shall not ignore the wrong done to our allies or delay the punishment—they can hardly delay their suffering. Others may have an abundance of money, ships, and horses: but we have good allies who must not be abandoned to the Athenians.

We must not leave it to arguments in law courts to deal with injuries which are unarguably happening. We must punish now, quickly and in full strength. And let no one try to tell us that when we are wronged we should stop to think about it—it is more the intending wrongdoers who should think hard. So, Spartans, vote for war and for the honour of Sparta. Do not allow the Athenians to grow stronger. Let us not abandon our allies, but with the gods’ help let us go out and attack the guilty.’

After this speech he himself, in his capacity as ephor, put the⁸⁷ question to the Spartan assembly. Their decisions are made by acclamation rather than vote, and Sthenelaïdas claimed that he could not tell which side had the louder shout. With the intention of

promoting the cause of war by making them show their opinions overtly, he said to the Spartans: 'Those of you who think that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are guilty should stand up and move over here' (pointing to a particular area), 'and those who think otherwise should move over there.' So they stood up and divided, and there was a great majority on the side of those who thought that the treaty had been broken.

The Spartans then recalled the allies to the assembly and told them that they had decided the Athenians were guilty, and that they wanted to call a full conference of all their allies and put it to the vote, so that war, if approved, would be undertaken with common consent. This accomplished, the allies returned home, and the Athenian envoys went back later when their specific mission was completed.

This resolution of the Spartan assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the duration of the Thirty Years Treaty established after the affair of Euboea.

In voting for war on the grounds of breach of the treaty the Spartans

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were not so much influenced by the arguments of their allies as by their fear of increasing Athenian power, when they could see much of Greece already subject to Athens.

There follows now an account of how the Athenians reached

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the position of such growth. When the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated by the Greeks at sea and on land, and the remnants who fled in their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychidas, the Spartan king, who had been in command of the Greeks at Mycale, returned home together with the allies from the Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had now revolted from the King of Persia stayed on and began a siege of Sestos, then still in Persian hands. They overwintered there and finally took the town when the barbarians abandoned it: after that the allies sailed back from the Hellespont to their own homes.

Meanwhile the Athenian people, rid now of the barbarian occupation of their land, immediately began to bring back their children and women and their remaining goods from their places of safe keeping, and set about the rebuilding of the city and its walls. Only a small part of the circuit wall still stood, and most of the houses were in ruins: the few intact houses were those in which the Persian high command had been quartered.

The Spartans could see what was coming, and arrived at Athens⁹⁰ with a delegation. They themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else in possession of fortifications, but they were mainly spurred by the insistence of their allies who were alarmed at the much increased size of the Athenian navy and the bold approach they had taken to the Persian War. The Spartan request was that the Athenians should not fortify their own city, but

should actually join with them in demolishing any city walls still standing outside the Peloponnese. In making this proposal to the Athenians the Spartans concealed the mistrust which was their real motive, arguing instead that if the Persians returned to the attack there would then be no fortified place which they could take as their headquarters, as they had recently done at Thebes: the Peloponnese, they said, could sufficiently provide both a refuge and a base of operations for all of Greece. On the advice of Themistocles, the Athenians managed to get rid of the Spartans and their proposal by replying that they would send delegates to Sparta to discuss the issues raised. Themistocles then recommended that they should send him to Sparta at once, and elect other delegates to join him: these should not leave immediately, but should wait for as long as it took to build the wall up to the minimum defensible height. The whole population in Athens at the time—men, women, and children—should set to work on the wall, sparing no private or public building which would help the construction, but demolishing them all.

So with these instructions given, and intimating that he himself would deal with all other business there, Themistocles set off for Sparta. On his arrival he did not present himself to the authorities, but kept delaying and making excuses. Whenever any official asked him why he was not appearing before the assembly, he said that he was waiting for his fellow delegates: some other business had detained them, but he expected them very shortly and was surprised that they had not yet arrived.

Their friendship for Themistocles led the Spartan authorities to⁹¹ believe what he told them, but as others kept arriving with clear statements that the wall was under construction and already reaching a good height, they could not discount this evidence. Aware of this, Themistocles proposed that rather than allowing the influence of hearsay they should send out some of their own worthies to see for themselves and bring back a reliable report. So this they did, and Themistocles sent a secret message to the Athenians about these envoys, telling them to detain them as unobtrusively as possible and not let them leave until he and his party were back in Athens: by now his fellow delegates, Habronichus the son of Lysicles and Aristeides the son of Lysimachus, had arrived with the news that the wall was in a sufficient state. His fear was that when they learnt the truth the Spartans might then refuse to let them go.

So the Athenians, as instructed, detained the envoys, and Themistocles now finally came before the Spartans and openly declared that Athens was by now sufficiently fortified for the safety of its own inhabitants, and that if the Spartans or their allies wished to make any representations in the future, they should come on the understanding that the Athenians took a clear view both of their own interests and of the common good. Themistocles and his colleagues pointed out that when they had seen fit to abandon their city and take to their ships, this bold decision was taken without reference to the Spartans, and in all subsequent joint deliberation

their advice had proved second to none. So now too they saw fit that their city should have a wall, for the greater benefit of their own citizens and the allies at large. An equal and fair contribution to decisions on common policy could only be made from a position of equal strength. So either, said Themistocles, the whole alliance should lose their walls, or the Athenian action should be approved.

On hearing this the Spartans showed no open anger against the⁹² Athenians. The ostensible purpose of their original embassy had not been to limit Athens, but to suggest a policy for the common good: and besides they were then on particularly friendly terms in view of the Athenians' determined stand against the Persians. Nevertheless, without showing it, they were vexed at the failure of their plan. The delegates from both sides left for home with no complaints made.

So this was how the Athenians walled their city in short time. To⁹³ this day the signs of hasty construction can be seen. The foundations are laid with all sorts of stones, some of them unsquared and placed just as they came in, and mixed among them are many gravestones and other pieces of sculpture. The circuit of the city wall was enlarged in all directions, and in their rush to complete it no building was spared demolition.

Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the building of the Peiraeus, on which a start had been made earlier, in his year of office as archon. He could see the virtue of the place, with its three natural harbours, and realized that becoming a seafaring nation was the key to the acquisition of power. He had been the

first to advance the proposal that the Athenians should take to the sea: and now he was quick to help lay the foundations of empire.

On his advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus to the thickness which one can still see. It was wide enough for two wagons bringing up the stones from opposite directions to pass each other. The interior of the wall was not rubble or clay, but the whole structure was made of large blocks of stone cut and squared, with clamps of iron and lead on the outer faces. The completed height was about half of what Themistocles intended. His plan was to frustrate any enemy designs by the size and thickness of the wall, which he thought could be adequately defended by a small number of those unsuited for other service, while the rest would man the fleet. His particular concentration on the navy had its origin, I think, in his perception that the King's forces found it easier to attack by sea than by land. He considered the Peiraeus more important than the upper city, and he would often advise the Athenians that if they were ever hard pressed on land they should go down to the Peiraeus and take on the world with their ships.

This then was the way in which the Athenians built their walls and took all other measures immediately after the Persian withdrawal.

Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent out from Sparta⁹⁴ as commander of the Greek forces, with twenty ships from the Peloponnese: the expedition was joined by the Athenians with thirty ships, and a good number of the other allies. They first campaigned

against Cyprus, and subdued most of the island. Next they turned to Byzantium, then in Persian control, and forced its capitulation. This was still when Pausanias was in command.

But Pausanias was already showing an oppressive tendency which

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the Greeks resented, especially the Ionians and all others recently liberated from the King of Persia. These came one after the other to the Athenians, asking them out of kinship to become their leaders and put a stop to any oppression from Pausanias. The Athenians welcomed these approaches, and determined to act on them and generally rearrange matters as they saw best.

Meanwhile the Spartans recalled Pausanias for an inquiry into the reports they had received. Numerous crimes were alleged against him by the Greeks who visited Sparta, and the clear impression was more of a tyranny than a military command. It so happened that his recall came just at the time when their hatred of him caused the allies (except the troops from the Peloponnese) to transfer their allegiance to the Athenians. On his arrival at Sparta he was punished for personal crimes against individuals, but acquitted of the major charges: the main accusation against him was collaboration with the Persians, for which there was thought very clear evidence. The Spartans did not continue his command, but in his place sent out Dorcis and a few colleagues with a small force. The allies would not now accept their leadership. Seeing how things were, Dorcis and his colleagues left for home and the Spartans

thereafter sent out no further commanders, fearing that any who did go out would become corrupted, as they had seen in the case of Pausanias. And they wanted to be rid of involvement in the Persian War. They thought the Athenians fully capable of taking the lead, and believed them well disposed towards Sparta at that time.

In this way the Athenians took over the hegemony, with the willing

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agreement of the allies prompted by their hatred of Pausanias. They then determined which of the cities should provide money and which should provide ships in furtherance of the war against the barbarians: the ostensible purpose was to retaliate for their own losses by ravaging the King's territory. It was now that there was first instituted at Athens the office of 'Treasurers to the Greeks', with responsibility for receiving the tribute (this was the term given to the contributions in money). The original tribute was assessed at four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was the island of Delos, and the meetings of the allies took place in the temple there.

At first the Athenians were the leaders of autonomous allies who⁹⁷ met together to make their policy in common. But in the period intervening between the Persian War and this war there was huge Athenian activity in the prosecution of war and the management of political affairs, activity undertaken against the barbarians, against their own rebellious allies, and against any Peloponnesian state which crossed their path at any time in their various ventures. I have written the following account and made this excursus because

all of my predecessors have omitted this period: their histories are either of the Greek world before the Persian invasion or of the Persian War itself. The only one to touch on this subject is Hellanicus in his *History of Athens*, but his treatment is brief and the chronology is imprecise. At the same time this excursus serves to demonstrate how the Athenian empire came into being.

The Athenians' first action was against Eion on the river Strymon,

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then in Persian hands. Under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took the town after a siege, and sold the inhabitants into slavery. They then turned to the Aegean island of Scyros, enslaving the Dolopes who inhabited it and installing their own settlers. They also made war on Carystus, independently of the rest of Euboea, and the Carystians eventually agreed to terms. After this came the revolt of Naxos: the Athenians went to war and blockaded the Naxians into submission. This was the first allied state to lose its freedom—something quite contrary to Greek norms which would subsequently happen to the others one by one.

There were various reasons for these revolts, but the main causes

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were failures to pay the tribute or provide the ships, and sometimes desertion from campaigns. The Athenians were exacting managers, and the coercion they applied was oppressive to people who were not used to hardship and had no wish for it. And there were other reasons too why the Athenians were now less popular as leaders.

They no longer observed any collective equality in their military campaigns, and it was easy for them to force back any defectors. The allies were in this responsible for their own problems. Most of them, sharing this reluctance to be involved in campaigns which would take them away from home, had the contribution which fell to them assessed in money rather than ships. The result was that the Athenians could spend this income on the development of their navy, and when they revolted the allies found themselves short of resources and inexperienced in war.

Next there took place the land- and sea-battles at the river 100

Eurymedon in Pamphylia, fought against the Persians by the Athenians and their allies. Commanded by Cimon the son of Miltiades the Athenians won both battles on the same day, and captured and destroyed a total of two hundred Phoenician triremes. Then, after a while, the Athenians faced the revolt of Thasos, occasioned by a dispute over the markets and the mine on the Thracian mainland opposite, which the Thasians controlled. The Athenians sent a fleet to Thasos, won the ensuing sea-battle, and landed on the island. At about the same time they sent out ten thousand settlers, drawn from their own people and their allies, to the Strymon to colonize the place then called Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They did indeed win possession of Nine Ways, then occupied by Edonians, but when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the combined

forces of the Thracians, who saw the founding of the colony as an act of war.

The Thasians, defeated in battle and now under siege, appealed¹⁰¹ to the Spartans and urged them to help by invading Attica. The Spartans promised to do so (this was kept secret from the Athenians), and would have done so had they not been prevented by the occurrence of the great earthquake, which the Helots and with them the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea took as the opportunity to revolt and secede to Ithome. (The Helots were mostly the descendants of the Messenians who had been enslaved long ago: hence the name 'Messenians' given to all the Helots.) The Spartans, then, were engaged in a war with the insurgents in Ithome, and the Thasians, now in the third year of the siege, capitulated to the Athenians. Under the terms of agreement they demolished their walls, surrendered their ships, undertook the payment assessed for immediate indemnity and future tribute, and gave up their rights in the mainland and the mine.

When the Spartans found their war against the Ithome rebels¹⁰² dragging on, they called in their allies, including the Athenians, who came with a substantial force commanded by Cimon. The main reason for inviting the Athenians was that they had a reputation for expertise in siege operations, whereas with their own siege now prolonged the Spartans recognized that they themselves lacked the necessary skills—otherwise they would have taken the place by storm. This campaign led to the first open dispute between the

Spartans and the Athenians. When Ithome was still not yielding to assault, the Spartans grew apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary spirit of the Athenians, and were conscious as well that they were of different race. Fearing, then, that if they stayed on they might be tempted to collude with the Ithome Helots in a revolution, they dismissed the Athenian force while retaining their other allies. Without revealing their mistrust, they simply said that their services were no longer required. The Athenians realized that some suspicion was afoot, and that their dismissal was not for the innocuous reason given. They took great offence and were indignant that they should be treated like this by the Spartans. As soon as they returned they abandoned the alliance with Sparta first made against the Persians and allied themselves with Argos, the enemy of Sparta, and at the same time both the Athenians and the Argives equally swore an alliance with the Thessalians.

After nine years of siege the rebels in Ithome could not hold out, 103
any longer, and in the tenth year they agreed terms with the Spartans. Under these terms they had safe conduct to leave the Peloponnese, but should never set foot on it again: any of them caught there would be the slave of his captor. There was also a previous response of the Delphic oracle to the Spartans, telling them to release the suppliant of Zeus of Ithome. So the Helots left the country with their children and women, and in their new hostility to Sparta the Athenians gave them welcome, settling them in

Naupactus, a town which they had recently taken from the control of the Ozolian Locrians.

Now the Megarians deserted Sparta and joined in alliance with Athens: the reason was that the Corinthians were gaining the upper hand in a war over disputed boundaries. The Athenians thus acquired both Megara and Pegae, and built for the Megarians the long walls from their city to the port of Nisaea, providing the garrison themselves. This was the first and the main cause of the intense hatred felt by Corinth for Athens.

The Libyan Inaros, son of Psammetichus and king of the Libyans¹⁰⁴ who bordered on Egypt, now instigated the revolt of most of Egypt from the Persian King Artaxerxes, starting from Mareia, the inland town opposite Pharos. He installed himself as ruler, and called in the Athenians. They happened to be engaged in an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred of their own and allied ships, but abandoned Cyprus and came to Egypt. Sailing from the sea into the Nile they gained control of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, then began an attack on the remaining sector, called the White Castle, in which the surviving Persians and Medes had taken refuge together with those Egyptians who had not joined the revolt.

An Athenian fleet made a landing at Halieis, and a battle ensued¹⁰⁵ against Corinthian and Epidaurian forces in which the Corinthians were victorious. Later the Athenians fought and won a sea-battle off Cecryphaleia against a Peloponnesian fleet. After this, war broke out between Athens and Aegina, and a great sea-battle took place

off Aegina in which both the Athenians and the Aeginetans were supported by their allies. The Athenians were the victors: they captured seventy of the enemy ships, then landed on Aegina and laid siege to the town. The Athenian general in command was Leocrates the son of Stroeus. Then the Peloponnesians, wanting to help the Aeginetans, sent over to Aegina three hundred hoplites who had previously been supporting the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: and the Corinthians together with their allies seized the heights of Geraneia and moved down into the Megarid. They reckoned that it would be impossible for the Athenians to send help to the Megarians with such large forces already deployed in Aegina and in Egypt—and, if they did, they would have to move their troops from Aegina. But the Athenians left the army besieging Aegina where it was, and arrived at Megara with a force drawn from the manpower still remaining at home—the oldest and the youngest—with Myronides the general in command. There followed an indecisive battle with the Corinthians: when the two sides parted, each thought they had had the better of the action. After the Corinthians left, the Athenians (who had in fact enjoyed the greater success) set up a trophy. The Corinthian troops, stung by the taunts of cowardice made by the older men back home, made further preparations and about twelve days later returned to set up their own trophy and claim the victory. The Athenians sallied out of Megara, killed the contingent erecting the trophy, then engaged and defeated the rest of their army.

As the Corinthians were retreating after this defeat, quite a large

section of them, hard pressed and missing the way back, found themselves in a private estate which was surrounded by a deep ditch with no other exit. Seeing this, the Athenians blocked the entrance with their hoplites, positioned light-armed troops round the perimeter, and stoned to death all those inside. This was a major disaster for the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

At about this time the Athenians also began to build their Long ¹⁰⁷ Walls to the sea, one to Phaleron and the other to the Peiraeus. The Phocians now made an expedition into Doris, the mother-country of the Spartans, and took one of the three main towns (these are Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum). The Spartans came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred of their own hoplites and ten thousand of their allies: this force was commanded by Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus as deputy for the king, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, who was still a minor. After forcing the Phocians to capitulate and hand back the town, they were ready to return home. To take the sea route through the Gulf of Crisa exposed them to the Athenians, who had sailed a fleet round and would certainly stop them. They saw equal danger in the land route over Geraneia with the Athenians in possession of Megara and Pegae: besides, the Geraneia passes were difficult and kept under constant guard by the Athenians, so they could see that the Athenians would stop them that way too. They decided, then, to stay in Boeotia while

investigating the safest means of passage. A contributory fact was that some Athenians were making secret approaches to them, in the hope that they would put an end to the democracy and the building of the Long Walls.

The Athenians set out to meet them with their full force, including a thousand Argives and contingents from their other allies, a total of fourteen thousand troops. They undertook this expedition because they realized that the Spartans had no means of return, but they also had suspicions of a plot to overthrow the democracy. Their forces were joined by some Thessalian cavalry in accordance with their treaty of alliance, but in the engagement these deserted to the Spartans.

The battle took place at Tanagra in Boeotia, and was won by the Spartans and their allies, though there was great slaughter on both sides. The Spartans then proceeded to the Megarid, cut down the plantations, and made their way home over Geraneia and across the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle the Athenians marched an army into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, and defeated the Boeotians in a battle at Oenophyta. They took control of the whole of Boeotia and Phocis, demolished the walls of Tanagra, and took as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians one hundred of their wealthiest men. They then completed the building of their own Long Walls. Soon afterwards the Aeginetans too capitulated to the Athenians: the terms were demolition of their walls, surrender of their ships, and assessment to pay tribute in the

future. And the Athenians sent a fleet round the Peloponnese, under the command of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, which set fire to the Spartans' dockyard, captured the Corinthian-owned town of Chalcis, and, making a landing in the territory of Sicyon, defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

The Athenians and their allies still remained in Egypt, where they

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experienced war in all its aspects. At first they were the masters of Egypt, and the King of Persia sent a Persian named Megabazus to Sparta with a supply of money, to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw the Athenians back from Egypt. As he was having no success and the money was being spent without result, Megabazus took himself back to Asia with what remained of the money. The King now sent out another Persian, Megabyxus the son of Zopyrus, with a large army. On his arrival after an overland march Megabyxus defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis. Eventually he confined them on the island of Prosopitis, and blockaded them there for eighteen months. In the end he drained the canal by diverting the water elsewhere, leaving their ships on dry land and most of the island now joined to the mainland: he then crossed over on foot and took the island.

This, then, after six years of fighting, was the collapse of the Greek

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enterprise in Egypt. A few from this great number made their way through Libya to Cyrene and survived, but the majority met their death. Egypt became subject again to the King of Persia, except for the marsh people under their king Amyrtaeus. The extent of the marshes made it impossible for the Persians to capture Amyrtaeus, and besides the marsh-dwellers are the fiercest fighters in Egypt. Inaros, the king of Libya who was instrumental in the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, captured, and crucified. A relief fleet of fifty triremes sent to Egypt by Athens and the rest of the alliance put in to the Mendesian mouth of the Nile without any knowledge of what had happened. They were attacked from land and sea by a Persian army and a Phoenician fleet: most of their ships were destroyed, and the remainder made their escape. Such was the end of the great Athenian and allied expedition to Egypt.

Now Orestes, the son of the Thessalian king Echekratides, was¹¹¹ exiled from Thessaly and persuaded the Athenians to restore him. They took with them a force of Boeotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, and marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They won control of the immediate area, but could never advance very far from their camp before the Thessalian cavalry stopped them. They failed to take the city, or to achieve any other object of the expedition, and went back with nothing accomplished, bringing Orestes with them. Not long after this a force of a thousand Athenians under the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus embarked in the ships they had at Pegae (which was now in

Athenian control) and sailed along the coast to Sicyon, where they made a landing and defeated those of the Sicyonians who came out to do battle. Immediately thereafter they took Achaean troops on board and sailed across the gulf to attack Oeniadae, a town in Acarnania. They laid siege to the town, but failed to take it and returned home.

Three years later the Peloponnesians and the Athenians established

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a five-year treaty. The Athenians now refrained from any Greek war, but sent an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred of their own and allied ships under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these ships were detached to sail to Egypt, in response to an appeal from Amyrtaeus the king of the marsh people, and the rest of them began a blockade of Citium. But Cimon's death and the onset of famine conditions made them leave Citium. As they sailed off Salamis in Cyprus they met a combined force of Phoenicians, Cypriots, and Cilicians and fought them both at sea and on land, winning both battles. They then set back for home, accompanied by the ships which had now returned from Egypt.

After this the Spartans undertook the so-called Sacred War, in which they won possession of the temple at Delphi and restored it to the Delphians. Then later, when the Spartans had left, the Athenians in turn sent out a force which recaptured the temple and gave it back to the Phocians.

Some time later, when the Boeotian exiles had gained possession,

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of Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and a few other places in Boeotia, the Athenians sent out an expedition of a thousand of their own hoplites and various allied contingents to attack these now hostile towns: the general in command was Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeroneia and enslaved the inhabitants, then started back after installing a garrison. On their return march they were attacked at Coroneia by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others of the same persuasion. This force defeated the Athenians, killing some and taking the others alive. The Athenians then withdrew from the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty to that effect conditional on the recovery of their captured men. The exiled party was restored, and all Boeotians regained their independence.

Not long after this Euboea revolted from Athens. Pericles had¹¹⁴ already crossed over to Euboea with an army of Athenians when the news reached him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered the Athenian garrison except for a few who made their escape to Nisaea: Megara had brought in troops from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus to aid the revolt. Pericles quickly brought his army back from Euboea, and soon afterwards the Peloponnesians invaded Attica under the command of the Spartan king, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias. They ravaged the land as far as Eleusis and Thria, but returned home without advancing any further. The Athenians crossed back to Euboea with Pericles in command and

reduced the whole island. Terms of agreement were settled for all of Euboea except Hestiaea: here the Athenians dispossessed the inhabitants and appropriated their land.

Shortly after their return from Euboea

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the Athenians made a thirty-year treaty with the Spartans and their allies, under which they handed back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea: these were places which they had taken from the Peloponnesians.

In the sixth year after this war broke out between Samos and Miletus over the possession of Priene. Having the worst of the war, the Milesians came to Athens and made indignant complaint of the Samians. They were supported by some private individuals from Samos itself who wanted a political revolution. So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and installed a democracy. They took hostages from Samos—fifty boys and fifty men—and deposited them in Lemnos: then they returned home, leaving a garrison on the island. But there were some Samians who would not stay. They made their escape to the mainland and formed a liaison with the leading oligarchs still on the island and with Pissouthnes the son of Hystaspes, then the Persian governor of Sardis. They gathered a force of about seven hundred mercenaries and crossed over to Samos at night. First they led an insurrection against the democrats and captured most of them, then they rescued the Samian hostages from Lemnos and declared their revolt from Athens. They handed over to Pissouthnes the Athenian garrison and the other officials

stationed in Samos, and began immediate preparations for an attack on Miletus. And Byzantium joined them in revolt.

When the Athenians became aware of this they sailed for Samos¹¹⁶ with sixty ships. Sixteen of these were deployed for other purposes, some sent towards Caria to keep a lookout for the Phoenician fleet, others to Chios and Lesbos to summon reinforcements. With the remaining forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles, one of the ten generals, the Athenians met a Samian fleet of seventy ships (including twenty transports) as they were sailing back from Miletus, and engaged them off the island of Tragia: the result was a victory for the Athenians. Later, when reinforcements arrived of forty ships from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, they landed on Samos and, with ground superiority achieved, built walls to invest the city on its three landward sides together with a blockade by sea. Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading fleet for an urgent mission to Caunus and Caria when news came that Phoenician ships were sailing against them (Stesagoras and other Samians had previously left Samos with five ships to call the Phoenician fleet in aid).

In this interval the Samians launched their fleet in a surprise attack

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on the unprotected Athenian naval camp, destroying the guard-ships and winning a sea-battle against the other ships which put out to meet them. So then for about fourteen days they were masters of their own sea and could import and export at will. But when

Pericles returned with his fleet the blockade resumed. Later, reinforcements came from Athens—forty ships commanded by Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles—together with thirty ships from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians offered some brief resistance at sea, but were unable to hold out long and in the ninth month of the siege were forced to capitulate. The terms of agreement were the demolition of their walls, the giving of hostages, the surrender of their ships, and the payment of full reparations in regular instalments. The Byzantians also agreed terms under which they returned to their previous subject status.

Not many years after this there took place the events which I have

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already described—the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the various other circumstances which were reasons for this war. All these operations of the Greeks in my account—against each other and against the barbarians—took place in the period of roughly fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. In this period the Athenians consolidated their empire and made great advances in their own independent power. The Spartans could see what was happening, but made only little attempt to prevent it and were inactive for most of the time. They had never been quick to go to war without immediate compulsion, and they were to some extent hampered by wars closer to home: but now the growth of Athenian power was unmistakable, and the Athenians were making

inroads on Sparta's allies. At this point, then, the Spartans could tolerate it no longer, and decided that they must go on the attack with all their energies and, if possible, destroy the power of Athens by undertaking this war. They themselves had already determined by vote in their assembly that the treaty had been broken and the Athenians were guilty of wrongdoing, but they sent to the oracle at Delphi and asked the god whether it would be better for them if they went to war. The god's response, so it is said, was that they would win if they fought in earnest, and that he himself, invited or uninvited, would take their side.

And they summoned their allies once more, to put the question 119
of war to their vote. At the congress held when representatives from the alliance had arrived the others spoke their piece, most of them critical of the Athenians and insistent that there should be war. The Corinthians, present also on this occasion, had already gone their private rounds of the other cities individually, soliciting a vote for war: their fear was that otherwise they would be too late to save Potidaea. They were the last to come forward, and they spoke as follows:

‘Fellow allies, we cannot now find fault with the Spartans: they 120
have cast their own vote for war, and have gathered us here now to do the same. This is just what leaders of an alliance should do—give equal weight to individual interests, yet with special concern for the common interest: and this responsibility is the counterpart of the special honour they are universally shown on other occasions. Now

those of us who have already had dealings with the Athenians need no instruction to be wary of them. But those who live more inland and away from the trade-routes should realize that if they do not protect the coastal cities they will find difficulty in exporting their produce and importing in return the goods which sea gives to land. They should not make a mistaken judgement of what we are now saying as if it did not concern them: they must expect that if they abandon the seaboard the danger will ultimately reach them too, so these present deliberations are about their own interests as much as ours. For this reason they should not be reluctant to choose war in place of peace. Sensible men, for sure, do not disturb themselves if they are not wronged: but brave men wronged go from peace to war, and then make peace again when their fortune in war allows it. Such men are not excited by military success, but neither will they tolerate wrong done to them simply to preserve their enjoyment of peace and quiet. People whose present comfort makes them reluctant to act will quickly find that inaction brings the loss of that agreeable ease which caused their reluctance: and people who make grand presumptions after military success have not realized the fragility of the confidence which excites them. Many badly laid plans have turned successful when met by greater incompetence on the part of the enemy: and yet more apparently well-planned strategies have ended in dismal failure. There is always a gulf between confident plan and execution in practice: we lay our plans in security, then fail them in the event through fear.

‘Now as for us in this present situation, there is wrong being done

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to us and we go to war with ample justification: and when we have beaten off the Athenians, we shall bring the war to a timely conclusion. There are many reasons why we should win this war. First, because we are superior in numbers and military experience; second, because we are all equally disciplined to follow our orders. They are strong at sea, but we shall fit out a navy for ourselves from the existing resources which we each have and from the funds at Delphi and Olympia: we can borrow from there and offer a higher rate of pay to win over their foreign sailors. Athenian power is based on mercenaries, not their own people. The same tactic would not work against us, as our power is men, not money. The likelihood is that one naval defeat will do for them: but if they hold out, we shall have more time to develop our skills at sea, and when our expertise matches theirs there is no doubt that we shall surpass them in courage. This is a quality natural to us which they cannot be taught, whereas their higher level of skill is something we can achieve by practice. The money required for this will come from our contributions. It would be truly disgraceful if, while the Athenians’ allies never fail to pay the tribute which maintains their enslavement, it turns out that we are not prepared to incur expense on retaliation against our enemies and thereby on our own safety—indeed on preventing the Athenians from robbing us of this same hoarded money and using it to our detriment.

‘And there are other avenues of war open to us. We can foster¹²² revolt among their allies, the surest way of cutting the revenues on which their strength depends; we can fortify a position in their own territory; and there will be many other means which cannot now be foreseen. War is not something that proceeds on set rules—far from it: for the most part war devises its own solutions to meet any contingency. So the safest course is to handle war in a dispassionate frame of mind: mistakes multiply when passion is engaged.

‘A further consideration is this. If these disputes were simply boundary questions among us between rival states of equal power, we could tolerate that. But as it is the Athenians are a match for all of us together, and much more powerful than any individual state, so if we do not combine and fight them with every people and every city united in this one purpose, they will find us divided and have no difficulty in conquering us. This may be a hard message, but you can be sure that our defeat would mean nothing less than downright slavery. That such a possibility should even be mentioned, that there should be any question of so many cities suffering at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnese. In that event people would say that we either deserve our fate or are cowards to accept it, and show ourselves a lesser generation than our fathers. Our fathers liberated Greece, but we are not even securing our own freedom: while we make it a principle to depose absolute rulers in any individual city, we are allowing a tyrant city to be established over us all. We do not see how this policy can be

innocent of all three of the worst failings—stupidity, cowardice, or indifference. It cannot be that you have avoided these failings only to resort to contempt of the enemy, that notoriously calamitous state of mind which from the number of falls it has caused is better renamed as mindlessness.

‘But there is no need to dwell on criticism of the past except in
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far as it serves the interest of the present. To secure the future, you must steel yourselves to take in hand the immediate task. You have it from your fathers that success is born from hardship, and you should not change that ethic even if you are now a little in advance of them in wealth and power: what was gained in poverty should not be lost in prosperity. There are indeed many reasons for going into this war with confidence. The god has spoken through his oracle and promised his own support, and all the rest of Greece will be on our side, either through fear or in hope of advantage. And you will not be responsible for breaking the treaty, when the god himself in telling you to go to war considers it already broken: rather you will be avenging its violation. Treaties are not broken by acts of self-defence: they are broken by the initial aggression.

‘So with every circumstance in your favour for war, and with
this

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the course we urge on you for our common good, if you believe that community of interest is indeed the surest bond between states as well as individuals, do not now delay in sending help to the

Potidaeans (they are Dorians besieged by Ionians, a reversal of what used to happen) or in pursuing the liberation of the others. It is impossible that we should wait any longer, seeing that some of us are already victims, and others will shortly suffer the same fate if it becomes known that we have convened and not found the courage to resist. No, fellow allies: recognize that we have now reached the crisis point and that the policy we propose is the best way forward, and vote for war. Do not be frightened by the immediate danger, but set your hearts on the more lasting peace which will follow. A peace won through war has a firmer base: to refuse war for the sake of the quiet life runs the greater risk. We should realize that the tyrant city now established in Greece threatens tyranny over all of us alike, with designs on all the states not already in her power. So let us attack and bring her under our control: let us win the future safety of our own homes and the liberation of the Greeks who are now enslaved.'

Such was the speech of the Corinthians. The Spartans, now that¹²⁵ they had heard all the opinions expressed, asked for the votes of each of their allies there present one by one, both great and small. The majority voted for war. This decision taken, they could not mount an immediate attack in their present state of unpreparedness, and determined that each should set about the appropriate provision with no delay. Even so, nearly a whole year was spent in the necessary preparation before they invaded Attica and openly commenced hostilities.

During this time they sent delegations to Athens making various

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complaints, to ensure that they had the strongest justification for going to war, if the Athenians made no concession. The first Spartan embassy demanded that the Athenians should drive out 'the curse of the goddess', the meaning of which is as follows. In earlier times there was an Athenian called Cylon, an Olympic victor and a powerful man of noble birth who had married the daughter of the Megarian Theagenes, then the tyrant of Megara. In answer to a question put by Cylon to the Delphic oracle the god replied that he should seize the Athenian Acropolis at the time of the greatest festival of Zeus. Cylon borrowed troops from Theagenes and persuaded his friends to join him, and when the time came round for the festival at Olympia in the Peloponnese he seized the Acropolis with the intention of making himself tyrant. He had thought that 'the greatest festival of Zeus' was that at Olympia, and that there was some connection with his own role as an Olympic victor. Whether this 'greatest festival' meant one in Attica or somewhere else was not a question either considered by Cylon or made clear in the oracle. (The Athenians too hold a great festival of Zeus the Kindly which is called the Diasia: this is held outside the city by the whole people, and many make local kinds of offering rather than the usual sacrifices.) But Cylon thought he had the right interpretation, and so made his attempt. When they saw what had happened the Athenians all rushed back from their fields, surrounded the Acropolis, and laid siege to the men occupying it.

After some time the Athenians grew weary of the siege and the majority of them went away, leaving the nine archons in charge of the guard detail and with full authority to deal with the matter as they thought best (in those days the nine archons were chiefly responsible for the administration of public affairs). Cylon and the men under siege with him were beginning to suffer from lack of food and water. Cylon and his brother managed to make their escape: and the others, in severe straits and with some of their number now dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the altar on the Acropolis. When the Athenian authorities in charge of the guard saw that they were dying in the temple, they persuaded them to leave their suppliant position with the promise that no harm would come to them, then led them off and put them to death. They even executed a group of them who on their way past sat down in supplication at the altars of the Dread Goddesses. For this crime the murderers and their families after them were held to be accursed and offenders against the goddess. So the Athenians drove out these accursed people, and they were driven out again later by the Spartan Cleomenes supported by the rival faction when there was civil strife at Athens: the living were exiled and the bones of the dead dug up and cast out. Nevertheless they returned afterwards, and their descendants still live in the city.

This then was the curse which the Spartans demanded should be
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driven out. They pretended that their prime object was to serve the honour of the gods, but in fact they knew that the curse attached to

Pericles the son of Xanthippus on his mother's side, and they thought that if he were expelled they would find it easier to deal with the Athenians. Not that they really expected this to happen: their hope was rather to discredit him in the eyes of his fellow citizens and make them think that this family circumstance of his would be a contributory cause of the war. He was the most influential man of his day and the leader of the state. His policy was constant opposition to the Spartans, and he would never let the Athenians make concessions, but was always pressing for the war.

The Athenians made the counter-demand that the Spartans 128 should drive out the curse of Taenarum. This referred to the time when some Helots had taken refuge as suppliants in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarum. The Spartans had recognized their suppliant status and persuaded them to move, then led them off and killed them. They themselves believe that the great earthquake in Sparta happened because of this crime.

The Athenians further demanded that they should drive out the curse of the goddess of the Bronze House, which came about as follows. When the Spartan Pausanias was originally recalled by the Spartiates from his command in the Hellespont, and put on trial by them but acquitted of the charges against him, he was not sent out again in any official capacity, but on his own initiative he took a trireme from Hermione without Spartan authority and sailed to the Hellespont. His pretence was that he had come to help the Greek war-effort, but in fact he was there to continue the intrigue with the

King of Persia which he had already started earlier: his aim was to become the ruler of Greece. The favour which first placed the King under an obligation to him and began the whole affair was this. When he was previously in the area after his return from Cyprus, he had captured Byzantium, which was then occupied by Persians, including some relatives and members of the King's own family who were taken prisoner in the town. These he returned to the King without the knowledge of the other allies: his story to them was that the prisoners had managed to escape him. His accomplice in this was Gongylus of Eretria, whom he had put in charge of Byzantium and the men captured there. Gongylus' mission was also to carry a letter to the King, the text of which (as was subsequently discovered) read as follows: 'Pausanias, the leader of Sparta, wishes to do you a service and sends back to you these captives of his spear. I propose, if this meets with your approval, to marry your daughter and bring Sparta and the rest of Greece under your control. I believe that I have the ability to achieve this in collaboration with you. If any of this is pleasing to you, send down to the sea a trusted man to be the intermediary in our further discussions.'

Thus far the plain proposal in Pausanias' letter. Xerxes was 129 delighted by the letter, and sent Artabazus the son of Pharnaces down to the sea with orders to take over the satrapy of Dascylium in place of the previous governor Megabates. He gave him a letter of reply which he was to send across to Pausanias in Byzantium

without delay, and show him the royal seal: and then he was to carry out with all diligence and loyalty any instructions given him by Pausanias on the King's business. On his arrival Artabazus did all that he was ordered, and sent across the letter. The text of the King's reply was as follows: 'Thus says Xerxes the King to Pausanias. The service you have done me in saving the men taken at Byzantium across the sea will stand recorded for ever in our house as a benefaction conferred by you. I am also pleased by the words you send me. Let neither night nor day cause you to slacken in the fulfilment of your promises to me, and let there be no impediment for lack of gold and silver to spend or troops to deploy in whatever number wherever they may be required. I have sent you Artabazus, a good man: in conjunction with him be as bold as you will to achieve the best and most successful result for both of us, in my interest and in yours.'

On receipt of this letter Pausanias, who was already held in great

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esteem by the Greeks for his command at Plataea, took a yet much higher opinion of himself and could not now bear to live in the usual manner. Whenever he left Byzantium he was dressed in Persian fashion, he was accompanied on his tours through Thrace by a bodyguard of Persians and Egyptians, and he had Persian food served at his table. He could not contain his ambition, but in small things made it clear what his larger intentions were for the future. He kept himself inaccessible, and treated all alike with such a

violent temper that no one could approach him. This was one of the main reasons why the allies changed allegiance to the Athenians.

This was the very behaviour which had caused his original recall¹³¹ when the Spartans heard of it. Now, when he had gone out there again in the ship from Hermione without their authority and was evidently behaving in the same way; when the Athenians had besieged him in Byzantium and forced him out; when he still would not return to Sparta, but established himself at Colonaë in the Troad; and when it was reported to them that he was intriguing with the Persians and that there was a sinister purpose to his residence there, then at last the ephors came to the end of their patience. They sent out a messenger with a dispatch-stick and ordered Pausanias to accompany the messenger back to Sparta: otherwise the Spartan citizens would declare war on him. Wishing to attract as little suspicion as possible, and confident that he could bribe his way out of the charges, Pausanias returned to Sparta for the second time. He was at first thrown into prison by the ephors (who have the power to imprison the king), but then later contrived his release and offered to stand trial if any wished to question his actions.

There was no clear evidence available to the Spartan government,

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either from the personal enemies of Pausanias or from the city as a whole, which would give solid grounds for the punishment of a member of the king's family who had at the time a royal

prerogative—he was the cousin and the guardian of the king Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas, who was still a minor. Even so, his flouting of usual custom and espousal of foreign ways gave rise to widespread suspicion that he was not willing to conform to his present position. They reviewed previous examples of his deviation from the established norms of behaviour, especially his treatment of the tripod which the Greeks had dedicated at Delphi as the first-fruits of their victory over the Persians. He had taken it on his own initiative to have it inscribed with this elegiac couplet:

Leader of Greece in the war which destroyed the forces of
Persia, Pausanias dedicates this to Apollo the god.

The Spartans had immediately erased these lines from the tripod and inscribed it instead with the names of all the cities which had taken part in the Persian defeat and the dedication of the monument. Even at the time this offence was regarded as Pausanias' doing, and now that his situation had taken this turn could be seen in a yet clearer light as consistent with his present attitude. They also received reports that Pausanias was involved in some intrigue with the Helots, and this was in fact so: he was promising them emancipation and citizenship if they would join in revolt and help him carry out his whole design. Even so, and even when some of the Helots informed on him, the Spartans would not believe what they were told and refused to make any move against him, following their usual practice in regard to their own people: they

were always slow to come to any irrevocable decision concerning a Spartan citizen without incontestable evidence. But then finally, so it is said, the man who was to convey to Artabazus Pausanias' latest letter to the King turned informer. He was a man from Argilus, a former lover and devoted servant of Pausanias. The thought had struck him, to his consternation, that none of his predecessors as messengers had ever yet returned. So he made a counterfeit of Pausanias' seal to avoid discovery if his suspicion proved wrong or if Pausanias asked for the letter back to make some amendment, then opened the letter: as he had rather expected, he found that the contents included the instruction for his own murder.

He showed the letter to the ephors, and this at last gave them¹³³ greater conviction, but they still wanted to hear for themselves some evidence from Pausanias' own mouth. So a plan was laid. The man went as a suppliant to the temple at Taenarum and built himself there a cabin divided in two by a partition. He concealed some of the ephors in the inner part, and when Pausanias came to him and asked the reason for his supplication, they heard the truth of the whole story. The man protested at what was written in the letter about him and went into all the other details, complaining that he had never once endangered Pausanias in the missions he had run for him to the King, and his reward for that was to meet the same death as most of the other messengers. Pausanias admitted every word of this and asked him not to be angry at the situation: he raised him by the hand to assure him of his safety in leaving the

temple, and told him to start his journey at once, so as not to delay the negotiations.

The ephors had heard every detail. For the moment they went¹³⁴ away, but with their now certain knowledge they moved to arrest Pausanias in the city. It is said that on the point of his arrest in the street Pausanias could read their purpose in the expression of one of the ephors approaching him, and that another out of friendship gave him a barely perceptible nod of warning. He then ran for immediate refuge to the temple of the goddess of the Bronze House—the precinct was nearby. To avoid exposure to the elements he entered a small room in the temple, and lay low. His pursuers lost him at first, but then took the roof off the building and, once they had found him inside and caught him there, walled up the doors, surrounded the place, and starved him to death. When they saw him on the point of expiry in his condition in that room, they carried him out of the temple still breathing, and he died as soon as he was brought outside. At first they intended to throw his body into the Caeadas ravine, their usual means of disposing of criminals, but then they changed their mind to bury him somewhere close by. Later the god at Delphi gave the Spartans an oracular response telling them to move Pausanias' grave to where he died (and he lies there now in the entrance to the precinct, as shown in the inscriptions on the gravestones). The oracle also declared that they had brought a curse on themselves by what they had done, and told them to give two bodies to the goddess of the Bronze House in

requital for the one. So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated those as their requital for Pausanias.

Since the god himself had decreed the curse, the Athenians countered

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the Spartans with the demand that they should drive it out.

Now the Spartan investigation into Pausanias' intrigue with the Persians produced evidence to implicate Themistocles also, and they sent an embassy to Athens to make this charge and to demand that he should meet the same punishment. The Athenians agreed, but as Themistocles had been ostracized and was living in Argos (and making frequent visits to other parts of the Peloponnese), with the willing collaboration of the Spartans they sent a joint posse of officers to track him down: their orders were to arrest him wherever they found him and bring him back.

Themistocles had forewarning, and made his escape from the 136 Peloponnese to Corcyra, where he had the status of a benefactor. But the Corcyraeans said that they could not harbour him for fear of incurring the hostility of Sparta and Athens, and conveyed him to the mainland opposite. Constantly pursued by the posse of officers who were following information about his movements, he was forced in desperation at one point to seek lodging at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was no friend of his. Admetus was not at home, but Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his wife, and she instructed him to take their child in his arms and sit down at the hearth. When Admetus returned shortly

afterwards Themistocles revealed who he was, and said that even if he had once opposed a request Admetus had made of the Athenians, this did not justify retaliation now that he was in exile. That would be to victimize him when he was in a much enfeebled state, and the only noble revenge was that fairly taken on equals. He added that his own opposition to Admetus had been on a matter of business and not a question of life or death: whereas if Admetus were to hand him over (he explained by whom and for what he was being pursued) he would be denying him the safety of his life.

Admetus listened, then raised Themistocles by the hand together¹³⁷ with his own son from where he was sitting with the boy in his arms, the most powerful form of supplication. Not long afterwards the Spartan and Athenian officers arrived. For all their lengthy protestations Admetus refused to hand over Themistocles, but, since he wished to make his way to the King of Persia, sent him across on foot to Pydna on the Aegean coast, a town in the kingdom of Alexander. Here he found a merchant ship setting sail for Ionia, and went on board: but the ship was driven by a storm to the Athenian naval station blockading Naxos. He was unknown to the others on the ship, but, fearful of what might otherwise happen, he explained to the captain who he was and why he was on the run. He told the captain that if he refused to save his life he would say that he had been bribed to take him on board; his safety depended on no one leaving the ship before the voyage resumed; if he agreed, there would be ample recompense. The captain did as he was asked, and

after riding at anchor off the Athenian station for a day and a night eventually put in to Ephesus. Themistocles took care of the captain with a gift of money (after his flight funds had reached him from friends in Athens and from the deposits he had left in safe keeping in Argos). He then travelled inland accompanied by one of the Persians who lived on the coast, and sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who had recently succeeded to the throne. In this letter he declared: 'I, Themistocles, have come to you. I am the man who has done your house greater harm than any other of the Greeks, for as long as I was forced to defend myself against your father's invasion: but I also did you yet greater benefit when I was in safety and your father in danger during his retreat. A debt of gratitude is owed me' (and here he mentioned the message he had sent from Salamis of an impending Greek withdrawal, and his agency—this was a false pretence—in preventing the destruction of the Hellespont bridges): 'and now I am here with the ability to do you great service, and persecuted by the Greeks for the friendship I feel for you. Give me a year, and then I shall explain to you in person why I have come.'

It is said that the King was impressed by his determination, and¹³⁸ told him to do as he proposed. In this intervening year Themistocles learnt all that he could of the Persian language and the way of life in the country. He presented himself after the year was over, and became a man of importance at the King's court and more influential than any Greek had yet been. This was due to his

previous reputation, to the hope he held out of enslaving Greece under the King, and most of all to the constant evidence he gave of the quality of his mind.

Themistocles was indeed a man who displayed beyond doubt, and more than any other, natural genius to a quite exceptional and awesome degree. Through the pure application of his own intelligence, and without the aid of any briefing or debriefing, he was a consummate judge of the needs of the moment at very short notice, and supreme in conjecturing the future, more accurate than any in his forecast of events as they would actually happen. He had the gift of explaining clearly all that he himself undertook, and was not lacking in competent judgement on matters outside his experience: and he foresaw better than any the possible advantage and disadvantage in a yet uncertain future. In summary, the intuitive power of his mind and the speed of his preliminary thought gave Themistocles an unrivalled ability to improvise what was needed at any time.

He died of an illness: though some say that he took his own life with poison, realizing that he could not fulfil his promises to the King. However that may be, there is a monument to him in the marketplace of Magnesia in Asia, where he had been governor. The King had given him Magnesia for his bread (which brought him revenue of fifty talents a year), Lampsacus for his wine (considered then the best wine district of all), and Myus for his meat. His family say that at his own request his bones were brought back home and

buried secretly in Attica, without the knowledge of the Athenians—burial of a man exiled for treason was illegal.

So ended the stories of Pausanias of Sparta and Themistocles of Athens, the two most eminent Greeks of their time.

On their first embassy, then, the Spartans made these demands for

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the expulsion of the accursed and met with similar counter-demands. Thereafter they sent a series of further embassies to Athens, demanding withdrawal from Potidaea and the restoration of independence to Aegina. Above all, and in the clearest possible terms, they repeated that there would be no war if the Athenians repealed the decree which had denied the Megarians access to the ports in the Athenian empire and to the Athenian market itself. The Athenians rejected the other demands and would not repeal the decree, citing the Megarians' encroachment on both the sacred ground and the neutral strip, and their harbouring of absconded slaves. Finally the last ambassadors arrived from Sparta: they were Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Agesandrus. They made no mention of the previous themes, but simply said this: 'The Spartans wish there to be peace, and there would be peace if you returned their independence to the Greeks.' The Athenians called an assembly and opened the debate, deciding to discuss the whole issue once and for all and give their final answer. Many came forward to speak and opinions were ranged on both sides—for war, and for the repeal of the Megarian decree to remove an impediment to peace. Among the

speakers was Pericles the son of Xanthippus, the leading Athenian at that time and a man of the greatest ability both with words and in action. He came forward and gave his advice as follows:

‘Athenians, my opinion remains that to which I have always held:

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we must not yield to the Peloponnesians. I recognize, though, that the spirit which persuades men to war can change when the action is on them, and that resolution varies with fortune. My advice too is very much the same as I have given in the past, and I can see that I must repeat it now: and if some of you are convinced I ask you to maintain your support for the policy which we agree through any reverse we might suffer—or else claim no credit for clear thinking when we meet with success. Events can take as stupid a course as human designs: that is why we blame chance for all that runs counter to our calculation.

‘The Spartans’ intentions against us have been clear for some time, and yet more so now. The terms of the treaty are that in cases of dispute both sides should go to arbitration, retaining their respective holdings in the interim. They have never yet asked for arbitration nor accepted our offer of it. They want to settle their grievances by war rather than discussion, and they are here now not to pursue complaints but to deliver an ultimatum. They tell us to withdraw from Potidaea, to restore independence to Aegina, and to repeal the Megarian decree: and now these last ambassadors are come here to demand that we return their independence to the

other Greeks as well. None of you should think that we would be going to war over a small matter if we refuse to repeal the Megarian decree. They make a great pretence that its repeal would prevent war, but I would not want you to be left with any suspicion that you went to war for a trifling cause. This “small matter” involves the whole confirmation of your resolve, and the test of it. If you give in to them on this, they will assume that fear prompted the concession and immediately impose some greater demand: stand firm on this, and you will make it clear to them that they would do better to treat you as equals.

So make up your minds here and now, either to submit before any

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harm is done, or, if it is to be war (and in my view that is the best course), to make no concessions for reasons either great or small, and to refuse to live in constant fear for our own possessions. Any claim enforced by equals on equals without recourse to arbitration, no matter whether the issue is of the greatest or the least significance, amounts still to enslavement.

‘Listen now while I detail the resources for war on either side, from which you can see that we shall be at no disadvantage. The Peloponnesians work their own land, and have no private or public wealth. Then they have no experience of lengthy overseas wars, as their poverty has restricted their warfare to short campaigns against each other. Such people cannot regularly crew ships or send out land armies: this would involve absence from their own properties

and the meeting of their own expenses—and in any case they would be denied the freedom of the sea. Wars are sustained by accumulated capital, not by enforced contributions. Men who work their own land are more willing to do war service with their bodies than with their substance: their body is a known quantity which they trust will survive the dangers intact, but they have no guarantee that their money will not be exhausted before the end, especially if, as is likely, they find the war prolonging itself beyond their expectation. In a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are capable of resisting the whole of Greece, but they are incapable of maintaining a war against an opposition which differs from them in kind: as long, that is, as they continue without a central deliberative forum, for lack of which they cannot take any immediate decisive action, and as long as all the various tribal groups in a miscellaneous confederacy have equal votes, so each promotes its own concern—a system unlikely to produce any effective results. And as you would expect some are all for vengeance on some enemy of theirs, others are all for minimal damage to their own interests. Their infrequent meetings allow little time for consideration of any common issue, and for the most part they carry on with their own business. Each thinks that their inertia will do no harm, and that it is someone else's responsibility rather than theirs to make some provision for their future: the result is that with all individually sharing this same notion they fail as a body to see their common interest going to ruin.

‘The most important point is that they will be hampered by lack

of money. It will take them time to raise the funds, and that means delay: but the opportunities of war do not wait. And we should not be frightened either of forts built in our territory, or of their navy. It is hard enough for a rival city to establish border-forts even in peacetime, and of course harder still in enemy territory and with our own fortifications no less of a threat to them. If they do build a fort, yes, they could do some harm with raids on part of our land and as a point of reception for deserting slaves, but not sufficient to prevent us sailing to their land and building our own forts there, then defending them with our navy, which is where our strength lies. We have more experience of land operations from our naval base than they have of naval operations from their land base. They will not easily acquire proficiency in seamanship. Even you, who have been practising since directly after the Persian War, have not yet fully mastered it. So how can men who are farmers, not sailors, achieve anything of any consequence, particularly when they will be denied even their training by the large fleet we shall always have blockading them? A blockade of only a few ships might embolden them to put numbers above inexperience and take their chances: but a full fleet barring them from the sea will keep them inactive, the lack of practice will diminish their skill, and the lack of skill will make them more timid. Seamanship is an art, no different from any other art: it does not admit of casual practice secondary to some other occupation, but demands no other occupation secondary to itself.

‘If they do touch the funds at Olympia or Delphi and try to win¹⁴³

over our foreign sailors with higher pay, that would be a serious danger if it were not the case that we can still match them with citizens and metics crewing the ships. But this is the case: and, most important of all, we have citizen captains and petty officers in greater numbers and of higher quality than in all the rest of Greece combined. And given the risks they would run, none of our foreign sailors would choose to switch sides for a few days of extra pay, when the price is exile from their own homes and the greater likelihood of defeat.

‘Such is broadly my view of the Peloponnesian position. Our own position, it seems to me, is both free of the weaknesses I have pointed out in theirs and also has strengths which they cannot equal. If they invade our country by land, we shall sail against theirs: and there will be no equality of effect between the devastation of even a part of the Peloponnese and that of the whole of Attica. They will not be able to acquire more land without fighting for it, whereas we have plenty of other land in the islands and on the mainland—control of the sea is a paramount advantage. Consider: if we were an island, could any be more invulnerable than us? So we should now think ourselves into the closest approximation to islanders, ready to abandon our land and our homes, but keeping close guard on the sea and our city. We must not let anger at our losses draw us into a pitched battle with the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us. If we win such a battle we

shall have to fight them again in no smaller numbers, and if we fail we shall lose our allies too: they are the source of our strength, but they will not acquiesce in our control if we are short of the means to enforce it. Do not mourn the loss of homes and land, but save your mourning for the loss of lives. Property is the product, not the producer of men. If I thought I could persuade you, I would be telling you to go out and destroy your property with your own hands, to show the Peloponnesians that there will be no surrender on this account.

‘I have many other grounds to encourage the confidence that you

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will win through, as long as you agree not to extend the empire while the war is on and not to undertake additional risks of your own making—I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of any enemy strategies. But I shall speak again about all this in detail when it is time for action. For now, we should send back the Spartan ambassadors with this answer. We shall admit the Megarians to our market and our ports if the Spartans for their part will conduct no more expulsions of foreigners involving either us or our allies (since nothing in the treaty prohibits either their action or ours); we shall return their independence to the cities in our control if they were independent when we made the treaty, and at such time as the Spartans too restore their own cities to a true independence allowing them individual choice of government rather than conformity to the Spartans’ interest; we are willing to go to

arbitration under the treaty; we shall not start a war, but if others do we shall defend ourselves. This is a fair answer, and the proper answer for our city to make. You must realize that war is inevitable, and the more willing we are to accept it the less intense will be our enemies' attack. Remember too that for states and individuals alike the greatest dangers give rise to the greatest glory. When our fathers took their stand against the Persians they did not start from resources such as ours, but they abandoned even what little they did possess and then, more by resolve than good fortune, more by courage than strength of armament, they drove back the barbarians and set our city on its path to greatness. We must not fall short of our fathers: we must resist our enemies with every means in our power, and strive to hand on to future generations a city no less great.'

Such was the speech of Pericles. The Athenians thought his 145 advice the best, and voted as he urged them. On his motion, the answer they gave to the Spartans followed his proposals in detail and in general: the Athenians would take no orders from Sparta, but were prepared to have the grievances settled by arbitration under the treaty on fair and equal terms. The Spartan ambassadors left for home, and there were no further embassies.

These then were the grievances and disputes which arose on 146 either side before the outbreak of war, taking their immediate start from the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. During this time the two sides still maintained communication and travel from one to the

other without the formality of heralds—but not without misgivings. What was happening amounted to the collapse of the treaty and a reason for war.

BOOK FOUR

In the following summer, about the time when the corn was coming into ear, a fleet of ten Syracusan and the same number of Locrian ships sailed to Messina in Sicily and captured it: they had been invited by the Messanans themselves, and Messina now defected from the Athenians. The main motive on the part of the Syracusans was that they could see the place was a gateway to Sicily, and they were afraid that the Athenians would at some time use it as a base from which to launch an attack on them with larger forces. The Locrian motive was hatred of the Rhegians, and the wish to reduce them in a campaign by sea as well as land. They had already made a full-scale invasion of Rhegian territory to prevent them interfering at Messina, partly instigated by the Rhegian exiles whom they harboured. Rhegium had long been in a state of internal dissension, which made resistance to the Locrians impossible at the present time and thereby intensified the Locrian attack. After ravaging the land the Locrians withdrew their infantry, but the ships were kept on guard at Messina, while others were being manned to join them at the anchorage there and prosecute the war from that base.

At about the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the

Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, king of Sparta: they established themselves and began ravaging the land. The Athenians now dispatched to Sicily the forty ships which they had been preparing, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles (the third general, Pythodorus, had already arrived in Sicily). Their instructions were to stop at Corcyra on their route and see to the problems of the people in the city, who were suffering from the raids of the exiles on Mount Istone: furthermore, sixty Peloponnesian ships had already set sail for Corcyra to support the exiles on the mountain, and the severe shortage of food in the city encouraged their belief that they could easily gain control. Demosthenes held no command after his return from Acarnania, but at his own request the Athenians granted him leave to use these ships at his discretion on their voyage round the Peloponnese.

When they were sailing off the coast of Laconia they heard that ₃ the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to press on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes asked them to put in at Pylos and take some necessary action there before continuing the voyage. They objected, but as it happened a storm arose which forced the ships into Pylos. Demosthenes immediately urged them to fortify the place, saying that this was the whole purpose of his joining their voyage. He pointed out the abundance of timber and stones available, and also the natural strength of the site and the fact that both it and the surrounding area for some

distance was unguarded (Pylos is about forty-five miles from Sparta, and lies in what was once Messenian land: the Spartans call it Coryphasium). The generals said that there were plenty of deserted promontories in the Peloponnese which he could occupy if he wanted to waste public money. In Demosthenes' view, though, this site had particular advantages over any other: there was an adjacent harbour; this had been home territory to the Messenians in the past, they spoke the same dialect as the Spartans, and they could do a great deal of damage if they were based there; and also they would give the fort a reliable garrison.

He failed to persuade either the generals or the troops (having 4 subsequently shared his plans with their contingent commanders), and was forced to remain inactive while the weather continued unfit for sailing. In the end the troops themselves, with nothing else to do, took it into their heads to gather round and fortify the place. So they set to and began the work. They had no stone-working tools, but chose suitable stones to carry to the site and fitted them together where each went best. If there was need for clay, in the absence of any containers they carried it on their backs, stooped forward so it was more likely to stay in position, and with their hands clasped behind to prevent it slipping off. In every possible way they hurried to finish work on the most vulnerable points before the Spartans could arrive to oppose them. Most of the site had sufficiently strong natural defences to have no need of a wall.

In fact the Spartans were holding some festival at the time, and 5

they paid little attention to the news when they heard it. They thought that when they did move against Pylos either the Athenians would not stay to resist, or else they could easily take the place by force: there was also the constraint that their army was still in Attica. The Athenians fortified the mainland aspect of the site and the most vulnerable parts elsewhere in six days. They then left Demosthenes with five ships as its garrison, and pressed ahead with the bulk of the fleet on the voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

When the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of 6
Pylos, they quickly set back for home. The Spartans and their king Agis regarded Pylos as their own affair: but they had also invaded early in the year and, with the corn still green, were running short of food for their numbers, while the onset of unseasonably wintry weather discomforted the troops. For many reasons, then, the result was a withdrawal earlier than intended, and this turned out to be their shortest invasion—they had stayed in Attica for fifteen days.

At about the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, captured 7
Eïon in the Thraceward region, which was a colony of Mende but hostile to Athens. He had gathered a few Athenians from the garrison posts and a larger force from the allies in that area, and the place was betrayed to him. Immediately the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans rallied to the support of Eïon, and Simonides was driven out with the loss of many of his men.

After the Peloponnesian withdrawal from Attica the Spartiates

themselves and the Perioeci nearest to Pylos made for the place immediately, while the rest of the Spartans, given that they had only just arrived home from another campaign, followed more slowly. They also sent round the Peloponnese summoning the allies to assist at Pylos as soon as possible, and called back their sixty ships at Corcyra, which were transported across the Leucadian isthmus, escaped detection by the Athenian ships (now at Zacynthus), and arrived at Pylos to join the land army already established there. While the Peloponnesian fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes managed to get two ships out in time to alert Eurymedon and the Athenians in the ships at Zacynthus to the danger at Pylos and tell them to come.

So the Athenian ships sailed at best speed in response to Demosthenes' message. Meanwhile the Spartans were preparing an attack on the fort by land and sea, confident that they would easily take a structure hastily built and thinly manned. In expectation of Athenian reinforcement with the ships from Zacynthus, their intention (if they had not by then already taken the place) was to proceed to block the entrances to the harbour to deny the Athenians any anchorage there. The island called Sphacteria extends down the side of the harbour bay and lies close to it, making the harbour safe and the entrances narrow. The entrance by Pylos and the Athenian fort allows a passage for two ships abreast, and at the other end the gap between island and mainland is less than one mile. The whole

island, being uninhabited, was wooded and pathless, and about two and three-quarter miles long.

They planned, then, to block these entrances with ships packed close together and prows facing outwards. Concerned that the island itself could become a base for Athenian action against them, they ferried hoplites across to it and stationed others along the mainland. In this way they thought that both the island and the mainland would be hostile territory to the Athenians; there would be nowhere for them to land elsewhere, as the coast round Pylos, outside the entrance to the bay and facing the open sea, offered no harbour and therefore no base for military support of their people in Pylos; they themselves would avoid the danger of a sea-battle and had every chance of taking the place by siege, since it had been occupied with little preparation and there was no store of food there. With that overall plan they began ferrying the hoplites to the island, choosing them by lot from all of the divisions. Contingents crossed over and returned in rotation, and the last contingent to cross, which was caught there, numbered four hundred and twenty, with attendant Helots in addition: their commander was Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

Seeing that the Spartans intended a combined attack with ships 9 and infantry, Demosthenes set about his own preparations. He dragged up on shore under the fort his remaining triremes from the five he had been left, and fenced them with a stockade. He armed their crews with poor-quality shields, most of them made of wicker,

as there was no means of acquiring arms in a deserted place, and even these were taken from two Messenian boats, a thirty-oared privateer and a cutter, which had just arrived. The Messenians had about forty hoplites on board, and these were pressed into service with the others. Demosthenes stationed the majority of both the poorly and the fully armed men on the best-fortified and strongest side of the site, facing the mainland, with instructions to repel any attack by the land forces. He himself selected sixty hoplites and a few archers from the whole body of his troops and went outside the wall down to the sea, at the point where he expected the enemy was most likely to attempt a landing. It was a difficult and rocky stretch, fronting the open sea, but he thought they would be keen to force their way ashore here, where the wall was at its weakest (not thinking they would ever be at a naval disadvantage, the Athenians had not built strong fortifications on that side): and if they did force a landing the place was vulnerable. So he went right to the edge of the sea at that point and stationed his hoplites there, hoping if he could to prevent the enemy coming ashore, and encouraged them with this address:

‘Men, you have joined me in facing this danger, and I do not want

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any of you at a crisis like this trying to show his intelligence by weighing all the odds stacked against us—do not think about it, but just engage the enemy with every hope of winning through on this occasion as you have before. When things have reached the critical

point, as they have now, there is no room for calculation and the danger is best met soonest. But actually I can see most factors in our favour, if we are prepared to stand our ground and not let their numbers panic us into throwing away the advantages which we have. This is a hard place for a landing—a potential advantage for us, I think, which will favour our side if we stand firm. But if we give way, even this difficult ground will be open to their advance with no one opposing them, and we shall then have a more formidable enemy because it will not be easy for them to retreat even if we do press back hard. Our best chance of beating them off is while they are still on their ships: once on land they are on equal terms with us.

‘And we should not be too fearful of their numbers. They may be a large force, but the difficulty of coming in to land will mean that only a few of them can fight at any one time. This is not the same as an army of superior size meeting us on land in equal combat, but they will be fighting from ships, which for success needs many conditions to combine at the right time on the sea. So I think their difficulties counterbalance our lack of numbers. You are Athenians, and you have experience of naval landings. You know that if an opponent stands his ground and is not intimidated into retreat by the crash of oars and the menace of ships bearing down on him, nothing will then shift him. So I call on you too now to stand firm, to fight them right on the shore, and to save both ourselves and this place here.’

This encouragement from Demosthenes boosted the Athenians' confidence, and they went on down to the sea and deployed along the very edge of the shore. 11

The Spartans now moved to attack the fort simultaneously with their land army and their ships, which were forty-three in number, and the admiral sailing in command was the Spartiate Thrasymelidas the son of Cratesicles. He made his attack where Demosthenes expected it, and the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, land and sea. The Spartans had divided their fleet into relays of a few ships at a time, as there was no room for more to put in, and they took turns of pause and attack, cheering one another on with every determination to press through somehow and take the fort. Most conspicuous of all in this action was Brasidas. He was commanding one of the triremes and could see that the other commanders and their helmsmen were wary of putting in to this rough coast, even where there seemed a possible opening, and concerned to avoid staving in their ships. He shouted out that it was nonsense to spare the timber and tolerate an enemy fort built in their country; he told the Spartan commanders to force a landing even if that broke their ships, and urged the allies to make a willing sacrifice of their ships, at this present time of need, to repay the Spartans for great benefits conferred; they should run their ships aground and make every effort to get on land and overpower both the men and the fort.

What he urged on the others he followed himself, forcing his 12

helmsman to ground the ship. He made for the gangway and tried to get down it, but was forced back by the Athenians and fainted from the multiple wounds he sustained. He fell into the outrigger, and his shield slipped from his arm into the sea. It was washed on land and recovered by the Athenians, who subsequently included it in the trophy they set up to mark this attack. The others tried their best to disembark, but found it impossible in view of the harshness of the terrain and the resolution with which the Athenians held their position. It was quite a reversal of circumstance—Athenians resisting from land (and Laconian land at that) a Spartan attack by sea, and Spartans attempting a naval landing to recover their own territory under Athenian occupation. The Spartans were generally thought at that time to be mostly a land power with unrivalled infantry, and the Athenians a sea power with overall naval supremacy.

So throughout this day and part of the next the Spartans continued

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their attempts to attack, and then desisted. On the third day they sent some of their ships to Asine to fetch wood for the construction of siege-engines, hoping that with these devices they could take the wall facing the bay, which might be high but afforded the best landing underneath it. Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, a total of fifty now, as they had been joined by some of the garrison ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships. When they saw the mainland and the island full of hoplites, and the Spartan

ships occupying the harbour and not sailing out to meet them, for lack of any other anchorage they sailed in the first instance to the uninhabited island of Prote, not far away, and camped there. On the following day they put to sea prepared for a naval battle—in the open sea if the enemy would come out for the fight: otherwise they themselves would sail into the bay.

The Spartans did not put out to meet them, nor had they in fact carried through their intention of blocking the entrances to the bay. Still on land and in no hurry, they began manning their ships and preparing to do battle in the huge harbour with any ships which entered it. Seeing how things stood, the Athenians moved in for the attack through both entrances. Most of the Spartans' ships were by now out from land and facing them. The Athenians fell on these and drove them into flight. They pursued as best they could over the short distance, crippling many of the ships and capturing five, one of them crew and all: the rest escaped to the shore, but the Athenians went in and rammed them. Other ships were still being manned, and these were disabled even before they could put out: some of them, evacuated in terror by their crews, were taken in tow by the Athenians and dragged away empty.

Anguished by the sight of this disaster, which threatened the isolation of their men on the island, the Spartans came running in support, plunged fully armed into the sea, and grabbed hold of their ships to pull them back—in all this flurry every man thought that any effort came to a standstill without the benefit of his personal

involvement. There was huge confusion and an inversion of their usual roles in this struggle for the ships: with the energy induced by shock the Spartans were virtually fighting a sea-battle from land, and the Athenians, victors eager to take maximum advantage of their present fortune, were fighting an infantry battle from their ships. They gave each other a hard fight and there were casualties on both sides: when they disengaged the Spartans had saved their empty ships, apart from those captured at the beginning. Each side now returned to their camp. The Athenians set up a trophy, returned the enemy dead, and took possession of the wrecks: and they immediately sent ships on a constant circuit round the island to keep guard on the men who were effectively marooned there. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, joined now by reinforcements from all quarters, kept their position facing Pylos.

When news of the situation at Pylos reached Sparta, it was 15 regarded as a major disaster and the Spartans decided that the authorities should go down to the camp, see for themselves, and take decisions on the spot as they thought best. Once the authorities had seen the impossibility of rescuing their men, they looked to avoid any danger of their coming to grief by starvation or being captured by force of numbers, and so decided to make a truce at Pylos with the Athenian generals (should they agree) while sending envoys to Athens to discuss a settlement and trying to achieve the earliest possible recovery of their men.

The generals accepted their proposal, and a truce was worked out

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on the following terms. The Spartans would bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships they had used in the battle and all other warships in Laconia, and they would not take arms against the fort either by land or by sea. The Athenians would allow the Spartans on the mainland to send over to their men on the island a set quantity of prepared food, for each man two Attic quarts of kneaded barley-meal, one pint of wine, and a piece of meat, with half that ration for their attendants: the sending of supplies would be done under Athenian supervision, and no boat should approach the island without their consent. The Athenians would continue to guard the island as before, but would not land on it: and they would not take arms against the Peloponnesian forces either by land or by sea. If either side deviated from these conditions in any way whatever, then the truce would be at an end. The truce would last until the Spartans' envoys returned from Athens: the Athenians would convey them there and back in a trireme. This truce would end on their return, and the Athenians would hand back the ships in the same state in which they had received them.

The truce was agreed on these terms, the ships (about sixty in number) were handed over, and the envoys were dispatched. On their arrival in Athens they spoke as follows:

'Athenians, the Spartans have sent us here to negotiate for our men

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on the island, in the hope that we can persuade you to an arrangement which will both be to your advantage and also allow us the most honourable outcome to the unfortunate situation in which we find ourselves. If we speak at some length, this is not a departure from our usual custom. In our country it is not our habit to use many words where few will suffice, but we do use more when the occasion demands an exposition of the relevant considerations to achieve the desired result. Please do not take what we say as polemic, or as a sermon assuming an unintelligent audience, but think of it as a reminder to the experienced of what you already know about good policy.

‘It is open to you to consolidate your present success, retaining what you now control and winning honour and glory besides: and to avoid the common error of men who have no experience of handling a piece of good fortune—one unexpected success makes them overconfident and grasping for more. Those who have met the most reversals of fortune in either direction have good reason to put least reliance on their successes: and experience suggests that this is particularly true both of your city and of us.

‘Witness our present misfortunes. We, with the greatest reputation

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in all Greece, have now had to come to you: and what we are here to ask of you we had previously thought was our own prerogative to grant. Yet what has happened to us was not the result of any loss of military strength (nor indeed of any gain in strength causing us

to overreach ourselves), but because we made a judgement on the facts at the time, and were wrong: all can make these errors, just as we did. So you should not let the present power of your city and its acquisitions make you think that fortune will always be on your side. Wise men deposit their gains in safe keeping against an uncertain future, and are then in a better position to take an intelligent approach to any losses: and wise men recognize that war follows wherever their fortunes lead, and does not confine itself to any area of involvement which they might choose. Such men, by their refusal to let success in war excite their confidence, are least likely to make a false move and most inclined to agree an end to the war when fortune is with them. And this, Athenians, is now your best course with us. You will want to avoid the danger that if you reject our proposal and then fail (as is perfectly possible), even these present successes which you have achieved will subsequently be attributed to luck: whereas it is open to you to leave to posterity an unendangered reputation for both strength and intelligence.

‘The Spartans invite you to a treaty ending the war. They offer¹⁹ peace, alliance, and a general state of good friendship and close relations between us. In return they ask for their men on the island, in the belief that it is better for both sides not to prolong the risks they each run, either that the men will find some means of forcing their escape or that they will be blockaded into submission. We think that it is the major enmities which admit of the most lasting settlements—not when one party is resistant and uses his broad

advantage over the enemy to enforce restrictive oaths and unequal terms of agreement, but when, despite his ability to do just that, he takes a fair view, makes generosity his victory, and surprises his opponent with a reasonable settlement. The other party now feels no need to resist, as he would if coerced, but rather an obligation to repay generosity in kind, and is all the more ready, from a sense of honour, to abide by the terms to which he has agreed. This is the sort of settlement men reserve for their more serious enemies, not for those with whom they have minor quarrels. And it is in human nature to bow gladly in response to concessions willingly given, but to meet arrogant obduracy with the determination to fight on, taking risks in defiance of judgement.

‘Now, if ever, is the right time for reconciliation, in both our 20 interests, before we are overtaken by something irremediably divisive, the inevitable result of which will be that you incur our undying enmity, not only collective but individual also, and lose the benefit of what we now invite you to accept. While the war is still undecided, while you stand to gain enhanced reputation and our friendship besides, and we to avoid any dishonour by resolving our predicament on reasonable terms—let us be reconciled. Let the two of us choose peace instead of war, and so bring relief from their pain to the rest of the Greeks. They will give you the main credit for this peace. At the moment they are involved in a war without knowing which side started it: but if the war is ended, as is now largely in your gift, it is you who will receive their gratitude. If you

decide for peace, you have the opportunity of friendship with the Spartans, and a firm friendship, when they themselves have invited it and you have granted, not enforced, the alliance. Think too of the likely benefit inherent in this. If we and you are speaking as one, you can be sure that the rest of the Greek world, lacking the power to match ours, will pay us the greatest deference.'

Such and no more was the speech made by the Spartans. Their ²¹ assumption was that the Athenians had earlier wanted a treaty, only to have it denied by their own refusal, and would now gladly accept the offer of peace and return their men. The Athenians took the view that, since they had the men trapped on the island, a peace treaty with the Spartans was now available to them whenever they wanted to make it, and they were inclined to grasp for more. In this they were mainly incited by Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a demagogue of the time and the most persuasive influence on the masses. He persuaded them to reply that first the men on the island must surrender their arms and themselves and be sent to Athens: once they were there, the Spartans should give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaëa (these had not been captured in war, but surrendered under the previous settlement, to which the Athenians had agreed at a time of difficulties, when they had more need of a treaty than now); then the Spartans could recover their men and make a treaty for whatever length of time was agreed by both sides.

The Spartans made no direct response to this reply, but asked ²²

the Athenians to appoint commissioners to meet them in private session for a full discussion of each point and a settlement on whatever terms were agreed in the debate. Cleon now pressed on in full force. He said he had always known that the Spartans had no honourable intentions, and this was now clear from their refusal to say anything in public and their request to confer with a small committee: if they had any sound proposal, they should declare it to all. The Spartans could see that it was impossible for them to speak in public, if indeed they were minded to make some concession in view of their disastrous situation, for fear of compromising themselves with their allies if they were heard to offer terms which were then rejected. They could see too that the Athenians were not going to accept their proposal on any mild conditions. So they left Athens with nothing achieved.

On their return the truce at Pylos was at an immediate end, and²³ the Spartans asked for the return of their ships according to the agreement. The Athenians refused to give them back, complaining of an attack on the wall in breach of the truce and some other apparently trivial infringements, and insisting on the clause which stated that any deviation whatever from the terms of the truce would bring it to an end. The Spartans protested and accused the Athenians of an injustice over the ships: they then went away and set to war.

Hostilities at Pylos were now in earnest on both sides. The Athenians kept two ships constantly sailing round the island in

opposite directions by day; at night they all anchored in a ring round the island, except on the side facing the open sea when there was a wind; and twenty more ships arrived from Athens to help in the blockade, bringing the total to seventy. The Peloponnesians camped on the mainland and made attacks on the wall, looking out for any opportunity which might arise to rescue their men.

Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and their allies brought up the

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further fleet which they had been preparing to join the ships on guard at Messana, and prosecuted the war from there. In this the main instigators were the Locrians, enemies of Rhegium, who had made a full-scale invasion of Rhegian territory on their own. They were eager to attempt a naval engagement, as they saw that the Athenians had few ships on the spot, and had learnt that the larger fleet destined for Sicily was occupied in the siege of Sphacteria. They reckoned that if they established control with their fleet they could blockade Rhegium with both ships and land forces, and easily subdue it—and then they would be in a strong position. There is very little distance between the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messana in Sicily, and the Athenians would not now be able to lie off Rhegium and command the strait. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily comes closest to the mainland: it is the so-called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. Its dangerous reputation is understandable given that narrow

gap and the currents caused by the influx of water from two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian.

In this intervening space, then, the Syracusans and their allies, 25 with somewhat over thirty ships, were forced to an engagement late in the day to defend a boat which was attempting the crossing, and they put out against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships. They were defeated by the Athenians and made a hasty retreat as best each could, with the loss of one ship. Night now ended the action.

After this the Locrians left Rhegian land, and the Syracusan and allied ships gathered and anchored at Peloris in the territory of Messana, joined there by their land forces. The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up and attacked when they saw that the ships were uncrewed: but they lost one of their own ships to the throw of a grappling-iron (its crew swam away). Thereafter the Syracusans manned their ships and began towing them on ropes along the shore towards Messana. The Athenians attacked again, but lost another ship when the Syracusans turned nose-on and made the first hit. So the Syracusans, successful in their move along the coast and the ensuing battle, as described, made safe return to the harbour at Messana.

News reached the Athenians that Camarina was being betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, so they sailed there. Taking this opportunity the Messanans launched a full-scale campaign, both by land and with the allied fleet, against Naxos, the Chalcidian city which was their neighbour. On the first day they

forced the Naxians behind their walls and ravaged the countryside: on the next day they sailed the ships round to the river Acesines and ravaged the land there, while their land forces began attacks on the city. At this point the Sicels from the other side of the hills came down in large numbers to help resist the Messanans. The Naxians took heart at this sight and, passing the word that the Leontinians and their other Greek allies were on their way to support them, made a sudden sally out of the city and fell on the Messanans. In the ensuing rout they killed over a thousand, and the remainder struggled to get home, as the barbarians attacked them along the roads and killed most of them. The ships put into Messina and then dispersed to their home ports.

The Leontinians and the other allies, together with the Athenians, now began an immediate campaign against Messina, thinking it crippled. Their plan of attack had the Athenians invading the harbour with their ships while the land forces moved against the city. But a sudden sally was made by the Messanans and a contingent of Locrians under Demoteles, left there as a garrison after the disaster at Naxos: they fell on the Leontinian troops, routed most of them, and killed a good number. Seeing this, the Athenians landed from their ships and came up in support: they caught the Messanans in disarray and chased them back into the city. They then set up a trophy and withdrew to Rhegium. After this the Greeks in Sicily continued to campaign against one another by land without any Athenian involvement.

At Pylos the Athenians continued the blockade of the Spartans on the island, and the Peloponnesians stayed encamped where they were on the mainland. It was a hardship for the Athenians to maintain their guard on the place. They suffered from lack of food and water (there were no springs other than one inadequate source on the acropolis of Pylos, and most had to scabble in the shingle on the shore to find some sort of drinkable water); conditions were cramped in the small area available for their quarters; with no harbour the ships had to take turns for food on land while the others stayed at anchor in the open sea. The greatest damage to their morale was caused by the unexpected prolongation of the siege, when they had thought that it would only take a few days to reduce a group of men on an uninhabited island with nothing but brackish water.

The reason was that the Spartans had put the word out for volunteers to get food to the island—milled grain, cheese, any other foodstuff suitable for men under siege—with a substantial reward attached and the promise of freedom to any Helot who successfully made the run. And they did get food in. Prominent among those taking this risk were the Helots, who set off from wherever they were in the Peloponnese and sailed by night to the seaward side of the island, watching particularly for a wind to carry them in. It was easier for them to evade the triremes' guard when the wind was blowing from the sea, as a full blockade was impossible under those conditions, and they themselves would sail in quite recklessly: the

boats they ran ashore had an agreed monetary value set on them, and the Spartan hoplites kept guard round the landing-places of the island. Any who took the risk when it was calm were caught. And divers would make their way across from the harbour, swimming underwater and pulling on a cord behind them skins filled with honeyed poppy-seed and crushed linseed: at first they got through undetected, but then a watch was set. The two sides employed every ingenuity, either to send food across or to intercept it.

When it was learnt at Athens that their own forces were having⁸²⁷ trouble and that food was being imported to the men on the island, there was growing concern and a fear that their blockade would be overtaken by winter. The supply of food was a double problem: the place was uninhabited, and they could see that it would be impossible to transport provisions round the Peloponnese, when adequate supplies could not be sent even in summer. They saw too that the blockade could not be maintained indefinitely in an area without harbours, so either they would have to abandon their siege and let the men survive, or the men would wait for stormy weather and sail away in the boats which brought them food. Their greatest fear was of the Spartans themselves: they thought that the lack of any further negotiation meant that the Spartans were in a strong position, and they began to regret their refusal to accept the treaty.

Cleon, aware of the Athenians' resentment of him for preventing the agreement, challenged the truth of the reports from Pylos. Those who had brought the reports proposed that, if they were not

believed, inspectors should be sent to see for themselves, and the Athenians chose for this role Cleon himself and Theogenes. Aware now that this would force him either to confirm the reports of those he was impugning, or else be shown a liar if he contradicted them, and seeing that opinion had shifted rather more in favour of military action, Cleon advised the Athenians that they should not be wasting time and opportunity by sending inspectors, but, if they judged the reports true, should be sailing there to deal with the men.

Then, with pointed allusion to Nicias the son of Niceratus, an Athenian general for whom he had a personal enmity, Cleon contested that, if the generals were real men, they could easily fit out a fleet to sail and take the men on the island: if he were in command, he would do exactly that. With the Athenians now beginning to barrack Cleon,

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asking why he was not already on his way if it seemed so easy to him, and conscious of the personal criticism of himself, Nicias told Cleon that as far as the generals were concerned he could take whatever force he wished and make his attempt. At first Cleon happily accepted the offer, thinking it only a debating point made by Nicias: but when he became aware that Nicias really was prepared to hand over his command, he began to backtrack and said that it was not he but Nicias who was general. He was now alarmed, and had not imagined that Nicias would have the nerve to stand aside. Nicias pressed him again, offered his own resignation

from the Pylos command, and called on the Athenians to witness it. As is typical of crowd behaviour, the more Cleon tried to extricate himself from this expedition and withdraw what he had said, the more they cheered on Nicias to hand over the command and shouted at Cleon 'Sail!'

So with no means now of escaping his own claims, Cleon undertook the expedition. He came forward and said that he had no fear of the Spartans; he would sail without requiring a single man from the city for his force, but would take with him the contingents from Lemnos and Imbros which were then in Athens, the peltasts who had come in support from Aenus and elsewhere, and four hundred archers; with this force added to the troops already at Pylos, within twenty days he would either bring back the Spartans on the island alive, or kill them where they were. This brash talk caused a certain amount of laughter among the Athenians, but even so the more sensible elements welcomed it, reckoning that they would thus achieve one or the other of two desired ends—either to be rid of Cleon (which they thought the more likely), or, if they proved wrong in this, to have the Spartans delivered into their hands.

When he had completed all the formalities in the assembly and the

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Athenians had passed the vote authorizing his expedition, Cleon chose Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, as his colleague, and quickly prepared for departure. He made this choice of

colleague because he had heard that Demosthenes himself was already planning the landing on the island: his soldiers were keen to make the attempt, as they were suffering from the hardships of the place and were more besieged than besieging.

Demosthenes' resolve was further strengthened by a fire on the island. The fact that the island, having never been inhabited, was largely wooded and pathless had up till now deterred him, as he thought this gave advantage to the enemy. Even if he landed with a large force the Spartans could do damage with attacks from hidden positions. The tree-cover would deny the Athenians a clear view of the enemy's shortcomings and capabilities, whereas any false move by their own forces would be plain to see, so the enemy could make unpredictable attacks wherever they wished, and the initiative would be theirs. Then again, if he were compelled to close quarters in a wooded area, he thought that the smaller force with a knowledge of the ground would have the advantage over the larger force without that knowledge: and with no sightlines to indicate where support was needed the Athenian army, large though it was, could be destroyed without realizing the extent of the destruction.

His experience in

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Aetolia contributed much to Demosthenes' thoughts at this time: there too a wood had played a part in the disaster.

Lack of space obliged the Athenian soldiers to put in at the extremities of the island to take their midday meal, with guards posted. One of them inadvertently set fire to a small area of wood:

a wind got up, and the result was that before they knew it most of the island's tree-cover had been consumed by fire. So Demosthenes, now with a clearer view, could see that there were more men on the island than he had thought (before this he had suspected the Spartans of sending in food for an exaggerated number), which would convince the Athenians of the importance of the enterprise and increase their enthusiasm for it: he could see too that it was now easier to land on the island. He therefore began to prepare for the operation, sending for troops from nearby allies and getting all else ready.

Cleon sent a messenger in advance to tell Demosthenes that he was on his way, and subsequently arrived at Pylos with the force he had requested. When he and Demosthenes were together they first sent a herald to the Spartan camp on the mainland inviting them, should they wish, to tell the men on the island to surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians without prejudice, on the understanding that they would be kept in reasonable conditions of custody, pending agreement on the larger issue.

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This proposal was rejected. The Athenians waited for one day, then in that following night embarked all their hoplites in a few ships and set out. Shortly before dawn they made landings on both sides of the island, from the open sea and on the harbour side, with a total of about eight hundred hoplites, and advanced at the run to the first guard-post on the island. The Spartan dispositions were as follows: in this first garrison there were some thirty hoplites; the

majority and their commander Epitadas occupied the middle and most level part of the island, round the source of water; and a small detachment guarded the very end of the island facing Pylos, which was sheer from the sea and least vulnerable to attack by land. There was in fact an ancient fort there, built of undressed stones, which they thought would be of use to them if they were hard-pressed to retreat. Such was the arrangement of the Spartan forces.

The Athenians rushed the first guards and killed them 32

instantly—they were still in bed or grabbing for their weapons. The landing had gone unnoticed, as the guards had thought that the ships were simply moving to their usual nightly anchorage. At dawn the rest of the army began to land: this consisted of the entire crews of rather more than seventy ships (except for the lowest-tier oarsmen), variously equipped; eight hundred archers and no less a number of peltasts; the Messenians who had come in support; and all the others stationed at Pylos apart from the guards on the wall. Demosthenes had organized them into separate groups of more or less two hundred, and these contingents occupied the high points of the ground, in order to cause the enemy maximum difficulty by surrounding them on all sides, thus leaving them no single front for any counterattack, but exposing them to massed opposition in every direction: if they moved against those in front of them they would be attacked from behind, and if against one flank they would be attacked by those stationed on the other. And wherever they moved, they would always have at their back their enemy's light-

armed troops, the most difficult of all to deal with, as they were effective at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings. It was impossible even to get near them: if pursued they could run back and still maintain their threat, and if it was the enemy retreating they would press them hard. Such was Demosthenes' strategy when he first planned the landing, and he now put it into practice.

When the contingent under Epitadas (the main body of the Spartans on the island) saw that their first garrison had been wiped out and an army was moving against them, they formed for battle and advanced towards the Athenian hoplites, wanting to come to close quarters: the hoplites were positioned directly in front of them, with the light-armed troops on the flanks and behind them. The Spartans could not get at the hoplites or make use of their own expertise, as they were kept back by a barrage of missiles from the light-armed troops on either side, and also the hoplites would not advance to meet them but stayed where they were. They could drive back the light-armed wherever they ran in particularly close to make their attacks, but then these troops would turn again and renew the fight: being lightly equipped they could easily outpace any pursuit in this difficult terrain, left rough by lack of habitation, and the Spartans in their heavy armour could not chase them over such ground.

For some little time they continued this long-range skirmishing³⁴

against each other. But when the Spartans were no longer able to respond with quick sallies wherever they were attacked, the lightarmed troops could see that they were now slower to defend themselves, and this sight had greatly increased their own confidence. They could see, too, that they clearly outnumbered the Spartans, and with greater experience of them now did not think them as formidable as they once had: they had made the initial landing in a state of abject terror at the thought of facing Spartans, but had suffered nothing so far to justify their apprehension. Turned now to contempt, they gave a shout and launched themselves in a body against the Spartans, bombarding them with stones, arrows, javelins—whatever each of them had to hand.

This combination of shouting and onslaught caused panic in an enemy unused to this sort of warfare. Moreover clouds of ash were rising from the newly burned wood, and a man could hardly see in front of his face for the hail of arrows and stones from so many hands, together with the ash. The Spartans were now in real difficulties. Their felt helmets were no protection against the arrows, and the spearheads broke off in their bodies when they were hit; there was nothing they could do to help themselves, with forward vision impaired and their own commands drowned out by the greater volume of the enemy's shouting; danger surrounded them on all sides, and they had no hope of any means of fighting to safety.

At length, as the number of wounded grew with their constant

wheeling around in the same spot, the Spartans closed ranks and made for the fort at the end of the island (which was not far away) and their garrison there. Seeing them give way, the light-armed troops harried them with fresh confidence and yet louder shouting, and those Spartans caught on the retreat were killed, but the majority made their escape to the fort and with the guards there took up stations to defend the fort at every point where it was open to attack. The Athenians followed, but the strength of the site made a flanking or encircling movement impossible, so they tried to drive them out with a frontal attack. For a long time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out through the attrition of battle, thirst, and sun—the Athenians determined to drive the enemy off the high ground, and the Spartans determined not to give way. The Spartan defence was easier now than it had been before, as they did not have to deal with an enemy surrounding them on the flanks.

With no end in sight, the commander of the Messenians came up³⁶ to Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that they were wasting their efforts: if they were prepared to let him have a section of the archers and the light-armed troops he would go round behind the Spartans by any route he could find, and he thought he could force the approach. He was given the troops he asked for, and set off with them from a point out of sight of the Spartans. He made his way along wherever the precipitous face of the island afforded a footing, on the side of the site where the Spartans had trusted in its natural defences and posted no guards. With difficulty he just managed to

get round, unseen, and then suddenly appeared on the height to their rear. The surprise of this caused consternation in the Spartans, but it was what the Athenians were looking for and the sight greatly increased their morale. The Spartans were now under attack from both front and back, and were falling into the same situation (to compare small with great) as at Thermopylae: there the Spartans were destroyed when the Persians went round behind them along the mountain path, and these likewise could no longer resist when exposed now to a double-sided attack. They were few against many, they were physically weakened by lack of food, and they began to withdraw: and the Athenians now controlled the approaches.

Cleon and Demosthenes realized that if the Spartans gave way 37 even a few steps further they would be slaughtered by the Athenian forces, so they stopped the fighting and restrained their own troops. They wanted to bring the Athenians live Spartans, and hoped that on hearing the terms announced the Spartans would be demoralized into handing over their arms and giving in to their desperate situation. They announced that it was open to the Spartans to surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, at the Athenians' discretion to decide as they saw fit. 38

On hearing this most of them dropped their shields and waved their hands to indicate acceptance of the terms. The armistice now came into effect and there was a meeting for further discussion between Cleon and Demosthenes and, from the Spartan side, Styphon the son of Pharax. (He was the third of the Spartan commanders. Of the

previous two the first, Epitadas, was dead: his nominated successor, Hippagretas, was lying among the corpses, still alive but taken for dead. As the law prescribed, Styphon had been nominated third commander, to take over if anything happened to the other two.) Styphon and his delegation said that they wished to communicate by herald with the Spartans on the mainland and ask for their instructions. The Athenians would not let any of them make the crossing, but sent word themselves for heralds to come over from the mainland. After two or three consultations, the final emissary to sail across from the Spartans on the mainland brought this message: 'The Spartans tell you to make your own decisions about yourselves, but to do nothing dishonourable.' They discussed with their own men, and surrendered their arms and themselves.

For the rest of this day and the following night the Athenians kept them under guard. On the next day they set up a trophy on the island and made general preparations to sail, handing over the prisoners to the custody of the ships' captains: and the Spartans sent a herald and recovered their dead. The numbers killed and taken alive on the island were as follows. A total of four hundred and twenty Spartan hoplites had been ferried to the island. Of these two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, and the rest had been killed: the live prisoners included about a hundred and twenty Spartiates. Not many Athenian lives were lost, as the fighting had not been a pitched battle.

The whole duration of the blockade of the men on Sphacteria, 39

from the naval battle to the fight on the island, was seventy-two days. For about twenty of these days, when the envoys were away seeking a treaty, the men were supplied with food, but for the rest of the time they depended on smuggled-in provisions. In fact a store of grain and other foodstuffs was found on the island, as the commander Epitadas had not been issuing to his men as full rations as he could afford. So now the Athenians and Peloponnesians withdrew their armies from Pylos, and each side returned home. And, mad though it had seemed, Cleon's promise was fulfilled: he did bring back the men within twenty days, as he had undertaken.

To the Greeks this was the most surprising event of the whole 40 war. They had thought that Spartans would never surrender their arms, in starvation or any other extremity, but would use them to the last of their strength and die fighting. They could not believe that those who surrendered were of the same quality as those who were killed. Some time later one of the Athenian allies taunted a prisoner from the island by asking, 'Were the dead, then, your good men and brave?' The Spartan replied that the 'spindle' (his word for an arrow) would indeed be a weapon of great value if it could pick out the brave: by this he meant that the stones and arrows killed whoever happened to be in their path.

When the men were brought to Athens the Athenians decided to 41 keep them imprisoned and chained until there was some agreement—and to take them out and kill them if the Peloponnesians invaded their land in the meantime. They established a garrison at Pylos,

manned by the Messenians from Naupactus who sent their best men for this purpose to what they regarded as their fatherland (Pylos lies in what was once Messenian territory). These Messenians kept up plundering raids on Laconia and were able to cause a great deal of damage as they spoke in the local dialect. With no previous experience of this sort of predatory warfare, with the Helots beginning to desert and the fear of yet wider revolution affecting the whole system of their country, the Spartans were seriously worried. Although not wanting to reveal their concerns to the Athenians, they continued to send embassies to Athens in the attempt to recover Pylos and their men. But the Athenians were inclined to reach for yet greater success: ambassadors came and came again, but every time the Athenians sent them back empty-handed.

Such, then, were the events concerning Pylos.

Immediately afterwards in the same summer the Athenians 42
campaigns against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships, two thousand of their own hoplites, and two hundred cavalry in horse- transports. They were joined by allied troops from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus, and commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus with two other generals.

The fleet sailed and put in at dawn between Chersonesus and Rheitus, at a beach on this shoreline directly under the hill Solygeius (this is where in ancient times the Dorians had established position for their war against the Aeolians inhabiting Corinth: there

is now a village called Solygeia on this hill). From this beach where the ships put in the distance to the village is just under a mile and a half, to the city of Corinth about seven and a quarter miles, and to the Isthmus two and a half miles. The Corinthians had received from Argos advance notice of the intended expedition, and in good time had gathered a full levy at the Isthmus (except those north of the Isthmus, and the five hundred troops they had on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas), and were keeping watch to see where the Athenians would land. In fact the Athenians sailed in undetected before it was light, but when the Corinthians were alerted by signals, they left half of their forces in the area of Cenchreae (in case the Athenians turned against Crommyon) and set off quickly to the defence.

One of the two Corinthian generals present in the field, Battus,⁴³ took a single division to the village of Solygeia to protect it (it was unfortified), while Lycophron began the attack with the rest of the force. The Corinthians fell first on the Athenians' right wing as soon as it had disembarked in front of Chersonesus, and then on the rest of the Athenian army. There was hard fighting, all of it hand-to-hand. The right wing of Athenians and Carystians (these were next to the Athenians on the extreme right) withstood the Corinthian attack and with some difficulty shoved them back. They retreated behind a drystone wall higher up the hill (the whole site sloped steeply upwards), and began pelting the Athenians with stones from the wall. Then they shouted a paean and came back to the attack.

Again the Athenians withstood them, and there was more hand-to-hand fighting. Now a division of Corinthians came up in support of their left wing, turned the Athenian right wing, and drove them down to the sea: but the Athenians and Carystians rallied by the ships and fought their way back. There was constant fighting meanwhile between the rest of the two armies, most intense where the right wing of the Corinthians under Lycophron were defending against the left wing of the Athenians, in the expectation that they would otherwise make an attempt on the village of Solygeia.

So for some long time they both held out, neither side giving way

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to the other. But finally, with the Athenian cavalry contributing an advantage over their opponents who had no horses, the Corinthians were turned back and retreated to the summit of the hill, where they grounded their arms and made no further descents, staying there inactive. In this defeat the most casualties were sustained on their right wing, including their general Lycophron. The rest of their army, similarly pressed to retreat, withdrew to the high ground and took up position there: they were not pursued far, and could make the retreat at their own pace. The Corinthians did not return to the attack, so the Athenians stripped the enemy dead and recovered their own, and immediately set up a trophy.

The other half of the Corinthian forces, who were stationed in Cenchraean territory on guard in case the Athenians sailed against Crommyon, had their view of the battle obscured by Mount

Oneium: but when they saw the dust-cloud and realized what was happening, they went straight in support. Support came too from the older men in Corinth when they heard of the situation. At the sight of these combined forces advancing on them the Athenians thought they were facing reinforcements from the neighbouring Peloponnesian states close by, and quickly withdrew to their ships, taking with them the spoils and their own dead (they had to leave two whom they had not been able to find). They embarked and crossed to the outlying islands, from where they sent a herald and recovered under truce the two bodies they had left. In the battle the Corinthians had lost two hundred and twelve men, and the Athenians a little under fifty.

On that same day the Athenians put out from the islands and 45 sailed to Crommyon, which is in Corinthian territory about fourteen and a half miles from the city of Corinth. They anchored there, ravaged the land, and made camp for the night. On the next day they first sailed round the coast to the territory of Epidaurus and made a landing there, then went on to Methana, which lies between Epidaurus and Troezen. They took control of the isthmus of the Methana peninsula and fortified it, establishing a garrison which for some later time carried out raids on the land of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. When the fortification of the site was finished, the fleet sailed back home.

At the same time as these events, Eurymedon and Sophocles, on 46

their way now with the Athenian ships from Pylos to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra and joined the people in the city in a campaign against the Corcyraean party established on Mount Istone (these had earlier crossed over from the mainland, after the civil war, and were now in control of the countryside and doing great damage). The Athenians attacked their fortified position and took it. The men had fled in a body to a higher point and came to terms, agreeing to hand over the mercenaries and, in their own case, to surrender their arms and submit to the decision of the Athenian people. The generals transported them to the island of Ptychia for custody under truce until they could be sent to Athens: a condition was that if any of them were caught trying to abscond, the truce would be at an end for all of them.

But the leaders of the democratic party in Corcyra, concerned that the Athenians might not execute the captives when they arrived at Athens, devised some sort of pre-emptive measure. They worked on a selected few of those held on the island, suborning their friends to go in with the apparently well-intentioned message that they had best abscond as soon as they could, and they themselves would have a boat ready: the Athenian generals, they said, were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean democrats. The persuasion worked, the

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boat was provided, and they were caught trying to sail away. The truce was then at an immediate end, and all the men were handed over to the Corcyraeans. A considerable contribution to this

outcome, making the story plausible and the perpetrators bold enough to try it on, was the attitude of the Athenian generals, who made it clear that, as they themselves were bound for Sicily, they would not want anyone else to transport the men to Athens and gain the credit for bringing them in.

When the men were delivered to them the Corcyraeans shut them up in a large building. Later they took them out in groups of twenty, shackled together, and made them pass between two parallel files of armed men, who beat and stabbed any personal enemy they saw: men with whips walked alongside, hurrying on those who were slow to approach this gauntlet. A total of sixty were taken out and killed in

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this way without the men in the building realizing what was happening (they thought they were being moved on to some other place). When they did learn the truth (someone had managed to alert them), they appealed to the Athenians and invited them to kill them themselves, if they wanted them dead. They refused to let any more leave the building, and said they would do their best to prevent anyone entering it.

The Corcyraeans had no intention anyway of forcing their way in through the doors, but climbed up onto the roof of the building, made a hole in the material, and began pelting them with the tiles and shooting down arrows. The men inside protected themselves as best they could, but most were also looking to take their own lives: they used the spent arrows to stab themselves in the throat, or

hanged themselves with the cords from some bedsteads which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn from their own clothing. Night fell on this atrocity, but throughout most of the night the killing went on in every form until they were all dead, either by their own hand or shot down from above. In the morning the Corcyraeans threw the bodies criss-cross onto wagons and took them outside the city. The women who had been captured in the fort were enslaved. Such was the annihilation by the democrats of the Corcyraean party based on the mountain, and the civil strife which had grown so violent ended in this—at least for the duration of this war: nothing worth reckoning was left of the other party.

The Athenians sailed off to Sicily, which was their primary destination, and began operations with their allies there.

Towards the end of summer the Athenians at Naupactus joined⁴⁹ the Acarnanians in a campaign against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf: it was betrayed to them, and they took it. The Acarnanians sent out settlers of their own to occupy the place, drawing them from all parts of the country. So this summer ended.

In the following winter Aristeides the son of Archippus, one of the

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generals commanding the Athenian ships sent out to the allies to raise money, arrested at Eïon on the Strymon a Persian, Artaphernes, who was on his way from the King of Persia to Sparta. He was sent to Athens, where the Athenians had his dispatches

translated from the Assyrian characters in which they were written, and read them. Amid much other matter the central point in these dispatches was that the King did not understand what the Spartans wanted; many envoys had come, but no two said the same thing; if, then, they wished to make themselves clear, they should send men back to him with the Persian emissary. Some time later the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, with an embassy of their own. There they were informed of the recent death of King Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes (he had died in this intervening period), and so returned home.

In this same winter the Chians demolished their newly built walls

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on the orders of the Athenians, who suspected them of revolutionary intent, but not before they had obtained assurances and the best guarantee they could that the Athenians likewise would make no revolution in their policy towards Chios.

So ended this winter, and with it the seventh year of this war chronicled by Thucydides.

The following summer began with a partial eclipse of the sun at the

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time of the new moon, and an earthquake early in that same month.

The majority of the exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos had established a base on the mainland, and from here, with mercenaries hired from the Peloponnese and others recruited

locally, they set out and captured Rhoeteium—then gave it back unharmed on the payment of two thousand Phocaeen staters. Thereafter they went against Antandrus: the city was betrayed to them, and they took it. Their overall strategy was to liberate all the so-called Actaeon cities (which had been administered by Mytilene but were now in Athenian control), with Antandrus their prime objective. There was an abundance of timber available there and on the nearby Mount Ida for the building of ships and other apparatus: they could fortify Antandrus and then easily use it as a base from which to make raids on Lesbos (which was not far away) and to gain control of the Aeolian towns on the mainland. They were ready to go ahead with these preparations.

In the same summer the Athenians made an expedition against⁵³ Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking with them troops from Miletus and some other allies: the generals in command were Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an island lying opposite Laconia by Cape Malea. The inhabitants are Spartans in the category of Perioeci. A commissioner for Cythera went over from Sparta to the island every year, and the Spartans kept a permanent hoplite garrison there, regularly replaced. They took good care of the place, as it was a port of call for merchant ships coming in to them from Egypt and Libya, and also served to discourage pirates' raids on Laconia from the sea, the one direction

from which it was vulnerable to depredation, as the whole of Laconia lies open to the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

The Athenians put in with their expeditionary force. With ten 54 ships and the Milesian hoplites they took the harbour town called Scandeia. With the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced on the city of Cythera, where they found the whole population already mobilized and camped outside. In the ensuing battle the Cytherans held their ground for a short while, but then turned and fled to their upper city. Thereafter they came to terms with Nicias and his fellow commanders, agreeing surrender to the Athenians at their full discretion short of the death penalty. There had in fact been some earlier communication between Nicias and some of the Cytherans, which speeded the agreement and moderated its immediate and subsequent effect: otherwise the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherans, on the grounds that they are Spartans and their island lies that close to Laconia. With the terms agreed, the Athenians took over Scandeia, the town by the harbour, and installed a garrison to secure the island. They then sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the other coastal areas of Laconia, making landings and overnight camps wherever there was opportunity, and ravaged that territory for about seven days.

Seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting 55 similar landings on their own territory, the Spartans did not concentrate their full forces for a pitched battle in any one place,

but sent out separate bodies of hoplites to guard the country wherever there was need, and generally maintained a full alert. They feared the possibility of a revolution overtaking their political system, now that they had suffered the massive and unexpected disaster on the island, Pylos and Cythera were in enemy hands, and they were beset on all fronts by a fast-moving war which outpaced their defences. In consequence they took what was for them the unusual step of raising a troop of four hundred cavalry, and a force of archers. And in all military matters they became yet more cautious than ever before, caught as they were in a naval conflict which ran counter to their traditional mode of armament—a naval conflict, moreover, against the Athenians, who always saw a missed opportunity as the loss of an expected success. Fortune too had been against them, and they were shattered by the many blows dealt them in a short time, quite contrary to any reasonable prediction: they now feared some further disaster like that which they had sustained on the island. This made them less confident for battle. Unused to reverses before now, they had lost faith in their judgement and thought that any move they made would end in failure.

In their present ravaging of the coastal areas the Athenians met⁵⁶ little resistance for the most part. Wherever they made landings, each local garrison, sharing this general diffidence, thought themselves outnumbered and took no action. One garrison, though, in the neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphroditia, did resist and

made a charge on the scattered crowd of light-armed troops which sent them flying, but then withdrew again when met by the hoplites. A few of the garrison were killed and their arms taken. The Athenians set up a trophy and sailed back to Cythera.

From there they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, and after ravaging part of that territory moved on to Thyrea. This is a place in the region called Cynouria, on the borders of Argos and Laconia. It was under Spartan control, and the Spartans had granted it as a home to the dispossessed people of Aegina in virtue of the help they had given Sparta at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt, and because, despite being Athenian subjects, they had always inclined to the Spartan cause.

While the Athenians were still approaching, the Aeginetans abandoned

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the fortification which they were in the process of building on the sea-front and retired to the upper city where they lived, just over a mile from the sea. One of the Spartan garrisons in the area had been helping with the construction, but refused the Aeginetans' request to join them behind the walls of the upper city. They could see danger in becoming immured, and withdrew to higher ground, where, reckoning that they would be no match in a battle, they did nothing. At this point the Athenians put in with their fleet, set out immediately in full force, and took Thyrea. They set fire to the city and looted everything in it. Those Aeginetans not killed in the close fighting were taken away and transported to Athens, together with

the resident Spartan governor, Tantalus the son of Patrocles, who had been wounded and captured alive. Taken to Athens at the same time were a few men from Cythera, whose removal was thought necessary on grounds of security. The Athenians decided to deposit these men in the islands; to allow the rest of the Cytherans the continued occupation of their own land on payment of a tribute of four talents; to kill all the captured Aeginetans in view of their constant previous hostility; and to imprison Tantalus in the company of his fellow Spartans from the island.

In Sicily, in this same summer, the people of Camarina and Gela⁵⁸ took the initiative of making a truce just between themselves. And then later all the other Greek Sicilians joined in a conference at Gela, each city sending delegates, to discuss the possibility of a general reconciliation. Many opinions were expressed one way or the other, and there were recriminations and demands as each delegation claimed some disadvantage. Amid all this the most compelling speech was made by Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusan. He addressed the gathering to this effect:

‘Fellow Greeks and Sicilians, I come from a city which is not the⁵⁹ least powerful in Sicily nor the worst afflicted by the war. What I have to say to you, then, is not local prejudice but a way forward for the general good, my view of the best policy for Sicily as a whole.

‘There is no need to give a lengthy description of all the misery inherent in war—you know that already. No one is forced to war

unwittingly, and no one is deterred from war if they think they will gain from it. So what happens is that one side sees the advantages as outweighing the dangers, and the other is prepared to face the risks rather than suffer an immediate loss. But if this very conflict is in fact a miscalculation on both sides, there is virtue in counselling reconciliation. And this counsel, if we are prepared to act on it in our present situation, could be of invaluable benefit for us too. It was of course to promote our own individual interests that we went to war in the first place; now we are trying to resolve our differences by discussion; and if we leave this conference without a fair settlement of individual interests, we shall go to war again.

‘And yet we should recognize that, if we have any sense, the question

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for this meeting will not solely be our local concerns, but whether we can still save the whole of Sicily from what, in my view, is the Athenian design against it. We should regard the Athenians as much more forceful agents of reconciliation than any words of mine. They are the greatest power in Greece; they are here with just a few ships at present to observe our mistakes; they are using the apparent legitimacy of “alliance” to turn our ingrained enmities to their covert advantage. If we start internal wars and call in their support (and these are people who readily launch expeditions even when not invited), if we harm ourselves at our own expense while at the same time clearing the way for their dominance, the likelihood is

that they will wait to see us exhausted and then come with a larger force in an attempt to bring all Sicily under their control.

‘Yet, if we have any sense, our only purpose in calling in allies⁶¹ and taking on additional risks should be to extend what each of us has by further acquisition—not to harm what we already possess. We should realize that internal dissension, more than anything else, is the ruin of our cities and the ruin of Sicily: all of us who live in this island are threatened by the designs of a common enemy, but we are still divided, city against city. We must recognize this. There must be reconciliation—individual to individual, city to city—and a united effort to save the whole of Sicily. No one should suppose that Athenian hostility is confined to the Dorians among us, while their shared Ionian descent confers immunity on the Chalcidian population. It is not a question of race. This Athenian attack is not motivated by the fact that there are two races here and they hate one of them. Their motive is to get their hands on the wealth of Sicily—which is our common possession. This is clear enough from their response to the appeal from the Chalcidian community: the Chalcidian cities have never in the past done anything to help Athens under the old alliance, but now the Athenians have found a particular enthusiasm to fulfil their own obligations stipulated in that agreement.

‘That the Athenians should be thus acquisitive and calculating is wholly understandable. My complaint is not of those who seek domination, but rather of those who are too ready to submit to it. It

has always been in human nature to dominate the subservient—but also to defend against the aggressor. If we recognize this but do not take the proper precautions, or if anyone has come here without the conviction that our most important task is to join together in dealing with the danger which threatens us all—then we are making a mistake. The most immediate way to be rid of this danger is to reach an agreement among ourselves, as the Athenians cannot move against us from home territory, but only from a base provided by those who invited them. In this way our war does not end in further war, but peace brings a trouble-free end to our differences: and our visitors, invited here with a good pretext for doing wrong, will have good reason to leave with nothing done for their trouble.

‘With regard to the Athenians, this is the great benefit we gain if we take the right decisions. As for ourselves, when peace is universally agreed to be the best state, why should we too not make peace? However our fortunes may differ—prosperity for one, its opposite for another—do you not think peace an advantage in either case, more likely than war to preserve good fortune and put an end to misfortune? Or that peace has its own honours and distinctions, won without danger? And one could continue at length listing the blessings of peace, as long a list as the miseries of war. I ask you to think carefully about this. Do not see anything suspect in what I say, but rather the prospect of salvation for each one of you.

‘And if anyone thinks that a just cause or adequate force will ensure some lasting success, he must be prepared for

disappointment and not take it too hard when he fails. He should realize that there is a long history of men retaliating against a wrongful attack who, so far from succeeding in their attempted revenge, have not even survived it; and of others who expected that their power would win them some new acquisition, and then, instead of gaining others' possessions, found themselves losing their own. Revenge does not have its just success, simply because it is a response to injustice: and strength acquires no guarantee from the confidence which accompanies it. The greatest determinant of affairs is the incalculable future, which is the most unreliable element of all and yet clearly has the most beneficial effect, as our common fear of the future makes us think twice before setting out to attack one another.

‘And now we have double cause for alarm—blind fear of what this

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hidden future may hold, and the immediate threat of the Athenian presence here and now. We can attribute our failure in what each of us planned and hoped to achieve to the effective constraint of these two factors. So let us send on their way the enemies threatening our land, and for ourselves reach an agreement, if we can, for all time: failing that, let us at least make a truce for as long as possible and defer our private quarrels to some future occasion. In short, let us recognize that if my advice is followed we shall each possess a free city and be our own masters, able to respond honourably, and on equal terms, to anyone doing us good or harm. But if we reject it

and submit to the control of others, any action we take, however successful, will not be a matter of our own deliberate revenge, but a forced collaboration with our greatest enemies against those who should be our friends.

‘Now, as I said at the beginning, I represent a major city, and 64
am more likely to attack others than be attacked. But in view of all these considerations I think it right to back down, and not to do my enemies the damage which redounds to my own harm; not to think, in idiot ambition, that control of my own will implies equal control of fortune, which I do not govern; but to make all reasonable concessions. And I ask you all to do the same as I do, imposing this on yourselves rather than having it imposed by the enemy. There is no shame in concessions made within a family—Dorian conceding to Dorian, or Chalcidian to his relatives. The important point is that we are all neighbours, all fellow inhabitants of a single land surrounded by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. We shall fight again, I imagine, when occasion demands, and come to terms again on our own, by negotiation among ourselves. But, if we have any sense, we shall always unite to resist a foreign invader, seeing that harm to any one of us endangers us all: and we shall never in future bring in outsiders as allies or as agents of reconciliation. This policy will ensure that in our present situation we do not deprive Sicily of the double benefit of getting rid of the Athenians and rid of internal war: and that for the future we enjoy on our own a free country less exposed to the designs of others.’

Such was Hermocrates' speech, and the Sicilians took his advice. 65

They agreed among themselves a decision to end the war on the terms that each should retain what they already held, except that Morgantina should go to the people of Camarina on payment of a specified sum to the Syracusans. Those allied to the Athenians called in the Athenian command and told them of their intention to agree a treaty which would apply equally to the Athenians. They gave their approval, the agreement was concluded, and after that the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.

When the generals returned the Athenians at home imposed the punishment of exile on two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, and a monetary fine on the third, Eurymedon, thinking that they had been bribed to withdraw when they could have taken control of Sicily. This was indicative of their attitude in view of their current good fortune: they expected no reverses, but achievement alike of the possible and the near-impossible, irrespective of the forces deployed, whether large or barely adequate. The reason was the success, beyond any rational prediction, of most of their operations, and this had fuelled their hope.

In the same summer the people in the city of Megara found 66
themselves hard pressed on two fronts—by the Athenians in the course of the war, with their regular full-scale invasions of Megarian territory twice in every year, and also by their own exiles in Pegae, expelled by the people's party after internal strife and now causing severe trouble with their depredations. The Megarians

therefore began discussing among themselves the proposal to take back their exiles and so not expose the city to ruination on both fronts. The friends of the exiles, aware of this agitation, came more into the open than they had before and added their own voice in support of this proposal. The democratic leaders, though, became alarmed, realizing that the people would not be able to stick with them through all this hardship. They therefore entered into discussions with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, offering to hand over their city: they saw this as a lesser danger to themselves than the restoration of the exiles whom they had expelled. It was agreed that the Athenians should first seize the long walls (which ran for over a mile from the city to their harbour at Nisaea), in order to preclude any intervention from the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, where a garrison (of Peloponnesians only) was stationed to ensure security at Megara. Thereafter they would try to deliver the upper city too, and thought that it would come over more readily when that first move had been made.

So when both parties had agreed the plans and made the practical

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arrangements, the Athenians sailed at nightfall to Minoa, the island facing Megara, with six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. These took up position in the trench not far from the long walls from which the clay for their bricks was dug, while a second division under the other general, Demosthenes, consisting of

light-armed Plataeans and Athenian border-guards, settled in ambush in the sanctuary of Enyalios, closer still to the walls. No one noticed their arrival other than the men briefed about this night's activity. Just before dawn these Megarian conspirators put the following plan into effect. They had a sculling-boat which they had persuaded the commander was for privateering purposes, and with his permission had for some time ensured the opening of the gates at night, when it was their practice to carry the boat on a wagon along the trench to the sea and row out: they would then bring it back before dawn and carry it on the wagon through the gates and inside the walls. Their professed intention was to keep these excursions hidden from the Athenian garrison on Minoa, as no boat would be seen in the harbour at all. On this occasion the wagon was already at the gates, and they were opened as usual to let the boat in: seeing their moment (all this was part of the preconcerted plan) the Athenians charged out from their ambush, running fast to reach the gates before they could be shut again and while the wagon was still between them to prevent their closing. At the same time their Megarian collaborators killed the guards on the gates. The first to run inside (at the point where the trophy now stands) were the Plataeans and border-guards with Demosthenes. The Peloponnesians nearest the scene had now realised what was happening, and as soon as they were inside the gates the Plataeans took on the troops coming up in defence and defeated them, thus securing the gates for the Athenian hoplites now pouring in. As each Athenian got inside he made straight for the wall.

A few of the Peloponnesian garrison resisted at first and fought back, and some were killed, but the majority took to flight, terrified by an enemy attack at night and the collaboration in battle against them by the Megarian conspirators, which made them think that the whole of Megara had betrayed them. A contribution was made by the Athenians' herald, who on his own initiative proclaimed that any Megarian wishing to join the Athenians should ground his arms with theirs. Hearing this, the Peloponnesians stayed no longer: convinced now that they really were faced with a double enemy, they took refuge in Nisaea.

At daybreak, with the walls by now captured and the Megarians in the city in a state of turmoil, those who had done the deal with the Athenians, together with a good number of others who were in the know, urged that they should open the city gates and go out to do battle. Their agreed plan was for the Athenians to rush in when the gates were opened, while they themselves would be identifiable—and so spared in the attack—by a smearing of oil over their bodies. Their own safety in opening the gates was further guaranteed by the arrival, as had also been prearranged, of a force of four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry who had travelled overnight from Eleusis. They had smeared themselves with oil and were already by the gates when one of those in the know revealed the plot to the other party. These gathered and came in a body, insisting that they should not go out to do battle, as they

had not ventured this before even when they were in a stronger position, and should not bring the city into obvious danger: if anyone disagreed, there would be fighting there and then inside the city. They gave no indication of knowing what was afoot, but spoke with the apparent conviction of those recommending the best policy: at the same time they stayed on guard close by the gates, with the result that the conspirators could not carry out their intended plan.

Realizing that there had been some problem, and that they would

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not be able to storm the city, the Athenian generals immediately set about the circumvallation of Nisaea, reckoning that if they could take it before any reinforcements arrived, Megara too would capitulate the sooner. They quickly procured from Athens iron and stonemasons and all else they needed. Starting from the walls which they controlled they built a cross-wall facing Megara, and from there drove a ditch and a wall down to the sea on either side of Nisaea, dividing the work among the army in sections. They made use of stones and bricks from the suburb, and cut down trees and brushwood for stockades where they were needed: the suburban houses themselves served as part of the fortification with battlements added.

They spent the whole of that day on the work. By the afternoon of the following day the walls were all but completed, and the people in Nisaea took fright. They were short of food (they had

been taking daily deliveries from the upper city), they did not expect any early support from the Peloponnesians, and they assumed that the Megarians were hostile. They therefore came to terms with the Athenians. These terms were that they should hand over their arms and then each should go free on payment of a set ransom: and that the Athenians should have discretion to do what they wanted with the Spartan commander and any other Spartans in the place. With this agreement made, they came out and left. The Athenians made a breach in the long walls just below the city of Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and saw to all other preparations.

It so happened that the Spartan Brasidas, the son of Tellis, was at ⁷⁰ this time in the area of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing for an expedition to the Thraceward region. When he heard of the capture of the long walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the possible fall of Megara, he sent to the Boeotians asking them to meet him with an army as soon as they could at Tripodiscus (this is the name of a village in the Megarid below Mount Geraneia). He himself went there with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from Phlius, and six hundred from Sicyon, as well as those of his own troops who had already assembled. He had thought that he could still reach Nisaea before it was taken. But when he learnt of its capture (he had in fact started out for Tripodiscus during that night), he picked a force of three hundred from his army and reached the city of Megara before his presence

was known—the Athenians were down by the sea and failed to notice his arrival. He professed the intention and, if possible, the actuality of an attempt on Nisaea: but most of all he wanted to enter the city of Megara and secure it. So he called on the Megarians to admit his force, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

Both the factions in Megara were alarmed. The democrats feared⁷¹ that Brasidas would impose the exiles on them and drive out their own party. The concern of the oligarchic party was that this very fear would cause the people to attack them, and that a civil war, with the Athenians lying in wait nearby, would be the end of Megara. So they refused to admit Brasidas, both parties considering it best to keep quiet and see what happened. Both expected a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thought it safer not to declare for whichever side they favoured until that side had won. Having failed to convince them, Brasidas went back to the rest of his army.

At dawn the Boeotians arrived. Even before Brasidas sent to them

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they had intended to come to the aid of Megara, and had already gathered in full force at Plataea: they saw that a threat to Megara was not irrelevant to them. The arrival of Brasidas' messenger made them much keener still, and they sent forward two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred cavalry, taking the bulk of their forces back home. The whole army Brasidas now had with him

amounted to at least six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were formed up near Nisaea and the sea, with the light-armed troops dispersed across the plain. The Boeotian cavalry fell on the light-armed and drove them back to the sea: this was an unexpected attack, as before now the Megarians had never received any support from any quarter. The Athenian cavalry rode out in response to engage them, and there followed a long cavalry battle in which both sides claim to have had the upper hand. Certainly the Athenians killed the Boeotian cavalry-commander and a few others who rode right up to Nisaea, and stripped them of their arms: and as they retained possession of these bodies and only released them under truce, they set up a trophy. But in the action as a whole neither side had come out of it with a decisive victory when they broke off, the Boeotians returning to their own forces and the Athenians to Nisaea.

Brasidas and his army then moved closer to the sea and the city of

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Megara. They occupied an advantageous position and formed up for battle, expecting an Athenian attack and knowing the Megarians were watching to see which side would win. They thought they were well placed in two respects: in their position they did not have to start a battle or deliberately expose themselves to risk; and, since they had clearly shown themselves ready to stand their ground, they might well have fair claim to an unopposed victory. At the same time the situation with the Megarians was working out well.

If Brasidas had not brought his army within sight of Megara, the Megarians would have had no chance: they would have lost their city as surely as if they had been defeated in battle. Whereas now there was the possibility that the Athenians would not offer resistance, and if so Brasidas and his force would achieve the object of their expedition without a fight.

And that is indeed what happened. The Athenians did march out and form up by the long walls, but when no attack was forthcoming they also took no action. Their own generals reached this same assessment, reckoning that since they had already succeeded in most of their objectives there was disproportionate risk in committing to battle against superior numbers. They might be victorious and capture Megara, but if they failed they would take losses among the finest of their hoplite force: whereas the Peloponnesians had at risk only a small part of the combined forces they could command and of each individual contingent represented there, making it likely that they would want to engage. Both armies stayed waiting for a time, but when there was no movement from either side, first the Athenians went back into Nisaea and then the Peloponnesians returned to their previous position. So now the Megarians friendly to the exiles, assuming Brasidas the victor and the Athenians no longer willing to fight, opened the gates to receive Brasidas himself and the commanders from the other cities, and began discussions with them, ignoring the now shattered pro-Athenian faction.

Later, after the allies had dispersed to their cities, Brasidas also⁷⁴

returned to Corinth and resumed preparation for his expedition to Thrace, which had been his original objective. Meanwhile in the city of Megara, once the Athenians too had gone back home, those who had been most involved in dealings with the Athenians quickly left, knowing that they had been discovered: the others made common cause with the friends of the exiles and recalled them from Pegae, first making them swear to solemn assurances that they would forget past quarrels and consider only the best interests of the city. But once in office these men conducted a military review, marshalling the various companies in different places, and picked out from the lines about a hundred of their enemies and of those thought to have been prime collaborators with the Athenians. They forced the people to pass judgement on them with open votes, secured their condemnation, and killed them. They then turned the city into an extreme oligarchy. So revolution was followed by counter-revolution: and there was never a change of government effected by so few which lasted for so long a time.

In the same summer the Mytilenaeen exiles were ready to 75
strengthen Antandrus as they had intended. Two of the three generals in command of the Athenian money-raising ships, Demodocus and Aristeides, were in the Hellespont area (the third, Lamachus, had sailed on with ten ships into the Black Sea). When they learnt of the proposed works at Antandrus they feared the place could become as much a danger to Lesbos as Anaea was to Samos: that is where the Samian exiles had established themselves,

and they were helping the Peloponnesians with a supply of steersmen for their fleets, keeping the Samians on the island in a state of constant unease, and harbouring emigrants. So the generals raised a force from the allies, sailed to Antandrus, defeated in battle the opposition that came out to meet them, and took the place back again. Not long afterwards, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Black Sea and was anchored at the river Callex in the territory of Heracleia, lost his ships when heavy rainfall in the interior caused a flash flood. He and his troops then made their way on foot through the Bithynian Thracians (who live in Asia, across the water from Thrace), and reached Calchedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Black Sea.

In the same summer also, and immediately after the withdrawal⁷⁶ from the Megarid, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships. On the matter of Boeotia both he and Hippocrates were in communication with a number of men in the Boeotian cities who wanted to change the existing order and turn it to democracy on the Athenian pattern: and plans had been coordinated, mainly at the instigation of an exile from Thespieae called Ptoeodorus. Some men were going to betray Siphæ, a town on the coast of the Gulf of Crisa in Thespian territory. Others from Orchomenus were ready to hand over Chaeroneia (a dependency of the Orchomenus which was once called 'Minyan' but is now known as Boeotian Orchomenus). The Orchomenian exiles took a major part in this plan, and were hiring mercenaries from the

Peloponnese: some Phocians were also involved (Chaeroneia lies at the edge of Boeotia, adjoining the territory of Phanoteus in Phocis). The Athenians' task was to take Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in Tanagraean land facing Euboea. All this was to happen simultaneously on a predetermined day, so that the Boeotians would each be occupied with a disturbance in their own area and would not be able to mobilize any combined force in support of Delium. If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, they were confident that, even if there was not an immediate and complete constitutional revolution in Boeotia, with these places occupied, plundering raids made throughout the country, and a nearby refuge available for any insurgents pressed to retreat, things could not stay as they were: in time Athenian support for the rebels, combined with the fragmentation of the opposing forces, would enable them to turn matters to their advantage.

Such was the prearranged plan. When the time came Hippocrates⁷⁷ himself was to march against the Boeotians with a force from Athens. Before that he had sent Demosthenes with the forty ships to Naupactus, to collect an army from the Acarnanians and the other allies in that region and then sail to Siphæ in anticipation of its betrayal: they had specified a day on which all these operations should coincide. On his arrival Demosthenes found Oeniadae now forced into the Athenian alliance by the combined pressure of all the Acarnanians. He then raised a full levy of all the allied forces in that area, and first of all led a campaign against Salynthius and the

Agraeans which succeeded in winning them over: after that he turned to preparations for keeping his appointment at Siphae, when the time came.

Meanwhile Brasidas, at about this same time in the summer, 78 was making his way to the Thraceward region with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he was at Heracleia in Trachis he sent a messenger ahead to friends in Pharsalus, asking for an escort for himself and his army through Thessaly. Several came to meet him at Meliteia in Achaea Phthiotis—Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torymbas, and Strophacus the consular representative of the Chalcidians—and he was then able to continue his journey. Other Thessalians too joined in escorting him, notably Niconidas from Larisa, who was a friend of Perdiccas.

To pass through Thessaly without an escort was difficult in any circumstances, and yet more so when under arms. All Greeks alike had come to regard as a threat any unauthorized passage by others through their land: and besides the mass of the Thessalians had always been friendly to Athens. So if the Thessalian system had been based on equal rights for all, rather than the traditional dominance of oligarchic cliques, Brasidas could never have gone on. Even as it was, his continued march was met at the river Enipeus by men of the opposite party to that of his escorts, who were ready to stop him, saying that he had no right to make his journey without the consent of the whole Thessalian community. His escorts replied that they would not give him further passage if there were

objections; he had appeared without notice, and in providing an escort they were simply fulfilling their obligations as his guest-friends. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its people; he was bearing arms not against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war; he knew of no hostility between Thessalians and Spartans which forbade access to each other's territory; he would not of course proceed now if they objected, nor could he, but he did not expect them to prevent him. They listened and left. On the advice of his escorts, Brasidas pressed on at speed with no halts, before a larger force could gather to stop him. On that day, having started from Meliteia, he ended at Pharsalus and camped by the river Apidanus: from there he went to Phacium, and then on to Perrhaebia. At this point his Thessalian escorts went back, and the Perrhaebians (who are subjects of Thessaly) brought him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas: this is a town lying under Mount Olympus in the part of Macedonia which faces Thessaly.

In this way Brasidas managed to hurry through Thessaly before⁷⁹ any opposition could be organized to stop him, and made his way to Perdiccas and into Chalcidice. Alarmed by the Athenian successes, both Perdiccas and those in the Thraceward region who were in revolt from Athens had summoned this force from the Peloponnese. The Chalcidians thought that they would be the first target of Athenian aggression (and the neighbouring cities not in revolt were secretly collaborating in this invitation): Perdiccas was not an open

enemy of Athens, but he too had fears arising from his old quarrels with the Athenians, and had a particular concern to force the submission of Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians.

What made it easier for them to secure the dispatch of an army from the Peloponnese was the fact that the Spartans were doing badly

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at the time. With the Athenians putting pressure on the Peloponnese, and not least on their own territory, the Spartans thought that the best way of distracting them was to retaliate by sending troops to their disaffected allies, especially as the allies were inviting Spartan support with a view to secession and had offered to meet the cost of the troops' maintenance. At the same time they welcomed an excuse to send out some of the Helots, to prevent any revolutionary response to the present situation, now that Pylos was under enemy occupation.

Spartan policy towards the Helots had always been essentially defensive, and fear of the numbers of vigorous young Helots had already prompted action. The Spartans invited all Helots who claimed to have given signal service in war to present themselves for selection, with the promise of freedom for the chosen. This was a ploy: they reckoned that the first to claim their right to freedom would also be those most likely to have the spirit for revolt. They selected some two thousand, who then put on garlands and paraded round the sanctuaries thinking themselves free: shortly afterwards

the Spartans did away with them, and nobody knew how any of them were killed.

So on this occasion they were glad to send seven hundred Helots with Brasidas to serve as hoplites. He hired the rest of his expeditionary force from the Peloponnese. Brasidas himself was 81 very keen to go, and the Chalcidians were eager to have him: so the Spartans agreed to his expedition. At Sparta he had a reputation for getting things done, whatever the need, and since being sent abroad he had proved invaluable to the Spartans. He immediately impressed the cities with his reasonable and moderate approach, which enabled him to bring about the secession of most of them, while other places were betrayed to him and captured. The result was to give the Spartans the ability to bargain at will (as they subsequently did) in any mutual return and recovery of places won or lost, and to reduce the pressure of war on the Peloponnese. And in the later stages of the war, after the Sicilian affair, the honourable conduct and intelligence shown by Brasidas at this time—directly experienced by some, heard of and believed in by others—played a major part in creating enthusiasm for the Spartans among the Athenian allies. He was the first Spartan sent out to them, he established a reputation for decency in all his dealings, and left in them a firm expectation that the others too were of similar character.

For their part, when the Athenians learnt of his arrival in the 82

Thraceward region they declared war on Perdiccas (holding him responsible for Brasidas' expedition), and took measures to keep a closer watch on their allies in the area.

Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army along with his own forces on a campaign against Arrhabaeus the son of Bromerus, king of a neighbouring people, the Lyncestian Macedonians: he had a quarrel with him, and wanted to subdue him. But when he and the army together with Brasidas reached the pass into Lynceus, Brasidas said that before any resort to war he wanted first to go ahead in person and see if he could bring Arrhabaeus into alliance with Sparta by negotiation. One factor was that Arrhabaeus was sending messages to the effect that he was willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as intermediary and arbitrator: and the Chalcidian envoys accompanying the expedition urged Brasidas not to remove the difficulties facing Perdiccas, otherwise they might find him less eager to assist in their own affairs. Besides, when Perdiccas' men were in Sparta they had hinted that he would bring over many of the places in the surrounding area to the Spartan alliance. In these circumstances, then, Brasidas asserted an equal and independent interest in addressing the question of Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas said that he had not brought in Brasidas to arbitrate in their local quarrels, but rather to take out his own enemies at his own direction: when he, Perdiccas, was paying half the maintenance of his army, Brasidas had no business to talk with Arrhabaeus. Despite his objections, and now in open dissent, Brasidas did make contact

with Arrhabaeus, accepted the assurances he gave, and withdrew his army without any invasion of the country. After this Perdiccas, in pique, reduced his contribution to the upkeep of the army from a half to one-third.

Immediately thereafter in the same summer, and shortly before⁸⁴ the grape harvest, Brasidas took the Chalcidians with him on a campaign to the Andrian colony of Acanthus. There was dissension in Acanthus whether to admit him or not—on the one side those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, on the other the people at large. Even so, fear for their crop still out in the fields induced the general populace to accept Brasidas' proposal that they should let him in on his own and then make their decision when they had heard what he had to say. Thus admitted, he took his stand before the people (he was not a bad speaker, for a Spartan) and spoke as follows:

'Men of Acanthus, my mission here with this army is undertaken⁸⁵ at the behest of the Spartans to validate the cause which we proclaimed at the beginning of the war: to fight the Athenians for the liberation of Greece. If we have been rather long in coming, that should be no reproach: we had hoped, mistakenly in the event, that bringing the war to their own country would enable us to crush the Athenians quickly, without involving you in any danger. But we have come now as soon as opportunity allowed, and with your help we shall do our best to defeat them.

‘So I am surprised at this exclusion—your gates shut against me, and no apparent welcome of my arrival. We Spartans thought that we would be coming to people who were already our allies in spirit even before our actual appearance, and would be glad to see us here. That is why we have run the substantial risk of many days’ journey through foreign territory in our full support of your cause. If you have now changed your minds, if you intend to resist liberation both for yourselves and for the rest of Greece, that could have dire consequences. It is not only a question of your own resistance. Any others I approach are less likely to join me, when they can point to the awkward fact that you, the first I came to, possessed of a notable city and a reputation for intelligence, turned me down. And I shall have no satisfactory explanation to offer: it will be thought either that the freedom I claim to bring is suspect, or that I have come here without the strength or capability to protect you from any Athenian offensive. And yet when I came to the support of Nisaea with this same army which I have with me now, the Athenians were not prepared to engage with us despite their superior numbers: and it is not likely that they could send against you by ship any force of the size they had at Nisaea.

‘As for myself, I have not come to do harm. I am here for the 86 liberation of the Greeks. And I have bound the authorities at Sparta by the most solemn oaths to guarantee the autonomy of any people I bring over to alliance with us: and when we speak of alliance, we are not looking to force or inveigle you into fighting on our side—

on the contrary, our purpose is to fight on your side to end your enslavement to the Athenians. So I say to you that there is no reason to suspect my motives (I have given you the strongest assurances), nor to think me incapable of protecting you: and every reason for you to come over to me with confidence.

‘And if any of you have personal fears which make you wary that I might hand over the city to one group or another, you can trust me absolutely in this. I have not come here to engage in party politics, and I would think it an ambiguous sort of liberty to bring you if I were to ignore our tradition and subject the majority to the few or the minority to the whole. That would be worse than foreign rule, and for us Spartans, so far from gratitude for our efforts and an enhanced reputation, the result would be a blackening of our name. We would be manifestly bringing on ourselves the very same charges which are the basis of our continued war against the Athenians—and all the more resented in us than in those who have never made any pretence to decency. For men of honourable standing it is worse to gain advantage by plausible hypocrisy than by open force: the latter proceeds on the purely contingent justification of superior strength, but the former on deliberate bad faith. You can see from this the degree

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of circumspection which we apply to the matters which concern us most. We have given you sworn assurances, and you could have no stronger confirmation of sincerity than from men whose actions

measured against their words afford cogent evidence that what they say is what they mean, because it coincides with their own interest.

‘But if your response to my offer is to say that you are unable to accept, but are sympathetic to our cause and trust that you can refuse without penalty; that liberation does have some obvious dangers for you; that it should of course be conferred on those able to accept it, but not imposed on anyone against their will—if that is your response, I shall first call on the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I have come here for your good and failed to persuade you: I shall then ravage your land and aim to force you. There will be no further scruple in my mind, and I shall consider my action justified by two imperatives—the Spartan interest, and the interest of the Greeks at large. I cannot leave you sympathetic but uncommitted to our side, or the Spartans will be damaged by your continued contribution to the Athenian revenue: and I cannot allow you to frustrate the Greeks’ emancipation from slavery. In any other circumstances there would be no reason to act like this, and we Spartans would have no business to liberate the reluctant if it was not in the cause of some common good. Nor are we looking for empire: on the contrary, our purpose is to stop others. We are intent on bringing autonomy to all, and we would prejudice the majority if we were to tolerate your opposition.

‘Think carefully, then, and take up the challenge to win first place in starting the liberation of the Greeks, to your everlasting

fame. For yourselves the prize is to secure your individual interests from harm, and to crown your whole city with a glorious name.'

Such was the extent of Brasidas' speech. The Acanthians debated⁸⁸ long, with much said on either side, and then took a secret vote. Influenced both by the seduction of Brasidas' offer and by fear for their crop, they decided by a majority to secede from Athens. They made Brasidas pledge fidelity to the oaths sworn by the Spartan authorities when they sent him out, guaranteeing the autonomy of any people he brought over as allies, and with that pledge given they admitted his army. Not long afterwards Stagirus too, a colony of Andros, joined the revolt.

These were the events of this summer.

At the very beginning of the following winter matters were ready

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for the betrayal of Boeotia to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and each had their appointment to keep—Demosthenes at Siphæ with his ships, and Hippocrates at Delium. But a mistake was made about the dates for their respective mobilizations, and Demosthenes, with the Acarnanians and many others of the allies in that area on board his fleet, sailed for Siphæ too early. His expedition came to nothing, as the enterprise was betrayed by a Phocian from Phanoteus called Nicomachus: he told the Spartans, and they told the Boeotians. As Hippocrates was not yet there to create diversionary trouble in the country, the Boeotians brought a full levy into action, and both Siphæ and

Chaeroneia were secured in advance. When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities learnt of this failure, they made no revolutionary move.

Hippocrates had raised a full-scale Athenian army—calling up 90 citizens, metics, and all foreigners then in the city—and arrived at Delium too late, when the Boeotians had already been to Siphæ and left. He settled his army there and began to fortify Delium in the following way. They first dug a trench in a circle round the sanctuary and the temple, and piled up the excavated soil to form a wall, which they then secured with wooden stakes driven in on either side: they packed the interior with vine-wood cut from around the sanctuary and stones and bricks stripped from the nearby houses, using every means to raise the height of the fortification. They erected wooden towers at suitable places where no sanctuary building was available for that purpose (there had once been a colonnade there, but it had collapsed). They began construction on the third day after setting out from Athens, and worked throughout that day, the next day, and until lunchtime on the fifth day. Then, when most of the work was complete, the main force retired to a distance of just over a mile from Delium, preparatory to a return home. Most of the light-armed troops continued immediately on the way back, but the hoplites grounded their arms there and waited: Hippocrates had stayed behind to organize the garrison and direct the completion of the remaining parts of the outwork.

During these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra.

When

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the contingents from all the cities had arrived, they could see that the Athenians were moving back home. Since they were no longer in Boeotia (when they grounded their arms the Athenians were just about on the border with the territory of Oropus), all the Boeotarchs, of whom there are eleven, were against giving battle except for one. Pagondas the son of Aeoladas was one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes (the other was Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas), and he held the presidency: he wanted to do battle, and thought the risk worth taking. He summoned the troops in successive companies, so that not all should leave their posts at the same time, and tried to persuade the Boeotians to go against the Athenians and take up the challenge. He spoke to them as follows:

‘Men of Boeotia, it should never have occurred to some of us commanders

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to question the legitimacy of engaging the Athenians in battle if we do not actually catch them still on Boeotian soil. They have crossed the border from their land to ours, they have built a fort here, and they intend the devastation of Boeotia. Of course they are our enemies wherever we find them, including the country from which they set out to inflict hostilities on us. As things stand, if any of you thought non-engagement the safer option, think again. People under attack and defending their own land have no opportunity for careful calculation, unlike those who are secure in their own possessions

and deliberately attack others out of greed for more. It is in your tradition to resist any attack by a foreign army, whether in your own country or next door—that has never made any difference. And this imperative applies to the Athenians with by far the greatest force, as beside all else they share a border with us. In relations between neighbouring states mutually assured defence is always the condition of independence. With the Athenians, then, in particular, whose ambition to enslave others extends far beyond their immediate neighbours, how can we not pursue the contest to the utmost? We can see examples of their treatment in the Euboeans across the water from us, and in most of the rest of Greece. We have to realize that, while other sets of adjacent countries generally fight their wars over boundary disputes, defeat for us will mean a single and undisputed boundary fixed which swallows our entire land: if the Athenians invade, they will take forcible possession of all that is ours. That is the price we pay for living next to the Athenians. They are far more dangerous than ordinary neighbours.

‘When people attack others—doubtless confident in their strength, as the Athenians now—they find little to fear in a campaign against quietist opponents who will only resist in their own country: less easily controlled are those who go outside their borders to confront them and, given the occasion, start the war themselves. We have experienced this here before with the Athenians. When they had gained control of our land as a result of our internal dissension, we defeated them at Coroneia and established for Boeotia the complete security which has lasted until

now. We should remember this. The older among you should seek to emulate their earlier deeds, and the younger—sons of fathers who showed their worth in those days—must strive to keep their family honour untarnished. We can trust to have on our side the god whose sanctuary they have fortified and now occupy against all law; and we can trust the favourable omens of the sacrifices we have made. So let us come to grips with them. Let us show them that they may satisfy their ambitions, if they wish, by attacking those who offer no resistance, but when they come against people whose code of honour is always to fight for the freedom of their own country and never to enslave any other country in defiance of justice, they will not get away unchallenged.’

With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to 93
confront the Athenians. He quickly mobilized his forces (it was already late in the day) and led them on close to the Athenian army, settling in a position where direct sight of each other was prevented by an intervening hill: here he formed up and prepared for battle. Hippocrates was still at Delium, and when he received a report of the Boeotian advance he sent instructions to his army to take up position. He himself came on shortly afterwards, leaving at Delium about three hundred cavalry to guard the place against any attack and also to watch for an opportunity to charge the Boeotians in the course of the battle. The Boeotians posted a detachment to oppose them: then, when all arrangements were in order, they appeared over the crest of the hill in the formation they had planned. They

numbered about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts. The right wing was held by the Thebans and their confederates; in the centre were the men from Haliartus, Coroneia, Copae and the other places round lake Copais; the men from Thespieae, Tanagra, and Orchomenus held the left wing; the cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on each wing. The Thebans were formed up to a depth of twenty-five ranks, and the others in whatever formation suited each contingent. This, then, was the scale and disposition of the Boeotian army.

The Athenian hoplites, equal in number to their opponents, were⁹⁴ drawn up eight-deep across the whole of their line, with cavalry stationed on either wing. There were no professionally equipped light troops present on this occasion, nor did Athens ever have a regular force of this kind. The full tally of those involved in the invasion was several times greater than that of their opponents, but most of them had come unarmed, given the universal call-up of all foreigners then in Athens as well as the citizens: these had already started for home, and only a few were there to take part in the battle. Formation made and engagement imminent, Hippocrates the general went along the Athenian line with these words of encouragement:

‘Men of Athens, this is only a brief exhortation, but for brave men

brief is as good as long: and it is more a reminder than an instruction. None of you should think for a moment that there is no cause for us to be facing dangers such as this on foreign soil. At stake in this country now is the future of our own. If we are victorious, the Peloponnesians will lose the use of the Boeotian cavalry and you will never see them invading our land again. In one single battle you can both win this country and promote the freedom of yours. Go to meet them, then, with a spirit worthy of our city—the first city in all Greece, where every one of us is proud to claim his birthright—and worthy of our fathers, who in their time fought and conquered the Boeotians at Oenophyta under Myronides and took possession of their country.’

Hippocrates reached halfway along the line with this encouragement,

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but had no time to go further, as the Boeotians, likewise encouraged by Pagondas with a quick speech there and then, immediately shouted a paean and advanced on them down the hill. The Athenians advanced in turn and met them at a run. The extreme wings of the two armies never engaged, as both were stopped short by gullies in their way. But the rest clashed in a gruelling fight with shields shoving against shields. The Boeotians on the left wing and as far as the centre were losing to the Athenians, who pressed hard on that section and especially on the Thespians. The troops on either side of them had fallen back, so the Thespians were encircled and hemmed in: those who died were cut down defending themselves

hand-to-hand. In the confusion of this encirclement some of the Athenians too were killed in mistake by their own side. So this section of the Boeotian line faced defeat, and ran to join that part of their army which was still fighting. Their right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, was getting the better of the Athenians, pushing them back gradually at first then ever more insistently. A further circumstance was that, in response to the difficulties of his left wing, Pagondas launched two squadrons of cavalry round the hill from the blind side, and their sudden appearance over the ridge struck terror into the victorious Athenian wing, who thought that another army was coming to attack them. Pressed now on both sides by the combination of this development and the Theban drive which was breaking their ranks, the entire Athenian army turned to flight.

Some made for Delium and the sea, and some for Oropus: others fled towards Mount Parnes, or in whatever direction they thought could offer some hope of safety. The Boeotians pursued to kill, especially their cavalry and the Locrians who had come in support just as the rout was beginning: but night closed the action, and helped the majority of the fleeing troops to make their escape. On the next day those who had reached Oropus and Delium were transported home by sea, leaving a garrison behind (they were still in possession of Delium). The Boeotians set up a trophy, recovered their own dead and stripped

the enemy dead, posted a guard on the field, and returned to Tanagra, where they laid plans for an attack on Delium.

A herald sent by the Athenians to request recovery of the dead was met on his way by a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, saying that he would get no response until he himself had returned from his mission to Athens. He then stood before the Athenians and delivered the message from the Boeotians, to the effect that the Athenians were guilty of breaking the established laws of the Greeks. It was universally accepted that invaders of others' territory kept out of the sanctuaries in that territory: but the Athenians had fortified and taken up occupation of Delium, and all that men do on unconsecrated ground was being done there in the sanctuary, and they had been drawing for their regular supply the holy water which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to touch except for purification before sacrifice. Therefore on behalf both of the god and of themselves, and calling in witness Apollo and all the deities sharing worship at that altar, the Boeotians gave notice to the Athenians that they could only retrieve their own when they had left the sanctuary.

On receipt of this message the Athenians sent a herald of their own

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to the Boeotians, to say that they had done no wrong regarding the sanctuary, and would not consciously do it any harm in the future: that had been no part of their original purpose in occupying it, which was to use it as a base for their own defence against those

who were in fact doing wrong to them. As for Greek laws, the rule was that those who had control of any territory, large or small, also and always took possession of the sanctuaries, maintaining as far as possible the traditional modes of observance. Indeed the Boeotians themselves, and most others who had driven out the original inhabitants of the land they now occupied, had once invaded sanctuaries belonging to others and now regarded them as their own. The same right of possession would apply to the Athenians too, if they had been able to take over more of Boeotia: as it was, they considered that part which they did occupy to be their own property, and they would not leave it voluntarily. As for sacrilegious use of the water, this was a matter of necessity, not deliberate violation: the Boeotians had attacked their country first, they were acting in self-defence, and had no choice but to use the water. There was every reason to think that actions to which people were constrained by war or some other emergency would be pardonable in the god's eyes too. Did not the altars provide refuge for involuntary offenders? And 'law-breaking' could only be predicated of malice aforethought: it was not a term applicable to those driven to some bold act by force of circumstance. As for the dead bodies, the Boeotians were guilty of much greater impiety in attempting to barter their return for a sanctuary than the Athenians in refusing to exchange the sanctuary for the recovery of what was theirs by right.

They requested, therefore, an unambiguous statement from the Boeotians that the recovery of their dead was not dependent on

their departure from Boeotian soil (they were not in any case now in the Boeotians' territory, but on land acquired by force of arms), and would proceed in the traditional way by formal truce.

The Boeotians replied that, if the Athenians were in Boeotia, they

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could remove their own only when they left Boeotian territory: if they were in Athenian territory, they could decide what to do by themselves. (The Boeotians' thinking was that, although the battle had taken place on the borders and the dead were in fact lying in the territory of Oropus, which was a subject possession of Athens, the Athenians could not recover the bodies without their agreement, and at the same time they could maintain the pretence of making no truce in respect of Athenian land. So they thought 'leave our country and then take what you ask' was a fine response.) The Athenian herald listened to this answer and left with his mission frustrated.

The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and slingers from

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the Malian Gulf, and they had been joined after the battle by two thousand Corinthian hoplites, the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and the Megarians too. With this force they marched to Delium and attacked the fortification, employing various methods including the application of an engine which succeeded in taking the place. This engine was constructed as follows. They sawed a great beam in two, hollowed it out

completely, then fitted the two parts precisely together again, like a pipe; at the far end they suspended a cauldron on chains, with an iron nozzle curving down into it from the beam; most of the rest of the wood was also cased in iron. From some distance they brought this machine up on wagons against those parts of the wall which were largely built of vine-wood and other timber. Wherever they got it close, they applied large bellows to their end of the beam and made them blow. The pipe was airtight, so the blast went straight through to the cauldron, which was full of lighted charcoal, sulphur, and pitch. The result was a huge flame which set fire to the wall and made it impossible for anyone to stay manning it: the defenders abandoned the wall and took to flight, and so the fort was captured by this means. Some of the garrison were killed and two hundred taken captive, but most of the others got on board their ships and were transported home.

Delium was captured on the seventeenth day after the battle.

Shortly

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afterwards the Athenian herald, knowing nothing of this event, came once more to ask for the dead: this time the Boeotians agreed their release and did not repeat the previous answer. In the battle there had died a little under five hundred Boeotians, and a little under a thousand Athenians, including their general Hippocrates, with heavy losses too among their light-armed troops and baggage-carriers.

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, who had sailed at the time only to have the intended betrayal of Siphæ come to nothing, took his fleet with the troops from Acarnania and Agræis on board as well as four hundred Athenian hoplites and made a landing on the coast of Sicyon. Before all his ships were in, the Sicyonians had rallied in defence and they routed those who had already landed and drove them back to the ships, killing some and taking others alive. They set up a trophy and returned the dead under truce.

Within the same days as the events at Delium Sitalces the king of the Odrysians died in the defeat of the army he had led against the Triballians. His nephew Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus, succeeded him as king of the Odrysians and the rest of his dominion in Thrace.

In the same winter Brasidas and his allies in the Thraceward region

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launched a campaign against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. There had been an earlier attempt to colonize the site of the present city by Aristagoras of Miletus when he was in flight from King Darius, but he was driven out by the Edonians. Then thirty-two years later the Athenians too made an attempt, sending out ten thousand colonists made up of their own people and volunteers from elsewhere: they were wiped out by the Thracians at Drabescus. The Athenians came again in the twenty-ninth year after that, with Hagnon the son of Nicias sent as founder-colonist, expelled the Edonians, and built a colony in this spot, which was previously called Nine Ways. Their base for this operation was Eïon,

a trading-post and seaport which they already possessed at the mouth of the river, about three miles distant from the present city. Hagnon named the settlement 'Amphipolis' because, with the Strymon looping round the site on two sides, and a long wall built to define and enclose it from one bend of the river to the other, his foundation had an imposing aspect both seawards and landwards.

This then was Brasidas' destination when he set out with his army

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from Arnae in Chalcidice. Towards evening he reached Aulon and Bormiscus, where lake Bolbe flows into the sea. He made supper there, then marched on through the night. It was wintry weather with snow beginning to fall, which made him press on all the faster, hoping to surprise the people of Amphipolis—except, that is, for the traitors among them. There were settlers from Argilus in the city (Argilus is a colony of Andros) who were the authors of this conspiracy, and others with them, some instigated by Perdiccas, some by the Chalcidians. The town of Argilus is close by, and for long the Athenians had had their particular suspicions of the Argilians and the Argilians their particular designs on Amphipolis. For some time, ever since the arrival of Brasidas provided the opportunity, they had been working with their people who had citizenship in Amphipolis to arrange for the surrender of the city. They now welcomed Brasidas into their own town, defected from the Athenians that very night, and before dawn conducted his army to the bridge over the river. The crossing was at some distance from

Amphipolis itself, and there were then no walls running down to it from the city as there are now, but a small garrison had been posted there. Brasidas easily overcame it, helped by two factors—the plot was already in operation, and the weather lent surprise to his attack. He crossed the bridge, and immediately annexed the property of all the Amphipolitans occupying the whole intervening area outside the walls.

His crossing of the river came as a sudden shock to the inhabitants

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of the city. That and the capture of many of their people outside, while others ran for refuge behind the walls, brought the Amphipolitans to a state of utter chaos, made worse by their suspicions of one another. Reports of opinion at the time suggest that Brasidas could well have taken the city if he had decided to proceed directly against it, rather than giving his army leave to plunder. As it was, with everything outside now overrun and no sign of the expected response from those inside, he settled his army and took no further action. The party opposed to the traitors were sufficiently strong in number to prevent the immediate opening of the gates, and with the assistance of the general Eucles (who was there from Athens to protect the place) they sent for help to the other general in the Thraceward region, Thucydides the son of Olorus, the author of this history. He was at Thasos, an island colonized from Paros, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. As soon as he received the message he sailed at full speed with the

seven ships at his disposal, wanting to reach Amphipolis, if possible, before any move to surrender the city, or, failing that, to secure Eion.

Brasidas meanwhile was doing his utmost to gain prior control¹⁰⁵ of the city. He was apprehensive of the support from the ships at Thasos, and moreover had learnt that Thucydides owned the rights to work the gold mines in that part of Thrace and consequently had powerful influence with the leading men on the mainland. His fear was that if Thucydides got there first the common people of Amphipolis would look to him to raise an allied force from the seaboard or from Thrace to protect them, and would lose any inclination to come over. He therefore offered moderate terms, issuing this proclamation: any of the Amphipolitans or Athenians in the city who wished to stay could do so in possession of their property and retention of fair and equal rights; any who did not wish to stay could take their effects with them but must leave within five days.

On hearing this proclamation the people in general began to waver,

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not least because there was only a small proportion of Athenian origin in the largely mixed citizen body, and many of those captured outside had relatives inside. In comparison with what they had feared, they thought the terms of the proclamation fair—the Athenians because they welcomed the chance to leave, reckoning that they were under particular threat and not expecting any rescue

soon; and the rest of the people in virtue of their retention of equal political rights and the unexpected release from danger. The supporters of Brasidas now spoke openly in justification of the proposals, as they could see that the people had been converted and were no longer inclined to listen to the Athenian general who was there in person. And so the agreement was made, and they admitted Brasidas on the terms as proclaimed. Such was the surrender of Amphipolis, and late in that same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eïon. Brasidas had just gained possession of Amphipolis, and came within one night of taking Eïon: if the ships had not arrived in support that quickly, Eïon would have fallen to Brasidas the following morning.

Thucydides now organized the defence of Eïon, both against 107 any immediate attack by Brasidas and for its future security, and took in those who had chosen under the terms of the truce to leave Amphipolis and come down to join him at Eïon. Brasidas did make a sudden attempt, sailing down the river in a fleet of boats in the hope of capturing the headland which juts out from the wall and so gaining command of the entrance to the harbour: and he tried an attack by land at the same time. He was beaten back on both fronts, and turned to settling the arrangements at Amphipolis. The Edonian city of Myrcinus went over to him, after Pittacus the king of the Edonians had been assassinated by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro: and soon afterwards Galepsus and Oesyne (both colonies of Thasos) went over also. Perdiccas arrived immediately

after Amphipolis was taken and helped Brasidas to consolidate these new gains.

The enemy possession of Amphipolis caused major alarm at Athens,

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for two reasons in particular. The city was a valuable source both of timber for shipbuilding and of financial revenue: and the Spartans, if granted passage through Thessaly, had always had a route towards the Athenian allies as far as the Strymon, but without control of the bridge could proceed no further, as above Amphipolis the river formed a large lake for some considerable distance, and on the Eion side there were triremes on watch—but now they had gained easy transit.

And the Athenians were afraid that their allies would defect. Brasidas was giving a general impression of moderation, and wherever he spoke he declared that he had been sent out to liberate Greece. When the cities subject to Athens heard of his taking of Amphipolis, of the offer he had made, and of the mild disposition of the man himself, they were more than ever excited by the prospect of revolt, and began secret negotiations with him, inviting him to come and help them, each of them keen to be the first to defect. They could see no cause for fear, but their underestimation of Athenian power was as great as the subsequent revelation of that power. Their criterion was more vague wish than sound policy: all men tend to wrap their desires in unconsidered hope, while using ruthless logic to banish their aversions. They drew confidence too

from the recent blow inflicted on the Athenians by the Boeotians, and from Brasidas' enticing (but untrue) claim that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused to engage his own unsupported army: they believed, then, that no punitive force would be sent against them. Most decisive of all in their willingness to take all risks was the gratifying excitement of the moment and the prospect of their first experience of the Spartans in full cry.

Aware of this, the Athenians dispatched garrisons to the various cities as best they could at short notice and in winter. And Brasidas sent to Sparta calling for reinforcements: in the meantime he made preparations for the building of triremes on the Strymon. The Spartans did not support his request. This was partly the jealousy of their leading men, and also the greater desire to recover their men taken prisoner from the island and to bring the war to an end.

In the same winter the Megarians recaptured their long walls from

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Athenian control and demolished them to the foundations.

After the taking of Amphipolis Brasidas and his allies campaigned against the peninsula called Acte, which stretches out into the Aegean sea from the canal dug by the Persian King and terminates in the height of Mount Athos. The cities of the peninsula are Sane, an Andrian colony close by the canal and facing the sea towards Euboea, and then Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoe, Olophyxus, and Dium. These are inhabited by a mixed population of barbarian peoples, bilingual in Greek and their native languages. There is a

small Chalcidian Greek element, but the majority are Pelasgians (descended from the Etruscans who once inhabited Lemnos and Athens), or else Bisaltians, Crestonians, or Edonians. They live in small towns. Most of these came over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium resisted, and he spent some time ravaging their land with his army.

When this still did not achieve their compliance, he broke off ¹¹⁰ for a campaign against Chalcidian Torone, where the Athenians maintained a garrison. He was invited there by a small group who were prepared to surrender their city. He arrived towards dawn, when it was still dark, and settled with his army around the temple of the Dioscuri, about a third of a mile from the city. His arrival went unnoticed by the general population of Torone and the Athenian guards, but the conspirators knew that he was coming, and a few of them had slipped out ahead to watch for his approach. When they discovered that he was already in place, they smuggled into the city seven of his soldiers lightly armed with daggers (these seven, led by Lysistratus from Olynthus, were the only ones of the twenty originally detailed who had the courage for this entry). They crept in through a gap in the seaward wall and climbed up unseen to the highest guard-post (the city is set on the slope of a hill). They killed the guards there, and then began breaking apart the postern gate which faces Cape Canastraeum.

Brasidas advanced the rest of his army a little way and then ¹¹¹

halted, sending forward a hundred peltasts to be ready to run in first whenever any gates were opened and the agreed signal given. As time passed and they wondered what was happening the peltasts gradually drew closer to the city. Meanwhile the Toronaeans at work inside with the infiltrated group of soldiers had broken the postern gate and cut through the bar to enable the opening of the gates by the agora. First they led some of the peltasts round the side and let them in through the postern gate, intending to intimidate the general population (who knew nothing of the plot) by the sudden appearance of troops at both rear and front: then they raised the fire-signal which had been specified and now let in the rest of the peltasts through the agora gates.

On sight of the agreed signal Brasidas set his army in motion and
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advanced at the run, the whole army giving a concerted shout which caused widespread panic in the city. Some of his troops pushed straight in through the gates, while others scaled the wall at a place where a collapse was being repaired and there were sawn planks inclined against the wall for the hauling up of stones. Brasidas and the bulk of his army turned immediately upwards to the highest parts of the city, to make sure of its complete capture from top to bottom: the rest of his troops spread out evenly to all other parts.

As the capture of their city proceeded the majority of the
Toronaeans

were distraught, with no idea of what was going on, but the conspirators and those who shared their politics immediately joined the invaders. When the Athenians were alerted (this was a force of about fifty hoplites, sleeping in the agora), a few of them were killed in hand-to-hand fighting but the rest managed to make their escape to safety in the fort of Lecythus, either on foot or by reaching the two ships they had there on guard-duty. Lecythus, previously taken over and occupied by the Athenians, was a headland jutting out to sea and separated from the city by a narrow isthmus. The Toronaeans friendly to the Athenians also took refuge there.

When daylight had come and the city was now firmly in his control,

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Brasidas issued a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that any who so wished could come out and return to their property with no threat to their civic rights. He also sent a herald to the Athenians requiring them to evacuate Lecythus under truce, taking their belongings with them, on the grounds that it was Chalcidian territory and not theirs. They replied that they would not leave, but asked him for one day's truce for the recovery of their dead. He granted them two days: and in these days he fortified the buildings near Lecythus while the Athenians likewise strengthened their own position.

Brasidas called a meeting of the Toronaeans and gave them much the same speech as he had delivered at Acanthus. He said that

it would not be right to think the worse of the men who had dealt with him to arrange the capture of the city, or to regard them as traitors—they had not been bribed, they were not looking to enslave Torone, but they had acted for the good of the city and its freedom. Nor should the uninvolved fear disadvantage: he had not come to damage the community or any individual. His proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians was intended to show that he thought none the worse of them for their sympathy in that direction. He expected that once they had experience of the Spartans they would show them similar loyalty—in fact much greater loyalty for the greater justice of their cause: at present they were afraid of the Spartans because they did not know them. He advised them all to make up their minds to be staunch allies, as from that point on they would be held to account for any backsliding. As for past behaviour, the Spartans had no quarrel with them: the iniquity was, on the contrary, that suffered by the Toronaeans themselves under a superior power, and any opposition they had shown to Sparta was pardonable.

Such was the speech with which Brasidas reassured the people of Torone. The truce had now expired, and he launched his assault on Lecythus. The Athenian defences were a wall in poor condition and some houses equipped with battlements, but even so they managed to resist the attack for one day. On the next day, with their opponents preparing to bring up a machine designed to throw fire at the wooden breastwork, and the army already approaching, the

Athenians erected a wooden tower on top of a building at a particularly vulnerable point where they thought it most likely that the machine would be applied. They carried up many jars and pitchers of water and large stones, and many men climbed onto the tower. But the overladen building suddenly collapsed with a great crash. To the Athenians close by who witnessed the accident this caused more frustration than alarm, but those further away, and especially those at the greatest distance, thought that the place had already been taken at that spot and set off in flight to the sea and their ships.

When Brasidas saw them deserting the parapets and realized what

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was happening, he flung his army on and captured the fort immediately, killing any he found inside. Such was the Athenians' exit from Lecythus, and in their ships and smaller craft they crossed over to Pallene. There was in Lecythus a sanctuary of Athena, and when Brasidas was about to attack he had advertised a reward of thirty minas of silver for the first man to scale the wall: thinking now that there had been more than human agency in the capture, he gave the thirty minas to the goddess and her sanctuary. He then demolished Lecythus, cleared the ground, and dedicated the whole area as a sacred precinct.

He spent the rest of the winter consolidating the places he had gained and planning further acquisitions. And with the passing of this winter there ended the eighth year of the war.

At the very beginning of spring in the following summer season, 117

the Spartans and the Athenians made a truce for a year. The Athenian thinking was that this would prevent Brasidas securing any further defections among their allies before they had time for counter-measures: and, if the circumstances were right, they could make a more general agreement. The Spartans had accurately identified the Athenians' fears, and thought that a period of relief from setbacks and pressure would make them more inclined to try for reconciliation and, with the return of the Spartan captives, a longer-lasting peace. Before this run of success by Brasidas, their overriding concern had always been, and still was, the recovery of these men: if he was now allowed to go on to yet greater success and thereby redress the balance, they would lose this chance to recover the men and the rest of their army would have to continue fighting an evenly balanced war with no guarantee of victory.

They therefore made a formal truce for themselves and their allies. These are the texts:

Concerning the sanctuary and the oracle of Pythian Apollo we resolve that

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any who wish should have access according to the established laws, without fraud or fear. This is resolved by the Spartans and their allies here present: and they undertake to use all diplomatic means to persuade the Boeotians and Phocians likewise. Concerning the money belonging to the god, it is resolved that we shall be diligent to discover the guilty parties, properly and justly in accordance with

the established laws, both you and we and those others who so wish, all in accordance with the established laws. These are the resolutions of the Spartans and their allies in the matters aforesaid.

A resolution of the Spartans and their allies in the event of the Athenians making a treaty. Both parties to remain within their own territory, retaining possession of what we each now hold: the Athenians at Coryphasium to stay within the bounds of Bouphras and Tomeus; in Cythera to have no communication with the Peloponnesian alliance, neither we with them nor they with us; at Nisaea and Minoa not to go beyond the road leading from the gates at the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and then directly from the temple of Poseidon to the bridge over to Minoa (nor should the Megarians or their allies cross this road); the Athenians to keep the island of Minoa which they have captured, but with no communication in either direction; and at Troezen the Athenians to retain what they now control, as agreed with them by the Troezenians.

In the use of the sea, the Spartans and their allies may sail in their own and allied coastal waters in any oared vessel of a capacity up to five hundred measures, but not in warships.

There shall be safe conduct both by land and by sea for any herald or embassy (with attendants as appropriate) travelling to or from the Peloponnese or Athens in diplomacy to end the war or settle disputes.

During this period there shall be no reception of deserters, either free or slave, either by you or by us.

You shall be legally accountable to us, and we to you, according to established practice, and any matters of contention shall be resolved by arbitration without recourse to war.

These are the resolutions of the Spartans and their allies. If you reach better or fairer resolutions than these, come to Sparta and explain them to us. Neither the Spartans nor their allies will refuse to consider any fair proposals which you make. Those who come should come with full executive authority, as you required of our spokesmen too.

The truce shall be for one year.

A resolution of the council and people. Prytany Acamantis, secretary Phaenippus, president Niciades. Proposer Laches. May it be to the good of the Athenians. Resolved to conclude the truce on the terms agreed by the Spartans and their allies and confirmed by them before the people: the truce to be for one year, and to begin on this day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion. During this period ambassadors and heralds shall travel between the two parties to discuss terms for the ending of the war. The generals and the prytaneis shall first convene an assembly to consider a permanent peace: thereafter, if it is agreed to send and receive embassies concerning an end to the war, the Athenians shall deliberate on any proposals made. The embassies here present now shall immediately

ratify the truce before the people, and swear to abide by it for the year.

This was agreed between the Spartans and their allies and the Athenians

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and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. The agreement was made and ratified by the following: for the Spartans, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxilaïdas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicastus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaeidas; and for the Athenians the generals Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus.

So this truce was made, and throughout its duration they continued negotiations for a longer-lasting treaty.

Several days were spent in promulgating the truce, and at about ¹²⁰ this time Scione, a city on Pallene, defected to Brasidas from the Athenians. (The Scionaeans say that they were originally from Pellene in the Peloponnese, but on the return voyage from Troy their ancestors were caught in the storm which hit the Achaean fleet, and driven off course to this place, where they then settled.) On their defection Brasidas crossed over to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead of him while he followed at some

distance in a cutter: his thought was that if he encountered a boat bigger than his the trireme would protect him, and if another trireme appeared in opposition it would concentrate on the big ship, not the smaller boat, and in the meantime he could make his escape. This crossing successfully completed, Brasidas called a meeting of the Scionaeans and began by repeating what he had said at Acanthus and Torone. He went on to express the greatest admiration for them, because with Pallene cut off at the isthmus by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea they were virtually islanders, yet of their own accord they had made the move to embrace freedom, and not waited timidly for their own clear good to be forced on them. This indicated that they would face any major test of endurance with equal courage: and, if he managed to arrange things as he intended, he would regard them as truly the most loyal of Sparta's friends, and pay them every honour.

The Scionaeans were excited by this speech and with universal¹²¹ enthusiasm (including even those who had originally been against the move) they made up their minds to commit to the war in earnest, and gave Brasidas an honorific welcome—on behalf of the whole community they crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Greece, and individuals flocked to festoon him with ribbons as if he were a victor in the games. For the time being he left a small garrison with them while he crossed back again. Shortly afterwards he sent over a larger body of troops, intending, with the Scionaeans now on his side, to make an attempt on Mende and

Potidaea: he expected that the Athenians would react as if Pallene were an island and send out a force to intervene, and he wanted to forestall them. He had also begun some dealings with these cities, with a view to their betrayal.

These, then, were his intentions, but in the meantime a trireme¹²² reached him bringing the ambassadors sent out to disseminate notice of the truce, Aristonymus from Athens and Athenaeus from Sparta. His army then returned to Torone, and the ambassadors briefed Brasidas about the agreement. All the Thraceward allies of the Spartans accepted the decision, and Aristonymus was generally satisfied: but by computing the days he realized that the Scionaeans had defected after the truce was ratified, and he declared that they were not covered by it. Brasidas argued at length that they had been in time, and refused to give up the city. Aristonymus reported on the matter to Athens, and the Athenians were all for an immediate campaign against Scione. The Spartans sent envoys to say that this would be a breach of the treaty: they set out their own claim to the city, reliant on Brasidas' testimony, but were prepared to submit the issue to arbitration. The Athenians were in no mood to risk arbitration, but wanted military action as soon as possible. They were furious that even those who could now be classed as islanders were presuming to defect, seduced by Spartan power on land, which would be quite useless in their situation. And in fact the truth of the matter supported the Athenians' claim: the Scionaeans had defected two days after the ratification of the truce. On Cleon's

motion and at his persuasion they immediately passed a decree for the destruction of Scione and the execution of its inhabitants. They took no action elsewhere, but began their preparations for this.

Meanwhile Mende defected from them: this is a city on Pallene¹²³ and an Eretrian colony. Brasidas accepted the defection, seeing no wrong in this, as they had come over to him openly during the truce, and he had his own complaints of Athenian truce-breaking. What had emboldened the Mendaean too to make this move was the ready determination they saw in Brasidas, as evidenced further by his refusal to give back Scione: and there was also pressure from the conspirators among them—they were only a small minority and would not abandon what they had started, but in fear of the consequences for themselves if they were shown up they had coerced the majority to go against their true inclination. Immediately the Athenians learnt of this revolt they became much more angry still, and began preparations against both cities. In expectation of an Athenian naval attack Brasidas evacuated the children and women from Scione and Mende to Chalcidian Olynthus, and sent across five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in overall command. And the two cities coordinated measures for their own defence against the imminent arrival of the Athenians.

Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile joined forces and launched a¹²⁴ campaign for the second time against Arrhabaeus in Lyncus. Perdiccas had with him a full army of the Macedonians under his

rule, and also hoplites from the Greek cities in his kingdom: with Brasidas, in addition to the rest of his Peloponnesians, were Chalcidians, Acanthians, and contingents from the other cities proportionate to their strength. The total Greek hoplite force numbered about three thousand, accompanied by nearly a thousand cavalry, Macedonian and Chalcidian combined, and there was a mass of barbarian troops besides. On entering the territory of Arrhabaeus they found the Lyncestians already encamped and ready to meet them: so they too took up position for battle. The two sides had their infantry stationed on two opposing hills, with a plain between them. First of all the cavalry from both sides rode down and fought an engagement in the plain. The next move was made by the Lyncestian hoplites: joined by their cavalry they advanced down the hill and offered battle. Brasidas and Perdiccas likewise advanced their troops and engaged. The result was a rout of the Lyncestians: many were killed, and the remainder escaped to the high ground and took no further part.

After this they set up a trophy and waited for two or three days, expecting the intended arrival of the Illyrians hired by Perdiccas. Then Perdiccas, impatient of sitting idle, was all for pressing on against the villages in Arrhabaeus' territory. But Brasidas was not keen and preferred to withdraw, for two reasons: he was concerned for the fate of Mende, if the Athenian ships got there before he did, and also the Illyrians had not turned up. In the midst of this disagreement

news came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhabaeus. The result was that both now decided to withdraw, as the Illyrians were formidable fighters: but because of their dispute no time had been fixed for the withdrawal to begin. Night supervened, and the Macedonians and the mass of barbarians took sudden fright, seized by that unaccountable panic to which large armies are liable. Convinced that the Illyrians come to fight them were many times their actual number, and were now virtually on them, they instantly turned and ran, making for home. At first Perdiccas was unaware of what was happening, but as soon as he realized he was obliged by the action of his troops to leave before he had a chance to see Brasidas (their camps were far apart).

At daybreak Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already decamped and the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack. He now planned his own withdrawal. He formed his hoplites into a compact square, with the mass of light-armed troops placed inside it. He detailed the youngest of his men to be ready to dash out through the ranks at any point where the enemy attacked, while he himself would bring up the rear of the retreat with three hundred picked troops, intending to stand and beat back the first wave of the enemy onslaught. Before the enemy were close on them he found time to give this quick encouragement to his troops:

‘Peloponnesians, I imagine that you are terrified by our isolation¹²⁶ and the prospect of an attack by barbarians in large numbers: otherwise I should simply be giving you encouragement, and not a

lecture as well. But as things are, in view of the desertion of our allies and the size of the force which faces us, I shall try with a few words of reminder and advice to impress on you the essential points. Your quality in battle should have nothing to do with the presence or absence of allies—it is a matter of your own native courage. Nor should you be frightened by mere numbers on the other side. You come from a different system. In regimes such as theirs it is not the many who govern the few, but the other way round, and these few have only won power for their family cliques by supremacy in war.

‘Your present fear of these barbarians is due to inexperience. You should realize from your previous encounter with the Macedonians among them—and I can tell you from my own estimate and intelligence received from others—that they will not prove so fearsome. When an apparent strength in an enemy is in fact a weakness, a lesson on the truth of the matter will lend courage to their opponents rather than frighten them: whereas when one side is possessed of a firm inherent advantage, an adversary unaware of it will be over-confident in attack. To the inexperienced these barbarians seem to mean business in a frightening way—the fearful spectacle of their numbers, the unbearable volume of their war-cries, the empty brandishing of their weapons in a show of menace. But when it comes to active engagement with men who are immune to all this, it is a different story. They have no regular formation, and so feel no shame in abandoning a position under pressure. Where honour is concerned,

flight or attack makes no difference to their reputation, so even their courage goes untested (and when each man is his own commander it is easy enough to find a good excuse for self-preservation). They obviously think it more effective to intimidate you from a safe distance than to engage hand to hand: if that were not so, their priorities would be reversed.

‘Look clearly, then, and you can see that all the terror they create in advance, insistent though it may be on the eyes and ears, in fact amounts to very little. So stand your ground and take what comes, then as opportunity allows continue to retire with discipline and formation maintained, and you will reach safety all the sooner. And for future reference you will discover how rabbles like this behave. If you withstand their first attack, they vaunt their bravery at a distance, all threats and posturing: but if you give way, they are quick to display a safe courage in chasing at your heels.’

With these words of advice Brasidas began to withdraw his army.

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Seeing this, the barbarians charged forward with great yells in a disorderly mass, thinking that Brasidas was on the run and they could catch and destroy him. But the skirmishing parties ran out and met them wherever they attacked, and Brasidas with his picked troops withstood the main charge. So to their surprise the barbarians found their first onslaught resisted: and thereafter the Greeks met and beat back each subsequent wave of attack, and whenever there was a pause continued their retreat. In the end the

barbarians pulled the bulk of their army away from Brasidas and the Greeks while they were still in open country, leaving a section to maintain their pursuit and harassment: with the rest they set off at the run after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they caught up with, and reached the pass in time to secure it (this is the narrow pass into Arrhabaeus' territory which runs between two hills, and they knew that Brasidas had no other route for his retreat). As Brasidas was just about to reach the point of no return they began an encircling movement to cut him off.

He realized what was happening and told his three hundred to run

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as fast as they could, in open order, to the hill which he judged the easier to capture, and try to dislodge the barbarians already stationed on it, before they could be joined there by the larger encircling force. They attacked and defeated the men on the summit, and now the main body of the Greek army made its way up there without much difficulty. The barbarians had in fact taken fright when their men lost the high ground in this defeat, and gave no further pursuit: they thought that the Greeks had now reached the border and had made good their escape. After gaining control of the high ground, Brasidas could proceed in greater safety, and on that same day he arrived at Arnisa, the first place in Perdiccas' kingdom.

His soldiers were angry on their own account at the premature retreat of the Macedonians, and whenever on the road they came

across their ox-carts or any piece of baggage dropped (as naturally happened in a panic-stricken retreat at night), they unyoked the animals and slaughtered them, and appropriated the baggage. From that point on Perdiccas regarded Brasidas as an enemy and developed a lasting hatred for the Peloponnesians—given his experience of Athenian activity this was contrary to his usual inclination, but he ignored the dictates of his best interest and took steps to ensure as soon as possible agreement with the Athenians and dissociation from the Spartans.

On his return to Torone from Macedonia Brasidas found the 129 Athenians already in possession of Mende. Reckoning that it was now impossible for him to cross over to Pallene and intervene, he stayed in Torone inactive, but keeping the place under guard. At about the same time as his campaign in Lyncus the Athenians had put their preparations into effect and sailed against Mende and Scione with fifty ships (including ten from Chios), a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and peltasts from their allies in the area: the generals in command were Nicias the son of Niceratus and Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes. Setting out in their ships from Potidaea they put in by the temple of Poseidon and marched against the Mendaean. They had gone out and encamped in a strong position on a hill outside the city, together with three hundred Scionaean who had come in their support and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries under their commander Polydamidas—a total of seven hundred hoplites. Nicias

took with him a hundred and twenty light-armed troops from Methone, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers in an attempt to reach them along a path up the hill, but they inflicted casualties on him and he was unable to force his way through. Nicostratus made another approach by a longer route with the rest of their forces, but the hill was hard to climb and the result was complete chaos—indeed the Athenian army came close to defeat. So on that day, with no submission by the Mendaeanes and their allies, the Athenians withdrew and made camp, and when night came the Mendaeanes went back into their city.

On the next day the Athenians sailed round to the side facing 130 Scione, captured the suburb, and spent the whole day ravaging the land with no one coming out to oppose them (there was in fact some political discord in the city): and in the course of that night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the following day Nicias took half of the army and proceeded to ravage the land as far as the border with Scione, while with the other half Nicostratus took up a siege position by the upper gates of the city, where the road leads to Potidaea. As it happened, this was where the Mendaeanes and auxiliaries had their arms piled inside the wall, so Polydamidas formed up his troops for battle and called on the Mendaeanes to go out and fight. One of the democrats, full of party fervour, shouted back that he was not going out and had no cause to make war. As soon as the man had spoken Polydamidas grabbed him by the arm and pulled him about. At this the democrats

immediately took up their weapons and turned in fury on the Peloponnesians and the opposite party in league with them. This onslaught routed them completely—it was both the suddenness of the attack and also their panic at seeing the gates thrown open to the Athenians which made them think this was a preconcerted move. Those not killed on the spot fled to the acropolis, their previous base. By now Nicias was back at the city, and the whole Athenian army poured into Mende. As the opening of the gates had not been a formal capitulation, they treated it as a city taken by force of arms and sacked the entire place: and it was only with difficulty that the generals prevented the slaughter of the inhabitants too.

After this the Athenians required the Mendaeans to keep their previous constitution unchanged, and bring to trial in their own courts any they considered responsible for the revolt. As for the men on the acropolis, they blockaded them with walls built down to the sea on either side, and installed a guard.

With the situation at Mende under control, they proceeded against Scione. The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians had come out to face

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them and established a strong position on a hill in front of the city, so placed that it was impossible for their opponents to complete a surrounding wall without taking the hill. The Athenians attacked in full force and in the ensuing battle drove off the troops occupying the hill: they then made camp, set up a trophy, and prepared for the

circumvallation of the city. Shortly afterwards, when this work was already in progress, the auxiliaries blockaded on the acropolis at Mende forced through the guard by the sea and made their way to Scione during the night: most of them slipped past the Athenian army camped outside and got into the city.

While the wall was being built round Scione, Perdiccas contacted the Athenian generals and came to an agreement with the Athenians (this was because of his hatred for Brasidas arising out of the retreat from Lyncus, and he had begun negotiations immediately after the retreat). It so happened that the Spartan Ischagoras was then on the point of bringing an army overland to reinforce Brasidas. When the agreement was made Nicias asked Perdiccas to give the Athenians some clear evidence of his reliability, and Perdiccas himself did not want any more Peloponnesians arriving in his country, so he exerted influence on his friends in Thessaly (he had always kept on good terms with the leading men there) and ensured that the army was blocked and the whole plan with it—so effectively that the Spartans did not even try for Thessalian cooperation. Nevertheless Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus did make their own way to Brasidas. The Spartans had sent them to supervise arrangements, and, quite contrary to usual practice, they brought with them from Sparta some of their younger men to be installed as governors of the cities, not wishing these appointments to be left to chance. And Brasidas appointed Clearidas the son of Cleonymus as governor of Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas the son of Hegesandrus in Torone.

In the same summer the Thebans demolished the walls of
Thespiae, 133

charging the city with pro-Athenian sympathies. They had long wanted to do this, and now had a ready opportunity after the flower of the Thespian army had been killed in the battle against the Athenians.

Also in the same summer the temple of Hera at Argos burned down. The priestess Chrysis had placed a lighted lamp near the woollen fillets and then fallen asleep, so that the whole place had caught fire and was ablaze before she noticed. In fear of the Argive reaction Chrysis fled that very night to Phlius: and the Argives, following the procedure prescribed by law, appointed another priestess in her place, by name Phaeinis. When Chrysis went into exile she had served as priestess over eight years of this war and halfway through the ninth.

Towards the end of the summer Scione had been completely ringed by a wall, and the Athenians withdrew the bulk of their army, leaving a garrison there.

In the following winter there was no action between Athenians¹³⁴ and Spartans because of the truce. But a battle was fought between the Mantineans and the Tegeans and their respective allies at Laodoceium in the territory of Oresthis, with the victory disputed. Each side had defeated the opposing wing, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. But although there were heavy casualties on both sides and the fight was evenly balanced, stopped only by

the onset of night, the Tegeans encamped on the field and set up their trophy immediately, whereas the Mantineans withdrew to Boucolion before setting up their own rival trophy later.

At the end of this same winter, close on spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached by night and got a ladder up against the wall, undetected thus far—a sentry had just passed on the bell, and before he came back to his post the ladder was placed at the point he had vacated. But the guards noticed quickly enough, before Brasidas had the chance to climb up, and he hurriedly withdrew his army without waiting for daybreak.

So ended this winter, and with it the ninth year of this war chronicled by Thucydides.

BOOK SEVEN

BOOK EIGHT

When the news reached Athens, for a long time they could not 1
believe that their forces had been so utterly destroyed, and would not credit even the unambiguous reports brought back by soldiers who had actually witnessed the events and made their escape. Then when they had to accept the truth they turned on the politicians who had taken part in advocating the expedition (as if they themselves had not voted for it), and were furious too with the oracle-mongers, the seers, and all others whose professed revelations of the divine will had at the time encouraged their hope of conquering Sicily. On every side there was nothing for them but pain, and they were plunged into fear and the utmost consternation at what had happened. The burden of loss lay heavy on individual families and on the city at large—so many hoplites gone, so many cavalymen, such a swathe of youth and no replacement to be seen. And when at the same time they could not see an adequate number of ships in the docks, adequate funds in the treasury, or an adequate supply of officers for the ships, they despaired of surviving the situation as it was. They thought that their enemies in Sicily, particularly after such a crushing victory, would immediately send a fleet against the Peiraeus, that their enemies in Greece itself, with all their resources now doubled in this way, would bring every

force to bear on them both by land and by sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join the enemy.

Nevertheless they decided that, as far as lay in their power, they should not give in. Specific decisions were to build up a fleet (procuring timber from wherever they could) and a financial resource; to take steps to secure their allies, most particularly Euboea; to make sensible economies in state expenditure at home; and to elect a board of older men to oversee the agenda for debate at any given time as occasion demanded. As tends to happen in a democracy, the people were ready to embrace any form of discipline in the panic of the moment, and they proceeded to implement the decisions they had taken.

So the summer ended.

In the following winter there was an immediate surge of excitement

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throughout the rest of Greece at the massive Athenian failure in Sicily. States which had so far been neutral thought that they should stay out of the war no longer, but volunteer to join the campaign against Athens even if not invited. They each reckoned that they would have been targets of Athenian aggression if the Sicilian venture had succeeded, and that the final stages of the war would be short: it would be a glorious thing to have taken part. The allies of the Spartans shared a new determination, stronger than ever before, to bring their long suffering to a speedy end. But most insistently of all the Athenian subjects were now eager to revolt

from Athens, whether or not they had the power to do so: they interpreted the situation in the light of their own emotions, and did not give the Athenians any chance of surviving the next summer. All this was encouraging to the Spartan state, and yet more so the likely prospect of their allies in Sicily coming to join them at the beginning of spring in full force, now that they had necessarily developed a strong navy. Confident on all fronts, they determined to prosecute the war with unhesitating vigour. They reckoned that with the war brought to a glorious conclusion they would be permanently free of dangers of the sort which the Athenians would have presented if they had added the Sicilian dimension to their power; and that once they had crushed the Athenians they themselves would be guaranteed the leadership of all Greece.

So right at the beginning of this winter their king Agis set out with

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an armed force from Deceleia and collected money from the allies to help pay for the fleet. He then turned to the Malian Gulf, where the Oetaeans were long-standing enemies: he confiscated the bulk of their cattle and exacted payment from them. Here also he put pressure on the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other Thessalian subjects in this region. Despite the indignant protests of the Thessalians he forced them to give hostages and money, sent the hostages for safe keeping to Corinth, and tried to compel them into the alliance. The shipbuilding requisition which the Spartans imposed on the allied states was for a total of a hundred new ships.

The numbers stipulated were twenty-five each from Sparta itself and Boeotia, fifteen from Phocis and Locris, fifteen from Corinth, ten from Arcadia, Pellene, and Sicyon, and ten from Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus, and Hermione. All other preparations were made for an immediate resumption of war at the approach of spring.

The Athenians too used this winter to carry out their own preparations

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as intended. They procured timber and built ships; they fortified Sounium to protect the corn-ships on their route round to Athens; they abandoned the fort they had built in Laconia when sailing round the Peloponnese on their way to Sicily, and made other economies wherever there seemed unnecessary expenditure; and most of all they kept a close watch on their allies to prevent revolt.

During the same winter, while both sides were engaged in this 5 activity and busy equipping themselves to all intents as though they were only just beginning the war, the Euboeans became the first of the Athenian subjects to send envoys to Agis to discuss revolt from Athens. He accepted their proposals and sent to Sparta for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaïdas, and Melanthus to come as the intended commanders in Euboea. They arrived with a force of about three hundred newly liberated Helots, and Agis began arranging their transport across. But just then envoys arrived from the Lesbians also, who were equally keen to revolt. As their case was actively supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded to defer

intervention in Euboea and turned to promoting the Lesbian revolt. He appointed Alcamenes (who had been about to sail to Euboea) as their governing commander, and promised them ten ships, with the Boeotians promising another ten. This was done without reference to the Spartan state: as long as Agis was at Deceleia with his own army there, he had full authority to send a force wherever he wished, to levy troops, and to raise money. Indeed it could be said that at this particular time he had much greater control over the allies than the Spartan government at home, as he had an army at his own disposal and was an immediately formidable presence wherever he chose to go.

While he was negotiating with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythraeans, also eager to revolt, turned for help not to Agis but to Sparta. They were accompanied by a representative of Tissaphernes, who had been appointed military governor of the west by King Darius the son of Artaxerxes. Tissaphernes was equally interested in securing the involvement of the Peloponnesians, and offered to provide their maintenance. He had recently received a demand from the King for the tribute due from his province, and he was in arrears as far as the Greek cities were concerned because the Athenians made collection impossible. He thought that if he could damage the Athenians he would be better able to get his tribute: and at the same time he hoped to present the King with a Spartan alliance, and thereby to carry out a further instruction from the King, which was to take alive or kill Amorges, the bastard son of Pissouthnes, who was in revolt in the Carian region.

The Chians and Tissaphernes thus shared the same objective and⁶ presented a combined case. At about the same time there arrived in Sparta Calligeitus the son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country and resident at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces. They had been commissioned by Pharnabazus to secure the dispatch of a fleet to the Hellespont for his own purposes. Like Tissaphernes, he was keen, if possible, to induce the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, for the same reason of tribute, and he wanted to be the one to present the King with a Spartan alliance.

The two parties representing Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were acting independently of each other, and when both were at Sparta there developed a fierce competition between them to win the priority of Spartan support: one party wanted ships and troops sent to Ionia and Chios first, the other to the Hellespont. The Spartans themselves were much more inclined to accept the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes, as their cause was also promoted by Alcibiades, who had a strong link of ancestral guest-friendship with Endius, one of the ephors at the time. (This friendship was the source of the Laconian name Alcibiades in his family: Endius' father was called Alcibiades.) Nevertheless the Spartans first sent an inspector to Chios—one of the Perioeci called Phrynīs—to establish whether the Chians did have the number of ships they claimed and the general capability of the city accorded with the account given.

When he reported that what they had been told was true, the Spartans immediately made an alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans, and voted to send them forty ships, on the assumption that, from what the Chians said, there was already a fleet there of at least sixty ships. Their original intention was to send ten of their own ships in this number, commanded by Melanchridas, their current admiral-in-chief. But an earthquake occurred, and after that they transferred the command from Melanchridas to Chalcideus, and reduced the number of ships under fit-out in Laconia from ten to five.

So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year of this war chronicled by Thucydides.

At the very beginning of spring in the following summer season the

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Chians pressed for the dispatch of the ships, as they were afraid that the Athenians would get wind of their intrigue (like all the others, they had tried to keep their overtures secret). So the Spartans sent three Spartiates to Corinth with instructions to arrange the immediate transport of the ships across the Isthmus from the Corinthian Gulf to the sea facing Athens, and then give the whole fleet sailing orders to Chios, including the ships which Agis was fitting out for Lesbos. The total number of allied ships at the Isthmus was thirty-nine. Pharnabazus' agents Calligeitus and Timagoras took no part in the

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expedition to Chios. They had brought money with them, twenty-five talents, but made no offer to contribute to the costs of this expedition, preferring to wait and finance a separate expedition later. When Agis saw that the Spartans were set on going to Chios first, he himself had no objection, but the allies convened a conference at Corinth to take their own view. They decided to sail first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was fitting out the five ships in Laconia; to go on from there to Lesbos under Alcamenes, Agis' choice for that command; and then finally to reach the Hellespont, with Clearchus the son of Rhamphias appointed to this last command. They decided also to transport only half of the ships across the Isthmus at first, and send these immediately on their way: the idea was to split the Athenians' attention between the ships setting out and the ships still to follow across the Isthmus. They were prepared to make the voyage in this quite open manner, as they had come to regard the Athenians as impotent, with no significant naval power yet in evidence. They followed their decision immediately with the transport of twenty-one ships over the Isthmus.

The others were in a hurry to sail, but the Corinthians were reluctant

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to join them until they had celebrated the Isthmian festival, which fell at that time. Agis was willing to let them observe the Isthmian truce, and to take on the expedition by himself. The Corinthians objected, and there ensued a delay, during which the Athenians

began to get some inkling of the Chian business. They sent one of the generals, Aristocrates, to confront the Chians. When they denied any plot, the Athenians required them, as a guarantee of good faith, to send back with Aristocrates a contribution of ships to the allied war-effort: and they sent seven. The reason for this compliance in sending the ships was that the Chian people at large knew nothing of the negotiations with Sparta, and the oligarchs who were in the plot did not want to provoke a breach with the people before securing their own ground—and they had lost hope of any Peloponnesian intervention because of the delays.

Meanwhile the Isthmian festival was being celebrated. The Athenians

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had been included in the proclamation of the festival truce, and had sent a delegation to attend. While they were there they acquired more precise information about the Chian business, and on their return they took immediate steps to ensure that the ships at Cenchreae could not get away without their knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with twenty-one ships under the command of Alcamenes. The Athenians intercepted them with an equal number of ships and tried at first to draw them out into the open sea. The Peloponnesians did not venture very far after them, but turned back. At this the Athenians also withdrew, as they had the seven Chian ships in their number and thought them unreliable. But later they crewed further ships to bring the total to thirty-seven, and when the Peloponnesians resumed their voyage

along the coast they chased them into Speiraeum, an uninhabited harbour in Corinthian territory just short of the border with Epidauria. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but gathered the rest into this harbour and anchored there. The Athenians attacked both by sea with their ships and from the land with troops they had put ashore. There followed a disorderly scrimmage of a battle in which the Athenians damaged most of the Peloponnesian ships on the shore and killed their commander Alcamenes: some of their own men fell too.

When they broke off the Athenians set a guard of enough ships to

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blockade the enemy, and anchored the rest of their fleet at the nearby islet, where they made camp. They also sent to Athens for reinforcements, as on the following day Corinthian troops arrived in support of the Peloponnesian ships, and shortly after them the other people of the area. The Peloponnesians could see the difficulty of maintaining a guard on such a desolate place, and were uncertain what action to take, even considering setting fire to the ships: in the end they decided to drag the ships on shore and sit it out with their land forces on guard until some suitable opportunity of escape presented itself. When Agis heard of their situation he sent them Thermon, a Spartiate, to take charge. The first news to reach the Spartans at home was that the ships had put out from the Isthmus (Alcamenes had been instructed by the ephors to send a horseman when the departure was under way), and they were immediately

ready to send out their own five ships with Chalcideus in command and Alcibiades with him. They were on the point of leaving when the second message came with news of the fleet's confinement in Speiraeum. Disheartened that their first move in the Ionian war had met with failure, they were minded to cancel any dispatch of ships from their home waters and even to recall some which had already sailed.

When Alcibiades heard of this he went back to Endius and the 12 other ephors and urged them not to abandon the expedition. His arguments were that they would have sailed and arrived before the Chians heard what had happened to the other fleet; that once he reached Ionia he would have no difficulty in persuading the cities to revolt; he would describe the Athenian weakness and the Spartan commitment, and his would be taken as a uniquely authoritative voice. He took Endius aside and emphasized the honour to be won if he were the agent of revolt in Ionia and a Spartan alliance with the King: he should not let this prize fall to Agis (there was no love lost between Alcibiades and Agis). He convinced the other ephors as well as Endius, and set sail with the five ships in company with the Spartan Chalcideus. They made all speed on the voyage.

At about this same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which 13 had served with Gylippus throughout the Sicilian war were on their way back. Off Leucas they were intercepted and mauled by the twenty-seven Athenian ships stationed there under Hippocles the

son of Menippus to watch for ships coming from Sicily: but all except one got past the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades arrested all they met in the course of¹⁴ their voyage, to prevent any reports of their coming. They put in first at Corycus on the mainland, where they released their prisoners and had a preliminary meeting with some of the Chians in the plot, who advised them to sail straight into the city unannounced. So they suddenly arrived at Chios to the surprise and alarm of the general public. The oligarchs had so arranged it that the council was sitting at the time, and Chalcideus and Alcibiades were given the floor. They announced that many more ships were on their way (keeping quiet about the blockade at Speiraeum), and the Chians formally declared secession from Athens, followed shortly by the Erythraeans. They then took three ships to Clazomenae and induced revolt there too. The Clazomenians immediately crossed to the mainland and began fortifying Polichna, in case they needed to retreat there from the small island on which their city stands. All the revolted cities were now engaged in building fortifications and preparing for war.

The news from Chios quickly reached Athens. The Athenians¹⁵ recognized that they now had a clearly major crisis on their hands: with the most important allied state gone over to the enemy, the rest of their allies would hardly stay quiet. In the alarm of the moment they immediately abrogated the penalties set for anyone suggesting or putting to the vote a proposal to touch the reserve of

a thousand talents which they had jealously guarded throughout the war. They now voted to broach this reserve and use it to man a large number of ships. From the blockading fleet at Speiraeum they voted to send directly to Chios the eight ships under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus which had broken off guard duty to pursue Chalcideus and his squadron, but returned when they failed to catch him: another twelve would be sent in support shortly afterwards under Thrasyclus, these too taken from the blockade. They removed the seven Chian ships participating in the blockade at Speiraeum, freed the slaves serving in them, and imprisoned the free men in the crews. They quickly manned another ten ships and sent them in partial replacement of the total number withdrawn from the blockade of the Peloponnesians, and planned to fit out and crew thirty more. There was urgency all round, and nothing was spared in the operation for the recovery of Chios.

Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos¹⁶

He took on an additional Samian ship and sailed to Teos, where he warned the inhabitants to stay loyal. But Chalcideus too was now bearing down on Teos from Chios with twenty-three ships, supported by the Clazomenian and Erythraean land forces keeping pace along the coast. Strombichides was informed in time and put back to sea. When he was well out in the open water he could see the size of the fleet coming from Chios, and turned to run for Samos, pursued by the enemy fleet. The Teians at first refused entry to the land forces, but then admitted them after the Athenians had

fled. These troops waited for a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. When time passed and he still did not come, they began on their own initiative to demolish the wall which the Athenians had built to protect the city of Teos on the landward side, and they were joined in this by a few barbarians who arrived under the command of Stages, one of Tissaphernes' deputies.

After chasing Strombichides back to Samos, Chalcideus and 17 Alcibiades armed the sailors from the ships they had brought from the Peloponnese and left them in Chios, then manned those ships and a further twenty with Chians and sailed for Miletus, intending to bring about its revolt. Alcibiades was friendly with the leading men in Miletus, and wanted to win over the Milesians before any more ships arrived from the Peloponnese. This would crown the achievement of widespread revolt among the Ionian cities solely with the help of the Chians and Chalcideus, and so win that prize for the Chians, for himself and Chalcideus, and, as he had promised, for Endius as the originator of the expedition. They made most of the voyage unobserved, and reached Miletus not far ahead of Strombichides and Thrasyclus, who had just arrived from Athens with twelve ships and joined in the chase. They succeeded in bringing Miletus to revolt, and when the Athenians sailed in hard on their heels with nineteen ships, the Milesians refused to admit them. The Athenians then took up a blockading position at Lade, the island facing the city.

And now, immediately after the revolt of Miletus, the first Spartan alliance with the King was negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as follows:

The Spartans and their allies made an alliance with the King and
Tissaphernes on these terms:

All the territory and all the cities which are in the King's possession, or were in the possession of the King's forefathers, shall belong to the King: and whatever revenues or other goods once accrued to the Athenians from these cities, the King and the Spartans and their allies shall jointly ensure that the Athenians receive neither monies nor any other goods.

The King and the Spartans and their allies shall jointly pursue the war against the Athenians: and termination of the war shall only be allowed if agreed by both parties, by the King and by the Spartans and their allies.

If any revolt from the King, they shall also be the enemies of the Spartans and their allies: and if any revolt from the Spartans and their allies, they shall be the King's enemies likewise.

So the alliance was agreed on these terms.

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Immediately after this the Chians manned a further ten ships and sailed to Anaea, wanting to find out how things stood at Miletus and also to bring the cities in that region into the revolt. A message came from Chalcideus telling them to go back, as Amorges was approaching overland at the head of an army. They sailed back to

Dios Hieron, where they caught sight of sixteen ships which Diomedon was bringing from Athens to follow the earlier squadron under Thrasyclus. As soon as they saw them, they scattered—one ship to Ephesus, the rest making for Teos. The Athenians captured four ships abandoned by their crews after reaching land in time, but the other five found refuge in the city of Teos. The Athenians then sailed away to Samos. The Chians put out to sea again with their remaining ships and, together with the land forces, secured the revolt of Lebedus and then Aerae. After that both army and ships returned to their various home cities.

At about this same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships at Speiraeum (which had been driven there earlier and then blockaded by an equal number of Athenian ships) made a sudden break-out, defeated the Athenians in battle at sea, and captured four of their ships. They then sailed back to Cenchreae and prepared once more for the expedition to Chios and Ionia. And Astyochus, who was just now succeeding as overall admiral-in-chief, arrived from Sparta to command them. 20

After the land forces had withdrawn from Teos Tissaphernes came in person with an army and completed the demolition of what remained of the fortification at Teos: he too then withdrew. Shortly after his departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships and established formal agreement with the Teians to allow the Athenians admission to their city on the same basis as the

Peloponnesians. He sailed on round to Aerae, but left when his attack on the city failed to take it.

This was also the time of the revolution in Samos, when the 21 people rose up against the men in power, helped by the Athenians from the three ships which they had there at the time. The Samian people killed in all up to two hundred of the most powerful men, condemned another four hundred to exile, and distributed their land and houses among themselves. The Athenians subsequently voted them independence on the grounds that their loyalty was now assured, and they continued their political reforms. Among other measures they withdrew all civic rights from the former landowners and prohibited any future marriage alliances, bride or groom, between them and the people or the people and them.

The Chians lost none of their original enthusiasm for promoting 22 revolt elsewhere, even before the Peloponnesians arrived in force, and a contributory motive was to involve as many cities as they could in sharing the risk of defection. Their next move in the summer was to send an expedition of thirteen of their own ships against Lesbos, following the Spartans' declared plan of progressing from Chios to Lesbos, and thence to the Hellespont. At the same time the infantry available from the Peloponnesians already there and their allies in the region marched round towards Clazomenae and Cyme. The Spartiate Eualas commanded the land force, and the ships were commanded by Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci. The fleet

sailed first to Methymna, and secured its revolt. Four ships were left there, and the rest went on to secure the revolt of Mytilene.

Meanwhile Astyochus, the Spartan admiral-in-chief, set out from Cenchreae with four ships, as planned, and reached Chios. On the third day after his arrival the Athenian fleet, numbering twenty-five, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon (Leon had brought a subsequent reinforcement of ten ships from Athens). On the same day, towards evening, Astyochus also put out to sea with the addition of one Chian ship and sailed for Lesbos, to offer what assistance he could. He arrived at Pyrrha, then on the next day at Eresus, where he learnt that Mytilene had been taken by the Athenians in one quick attack. They had sailed straight into the harbour without any warning, captured the Chian ships there, then put troops ashore and defeated the force which met them: so they were now in possession of the city. Astyochus heard this from the Eresians and from the Chian ships which had been left earlier at Methymna with Euboulus, but were now running for home after the capture of Mytilene and happened to meet him at Eresus (there were three of them now—one had been caught by the Athenians). So instead of pressing on to Mytilene Astyochus first secured the revolt of Eresus, then armed the men from his own ships and sent them round by land to Antissa and Methymna, putting Eteonicus in command, while he took the sea route with his and the three Chian ships. His hope was that the appearance of his force would encourage the Methymnaeans and keep them firm in their revolt.

But when it turned out that everything was going against him in Lesbos, he took his land party back on board and sailed away to Chios. The allied land forces originally destined for the Hellespont were also dispersed back to their home cities. Shortly afterwards six more of the allied Peloponnesian ships from Cenchreae arrived to join Astyochus in Chios.

After restoring conditions in Lesbos the Athenians sailed on from there to capture from the Clazomenians the place they were fortifying on the mainland, Polichna. They brought them all back to their city on the island, except for the main instigators of the revolt, who absconded to Daphnus. So Clazomenae rejoined the Athenian alliance.

In this same summer the Athenians blockading Miletus with their²⁴ twenty ships at Lade made a landing at Panormus in Milesian territory, where the Spartan commander Chalcideus was killed when he brought up a few troops in opposition. On the third day after that the Athenians sailed across again and set up a trophy, which the Milesians pulled down, considering it erected without any complete conquest of the territory. Leon and Diomedon now used the Athenian fleet from Lesbos to prosecute war against the Chians from their ships, launching their attacks from the Oenoussae islands opposite Chios, from Sidoussa and Pteleum, fortified positions they held on the Erythraean peninsula, and from Lesbos itself: their marines were hoplites taken from the service-list and pressed into this role. Landings were made at Cardamyle and Boliscus, where the

Chian forces coming to resist them were defeated with many casualties and the general area devastated: they were defeated again in another battle at Phanae, and in a third battle at Leuconium.

After this the Chians no longer came out to fight, and the Athenians comprehensively ravaged their richly cultivated land which had remained inviolate from the Persian Wars until then. Except for the Spartans, the Chians are the only people I know of who have combined prosperity with prudence, and matched the growth of their city with a corresponding stability of well-ordered government. Their very revolt (which may seem on the face of it a lack of caution) was not undertaken until they had a good number of firm allies to share the risk, and could see that after the Sicilian disaster Athens was in a dire state undeniable even by the Athenians themselves. And if they were undone by one of those miscalculations to which human affairs are prone, their mistake was shared by many others who, like them, thought that Athenian power would soon be completely destroyed. As it was, denied the sea and despoiled by land, some of them were prepared to bring their country back to the Athenians. The authorities became aware of this, but took no direct action themselves. Instead they brought the Spartan admiral Astyochus over from Erythrae with the four ships he had there, and discussed with him how best to put down the conspiracy by moderate means, either taking hostages or in some other way. This, then, was the state of affairs in Chios.

Towards the end of this summer Athens sent out an expedition of ²⁵

a thousand Athenian hoplites, fifteen hundred Argives (the Athenians providing hoplite armour for the five hundred of the Argives who had come light-armed), and a thousand from the allies. This force embarked in forty-eight ships (including some troop-transports) under the command of the generals Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and sailed to Samos, then crossed over to Miletus and took up position there. The Milesians came out to meet them with eight hundred hoplites of their own, together with the Peloponnesian troops who had come with Chalcideus and a body of mercenaries hired by Tissaphernes, who was there in person with his cavalry. These now engaged the Athenians and their allies in battle. The Argives on their wing charged ahead in some disorder, contemptuous of the opposition and convinced that no Ionians would withstand their attack. They were defeated by the Milesians and nearly three hundred of their men were killed. The Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, then drove back the barbarians and the rest of the miscellaneous opposition, but did not engage with the Milesians, as after the rout of the Argives they had retreated inside their city when they saw the other forces losing. The Athenians, now masters of the field, took up a position right in front of the city of Miletus. (A particular circumstance of this battle was that the Ionians on both sides had the better of the Dorians: the Athenians were victorious over the Peloponnesians facing them, and the Milesians over the Argives.) The Athenians set up a trophy and

began preparations to wall off the city (it stands on a narrow-necked peninsula), reckoning that if they could reduce Miletus to compliance the other cities also would easily be won back.

But meanwhile, late in the afternoon, they heard reports of the²⁶ fleet of fifty-five ships from the Peloponnese and Sicily which was now nearly on them. At the instigation of the Syracusan Hermocrates, who had been foremost in urging the Sicilian Greeks to take their part in the final overthrow of Athens, twenty ships had come from Syracuse and two from Selinus; and the Peloponnesian ships under preparation were now ready. The Spartan Therimenes had been put in charge of conveying both squadrons to the admiral-in-chief Astyochus. They first sailed to Leros, an island some way short of Miletus. Here they learnt that the Athenians were at Miletus, and so sailed on into the Iasian Gulf to find out more about the Milesian situation. Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichioussa, a place in Milesian territory which was the point in the Gulf where the fleet had sailed in and made their camp. He told them about the battle (he had been there in person and fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes), and advised them, if they did not want to see the ruin of their campaign in Ionia and indeed of their whole cause, to go as quickly as they could to the relief of Miletus and not allow the city to be walled off.

They were ready to go at daybreak. But when the Athenian general

Phrynichus received clear information about this fleet from Leros, although his fellow commanders wanted to stay where they were and fight it out at sea, he said no: he would not undertake such a fight himself, nor would he allow them or anyone else to do so if he could help it. When it was open to them to postpone battle until they had precise knowledge of the number of enemy ships they faced and the relative number they could muster themselves with time spent on proper preparation, he would never take such an unconsidered risk simply to avoid an accusation of dishonour. There was nothing dishonourable in Athenians making a strategic retreat from an enemy navy. The real harm would be defeat, whatever the circumstances, which would not just bring dishonour on the city but also plunge it into extreme danger. After the disasters it had suffered the city could barely afford to take offensive initiatives even with secure preparation and at a time and place it could choose, except in an emergency: still less should it court risks of its own making if there was no compulsion to run them. Phrynichus proposed that as soon as they could they should take on board the wounded, the whole infantry, and the gear they had brought with them (but leaving behind, to lighten the ships, any spoil obtained from enemy country), and sail back to Samos, where they could gather all their ships and continue attacks from there as opportunity offered. His view prevailed, and he took the action proposed. This decision was seen, not only at the time but also in hindsight, as confirming Phrynichus' reputation for intelligence, as shown both here and in all other matters within his control. So just before

nightfall the Athenians pulled out from Miletus in this way, their victory incomplete. Once at Samos the Argives quickly sailed home in disgust at their own defeat.

At dawn the Peloponnesians put to sea from Teichioussa and 28 arrived at Miletus after the Athenians had left. They stayed for one day, then on the next day took with them the Chian ships which, under Chalcideus at the time, had been pursued into the harbour, and sailed back to Teichioussa intending to fetch the tackle which they had unloaded there. When they arrived they were approached by Tissaphernes with his land army: he persuaded them to sail against Iasus, where his enemy Amorges had stationed himself. They made a sudden attack on Iasus and took it, aided by the inhabitants' assumption that the ships could only be Athenian. In this action the Syracusans won particular plaudits. Amorges (who was the bastard son of Pissouthnes, and in revolt from the King) was captured alive by the Peloponnesians and handed over to Tissaphernes to take back to the King if he so wished (those were his instructions from the King). They then plundered Iasus and the army appropriated a very great quantity of treasure, as the place had long been wealthy. They did no harm to the mercenaries with Amorges, but took them over and conscripted them into their own ranks, since most of them came from the Peloponnese. The town itself they handed over to Tissaphernes together with all their captives, slave or free, for whom they had agreed with him a price of one Daric stater each. They then returned to Miletus. Pedaritus

the son of Leon had been sent out from Sparta to be governor in Chios, and they had him escorted as far as Erythrae by Amorges' mercenary troops. In Miletus itself they installed Philippus as governor.

So the summer ended.

In the following winter, when Tissaphernes had made arrangements

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for Iasus to be garrisoned, he came on to Miletus and distributed a month's pay, as he had promised at Sparta, to all the ships at the rate of one Attic drachma a day for each man. Thereafter he proposed to pay at a half-drachma rate, until he could consult the King: if the King gave permission, he would pay the full drachma. This matter of pay was not pressed by Therimenes (who was not the admiral, but had simply been in charge of delivering the ships to Astyochus), but the Syracusan general Hermocrates did raise objections, as a result of which an increase of five ships' worth was agreed in the total pay, giving each man a little more than half a drachma a day. Tissaphernes was now offering thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and extra payment in the same proportion for any ships beyond that number.

During the same winter the Athenians at Samos received from 30 home a further reinforcement of thirty-five ships with the generals Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. They now assembled their whole fleet, including the ships engaged at Chios, for the purpose of allotting forces to the two main operations, which were

a naval blockade at Miletus and the dispatch of a fleet and infantry to Chios. It fell to Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon to take thirty ships to Chios together with troop-transports carrying a portion of the thousand hoplites who had gone to Miletus: the other generals were based in Samos with seventy-four ships to dominate the sea and keep up attacks on Miletus.

Astyochus happened to be in Chios at the time, selecting hostages

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to hold against the possible betrayal of the island to Athens, but when he heard of the arrival of the fleet with Therimenes and the improvement of the allies' prospects, he abandoned this task and put to sea with his ten Peloponnesian ships and ten Chian, first attacking Pteleum without success, then sailing on to Clazomenae. Here he demanded that the pro-Athenian party should remove to Daphnus, and Clazomenae come over to the Peloponnesians: he was joined in this demand by Tamos, a Persian deputy governor of Ionia. When the Clazomenians refused, he launched an attack on the city (which was unwallled) but failed to take it. He then sailed away in a strong wind which carried his ship to Phocaea and Cyme, while the rest of his fleet put in to the islands lying off Clazomenae—Marathoussa, Pele, and Drymoussa. Detained there by the winds for eight days, they plundered or consumed the property deposited by the Clazomenians for safe keeping in the islands, and took what remained on board their ships when they sailed to Phocaea and Cyme to rejoin Astyochus.

While he was still in that area Astyochus was approached by 32
envoys from Lesbos with proposals for a second revolt. He was
ready to accept, but the Corinthians and the other allies were
unenthusiastic in view of the previous failure. So he put out and set
sail for Chios, where his ships finally arrived from various
directions after being scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus,
who had earlier been making his way by land from Miletus, now
reached Erythrae and made the crossing to Chios with his attendant
troops. He also had at his disposal the five hundred or so armed
crewmen left in Chios by Chalcideus from his five ships. When some
of the Lesbians came and repeated their offer to revolt, Astyochus
presented to Pedaritus and the Chians the argument for intervening
with their fleet to secure the defection of Lesbos: by this action they
would either bring more allies to their side, or, even if not wholly
successful, do some damage to the Athenians. But they would not
hear of it, and Pedaritus refused to let him have the Chian ships.

Astyochus then took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from 33
Megara, one more from Hermione, and the ships he had brought
with him from Laconia, and sailed with these for Miletus to take up
his full command of the navy as admiral-in-chief. As he left he made
it repeatedly clear to the Chians that they could expect no help from
him whatever when they themselves might be in need. He made
land at Corycus in Erythraean territory and camped there for the
night. The Athenian naval and infantry force sailing from Samos to
Chios also put in there and anchored on the other side of the hill

which was all that separated the two fleets and kept them unaware of each other's presence. But in the night a letter came from Pedaritus with the information that some Erythraean prisoners had been released from Samos on the promise that they would betray their city to the Athenians, and had now arrived in Erythrae for that purpose. So Astyochus immediately set sail back to Erythrae. (That was how close he came to falling into the hands of the Athenians.) Pedaritus sailed across to meet him, and together they investigated the story of this supposed treachery. When they found that the whole thing was a ruse to get the fellows safe out of Samos, they dropped the charges and sailed back, Pedaritus to Chios and Astyochus to his original destination of Miletus.

Meanwhile the Athenian force had also left Corycus, and as their 34 ships were rounding the Arginum promontory they chanced on three Chian warships and gave chase as soon as they sighted them. A violent storm blew up and the Chian ships just managed to reach the safety of their harbour, but the three Athenian ships foremost in the pursuit were wrecked and blown ashore close to the city of Chios, their crews either captured on land or lost at sea. The rest of the Athenian fleet found refuge from the storm in the harbour under Mount Mimas called Phoenicus. From there they sailed on later to put in at Lesbos, and began preparing for the fortification they intended to build in Chios.

During this same winter the Spartan Hippocrates set out from 35

the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships (commanded by Dorieus the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues), one Laconian ship, and one Syracusan. They sailed across and put in at Cnidus, which had now revolted from Athens under the influence of Tissaphernes. When they learnt of this arrival the Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus ordered them to use half of their ships to keep guard on Cnidus and to station the other half around Triopium to seize the merchant ships putting in there from Egypt (Triopium is a promontory at the end of the Cnidian peninsula, with a sanctuary of Apollo). The Athenians heard of this and sent a fleet from Samos which captured the six ships on guard duty at Triopium (though the crews escaped). They then sailed on to Cnidus and launched an attack on the unwallled city which nearly succeeded in taking it. They attacked again on the following day, but in the night the inhabitants had improved their defences and had been joined by the crews escaped from the ships at Triopium. Unable now to do as much damage as before, the Athenians left and sailed back to Samos after ravaging the Cnidians' land.

At about the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus to take command

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of the fleet. At this stage the Peloponnesians based there were still comfortably placed in all essentials: the pay was adequate, the troops had the added security of the huge spoils taken from Iasus, and the Milesians were committed in support of the war. They did, though, think that the first agreement with Tissaphernes made

between him and Chalcideus was deficient and tended to their disadvantage. So before Therimenes left they made another agreement, as follows:

An agreement between the Spartans and their allies and King Dareius and

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the King's sons and Tissaphernes. There shall be a treaty and friendship between the parties on these terms:

Whatever territory and cities belong to King Dareius, or belonged to his father or forefathers, neither the Spartans nor the allies of the Spartans shall go against these for the purpose of war or any other detriment, and neither the Spartans nor the allies of the Spartans shall exact tribute from these cities: nor shall King Dareius or the subjects of the King go against the Spartans or their allies for the purpose of war or any other detriment.

If the Spartans or their allies make any request of the King, or the King of the Spartans or their allies, whatever action they take by mutual agreement shall be valid.

Both parties shall jointly pursue the war against the Athenians and their allies: and if they terminate the war, both parties shall do so jointly.

Whatever troops are in the King's territory, at the summons of the King, shall be maintained at the King's expense.

If any of the cities which are party to this agreement with the King go against the King's territory, the others shall intervene and assist the King to the full extent of their power: and if any in the

King's territory, or in any territory over which the King has dominion, go against the territory of the Spartans or their allies, the King shall intervene and give assistance to the full extent of his power.

After the conclusion of this agreement Therimenes handed over³⁸ the fleet to Astyochus, then sailed away in a cutter and was never seen again. The Athenians had now transferred their forces from Lesbos to Chios and, with superiority on both land and sea, began fortifying Delphinium, a place not far from the city of Chios which was in any case strong on the landward side and also offered harbours. The Chians took no action. They had already been badly beaten in many battles, and anyway their internal relations were in a poor state: now that Tydeus the son of Ion and his followers had been executed by Pedaritus as pro-Athenian agents, and the rest of the population forced under tight control, no one could trust anyone else, and for that reason it was thought that they themselves would not be a match for the Athenians, nor would the mercenaries brought by Pedaritus. They did, though, send to Miletus and ask for the help of Astyochus. When he refused, Pedaritus sent a letter to Sparta accusing him of misconduct. This, then, was the situation the Athenians found in Chios. Their fleet at Samos made several attempts to attack the enemy ships at Miletus, but as these would never come out to fight, the Athenians withdrew to Samos and took no further action.

In this same winter, round about the solstice, the twenty-seven ships

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which the Spartans had been persuaded to fit out for Pharnabazus (through the agency of Calligeitus the Megarian and Timagoras the Cyzicene) set out from the Peloponnese and sailed for Ionia: the commander on board was the Spartiate Antisthenes. With these ships the Spartans also sent out eleven Spartiate men as commissioners to advise Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilas. Their instructions, on arrival at Miletus, were to assist Astyochus in the general management of affairs for the best outcome, and, at their discretion, to send on this fleet as it was, or a larger or smaller number of ships, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, putting Clearchus the son of Rhamphias in command (he was sailing with the expedition). The eleven commissioners also had authority, again at their discretion, to depose Astyochus from his command and appoint Antisthenes in his place: in view of Pedaritus' letter the Spartans had their doubts about Astyochus. These ships, then, set out from Malea across the open sea and were putting in to Melos when they chanced on a squadron of ten Athenian ships, three of which they captured empty of their crews and then burned. Fearing now that the ships which had got away from Melos would report their approach to the Athenians at Samos (as indeed they did), they took the precaution of sailing a longer way round via Crete to put in at Caunus in Caria. They thought they were now safe, and from

there they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus requesting an escort along the coast.

At the same time the Chians and Pedaritus kept sending messages

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to Astyochus, despite his continued reluctance, urging him to bring his whole fleet to their assistance: they were being blockaded, and he should not stand by while the greatest of the allied cities in Ionia was cut off by sea and devastated by raids on land. A relevant factor was that the Chians had large numbers of slaves (a denser slave population than any state other than Sparta), and their punishments for any misdeeds were all the harsher because of their numbers. So when the Athenian forces seemed firmly installed in Chios with a fortified base, the majority of the slaves immediately deserted to them, and their knowledge of the country was instrumental in doing it the greatest damage. The Chians insisted on the need for help, while there was still some hope and the possibility of prevention, with the fortification of Delphinium in progress but not yet completed, and the Athenians beginning a longer circuit wall to protect both camp and ships. Although disinclined in view of his earlier threat, when Astyochus saw the allies enthusiastic in this cause he too determined to support the Chians.

But in the meantime he received the message from Caunus

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announcing the arrival of the twenty-seven ships and the Spartan commissioners. He thought there was nothing more important than to provide a convoy for such a large reinforcement of ships which

would extend their control of the sea, and to ensure the safe passage of the Spartans who had come to report on his conduct. So he immediately abandoned the Chios plan and sailed for Caunus. In the course of his voyage down the coast he made a landing at Cos Meropis, an unwalled city left in ruins after being hit by the largest earthquake in living memory. The inhabitants had fled to the mountains, and Astyochus sacked the town and in a series of raids plundered everything he could take from the countryside (except for the free men rounded up—these he let go). From Cos he reached Cnidus at night, but could only follow the Cnicians' urgent recommendation not to disembark his men, but to sail on directly, without any pause, against the twenty Athenian ships which Charminus (one of the generals from Samos) had out on patrol looking for the twenty-seven ships expected from the Peloponnese—the very ships which Astyochus had come to escort. The Athenians in Samos had heard from Melos of their approach, and Charminus was patrolling the area round Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes, and off the coast of Lycia: he now had the further information that the ships were at Caunus.

So without any pause, and before his movements could be detected,

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Astyochus sailed on towards Syme, hoping to catch the Athenian ships somewhere in the open sea. Heavy rain and cloudy conditions disoriented his ships in the darkness and created confusion. The fleet became split up, and when day broke the left wing could now be

seen by the Athenians, while the rest of the ships were still straggling the other way round the island. Charminus and the Athenians hastily put out to sea against them with fewer than their total of twenty ships, thinking the ships they could see were the fleet from Caunus for which they had been watching. They attacked immediately, disabled three and damaged others, and were having the better of the action until the unexpected appearance of the larger part of Astyochus' fleet had them blocked on all sides. They then turned to run, losing six ships as they did so, but escaping with the rest to the island of Teutloussa, and from there to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put in to Cnidus, where they were joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus: the entire combined fleet then sailed across to erect a trophy on Syme, and went back to anchor at Cnidus.

When the Athenians at Samos heard of this sea-battle and its result,

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they took their whole fleet and sailed to Syme. They made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, nor did the Peloponnesians come out to attack them. They simply collected the ships' equipment they had left at Syme, and after touching at Loryma on the mainland sailed back to Samos.

All the Peloponnesian ships were now together at Cnidus, and necessary repairs were being carried out. At the same time, since Tissaphernes had arrived, the eleven Spartan commissioners discussed with him any aspects of the previous agreements which

they found unsatisfactory, as well as the future conduct of the war as would best serve the interests of both parties. Lichas was the keenest critic of the situation as it was. He said that both treaties, those negotiated with Chalcideus and then with Therimenes, were badly drawn. It was monstrous for the King now to claim possession of all the territory over which he or his forefathers had once held dominion in the past. That would mean renewed slavery for all the islands, for Thessaly, for Locris, and for all Greece as far as Boeotia, and instead of bringing them freedom the Spartans would be imposing Persian rule on the Greeks. He therefore demanded a different treaty on better terms. Certainly, he said, Sparta was not going to observe the present agreements, and did not want maintenance at all if those were the terms for it. Tissaphernes took offence at this and left the meeting in a rage without settling anything.

The Spartans meanwhile made the decision to sail to Rhodes. 44

They had been receiving communications from some of the most powerful men in Rhodes, and hoped to bring over an island which was strong in numbers of sailors and infantry alike, thinking also that with their alliance as it would then stand they would be able to maintain their fleet by themselves, without asking Tissaphernes for money. So in this same winter they sailed as soon as they could from Cnidus, and their first landing in Rhodian territory was at Cameirus, with ninety-four ships. Their arrival terrified the people at large, who knew nothing of the negotiations and began to run

away, not least because their city had no walls. The Spartans then called a meeting of the Cameirans, inviting also people from the other two cities on the island, Lindus and Ialysus, and persuaded the Rhodians to secede from Athens. So Rhodes came over to the Peloponnesian alliance. The Athenians became aware of the Spartan intentions at the time, and sailed with their fleet from Samos in an attempt to forestall them. They appeared in the offing, but were just too late and sailed away for the time being to Chalce, then back to Samos. Later they carried on hostilities against Rhodes with naval attacks launched from Chalce and Cos. The Peloponnesians meanwhile collected some thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, dragged their ships up on shore, and took no other action for eighty days.

But in the meantime and even earlier, before the Peloponnesian⁴⁵ move to Rhodes, another sequence of events was developing. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus the Peloponnesians began to have their suspicions of Alcibiades, and the result was a letter reaching Astyochus from Sparta with orders to have Alcibiades killed (he was a personal enemy of Agis, and thought untrustworthy in other ways too). In his initial alarm Alcibiades took refuge with Tissaphernes, and then began working on him to do as much damage as he could to the Peloponnesian cause, and became his constant mentor. He had Tissaphernes cut down the sailors' pay from one Attic drachma a day to half a drachma, and that at irregular intervals. He instructed Tissaphernes to tell the

Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with their longer experience of naval management, paid their sailors only half a drachma, not from any shortage of funds but to prevent their men feeling flush enough to compromise their fitness by spending money on unhealthy pursuits, or deserting their ships if they were not held hostage by pay still owing. He also told him to bribe the trierarchs and the allied generals into agreement. (Only the Syracusans refused: their general Hermocrates was the sole voice protesting on behalf of the whole alliance.) When cities came asking for money Alcibiades saw them off in person and acted as Tissaphernes' mouthpiece. He told the Chians that they must have lost all shame: they were the wealthiest people in Greece, and despite the protection of a mercenary army they were now expecting others to risk both lives and money in defence of their freedom. To the other cities he replied that, when they had been paying large sums to the Athenians before their revolts, it was scandalous if they were not now prepared to make equal or greater contributions in their own cause. He explained that at present finance was understandably tight, as Tissaphernes was supporting the war at his own expense, but that if at some point funds for maintenance came through from the King, Tissaphernes would restore full pay and give appropriate subsidy to the cities.

Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in too much of a⁴⁶ hurry to conclude the war, and not to plan on giving one and the same side superiority on both land and sea by bringing up the

Phoenician fleet he had under preparation or paying for more Greek sailors. He should allow the division of power to continue, and then it would always be open to the King to set the others on whichever side proved troublesome to him. But if a combination of land and sea power produced a victor, the King would have no obvious ally to help him crush the victorious side, unless he was prepared, at great expense and risk, to enter the lists himself sooner or later and take the contest through to its conclusion. The more economical course, at a fraction of the expense and no danger to the King himself, was to let the Greeks wear themselves out against each other. The Athenians, he said, would be more suitable partners in the King's empire. They were not so ambitious to expand their power on land, and both the principle and the practice of their conduct of the war matched the King's interests very well. The Athenians would cooperate in a policy of enslavement, with the Aegean area subjugated to them and all the Greeks living in the King's territory subjugated to the King: whereas the Spartans were coming on the contrary as liberators, and it was not likely that when they were liberating Greeks from Greeks they would stop short of liberating Greeks from barbarians, unless the Persians managed somehow to get them out of the way soon. So he advised him first to wear both sides out, then, when he had clipped Athenian power as much as he could, to get the Peloponnesians out of his country.

To judge by his actions, Tissaphernes was largely inclined to follow this course. He evidently thought well of Alcibiades' advice

in these matters and placed his full confidence in him. As a result he kept the Peloponnesians on poor rates of pay, and would not let them fight any sea-battle, always saying that the Phoenician fleet would arrive soon and then they could fight from a position of superiority. In this way he gradually weakened their cause and reduced the efficiency of their navy, which at its peak had been in formidable condition. And generally he made it clear beyond any possibility of concealment that he had little enthusiasm for supporting them in the war.

In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, Alcibiades,
now

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under their patronage, was telling them what he genuinely thought was in their best interests. But at the same time he was working for his own return to his country. He knew that the day would come (if he did not destroy his country before then) when he could persuade the Athenians to recall him: and he thought his best means of persuasion was to be seen as the intimate of Tissaphernes. So it transpired. The Athenian army at Samos became aware of his strong influence with Tissaphernes. This was partly because Alcibiades himself included the promise of making Tissaphernes their friend in his messages to the most powerful men in the army, asking them to put it about to the better class of people that he was willing to come back and join them in an oligarchy, but not in the malign sort of democracy which had driven him out. But yet more important was

the fact that the trierarchs and leading Athenians at Samos had made up their own minds to overthrow the democracy.

This movement began in the base at Samos and later spread from

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there to the city of Athens. At first some individuals from Samos crossed over to the mainland and held discussions with Alcibiades. He offered the prospect of winning them the friendship first of Tissaphernes and then of the King himself, if the democracy was abandoned (this would overcome the King's reservations). The wealthiest Athenians, who were the most imposed on, now began to conceive great hopes of getting the government into their own hands and also of defeating the enemy. On their return to Samos they brought suitable colleagues into a conspiratorial group, while publicly announcing to the troops at large that the King would be their friend and would provide money if Alcibiades were recalled and democracy abandoned. The common soldiers may have felt some immediate distaste at the deal, but the straightforward hope of pay from the King kept them quiet. After making this announcement to the whole army, the group planning the oligarchy gave further consideration to Alcibiades' proposal both among themselves and within a wider circle of their fraternity members.

The others thought it straightforward enough and sound, but Phrynichus (who was still general) would have none of it. In his view—and he was right—Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than he did for democracy, and his sole motivation was somehow to

change the existing political order so that his friends could have him called back. Their own overriding concern, he said, must be to avoid civil strife. And it was not a straightforward matter for the King to take the Athenian side: that would set him at odds with the Peloponnesians, who were now just as much in evidence on the sea and controlled some of the most important cities in his dominions; he did not trust the Athenians, and he had the ready alternative of making allies of the Peloponnesians, who had so far done him no harm. As for the allied states, Phrynichus said he was certain that no difference would be made by the conspirators' evident promise to install oligarchies, simply on the grounds that Athens itself would not be a democracy. The seceded states would not come back, and those still in the alliance would not be any more loyal. Oligarchy or democracy was all one to them if they were still enslaved: what they wanted was their freedom, irrespective of their ultimate form of government. In any case, Phrynichus continued, they thought the so-called 'great and good' would oppress them as much as the democracy: it was they who were the authors and facilitators of crimes done by the people, and they who benefited most from them. If it was up to the oligarchs there would be a violent regime and executions without trial, whereas the people offered the allies a legal refuge and a restraint on oligarchic excesses. The cities had learnt this from actual experience, and he had no doubt of their view. So Phrynichus declared that as far as he was concerned there was no merit in Alcibiades' proposal or its present development.

But the conspirators at this gathering stuck to their original decision.

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They approved the present proposals and planned to send Peisander and other envoys to Athens, to negotiate about the recall of Alcibiades and the overthrow of democracy in the city, and to ratify friendship between Tissaphernes and the Athenians.

Knowing that there would be a proposal for the restoration of 50 Alcibiades (and that the Athenians would accept it), Phrynichus was now concerned, in view of his own express opposition, that if Alcibiades did return he would do him some harm for attempting to stand in his way. He therefore had recourse to the following stratagem. He secretly sent word by letter to Astyochus the Spartan admiral (who at the time was still at Miletus) to the effect that Alcibiades was undermining the Spartan cause by promoting friendship between Tissaphernes and the Athenians. He included full detail in his letter, and added the hope that Astyochus would understand his motive in doing down a personal enemy even at some disadvantage to his own country. Astyochus had no intention of punishing Alcibiades (with whom in any case he now had less frequent dealings), but went up to see him in Magnesia and to see Tissaphernes too, and, turning informer himself, he told them both the content of the letter from Samos. (It was said that Astyochus had sold himself to Tissaphernes, and was taking private payments for this and other information: that was also why he had not pressed harder in the matter of the reduced wages.) Alcibiades immediately

sent a letter to the authorities in Samos denouncing Phrynichus for what he had done, and demanding his execution. This disconcerted Phrynichus, and the revelation did indeed leave him in a very dangerous position. So he sent another letter to Astyochus, protesting at the earlier breach of confidence, and saying now that he was prepared to give the Spartans the opportunity to destroy the whole Athenian army in Samos. He gave detailed indications of how this could be done (Samos being unwallled), and said that, when the Athenians were now threatening his life, he could not be blamed for taking this or any other action to avoid destruction by his most virulent enemies. Astyochus revealed this too to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus had planned on Astyochus' continued betrayal of 51 confidence, and then an immediate further letter from Alcibiades on this issue. He now anticipated this by informing the army that he had clear intelligence of enemy intentions to attack their base while Samos was still unfortified and not all their ships were in harbour. They must therefore fortify Samos as quickly as they could, and maintain all else on defensive alert. As general he was within his powers to command this action on his own authority. So they set to the work, and in consequence the fortification of Samos (which was intended in any case) was completed all the sooner. Not long afterwards the letter came from Alcibiades, warning that the army had been betrayed by Phrynichus and the enemy were about to attack. It was thought that Alcibiades could not be trusted, that he was privy to the enemy's plans and was imputing complicity to

Phrynichus out of personal hatred. So this letter did Phrynichus no harm, but actually served to confirm the information given in his own statement.

After this Alcibiades continued to work on Tissaphernes, trying to

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bring him round to friendship with the Athenians. Tissaphernes was wary of the Peloponnesians, as they had more ships in the area than the Athenians, but even so he was inclined, if at all possible, to go along with Alcibiades, especially when he reflected on the quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus over the treaty of Therimenes (this had taken place before the move to their present station in Rhodes). On that occasion Alcibiades' previous argument, that Spartan policy was to liberate all the cities, had been borne out by Lichas when he declared it an intolerable clause in the agreement that the King should have possession of the cities which at some time in the past had been under either his or his forefathers' rule. Alcibiades was playing for high stakes, and applied himself assiduously to his courtship of Tissaphernes.

Meanwhile Peisander and the other envoys sent by the Athenians

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in Samos arrived at Athens and spoke at length to the assembled people, summarizing as the essential point that with the recall of Alcibiades and a modification of their democracy they could secure the King as their ally and defeat the Peloponnesians. There was much general opposition to the proposal about the democracy, Alcibiades' enemies were loud in protesting that it would be

monstrous to allow the return of a law-breaker, and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces cited the Mysteries as the reason for his banishment and invoked the gods against his recall. Amid all this opposition and outrage Peisander came forward again and called out each objector, asking them in turn whether they could see any hope of survival for the city unless someone persuaded the King to change to their side—when, as he pointed out, the Peloponnesians had a fleet at least as large as their own out at sea and ready for action, they had more cities in their alliance, and they were being financed by the King and Tissaphernes, whereas Athens had no money left. When in answer to his question they all acknowledged that they could see no other hope, Peisander went on to present them with the stark conclusion. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘this is not going to happen unless we win the King’s trust by adopting a more prudent form of government and restricting eligibility for office to a select few; unless we concentrate now on survival rather than the constitution (we can always change things later, if there is anything we do not like); and unless we bring back Alcibiades, who is the only man alive who can make this happen.’

The people at first reacted angrily to this talk of oligarchy, but
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Peisander continued his clear explanation of why there was no alternative means of survival, fear, combined with the hope of future reversal, brought them to accept. So they voted that Peisander should sail with ten others to negotiate with Tissaphernes

and Alcibiades for what they judged the best outcome. Peisander had also denounced Phrynichus, and the people relieved him and his colleague Scironides of their commands and sent Diomedon and Leon to the fleet to replace them as generals. (This denunciation was the claim that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges: and Peisander made it because he feared that Phrynichus would not be in favour of negotiation with Alcibiades.) Peisander also canvassed all the cabals which were already established in the city for mutual support in lawsuits and elections to office, and urged them to unite and work in common for the overthrow of the democracy. After making other arrangements to speed the matter in hand, Peisander and his ten colleagues proceeded on their voyage to Tissaphernes.

Leon and Diomedon had by now joined the Athenian fleet, and⁵⁵ in the same winter they sailed against Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian ships pulled up on shore, but made a landing and defeated the Rhodian force which came out to oppose them. They then retired to Chalce, and made that rather than Cos the base of their operations: it was easier from there to track any movements of the Peloponnesian fleet.

A Laconian called Xenophantidas now arrived in Rhodes, sent from Chios by Pedaritus to report that the Athenian fortification was now complete, and that Chios would be lost if the entire fleet did not come to its aid. The Peloponnesians at Rhodes were minded to give assistance. But meanwhile Pedaritus himself, with his own mercenary force and the whole Chian army, made an attack on the

Athenian wall protecting their ships. He took part of the wall and a few ships drawn up on land, but the Athenians came out against them, routed the Chians first, and then defeated the force with Pedaritus. Pedaritus himself and a large number of Chians were killed, and a great quantity of arms captured.

After this the Chians were yet more tightly blockaded 56
by both land and sea, and the famine there was now severe.

Meanwhile Peisander and his fellow Athenian envoys reached Tissaphernes and began discussions about an agreement. Alcibiades could not rely on Tissaphernes' response (he was more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the Athenians, and was still inclined, as Alcibiades himself had advised, to wear down both sides), so he resorted to the ploy of setting Tissaphernes' demands of the Athenians so high that there could be no agreement. It seems to me that Tissaphernes also wanted the negotiations to fail. He was motivated by his fears, while Alcibiades, seeing that Tissaphernes was unlikely to agree on any terms, did not want the Athenians to conclude that he was incapable of influencing Tissaphernes: rather that Tissaphernes was primed and ready to reach agreement, but the Athenians themselves were not offering sufficient inducement. With Tissaphernes there in person, Alcibiades acted as his spokesman and made such exorbitant demands that, even though they went a long way to accommodate them, the Athenians bore the blame for the breakdown of the talks. He demanded first that the whole of Ionia should be ceded to the King, then subsequently added the off-lying

islands and some other places. The Athenians made no objection thus far, so finally at their third meeting (fearful now that his complete lack of influence would be shown up) he demanded that the King should be allowed to build ships and sail off his own coast wherever and with whatever number of ships he wanted. At that point the Athenians had enough: they could see no way forward, and thought they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they left in a rage and took themselves to Samos.

Immediately after this, and in the same winter, Tissaphernes went

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down to Caunus. He wanted to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and to avoid a complete breach of relations by offering them continued maintenance on whatever terms he could obtain in a further agreement. He was afraid that if they were otherwise short of the means of maintaining that number of ships, either they would be obliged to fight the Athenians and lose, or their crews would desert: in either case the Athenians would achieve what they wanted without any help from him. His main fear, though, was that they would plunder the mainland in search of food. Looking ahead, then, with all this taken into consideration, and wishing as he did to keep the two Greek powers evenly matched, Tissaphernes invited the Peloponnesians to meet him at Caunus, made his offer of maintenance, and concluded a third treaty with them, as follows:

In the thirteenth year of the reign of King Dareius, and in the ephorate of

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Alexippidas at Sparta, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander between, on the one hand, the Spartans and their allies, and, on the other, Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the respective interests of the King and of the Spartans and their allies.

All the King's territory which lies in Asia shall remain the King's: and the King shall determine as he pleases in respect of his own territory.

The Spartans and their allies shall not go against the King's territory for any detriment, neither shall the King go against the territory of the Spartans or their allies for any detriment. If any of the Spartans and their allies go against the King's territory for detriment, the Spartans and their allies shall intervene to prevent it: and if any of those in the King's dominion go against the Spartans or their allies for detriment, the King shall intervene to prevent it.

Maintenance for the ships now present shall be provided by Tissaphernes according to the agreement, until such time as the King's ships arrive. When the King's ships have come, the Spartans and the allies may, if they choose, take responsibility on themselves for the maintenance of their own ships: if they wish to continue to receive maintenance from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall provide it, but at the end of the war the Spartans and their allies shall pay back to Tissaphernes whatever money they have received.

When the King's ships have come, the ships of the Spartans and their allies and the King's ships shall jointly pursue the war in

whatever way is decided by Tissaphernes and the Spartans and their allies. And if they wish to agree a settlement with the Athenians to end the war, the terms of that settlement shall be the same for both parties.

So the treaty was agreed on these terms. Tissaphernes now began

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preparations to bring up the Phoenician ships (as specified in the treaty) and to fulfil his other undertakings. He was anxious to be seen making a start, at any rate.

Towards the end of winter the Boeotians took Oropus, despite an
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Athenian garrison there. The place was betrayed to them in a joint operation involving men from Eretria as well as Oropus itself. Their ulterior motive was the revolt of Euboea: Oropus lies opposite Eretria, and in Athenian hands would inevitably present a considerable danger to Eretria and the whole of Euboea. So with Oropus now secured the Eretrians came to Rhodes and invited the Peloponnesians to intervene in Euboea. They, though, were more concerned to relieve the distress of Chios, and set sail from Rhodes with their entire fleet. When they reached Triopium they caught sight of the Athenian fleet out at sea on their way from Chalce. Neither side attacked the other, and the Athenians went on to arrive at Samos and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, now recognizing that they could not bring help to Chios without engaging the Athenians at sea.

So this winter ended, and with it the twentieth year of this war chronicled by Thucydides.

At the very beginning of spring in the following summer season⁶¹ Dercylidas, a Spartiate, was dispatched overland by the coastal route to the Hellespont with a small army to secure the revolt of Abydos (which is a Milesian colony). And the Chians, with Astyochus still doubting his ability to help, were forced by the stranglehold of the blockade to fight it out at sea. A fortunate circumstance was that while Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had received from Miletus a new governor after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartiate called Leon, who had come out as lieutenant to Antisthenes, and he brought with him twelve ships which had been guarding Miletus: these were five Thurian ships, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one Milesian, and Leon's own ship. The entire Chian land forces broke out and seized a strong position, while their thirty-six ships were launched against the Athenians' thirty-two, and came to battle. It was a hard fight, and when they turned back to the city as evening came on the Chians and their allies had not been worsted in the action.

Very soon after this Dercylidas reached the Hellespont overland⁶² from Miletus, and Abydos seceded to him and to Pharnabazus, followed two days later by Lampsacus. Strombichides in Chios heard of this and hurried to intervene with twenty-four Athenian ships, which included some troop-transports carrying hoplites. He defeated the Lampsacenes who came out to meet him, and took

Lampsacus (which was unwall'd) in one quick attack. He carried off the movable goods and the slaves, but returned the free inhabitants to their homes. He then went on to Abydos, but the people would not concede and repeated attacks failed to take the place. So he sailed over to Sestos, a city on the Chersonese opposite Abydos which had once been in Persian hands, and turned it into a fortress to keep guard on the whole of the Hellespont.

Meanwhile the Chians gained greater control of the sea. That,
and

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the news of the sea-battle and the departure of Strombichides and his ships, emboldened Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus. Astyochus took two ships through to Chios and brought back the allied ships which had gone there: then with his entire fleet united he sailed out against Samos. The Athenians were now in a state of mutual suspicion, and did not come out to meet him: so he sailed back to Miletus.

The reason was that about this time or somewhat earlier the democracy at Athens had been overthrown. When Peisander and his fellow envoys came to Samos after their meeting with Tissaphernes, they took steps to establish yet firmer control within their own army, and in Samos itself encouraged the most powerful men to join them in the attempt to set up an oligarchy, despite the fact that the Samians had been through a revolution to avoid coming under oligarchic government. At the same time the Athenian revolutionaries in Samos conferred among themselves and took the

view that they should leave Alcibiades out of it, as he was evidently unwilling to join them and in any case was hardly suitable for participation in an oligarchy: given that they were already compromised, they should take it on themselves to ensure that the movement did not stall. They also determined to maintain the war-effort, and make ready contributions of money or any other requisite from their own resources, as this would now be an imposition not at the behest of others but for their own benefit.

With this general confirmation among themselves they proceeded

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immediately to dispatch Peisander and half of the envoys to Athens to take matters forward at home, instructing them to set up oligarchies in all the subject cities at which they put in on their voyage: the other half of the envoys were sent variously to other subject places. They also sent Diitrephes, who was then at Chios, to take up the command in the Thraceward region to which he had already been appointed. When he arrived at Thasos he put down the democracy there. But within two months of his departure the Thasians began fortifying their city: they had no more need for an aristocracy backed by Athens when they were daily expecting their liberation by the Spartans. There was a group of Thasian exiles driven out by the Athenians and now based in the Peloponnese. In conjunction with their friends at home they were working hard to obtain ships and bring about the revolt of Thasos. So now what had happened was exactly what they wanted—a redirection of

government without any danger to themselves, and the overthrow of the democracy which would have opposed them. So in the case of Thasos the result was the opposite of that intended by the Athenians involved in introducing the oligarchy, and I imagine the same was true of many other subject states also. Once they had acquired a 'sensible' government with no restraints on their actions, the cities went straight for outright freedom, and had little time for the specious 'law and order' offered by the Athenians.

In the course of their voyage to Athens Peisander and his colleagues,

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as agreed, put down the democracies in the various cities along their route, and from some of the places they took on board hoplites who would support them. When they reached Athens they found most of the work already done by the members of the cabals. A group of younger men had conspired to have one Androcles quietly murdered: he was a leading champion of the people and had been instrumental in the banishment of Alcibiades. They had two reasons for killing him, the second stronger than the first: the fact that he was a demagogue, and, looking forward to the return of Alcibiades and the friendship he would secure with Tissaphernes, the belief that this would place them in his good books. There were some other inconvenient people also quietly disposed of in the same way. The conspirators had prepared the ground with a public manifesto, to the effect that there should be no state pay for anyone not on active military service, and that participation in government should

be restricted to a maximum of five thousand, those to be the citizens most capable of serving the state with both property and person.

This was only a pretence intended to play well with the general⁶⁶ public, as the authors of the revolution were certainly going to keep the government of the city in their own hands. There were still even so meetings of the assembly and of the council (that is, the council of five hundred chosen by lot): but the agenda was controlled by the clique of conspirators, all speakers came from their number, and their speeches were vetted in advance. No one else now would express any contrary view, as there was general fear at what they saw as the extent of the conspiracy. If anyone did speak up, he quickly met his death in some convenient way. There was no attempt to search for the perpetrators, and none of the suspects was ever brought to trial. The people were terrorized into silence, and thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even if they never said a word. They imagined the conspiracy to be much more widespread than it actually was, and this kept them demoralized: they had no means of discovering the truth, as the pure size of the city made it impossible for everyone to know everyone else. For this same reason it was impossible to identify sympathizers with whom to share grievances and plan any counteraction: the choice of confidant could only be either a stranger or an intimate who could not be trusted. All the democrats now approached one another with suspicion, on the possibility that any one of them could be involved

in what was going on. There were indeed some participants whom no one would ever have expected to turn oligarch. It was these examples which intensified mutual suspicion among the people at large, and by giving solid cause for the democrats to mistrust one another greatly contributed to the security of the oligarchs' position.

This, then, was the situation Peisander and his colleagues found⁶⁷ on their arrival at Athens, and they immediately applied themselves to the next stages. First they convened an assembly of the people and proposed the election of ten commissioners with authority to draw up recommendations for the best management of the city and lay their proposals before the people on a fixed day. Then, when this day came, they held the assembly in the confined space of the sanctuary of Poseidon at Colonus, about a mile outside the city. The only proposal brought forward by the commissioners was simply that any Athenian should have impunity to introduce any resolution he wished: but they also specified severe penalties for anyone indicting the proposer for illegality, or using other means to do him harm. And now the real scheme was proposed without further concealment. The motion was that all existing offices in the present order of government should be abolished, and there should be no state pay for office; that a presiding board of five should be elected, that these five should elect another hundred, and each of these hundred co-opt three more; that these Four Hundred should meet in the council-chamber with absolute authority to govern the city in

whatever way they might consider best; and that they should summon meetings of the Five Thousand as and when they might so decide.

The proposer of this motion, and to all appearances the most committed

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agent in the overthrow of the democracy, was Peisander. But in fact the man who had developed the whole scheme to this point and worked longest for its achievement was Antiphon. He was a man of quality, equal to any of his contemporaries in Athens, and exceptionally gifted in his powers of thought and expression. He was reluctant to come forward in the assembly or on any other public stage. This, and a reputation for cleverness, meant that the people at large were suspicious of him: but for individuals consulting him about a case they had to argue in the law courts or the assembly he was the one man who could give them outstanding service. And when later the regime of the Four Hundred had fallen and the people were intent on reprisals, and he was brought to trial for his part in setting up this regime, the speech he gave in his own defence was without doubt the finest ever made, up to my time, by any man on a capital charge. Phrynichus also showed himself exceptionally committed to the oligarchy. He had his own reasons to be afraid of Alcibiades (knowing that Alcibiades was aware of his dealings with Astyochus when he was at Samos), and thought it unlikely that he would ever be recalled under an oligarchy. Once Phrynichus had subscribed to the cause, he was seen as particularly

dependable when there were dangers to face. Another leading figure among the revolutionaries was Theramenes the son of Hagnon, a man of considerable eloquence and intellectual power.

So it was not surprising that in the hands of so many able men the enterprise succeeded, despite its inherent difficulty: it was not an easy task to terminate the liberty of the Athenian people almost exactly a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when they had been not only free of subjection to anyone else but also, for over half of that period, accustomed to imperial power over others.

No opposition was expressed in the assembly, but all these proposals

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were ratified and the assembly then dismissed. After that the next move was to have the Four Hundred occupy the council-chamber, and this was achieved in the following way. All Athenians did daily duty either on the walls or on parade, with arms ready to hand because of the enemy at Deceleia. On this particular day those not involved in the plot were allowed to leave the parade-ground as usual, and the conspirators had been told to loiter not exactly right by their arms, but not too far away: if anyone tried to oppose what was going on, they were to take up their arms and intervene. There were also on hand some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the Athenian settlers who had been sent out to occupy Aegina: these had been brought in with their own arms for this very purpose, and were given the same instructions. With

this deployment in place the Four Hundred arrived, each carrying a concealed dagger, accompanied by the hundred and twenty young men they used as their enforcers. They broke in on the regularly appointed councillors meeting in the council-chamber and told them to take their pay and leave. They had themselves brought with them money to pay for the unexpired period of the councillors' term of office, and handed it to each of them as they left the building.

With the council retiring in this way without objection, and the rest

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of the citizen body keeping quiet and causing no trouble, the Four Hundred installed themselves in the council-chamber. For the present they chose their own presiding officers by lot, and observed the traditional prayers and sacrifices to the gods on assuming their administration. Soon, however, they made wholesale changes in the democratic system. They stopped short of recalling the exiles (because Alcibiades was one of them), but otherwise took resolute control of the city. They put some (not many) to death—those whom they thought it convenient to get out of the way—and imprisoned or exiled some others. They also communicated with Agis, the Spartan king, who was at Deceleia, saying that they were willing to make peace and expected him to be readier to agree terms with them than with the fickle democracy they had supplanted.

Agis took the view that Athens could not be in a settled state, and

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that the people would not so quickly surrender their long-standing freedom. He thought that the sight of a large enemy army would keep them unsettled (and in any case he was not at all convinced that the ferment in Athens was now over), so he gave no conciliatory answer to the emissaries of the Four Hundred and in fact sent for substantial reinforcements from the Peloponnese. Not much later he took his own garrison force from Deceleia together with the newly arrived troops and came down to the very walls of Athens. His hope was that ferment among the Athenians would make them more likely to capitulate on Spartan terms, or even allow him immediate capture amid the chaos caused by the combination of internal and external threats: if that meant that the Long Walls would be unguarded he could hardly fail to take them. But as he came up closer the Athenians gave no sign whatever of any internal disturbance. They sent out their cavalry and a detachment of hoplites, light-armed troops, and archers, shot down some of his men who had advanced too far, and took possession of a number of arms and dead bodies. Agis now realized how things stood in the city, and took his army back. He and his own troops stayed on in their station at Deceleia: he kept the reinforcements in Attica for a few days, then sent them home. Thereafter the Four Hundred resumed their diplomatic approaches to Agis, and he was now more receptive. At his suggestion they also sent envoys to Sparta to discuss terms for the peace they wanted to conclude.

They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the forces there 72

and explain that the oligarchy presented no detriment to the city or its citizens, but had been established to preserve the national interest, and that there were five thousand (not just four hundred) involved in the administration—and this despite the fact that because of military campaigns and official business abroad the Athenians had never yet held an assembly on a matter important enough to achieve an attendance of five thousand. These emissaries were sent out with instructions to make these and other appropriate arguments as soon as the Four Hundred were formally installed. Their fear, realized in the event, was that the general body of Athenian sailors would not be prepared to stay with an oligarchic regime, and that trouble would start at Samos and end in their overthrow.

A reaction against the oligarchic movement had already set in at 73 Samos, and the following events took place at about the same time as the Four Hundred were being organized in Athens. Some of the Samians who had earlier led the revolution against the men in power, and had counted as ‘the people’ at the time, were now changing sides under the influence of Peisander (after his arrival in the island) and the Athenians in his coterie at Samos. They formed themselves into a group of some three hundred conspirators and planned to attack the others who were now ‘the people’. There was an Athenian called Hyperbolus, a worthless fellow who had been ostracized, not out of fear of his power or position, but because he was a pest and a disgrace to the city. In collusion with Charminus,

one of the generals, and a number of other Athenians in Samos, and as a guarantee of their complicity, these men had Hyperbolus murdered. They colluded with them in other acts of violence also, and were ready and willing to launch an attack on the majority party. The people learnt of their intentions and gave this information to the generals Leon and Diomedon (who had been appointed to office by the democracy and were not happy with the move to oligarchy), and also to Thrasyboulus and Thrasyllus (the former a trierarch, the latter a serving hoplite) and the others who were seen to be most constant in their opposition to the oligarchic conspiracy. They begged them not to stand by inactive while they were destroyed and Samos alienated from Athens, when Samos was the one remaining bastion of the Athenian empire. This appeal had its effect. The men they had approached went round the troops individually to ensure their resistance, with particular attention to the Parali, the crew of the ship Paralus who were all freeborn Athenians and ready to attack oligarchy anywhere, real or imaginary: and whenever Leon and Diomedon had to sail elsewhere they always left some ships behind for the protection of the Samians. So when the three hundred made their attack, all the crews, and especially the Parali, rallied to the defence, and the majority party emerged victorious. They killed some thirty of the three hundred, and punished the three main instigators with exile. They offered the others an amnesty, and incorporated them into the subsequent democracy.

The Samians and the army in Samos now sent the Paralus at full

speed to Athens to report the developments, not knowing that the Four Hundred were now in power. On board was an Athenian who had been a fervent supporter of the counter-revolution, Chaereas the son of Archestratus. When they sailed in the *Four Hundred* immediately arrested two or three of the *Parali*, confiscated their ship, and transferred the rest of the crew to a troop-ship detailed for guard duty round Euboea. When Chaereas saw the situation he managed some-how to make a quick escape and got back to Samos. There he gave the troops a greatly exaggerated account of horrors at Athens—free men flogged like slaves, no opposition to the government tolerated, wives and children sexually abused, plans to arrest and imprison the relatives of all military personnel at Samos who were not of their party, and to execute these hostages if they did not conform. And he added a good number of other falsities.

On hearing this the first reaction of the troops was to turn on the main authors of the oligarchy and any others who had supported them, and they were on the point of shooting them down. But they desisted when the moderates restrained them and warned that they could ruin everything, with the enemy fleet on watch close by and prepared for action. After this, Thrasyboulus the son of Lycus and Thrasyllus (the two main leaders of the counter-revolution) were ready to declare their hand and re-establish democracy among the Athenians at Samos. They had all the soldiers, especially those of the oligarchic party, swear the most binding oaths that they would

without fail support the democracy and maintain unity, commit themselves to continued prosecution of the war against the Peloponnesians, and regard the Four Hundred as enemies beyond any negotiation. The same oath was sworn by all Samians of adult age, and the Athenian army recognized a solidarity with the Samian people in all that they did and all that might result from the risks they shared: they could see that neither the Samians nor they themselves had any other place of safety, and that if they lost either to the Four Hundred or to the enemy at Miletus that would be the end of them.

So for a while there was a power-struggle, one side trying to 76 impose democracy on the city, and the other trying to impose oligarchy on the armed forces. The soldiers proceeded directly to call an assembly, at which they deposed their former generals and any of the trierarchs they suspected, and elected other trierarchs and generals in their place: Thrasyboulus and Thrasyllus were among the new generals chosen. Individuals stood up in the assembly and offered a variety of points for their own encouragement. It was no cause for worry, they said, that the city had revolted from them: this was the revolt of a minority against a majority, and the majority were better able to provide for themselves in every way. They controlled the entire fleet, and could force the other subject cities to provide funds just as much as any navy based in the Peiraeus. Samos was a strong state to have on their side—in the Samian war it had come very close to wresting

control of the sea from the Athenians—and their base of operations against the enemy would be the same as before. Their possession of the fleet made them better able to bring in supplies than the Athenians at home. In fact it was only their own position in forward defence at Samos which had so far enabled the Athenians to keep the Peiraeus open: and now, if it came to it, if the Athenians refused to give them back their constitution, the fleet at Samos would be better able to close the sea to the city Athenians than vice versa. In any case, in terms of winning the war, the home state was of little or no use to them and was no great loss, considering that the Athenians at home could no longer give them any money (the troops were paying for themselves) or any sensible political decision—which was the reason why states controlled armies. In this respect the people at home had made a serious error in subverting the ancestral constitution. They in Samos were maintaining it, and would do their best to reimpose it at home: so there was at least as much good political advice available in Samos as in Athens. And then there was Alcibiades: if they recalled him with an immunity, he would gratefully bring them the King's alliance. Above all, and if all else failed, with such an extensive fleet at their command they had many possibilities of finding refuge—cities and land—elsewhere.

After holding this assembly and building their morale with speeches

along these lines, they turned with equal energy to preparations for continuing the war. The ten envoys dispatched to Samos by the Four Hundred heard how things stood when they reached Delos, and stayed there without proceeding further.

At about this same time there was also unrest among the 78 Peloponnesian troops in the fleet at Miletus, who bandied about vociferous complaints that Astyochus and Tissaphernes between them were ruining their cause. Astyochus, they said, had refused to fight earlier when they were in better condition and the Athenian fleet was small, and was refusing to fight now, when there was said to be civil strife among the Athenians and their ships were still dispersed. They could well be worn out with waiting for Tissaphernes to produce his Phoenician ships, which seemed mere talk and no substance. As for Tissaphernes, he was not only failing to bring up these ships, but his irregular and incomplete payment of wages was weakening the fleet. They said there should be no more delay, and it was time for a decisive battle. The Syracusans were particularly insistent.

The allies and Astyochus became aware of this agitation. They 79 held a conference at which they agreed to go for a decisive battle at sea, a resolution confirmed as news came in of the trouble at Samos. So they put to sea with their entire fleet of a hundred and twelve ships, making for Mycale, where they had told the Milesians to go round to meet them on foot. At the time the Athenians had their eighty-two ships from Samos lying at Glaucæ on the promontory of

Mycale (at this point the distance from Samos to the mainland at Mycale is very short). When they saw the Peloponnesian ships approaching, they retreated back to Samos, thinking that they did not have sufficient numbers to stake all on one battle now. Besides, they had received advance information from Miletus that the enemy were looking to fight, and they were expecting Strombichides to return from the Hellespont to reinforce them with the ships which had gone from Chios to Abydos—a courier had been sent to summon him. So for these reasons the Athenians retreated to Samos, while the Peloponnesians sailed in to Mycale and made camp there, together with the land troops from Miletus and other local areas. On the next day they were ready to sail against Samos, but news came that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont, and they immediately sailed off back to Miletus. With their fleet now augmented the Athenians went on the attack themselves, sailing against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships. They now wanted the decisive battle, but as no one would come out to meet them they sailed back to Samos.

The Peloponnesians refused to fight because they doubted their⁸⁰ ability to match the full Athenian fleet, but they were also concerned to find the money to support their own large number of ships, especially as Tissaphernes was such a poor paymaster. So in this same summer, and immediately after this refusal to come out against the Athenians, they sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias with a squadron of forty ships to Pharnabazus, as was his original

commission when he left the Peloponnese. Pharnabazus had been inviting them to come, and was ready to pay for their maintenance: at the same time Byzantium was communicating with them about revolt from Athens. So this Peloponnesian squadron put out into the open sea (to avoid being seen on its voyage by the Athenians), but was caught in a storm. Clearchus and the majority of the ships made Delos, and then returned to Miletus (Clearchus himself subsequently took his way to the Hellespont by land to assume his command): but the ten ships under the Megarian general Helixus weathered the storm and reached the Hellespont, then secured the revolt of Byzantium. Thereafter the Athenians at Samos, informed of these developments, sent a naval force to keep guard on the Hellespont, and there was a minor sea-battle off Byzantium, eight ships against eight.

Ever since he had restored the democracy at Samos,
Thrasyboulus

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remained insistently of the view that Alcibiades should be recalled, and his fellow leaders agreed with him. He finally persuaded the mass of troops at an assembly, and they voted through both the recall and an immunity. Thrasyboulus then sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos, convinced as he was that their only hope of survival was if Alcibiades could win Tissaphernes over to their side from the Peloponnesians. An assembly was called, at which Alcibiades first spoke of his own circumstances, complaining about the exile imposed on him and

blaming it for his actions. He then talked at length about the political situation, giving them strong hopes for the future and greatly exaggerating his own influence with Tissaphernes. In this he had several purposes. He wanted to frighten the oligarchy at home and ensure the dissolution of the cabals; to increase his prestige among the Athenians at Samos and encourage their own confidence; and to dash the enemies' present hopes by alienating them as far as he could from Tissaphernes. So Alcibiades boasted on with huge promises: Tissaphernes had assured him that if he could trust the Athenians they would not lack for maintenance as long as he had money of his own to give, even if in the end he had to sell his own bed; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships, already now at Aspendus, on the Athenian rather than the Peloponnesian side; but that he would only trust the Athenians if Alcibiades was restored unharmed to be their guarantee.

On hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athenians promptly

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elected Alcibiades general alongside their existing generals, and allowed him full control of their affairs. Every man among them held more precious than anything else this new hope of personal safety combined with retribution on the Four Hundred. From what they were told they conceived an immediate disdain for the enemy close at hand, and were ready to sail straight for the Peiraeus. Despite popular pressure for this course, Alcibiades flatly refused to let them sail against the Peiraeus and turn their backs on the nearer

enemy. He said that since he had been elected general he must first sail to Tissaphernes and discuss with him the conduct of the war. He left immediately after this assembly, to give the impression of complete cooperation between the two of them. He also wanted to increase his prestige in Tissaphernes' eyes and make it clear to him that he had now been appointed general and was in a position to do him good—or harm. In effect, Alcibiades was using Tissaphernes to put pressure on the Athenians, and the Athenians to put pressure on Tissaphernes.

When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of Alcibiades' recall⁸³ their already existing mistrust of Tissaphernes deepened into a yet greater alienation. What had happened was that by the time of the Athenians' attempted attack on Miletus, when they had not been prepared to come out and fight, Tissaphernes had become much more remiss in his payments, and this question of Alcibiades now had intensified a longer-standing resentment against Tissaphernes. As before—and not this time just the common soldiery, but some of the officers also—they gathered in groups to take stock of their grievances: they had never yet received their full pay; what came was too little and too infrequent; if no one would take the fleet out to fight or move it to a reliable source of maintenance, the men would start deserting; all this was the fault of Astyochus, who was toadying to Tissaphernes for his own profit.

While they were still taking stock there was an actual fracas involving

Astyochus. The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most part free men (more so than in other contingents), and so were particularly forthright in besieging Astyochus with demands for pay. He gave them a somewhat dismissive answer accompanied by threats, and even raised his stick against Dorieus when he supported the claims of his own men. At this the crowd of troops saw red, as sailors will, and surged forward to strike Astyochus down. He saw it coming and ran for refuge at a nearby altar. In the end he was not hurt, and the confrontation was dissipated. Another incident was a surprise assault made by the Milesians on the fort which Tissaphernes had built in Miletus: they captured it and expelled the guards he had posted there. This action met with the approval of the other allies, especially the Syracusans. Lichas, though, was not pleased. He said that the Milesians and the others living in the King's territory should pay all reasonable deference to Tissaphernes and keep on good terms with him until they brought the war to a successful conclusion. This and other similar pronouncements caused much resentment among the Milesians, and when Lichas subsequently died of disease they refused to allow the Spartans present at the time to bury him where they wanted.

Relations with Astyochus and Tissaphernes were in this state of⁸⁵ discord when Mindarus arrived from Sparta to succeed Astyochus as admiral-in-chief. Astyochus handed over the command and sailed for home. Tissaphernes sent with him to Sparta a spokesman from his own court circle, a bilingual Carian called Gaulites, who was to

complain of the Milesian action in the matter of his fort and at the same time defend him against their counter-charges. He knew that the Milesians were travelling to Sparta specifically to denounce him, and that with them was Hermocrates, who was likely to expose Tissaphernes as a double-dealer, in league with Alcibiades to damage the Peloponnesian cause. Tissaphernes had had a grudge against Hermocrates ever since the question of the delivery of pay for the fleet: and in the latest stage, after Hermocrates had been exiled from Syracuse and other generals had arrived to command the Syracusan ships at Miletus (these were Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus), Tissaphernes had made much more vehement attacks on him now that he was an exile, alleging among other things that the reason for Hermocrates' display of hostility was that he had once asked Tissaphernes for money and been refused. So then Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates all sailed off to Sparta. By now Alcibiades had left Tissaphernes and crossed back to Samos.

The envoys sent out earlier by the Four Hundred to give reassuring

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explanations to the Athenians in Samos now arrived from Delos, after Alcibiades had returned. An assembly was held at which they attempted to make themselves heard. At first the soldiers would not listen, and kept up a clamour for 'death to the destroyers of democracy'. Quiet was restored with some difficulty, and the envoys then had their hearing. They gave out that the change of government was made for the salvation of the city, not for its

destruction, and there was no intention of betraying it to the enemy (if there were, this could have been effected in the recent enemy invasion when the new government was already in place); that all members of the Five Thousand would have their turn in the administration; and that the men's families back home were not being abused—as scandalously alleged by Chaereas—or suffering any other detriment, but staying perfectly secure in their own property.

As they went on and on they increasingly lost their audience. The soldiers turned angry and voiced a range of opinions, most calling for an attack on the Peiraeus. It was then that Alcibiades can be said for the first time to have done an outstanding service to his country. With the Athenians at Samos ready to sail against their own people at home—in which case, without any doubt, the enemy would immediately have taken possession of Ionia and the Hellespont—Alcibiades stopped them. At that particular moment no other man would have been capable of restraining the crowd, but he had them drop the idea of a naval attack and spoke forcefully to shame them out of any inclination to vent their anger on the individual envoys. He took it upon himself to answer the envoys and send them back. His answer was that he had no objection to the government of the Five Thousand, but they must get rid of the Four Hundred and restore the council of five hundred as in the old constitution. If they had made economies to provide better keep for their troops on service, that he could wholly applaud. Generally, they must stand firm and make no concessions to the enemy. If the

city was kept safe, there was every hope of a reconciliation among themselves: but once there was any failure either at Samos or at home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with.

There were also present some envoys from Argos, bringing offers of help addressed to 'the Athenian people in Samos'. Alcibiades thanked them, and sent them back with the message that help would be welcome when it was called for. These Argives had come with the crew of the *Paralus*, who as related earlier had been assigned to the troop-ship on patrol round Euboea. They were then given the task of conveying to Sparta some Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred (these were Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias). When they were off Argos in the course of their voyage they arrested the envoys and handed them over to the Argives, on the grounds that they were among those chiefly responsible for the overthrow of the democracy. The *Parali* did not return to Athens, but took their trireme from Argos to Samos, bringing with them the Argive envoys.

In this same summer there came a time when Peloponnesian vexation

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with Tissaphernes reached its height, for all the other reasons as well as the return of Alcibiades, and they thought he was now clearly siding with Athens. So at this time, and evidently in an attempt to dispel their suspicions, Tissaphernes prepared to travel to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships, and he invited Lichas to accompany him. He announced that he would second his deputy

governor Tamos to the army, to take personal charge of the payment of maintenance during his own absence. Accounts vary, and it is not easy to discover what Tissaphernes had in mind when he went to Aspendus, or why having gone there he did not bring back the ships. That a Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships had come as far as Aspendus is certain: but as to why they never came further there are many conjectures. Some think that in removing himself to Aspendus Tissaphernes was continuing his policy of wearing down Peloponnesian morale (and certainly the provision of maintenance was no better when delegated to Tamos, in fact rather worse). Others think that he had brought the Phoenicians up to Aspendus in order to make money by selling the crews their discharge (and so had no intention of putting them to active service). Yet others see his motive in the context of his denunciation at Sparta: he wanted, that is, to have it reported of him that there was no dishonesty, that he was known to have gone to fetch the ships, and that they were indeed manned and ready. But it seems to me quite clear that in not bringing up the fleet his motive was the attrition and containment of the Greek powers—damage done by his long absence on the way to Aspendus and the time he would spend there, and stalemate preserved by not strengthening either side with the support he could give. If he had wanted, he could indeed without doubt have brought the war to a decisive conclusion by taking a plain part. If he had brought up the ships he would in all probability have handed victory to the Spartans, who were now facing the Athenian fleet with equal

numbers and no sense of inferiority. What really exposes Tissaphernes is the excuse he gave out for not bringing up the ships, which was that the number mustered was less than the King had specified: but in that case he could doubtless have won yet greater favour by saving the King money and achieving the same result at less expense. Whatever his motive, Tissaphernes now came to Aspendus and met the Phoenicians: and at his suggestion the Peloponnesians sent Philippus, a Spartan, with two triremes for the supposed purpose of fetching the ships.

When Alcibiades learnt that Tissaphernes was on his way to 88
Aspendus, he took thirteen ships and sailed for Aspendus himself, promising the army at Samos a major benefit which he could guarantee: he would either bring back with him the Phoenician ships on the Athenian side, or at least prevent them going to the Peloponnesians. He had probably known all along that Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing up the ships, and wanted to compromise him as much as he could in the eyes of the Peloponnesians as his own friend and a friend of the Athenians, and thereby to increase the pressure on him to join the Athenian side. So Alcibiades set out on his voyage eastwards, making directly for Phaselis and Caunus.

The envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos now arrived back 89
at Athens and reported what Alcibiades had said—the need to stand firm and make no concessions to the enemy, his high hopes of

reconciling army and city and winning through against the Peloponnesians. This was a great encouragement to the rank and file of the oligarchic movement who had felt uneasy for some time and would gladly have abandoned the whole business if there was any safe way out. They were already beginning to group together and share their criticisms of the state of affairs, and they were led in this by some of those who were actually generals or held other office in the oligarchy, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon and Aristocrates the son of Scelias, and some others. These men had taken a leading part in the revolution, but now (or so they said) they were seriously afraid of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades, afraid too that their colleagues who were sending delegations to Sparta might go their own way without wider consultation and do damage to the city. So they thought they should move away from an extreme oligarchy, and instead make the Five Thousand a reality rather than a pretence, and establish a constitution of greater equality. This was the phrase they used as a political smokescreen, but in fact most of them harboured private ambitions and fell into the syndrome which is characteristically fatal to an oligarchy succeeding a democracy. From the very first day members of an oligarchy have no truck with mere equality, and they all think they deserve unquestioned first place: whereas in a democracy the result of an election is easier to bear when the loser can console himself with the thought that he was not competing with his equals. What most clearly influenced them was the strong position of Alcibiades at Samos and their own belief that the oligarchy could not last: so

each of them was manoeuvring to establish his own claims as the foremost champion of the people.

Those among the Four Hundred most prominently opposed to 90 this sort of compromise were Phrynichus (who at the time when he was general in Samos had spoken out against Alcibiades), Aristarchus (a particularly vehement and long-standing opponent of democracy), Peisander, Antiphon, and a number of other influential figures. They had already been sending their own delegations to Sparta to press for the peace agreement they wanted—they had done this as soon as their position was established, and again when Samos declared against them for democracy—and they had started their fortification at the place called Eëtioneia. They intensified both activities when their own envoys returned from Samos and they saw a shift in the attitude both of the general public and of those in their movement previously thought secure. Alarmed by developments both at home and in Samos they hurriedly dispatched Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others to Sparta, with authorization to make peace with the Spartans on any remotely tolerable terms, and they speeded yet more energetically the construction work on the fortification at Eëtioneia. According to Theramenes and his party, the purpose of this fortification was not to bar the Peiraeus to any attack by the fleet at Samos, but rather to allow the enemy access at will with both naval and land forces.

Eëtioneia is a claw of land closing the entrance to the Peiraeus. The wall now being built joined the existing wall, which faced the

land on the west, to form an enclave where a small number of men stationed there could command the approach from the sea. The old wall facing the land and the new wall being built on the inner side facing the sea both terminated at one of the two towers guarding the narrow mouth of the harbour. They also walled off the largest storehouse in the Peiraeus, which was closest to the new fortification and directly connected to it. They took control of the storehouse themselves, and compelled all corn-merchants to transfer their existing stock and unload all further imports into it: the sale of corn was only allowed from this depot.

For some time Theramenes had been airing his views, and when⁹¹ the envoys returned from Sparta with nothing achieved by way of an agreement for the people as a whole, he declared that this fortification could well be the ruin of Athens. It so happened that at this same time, in response to the Euboeans' invitation, a Peloponnesian fleet of forty-two ships (including some Italian ships from Taras and Locri, and a few from Sicily) was now lying at Las in Laconia getting ready to sail to Euboea under the command of the Spartiate Agesandridas, the son of Agesandrus. Theramenes claimed that these ships were destined not for Euboea but for the support of the party fortifying Eëtioneia, and warned that without immediate precautions they could all be lost before they knew it. This charge was not simply a canard, and came close enough to the thinking of the men against whom it was laid. For them the ideal was oligarchy at home and the continuation of empire over the

subject allies; failing that, the retention of their ships and walls, and their independence; and if this too was denied them, they had no intention of becoming the prime victims of a restored democracy, but would bring in the enemy and agree the loss of walls and ships, and any fate whatever for the city, as long as they themselves could save their own skins.

This was why they were so keen to press ahead with the building

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of this fortification and incorporate into it posterns and entrances and other means of introducing the enemy: they wanted to have it finished when the time came. Now as yet this sort of talk had been confined to a few and largely kept secret. But then after his return from the embassy to Sparta Phrynichus was stabbed in the crowded marketplace by one of the border-guards in a planned assassination. He had just left the council-chamber and not gone far: he died on the spot. The assassin made his escape, but his accomplice, a fellow from Argos, was caught and put to torture by the Four Hundred. He did not give the name of anyone who had commissioned the murder, and said nothing more than that he knew there had been large gatherings at the house of the border-guard commander and in other houses elsewhere. The fact that no untoward action followed this affair encouraged a bolder approach from Theramenes and Aristocrates and all others (whether members of the Four Hundred or not) who shared their view. At the same time the ships from Las had now sailed round, taken station at Epidaurus, and raided

Aegina. Theramenes declared that if they were really on their way to Euboea it made no sense for them to have sailed up the gulf to Aegina and then returned to anchorage at Epidaurus: they must have been called in for the purpose which he had always maintained, and so doing nothing was now no longer an option. After much more inflammatory talk and airing of suspicions the people finally took positive action. The hoplites in the Peiraeus engaged in the construction of the wall at Eëtioneia (among whom was Aristocrates as company commander of the contingent from his own tribe) seized Alexicles, who was a general in the oligarchic party and particularly implicated with the cabals, and took him off to imprisonment in a private house. Others involved in this kidnap included one Hermon, the commander of the border-guards stationed at Mounichia: and, most importantly of all, the rank and file of the hoplites were in support.

When this was reported to the Four Hundred, who happened to be in session in the council-chamber, they were immediately ready to take to arms (though some did not agree) and turned on Theramenes and his associates with threats. Theramenes defended himself and said that he was prepared to go right now and assist in the rescue of Alexicles. He took with him one of the generals who shared his view and went down to the Peiraeus. Aristarchus also went to the scene with some of the younger cavalrymen. There ensued widespread confusion and alarm. Those in the city thought that the Peiraeus was already in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries and the prisoner had been killed, and those in the

Peiraeus thought that they were in imminent danger of an attack from the city. In the city the older men struggled to restrain the party members who were running through the streets to fetch their arms, and Thucydides, the consular representative for Athens in Pharsalus, who happened to be in Athens at the time, worked tirelessly to confront every man he met and plead with him not to destroy his country when the enemy was lying ready so close by. These efforts eventually brought calm and the two sides kept their hands off each other.

When Theramenes (who was himself a general) reached the Peiraeus he put on a show of remonstrance with the hoplites, whereas Aristarchus and the opposition expressed genuine fury. Most of the hoplites stayed of the same mind and were ready to resist in earnest. They began by asking Theramenes if he thought the wall was being built to any good purpose, and whether it would not be better demolished. He replied that if they decided to demolish it, that was his decision also. At this the hoplites and a crowd of men from the Peiraeus immediately got up on the fortification and began to pull it down. The call had gone out to the people that anyone who wanted government by the Five Thousand instead of the Four Hundred should come and join the work. They still covered themselves by speaking of the Five Thousand, rather than calling outright for those who wanted a democracy, as they feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist, and careless talk from one man to the next could cause trouble. This was exactly why the Four Hundred did not want the Five Thousand either to exist or

to be known not to exist. Their view was that to have that number of participants in government would be tantamount to democracy, whereas keeping the whole question obscure would promote a general and mutual fear of everyone else.

On the next day the Four Hundred, shaken as they were by the⁹³ events, still held a meeting in the council-chamber. And the hoplites in the Peiraeus released Alexicles from his arrest, completed the demolition of the wall, and proceeded to the theatre of Dionysus near Mounichia, where they grounded their arms and held an assembly. On the decision taken there they marched straight to the city and again grounded their arms, this time in the Anaceium. Selected members of the Four Hundred came to meet them there and talked with them individually, looking to persuade any they saw as reasonable men to show an example of calm and restrain the others. They promised that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that all these would have their turn on the Four Hundred with the method of rotation to be determined by the Five Thousand themselves. In the meantime they begged them to take no action which could ruin the city and drive it into the hands of the enemy. There were many such individual discussions, which left the whole hoplite body in milder mood than it had been, and much more concerned now for the wider national interest. They agreed that an assembly should be held on a specified day in the precinct of Dionysus to discuss the means of restoring harmony.

When the day came for this assembly and the people were on the

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point of gathering in the precinct of Dionysus, news came that the forty-two ships with Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. All in the popular party thought that this was exactly what Theramenes and his associates had long been saying, that this fleet was destined for the fortification at Eëtioneia, and it was just as well that the wall had been demolished. It could be that some prearranged agreement had kept Agesandridas hovering around Epidaurus and that area, but it is likely that he lingered there on his own initiative in view of the prevailing agitation at Athens, with the hope of intervening at the critical moment. The Athenians' reaction to this news was to rush straight down to the Peiraeus with every available man, thinking that an enemy threat more serious than any from their own internal conflict was now not far off them and heading right for their harbour. Some went on board the ships which were lying ready, others began to launch more ships, and yet others went to the defence of the walls and the mouth of the harbour.

In fact the Peloponnesian ships sailed on past, rounded Sounium⁹⁵ and came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae: they then went on to Oropus. The Athenians had to put out a fleet in haste and were obliged to use crews who had not trained together—a consequence both of the civil disturbances at home and of the need to take immediate action to protect their most vital interest (now that

Attica was closed to them they depended completely on Euboea). With Thymochares as general in command they sent a number of ships to Eretria, which made a combined total of thirty-six when they arrived and were added to the ships already at Euboea. They had to fight as soon as they got there. Agesandridas gave his men their lunch and then took his ships out from Oropus, which is about six and a half miles across the sea from the city of Eretria. As he bore down on them, the Athenians too gave orders for the immediate manning of their fleet, thinking that they had the crews close by their ships. But in fact they were not shopping for their lunch in the marketplace, as the Eretrians had deliberately arranged that the only food for sale was at the houses on the far edge of town: this was in order to slow the manning of the Athenian ships so that the enemy could attack before they were ready and force the Athenians to come out against them whatever their state of preparedness. Indeed a signal had been raised at Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when it was time to sail to the attack. Disorganized to this extent, the Athenians did put out their ships and engage in battle off the harbour of Eretria: for a short while they managed to hold their own, but were then turned to flight and chased back to land. Those who took refuge in the city of Eretria, assuming it to be friendly, fared worst of all: the inhabitants butchered them. Others who made the Athenian-held fort in Eretria survived, as did the ships which reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians captured twenty-two of the Athenian ships, variously killed or made prisoners of the crews, and set up a trophy. Not long afterwards they secured the

revolt of the whole of Euboea apart from Oreus (which was still under Athenian control), and saw to general arrangements for the island.

When news reached the Athenians of the events in Euboea, the⁹⁶ panic which set in was greater than any before. Not even the disaster in Sicily, which had seemed so comprehensive at the time, nor anything else so far had frightened the Athenians as much as this. With the army at Samos in revolt, no ships in reserve or crews to man them, dissent at home which could break into civil war at any moment, and now to crown it all this immense blow which had lost them their ships and, most crucially, lost them Euboea, a more important lifeline than Attica itself—how could they not be reduced to despair, and with good reason? But what caused them the greatest and most immediate alarm was the fear that the enemy might be bold enough to exploit their victory and sail straight for them, against a Peiraeus empty of ships: and they imagined the enemy all but there already. And indeed, if the Peloponnesians had been bolder, they could easily have done this. Then they could either have exacerbated the divisions in the city by simply lying off the Peiraeus, or, if they had to stay longer and start a blockade, they would have forced the fleet in Ionia, despite its opposition to the oligarchy, to come to the help of their kinsmen and the city as a whole: and in that case the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and everything as far as Euboea—virtually the whole Athenian empire—would have fallen into their hands. Not for the first time (there had

been many other examples) the Spartans showed themselves, of all possible enemies, the ideal opponents in a war fought by the Athenians. The marked difference in national character (the Athenians quick and enterprising, the Spartans slow and unadventurous) gave a particular advantage to the Athenians as a naval power. The Syracusans proved the point: they were the most closely comparable in character to the Athenians, and so the most successful in fighting them.

At any rate the Athenians' reaction to the news was to man
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ships despite all, and to call an immediate assembly, the first to meet again in the traditional place for assemblies known as the Pnyx. At this assembly they deposed the Four Hundred and voted to transfer government to the Five Thousand (to be constituted of all those who could provide their own hoplite armour), and to abolish all pay for any public office, with the sanction of a curse on anyone infringing this rule. There followed a series of subsequent assemblies as a result of which they appointed legal commissioners and voted in the other elements of a new constitution. And now for the first time, at least in my lifetime, the Athenians enjoyed a political system of substantial and obvious merit, which blended the interests of the few and the many without extremes, and began to restore the city from the wretched situation into which it had fallen. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and other exiles with

him, and sent messages both to him and to the army at Samos urging them to take an active part.

On this counter-revolution Peisander and Alexicles and their associates

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and the other leading figures in the oligarchy slipped out of the city to Deceleia, all except Aristarchus, who, as one of the generals at the time, hastily took with him some of the most barbarous of the archers and made for Oenoe. This was an Athenian fort on the border with Boeotia, which was at present under siege in a unilateral action by the Corinthians (though they had also called in the Boeotians) in response to a defeat inflicted by the garrison at Oenoe which killed some of their troops returning home from Deceleia. In collusion with the besiegers Aristarchus tricked the garrison by telling them that the Athenian authorities had made a general peace agreement with the Spartans, and one of the conditions was that they must hand over Oenoe to the Boeotians. Trusting the word of a general, and cut off by the siege from all other information, the garrison came out under truce. In this way Oenoe was captured and occupied by the Boeotians: and the oligarchic revolution at Athens came to an end.

At about the same time in this summer there were developments, also among the Peloponnesians at Miletus. No provision at all was now forthcoming from any of those to whom Tissaphernes had delegated their maintenance when he went to Aspendus; neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had so far made any

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appearance; Philippus, who had been detailed to accompany Tissaphernes, and also Hippocrates, a Spartiate in Phaselis at the time, had both sent letters to Mindarus, the admiral-in-chief, saying that the ships would never come and Tissaphernes had been playing them false throughout; and Pharnabazus was still inviting them, eager to secure their fleet for his own purpose of inducing the rest of the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians (just like Tissaphernes, and like him he expected to profit from the revolts). So for all these reasons Mindarus finally moved his fleet from Miletus. With strict discipline enforced and at very short notice, so as not to alert the Athenians at Samos, he put out to sea with seventy-three ships and sailed for the Hellespont (sixteen ships had already gone there earlier in this same summer, and overrun part of the Chersonese). He was caught in a storm and forced by the wind to put in at Icaros, where bad weather kept him for five or six days before he went on to arrive at Chios.

When Thrasyllus heard that Mindarus had sailed out of Miletus, ¹⁰⁰ he too immediately put to sea from Samos with fifty-five ships, anxious that Mindarus should not reach the Hellespont before he did. On learning that Mindarus was at Chios, and thinking that he would spend some time there, Thrasyllus posted lookouts at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, to detect and report any movement by the Peloponnesian ships, while he himself sailed along the coast to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley and other provisions so that, if there was a prolonged delay, he could use Lesbos as a

base for attacks on Chios. At the same time he wanted to sail against the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had revolted from Athens, and take it if he could. What had happened was that some of the most powerful citizens of Methymna, now in exile, had brought over from Cyme some fifty hoplites of their own political persuasion together with mercenary troops hired on the mainland, a total of about three hundred in all, led by a Theban, Anaxandrus, in virtue of the kinship connection. These first of all attacked Methymna, but their attempt was cut short by the arrival of some of the Athenian garrison from Mytilene: beaten back again in a battle outside the walls, they made their way over the mountain and secured the revolt of Eresus. So Thrasyllus sailed to Eresus with all his ships, intending to launch an assault. Thrasyboulus had already got there before him, having set out from Samos with five ships as soon as news came of the exiles' landing: but he had arrived too late to prevent the revolt and was now lying at anchor off Eresus. Thrasyllus and Thrasyboulus were joined also by two ships returning home from the Hellespont and by the Methymnaeans' ships, bringing the total of the fleet gathered there to sixty-seven. Using the troops from these ships they began preparations for an attack on Eresus with siege-engines and all other means in the hope of taking the place by storm.

Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios spent ¹⁰¹ two days provisioning and had their wages paid by the Chians (three Chian 'fortieths' for each man). On the third day they put out

from Chios and sailed fast, not across the open sea (to avoid meeting the ships at Eresus), but keeping Lesbos on their left and making for the mainland. They touched at the harbour of Carteria in Phocaean territory, and took their lunch there, then sailed on past Cyme and had their dinner at Arginousae on the mainland opposite Mytilene. Leaving there well before dawn they sailed along the coast to reach Harmatus, which is on the mainland directly facing Methymna. They lunched there and hurried on, sailing round the promontory of Lectum and past Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the other towns in that area, and finally reached Rhoeteium on the Hellespont before midnight. Some of their ships also put in at Sigeium and other neighbouring places.

The Athenians who were at Sestos with eighteen ships realized¹⁰² from the beacon-signals lit by their own lookouts and from the sudden appearance of multiple watch-fires on the enemy shore opposite that a Peloponnesian fleet was approaching the strait. In that very night they sailed as fast as they could towards Elaeus, hugging the shore of the Chersonese and hoping to get out into the open sea away from the enemy ships. They did go undetected by the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had received previous notice of the approach of a friendly fleet and been told to keep a close watch on the Athenians in case they tried to sail out of the strait. But at dawn they caught sight of Mindarus' ships, which immediately gave chase. Not all of the Athenian ships managed to outrun them. Most made their escape towards Imbros and Lemnos, but the four

hindmost were caught off Elaeus: one of these ran aground near the sanctuary of Protesilaus and was captured crew and all; two others were captured without their crews; and one more, abandoned by its crew, was burned off the shore of Imbros. After this the entire Peloponnesian fleet, joined now

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by the ships from Abydos to make a total of eighty-six, blockaded Elaeus for the rest of that day: but the town would not capitulate, and the fleet sailed off to Abydos.

The Athenians, failed by their lookouts and not thinking it possible that an enemy fleet could pass them by undetected, were happily settling to the assault on the walls of Eresus. When they learnt the reality, they immediately abandoned Eresus and sailed with all speed to the defence of the Hellespont. On their way they chanced on and captured two Peloponnesian ships which had pressed the pursuit rather too boldly into the open sea. On the following day they arrived at Elaeus and anchored there. They were joined by the ships which had escaped to Imbros, and spent five days in preparation for the impending battle.

The engagement then began, and proceeded as follows. The Athenians started sailing in column close in to the shore towards Sestos, and seeing this movement the Peloponnesians likewise put out from Abydos to face them. With battle now a certainty, the Athenians—seventy-six ships—extended their line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, and the Peloponnesians—eighty-six ships—extended theirs from Abydos to Dardanus. The

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Peloponnesian right wing was held by the Syracusans, and Mindarus himself was on the other wing with the fastest ships in the fleet. The Athenian left wing was commanded by Thrasyllus, and the right by Thrasyboulus: the other generals took various positions in between. The Peloponnesians were keen to make the first moves to engage. They wanted, if possible, to outflank the Athenian right wing with their left to debar their exit from the strait, and to drive the Athenian centre back to land (which at that point was at no great distance). The Athenians realized what they were trying to do, and countered by extending their own line on the flank where the enemy was hoping to block them. They were getting the better of this manoeuvre, but by now their left wing had gone beyond the headland called Cynossema. The result of these moves to right and left was that the centre of the line became weak and over-extended, not least because the Athenians had a smaller complement of ships and the sharp angle described by the coast round Cynossema prevented sight of what was happening on the other side of it.

So the Peloponnesians fell on the centre and drove the Athenian ships off the water, then disembarked themselves to follow up on land their decisive superiority in the action. No help could be brought to the centre either by the right wing with Thrasyboulus or by the left wing with Thrasyllus. Thrasyboulus was being pressed hard by the pure number of ships against him, and the left wing not only had their view obstructed by the headland of Cynossema but were also tied down by the Syracusans and others who were

opposing them with equal forces. But then, over-confident after their victory, the Peloponnesians began chasing individual ships at random and part of their line fell into disarray. Seeing their opportunity, Thrasyboulus and his wing stopped extending their line and suddenly turned to attack the ships ranged against them. They routed these and next took on the scattered ships of the victorious Peloponnesian centre, giving them such a mauling that most of them turned to flight without any resistance. And by now the Syracusans too had given way to Thrasyllus' wing, and were the more urgent to make their own escape when they saw the others in flight.

After this rout the Peloponnesians fled for the most part to the ¹⁰⁶river Meidius at first, and then later to Abydos. The Athenians captured relatively few ships (as the narrow confines of the Hellespont allowed the enemy to reach places of refuge close by), but this victory at sea could not have come at a better time for them. Up till this point they had been wary of the Peloponnesian navy because of a series of small defeats as well as the disaster in Sicily, but now they could shake off their habit of self-depreciation and abandon any further respect for the enemy's ability at sea. From the enemy forces they did even so capture eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, and one each from Leucas, Sparta, Syracuse, and Pellene: their own losses amounted to fifteen ships. They set up a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, brought in the wrecks, and returned the enemy dead under truce.

They then sent a trireme to announce the victory at Athens. The arrival of this ship with news of an unhopedor success, following soon on the blows they had suffered with Euboea and the revolution at home, greatly increased Athenian morale: they now thought that with full commitment to their own cause they could still win through.

The Athenians at Sestos quickly repaired their ships, and on the ¹⁰⁷fourth day after the sea-battle sailed for Cyzicus, which had revolted. On their way they sighted the eight ships from Byzantium anchored at Harpagium and Priapus: they sailed in to the attack, defeated the opposition on land, and captured the ships. When they arrived at Cyzicus (which was unwallled) they took back the city and exacted a payment from it. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus and recovered those of their captured ships which were still seaworthy (the rest had been burned by the Elaeusians), and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were there.

At about this same time Alcibiades sailed back with his thirteen ¹⁰⁸ships from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, to announce that he had prevented the Phoenician ships from going to the Peloponnesians and had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athenians than ever before. He then crewed an additional nine ships and went off to exact a large sum of money from the Halicarnassians and to fortify Cos. With that done and a governor installed in Cos he sailed back to Samos towards the beginning of autumn.

When Tissaphernes learnt that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he decamped from Aspendus and set out for Ionia. Now the people of Antandrus (who are Aeolians) had taken advantage of the Peloponnesian presence in the Hellespont to bring some hoplites from Abydos overland across Mount Ida and install them in their city. They were suffering oppression by the Persian Arsaces, who was Tissaphernes' deputy. This Arsaces had committed an atrocity on the Delians who had settled in Atramyttium when the Athenians removed them from Delos to purify the island. Arsaces pretended an unspecified cause of hostilities and invited the best of the Delians to serve in his army. He led them out in apparent friendship and alliance, but waited for them to take their midday meal and then surrounded them with his own troops and shot them down. This example made the Antandrians fear similar violence on themselves, and since in any case Arsaces was imposing intolerable burdens on them they drove out his garrison from their acropolis.

Tissaphernes saw this as the work of the Peloponnesians, added to

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the similar expulsions of his garrisons at Miletus and Cnidus. He realized that his stock was very low with them, and feared that they could do him further harm. At the same time he was vexed to find that Pharnabazus had secured their services in less time and at less expense, and was more likely than himself to achieve success against the Athenians. He therefore determined to go and meet

them at the Hellespont, to complain of the business at Antandrus and to present the most plausible defence he could to the various charges made against him including the question of the Phoenician ships. His first stop was at Ephesus, where he offered sacrifice to Artemis.

APPENDIX

Weights, Measures, and Distances; Money; Calendar

1 obol	= 0.77 g	= 1/40 oz
6 obols = 1 drachma	= 4.6 g	= 1/6 oz
100 drachmae = 1 mina	= 460 g	= 1 lb
60 minas = 1 talent	= 27.6 kg	= 61 lb

1 <i>kotyle</i> (wet or dry)	= 0.273 l	= 1/2 imp. pint	= 2/3 US pint
12 <i>kotylai</i> = 1 <i>chous</i>			
(wet)	= 3.28 l	= 5 3/4 imp. pints	= 7 US pints
12 <i>choes</i> = 1 <i>metretes</i>			
(wet)	= 39.31 l	= 8 2/3 imp. gallons	= 10 1/2 US gallons
4 <i>kotylai</i> = 1 <i>choinix</i>			
(dry)	= 1.09 l	= 2 imp. pints	= 2 1/3 US pints
48 <i>choinikes</i> =			
1 <i>medimnos</i> (dry)	= 52.42 l	= 11 1/2 imp. gallons	= 14 US gallons

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|-----------------|-----------|
| 1. Hecatombaeon | July |
| 2. Metageitnion | August |
| 3. Boedromion | September |
| 4. Pyanopsion | October |
| 5. Maemacterion | November |
| 6. Posideon | December |
| 7. Gamelion | January |
| 8. Anthesterion | February |
| 9. Elaphebolion | March |
| 10. Munychion | April |
| 11. Thargelion | May |
| 12. Sciophorion | June |

EXPLANATORY NOTES

These notes seek to help a range of readers, including readers without a great deal of background knowledge, to understand both Thucydides' subject matter and his treatment of it. I give references to other ancient texts for material not provided by Thucydides; and sometimes to books (but in these notes not to periodical articles) in English which provide a helpful discussion of matters which cannot be discussed at length in these notes. I list here some books which are not cited regularly in the individual notes but will regularly be helpful to those who wish to pursue matters further. Full bibliographical details are given in the Select Bibliography.

On Greek history in general there are chapters by experts, with source references and modern bibliography, in the latest edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*: in particular, for readers of Thucydides, vol. v², on the period 478–404; also vols. ii. 1/2³ on the bronze age, iii. 1² on the tenth to eighth centuries, iii. 3² on the eighth to sixth centuries, iv² on the late sixth and early fifth centuries including the Persian Wars. Shorter histories of Greece include, in the Routledge History of the Ancient World, R. Osborne, *Greece in the Making, 1200–479 BC*, and S. Hornblower, *The Greek World, 479–323 BC*; in the Blackwell History of the Ancient World,

J. Hall, *A History of the Archaic Greek World, ca. 1200–479 BCE*, and P. J. Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World, 478–323 BC*.

A four-volume series by D. Kagan gives a detailed history of the Peloponnesian War and what went before it, with discussion of the views of many scholars over the past century: *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, *The Archidamian War*, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*—and he has also written the single-volume *The Peloponnesian War*. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, ranges more widely than its title suggests. Other recent books on the Peloponnesian War include G. L. Cawkwell, *Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War*; J. F. Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study*; V. D. Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (vivid and stimulating, but not always reliable on details). On naval matters, J. S. Morrison, J. F. Coates, and N. B. Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*, is of fundamental importance.

Out of many books on Thucydides, J. H. Finley, jun., *Thucydides*, and S. Hornblower, *Thucydides*, are the best overall treatments; a good and up-to-date introduction for non-specialists is P. Zagorin, *Thucydides: An Introduction for the Common Reader*. K. J. Dover, *Thucydides*, in the series *Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics*, reviewed the themes perceived as most important in the 1970s. A recent collection of studies by different authors is A. Rengakos and A. Tsakmakis (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Thucydides*. There are two major commentaries in English: A. W. Gomme, A.

Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. There are editions with translation and commentary by P. J. Rhodes of Books 2, 3, and 4.1–5.24 (and Book 1 envisaged); there are editions with commentary of Book 2 by J. S. Rusten (with a linguistic emphasis: and Book 1 envisaged), and of Books 6 and 7 by K. J. Dover. There is a single-volume commentary based on the Penguin translation, D. Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. References by name alone are to the comments of these on the passage under discussion; our debts to Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover and to Hornblower go far beyond the points at which they are explicitly cited.

The largest-scale and most authoritative atlas, of an austere kind simply showing topography and locating sites, is R. J. A. Talbert (ed.), *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*; smaller and cheaper, and including some thematic maps and plans of battle sites, is N. G. L. Hammond (ed.), *Atlas of the Greek and Roman World in Antiquity*.

BOOK ONE

The narrative of the Peloponnesian War proper begins in Book 2, and from there onwards Thucydides uses a framework of seasonal years, divided into summers and winters, and very rarely steps outside it (see first note on Book 2). The structure of Book 1 is complex but coherent (see analysis on p. lviii)—and there is no need

to suppose, as some scholars have done, that what we now have has been revised from an earlier version with a different emphasis.

Thucydides begins (1–23.3) by claiming that the Peloponnesian War was greater than any previous war, and in what is often called his ‘archaeology’ (2–19) he gives an outline of the growth of power in Greece to justify that claim. He was a writer proud of the trouble he took to get the facts right, and digresses to make that point (20), before repeating his claim that previous wars were not as great as the Peloponnesian War (21). Criticism of other writers leads to a digression on his method and aim in writing his history (22), which is followed by a final statement of the greatness of the Peloponnesian War (23.1–3).

The remainder of Book 1 is devoted to the causes of the war and to the events leading up to it. In the second half of 23 Thucydides distinguishes between ‘the real reason, true but unacknowledged’ and ‘the openly proclaimed grievances on either side’. He then sets out to give a definitive account of the grievances, ‘so that nobody in future will need to look for the immediate cause’, and gives a detailed narrative of two episodes, concerning Corcyra in 435–433 (24–55) and Potidaea in 433–432 (56–66), in each of which Athens came to fight against Sparta’s ally Corinth. Corinth and other states then decided to put pressure on Sparta as leader of the Peloponnesian League to take action against Athens, and Thucydides reports a meeting in Sparta in 432, in which two other grievances, concerning Aegina and Megara, emerge (67–88): there are speeches

by Corinthians and by Athenians ‘come there on other business’, and by the Spartan king Archidamus and ephor Sthenelaïdas. The upshot was a decision by Sparta that Athens was in the wrong and a war against Athens was necessary, and the summoning of a formal congress of the Peloponnesian League to ratify that decision.

Thucydides ends that section by repeating his belief that his ‘real reason’, Spartan fear of Athenian power, counted for more than the particular grievances which he has been reporting; and he then sets out to justify his belief by giving an account of the growth of Athenian power from the foundation of the Delian League to continue the war against Persia after the defeat of the Persian invasion of Greece in 480–479 (89–118, with another statement of the belief in 118). He resumes his main narrative with the congress of the Peloponnesian League in 432 (119–25). The Peloponnesians were not ready to start fighting immediately, so the winter of 432/1 was devoted to preparations and diplomatic exchanges (126–46). This leads Thucydides into another digression on earlier history (126–38): on Cylon’s attempt to become tyrant in seventh-century Athens, which had resulted in a curse which Sparta tried to exploit against Athens; on the downfall of Pausanias in Sparta after the Persian Wars, leading to a curse which Athens in turn tried to exploit; and on the downfall of Themistocles of Athens at the same time. Book 1 ends with Athens’ response to the pressure from Sparta (139–46), featuring a speech by Pericles in Athens which claims that the grievances were merely pretexts, appeasement would achieve nothing, and if war had to come Athens was well placed to win it.

The one point at which Thucydides seems to lose sight of his overall purpose is 126–38, where the stories of Cylon and Pausanias arise from their use in the propaganda of 432/1 but Thucydides then proceeds from Pausanias to Themistocles: he sees these two as ‘the two most eminent of the Greeks of their time’ (138), and he sees Themistocles as a precursor of his hero Pericles.

1.1–23.3 Introduction

1.1 *Preface.* Thucydides introduces himself and his subject as Herodotus had introduced himself and his subject; whereas Herodotus ‘presented the results of [his] enquiry [*historie*]’, Thucydides ‘wrote this history of the war’, or, more literally, ‘put together in writing [*xynegrapse*] the war’. Herodotus wrote about the Persian Wars and (generously interpreted) their background, ‘to preserve the fame of . . . remarkable achievements’; Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War (much more strictly interpreted), ‘reckoning that this would be a major war and more momentous than any previous conflict’. So we see from the beginning that, although much of his writing is matter-of-fact, Thucydides’ history also has a superlative side to it. Although he never names Herodotus, there are various points where he clearly has Herodotus in mind.

‘He began his work right at the outbreak’; he lived beyond the end of the war (see e.g. 5.26); and there has been much discussion of how much of his history was written at different

times and how far what was written early was revised later, on which see Introduction, pp. xxv–xxviii.

He begins by justifying his claim that the Peloponnesian War was greater than any previous war, and insists from the outset on his credentials as a historian: ‘accurate research’ into the distant past was impossible, but he ‘enquired as far into the past’ as he could, looking for ‘evidence which [he could] trust’. The last sentence of the chapter opens a ring (cf. Introduction, p. xlii), which will be closed at the beginning of 1.20.

1.2–19 ‘Archaeology’. Here Thucydides outlines the development of Greece from the earliest times to the period after the Persian Wars: he is not aware of the ‘dark age’ between the break-up of the bronze-age civilizations after c.1200 and the emergence of archaic Greece c.800, but thinks of an uninterrupted progress from the more primitive to the more advanced. He accepts the main lines of the traditional stories, and does not as Herodotus did (Hdt. 1.1–5 contr. following chapters) distinguish between a legendary distant past and a knowable more recent past, but he omits any religious dimension and approaches the stories in a rationalist spirit (see especially 1.9–11, on the Trojan War). In this section he gives reasons for his statements, as he does not when writing the history of his own time: he argues from Homer (1.3, 5, 9, 10), from the names given to the Greek people (1.3), from current practice among more primitive

people (1.5–6), from burial practices (1.8), from how later generations might interpret the physical remains of Athens and of Sparta (1.10); he frequently cites *tekmeria* (pieces of evidence), *semeia* (indications), and *martyria* (testimony); where he cannot be certain he estimates likelihood (*eikos*). (For a passage on facts and evidence by a contemporary of Thucydides see Antiph. 5. *Chorus-Member* 31.) Modern historians do not always think he has arrived at the right answers, but he has certainly looked in the right kinds of way for evidence to support his account. The theme of his summary is the increase of power, on land and particularly at sea, and the growth of population and wealth which made that increase possible.

1.2–3 In Thucydides' earliest phase the Greeks were so disunited that there was no single name applicable to them all, and they were not settled but underwent frequent population movements. However, his contrast may be between planting crops for the year and planting olives and vines for the long term (Gomme) rather than between hunting-and-gathering and agriculture (Hornblower). Attica was not the most fertile part of Greece, but it was not in fact the most infertile. The classical Athenians claimed that they were autochthonous, were directly descended from the original population of Attica: it is at least true that the city of Athens is one of the few sites in Greece which were occupied continuously from the bronze age to the archaic period. Modern historians distinguish between a

migration from Greece to the Aegean islands and western Asia Minor in the dark age, when life was insecure, in the tenth and ninth centuries, and the sending-out of colonies in the archaic period, to facilitate trade and to export people for whom there was insufficient food at home, from the eighth century onwards. Athens was generally regarded as the mother-city of the Ionians in a strict sense, those Greeks who settled in the middle stretch of the islands and the Asiatic coast, with Aeolians to the north and Dorians to the south (the word 'Ionians' could be used more loosely to refer to all the eastern Greeks: cf. note to 1.94–5), but we cannot now determine how large a part Athens played in this process. When the Greeks worked out a chronological framework for the stories of their past, they placed the Trojan War at what by our reckoning is the beginning of the twelfth century and Homer in the eighth century.

1.4 Minos was a legendary ruler of Crete, dated earlier than the Trojan War: the truth behind the legends is that what archaeologists have called the 'Minoan' civilization of Crete (not Greek in its language) was the first advanced civilization in the Greek world, and in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries was able at any rate to influence the Greek mainland, the Aegean islands (the Cyclades are the islands of the southern Aegean, which encircle Delos), and western Asia Minor. The Carians (cf. 1.8) in the classical period occupied the south-

western corner of Asia Minor: they were not Greek, but their history was bound up with that of the Asiatic Greeks; it is not now believed that they occupied the islands.

1.5 Before the existence of agreements to guarantee peaceful intercourse, visits to neighbouring territory were likely to be for plunder, and would be led by powerful men able to afford a ship and recruit a crew. A Homeric example of the question is *Od.* 2.69–74; but in *Od.* 3.71–4 piracy is a matter for reproach. Thucydides envisages the early Greeks as living in separate villages (cf. 1.10, on Sparta), which over time by the process known as *synoikismos* ('coming to live together') joined to form more substantial cities; and he cites people in the more primitive part of Greece in his time (listed from east to west along the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth) as evidence for what the more advanced part had been like in the past.

1.6 Carrying arms on a day-to-day basis is seen as characteristic of primitive and insecure peoples (cf. the 'frontier mentality' in the USA). Athens, although not abandoned in the dark age, lagged behind Peloponnesian cities in the archaic period, and is not likely to have been the first city to adopt a more luxurious and relaxed lifestyle. However, in Thucydides' own time Athens was the most prosperous Greek city while its rival Sparta was self-consciously old-fashioned and austere, and what is said here is probably an inference from that. The 'Ionian' tunic (*chiton*, undergarment) was made of linen and

was elaborate, while the ‘Dorian’ was made of wool and simple. The hairstyle mentioned here is referred to as an old men’s fashion by Aristophanes (*Eq.* 331, *Nub.* 984); but in Thucydides’ time long hair was affected by upper-class young Athenians and also by Spartans: elaborate clothing and long hair are inappropriate for physical hard labour (and the Spartans had Helots, for whom see note to 1.101–3, to farm their land)—but of course fashion and convenience often do not coincide. The elaborate fashion is more likely to have originated in Ionia and to have passed to Athens; for the late fifth century the ‘Old Oligarch’ remarks that in Athens citizens dress no better than metics (foreign residents) and slaves ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10)—and we may compare the development of jeans from working men’s trousers to universal fashion.

Nudity for athletics goes back further than Thucydides seems to have thought: vase painting and sculpture show that the practice was well established in the sixth century. As in 1.5 he argued from current practice in the more primitive part of Greece, here he argues from current practice among the barbarians; Hdt. 1.10 remarks that among the barbarians it is thought disgraceful even for men to be seen naked.

1.7–8 Thucydides envisages development from unfortified to fortified and from inland to coastal cities; and in fact long-established cities such as Athens, Corinth, and (particularly)

Sparta were inland and developed separate harbour towns. His thinking is that when life became more settled the accumulation of wealth became easier and more desirable, so that access to the sea became more worthwhile, but when there was more to defend there was greater need to fortify cities. For the Carians, cf. 1.4 (it is thought that Thucydides assumed too readily that the burials on Delos were in a manner not merely used by the Carians but distinctive of the Carians); the Phoenicians never settled in the Aegean on a significant scale, but there is archaeological evidence that they visited it and perhaps colonized on a small scale in the dark age and archaic period. For the 'purification' of Delos in 426/5, cf. 3.104: even innocent death gave rise to pollution, so it had to be kept away from sanctuaries as far as possible.

1.9–11 More than Herodotus (who did not believe that Helen was in Troy: 2.112–20), Thucydides accepts the traditional account of a Greek war against Troy, in the north-western corner of Asia Minor, to recover Helen, the wife of king Menelaus of Sparta, from her abductor Paris; but he approaches it in a rationalist spirit. How much truth, if any, there is behind the legend continues to be disputed by scholars. Thucydides does not deny the story of an oath sworn by Helen's suitors to support her and her husband (cf. Paus. 3.20), but he thinks it more important that Menelaus' brother Agamemnon was the most powerful ruler in Greece. In the Catalogue of Ships

(Hom., *Il.* 2.484–760) Agamemnon had 100 ships of his own and provided a further 60 for the Arcadians (lines 569–80, 603–13); the account of his sceptre is given in *Il.* 2.100–9.

In Thucydides' time the 'cyclopean' walls of Mycenae were visible but other signs of its wealth were not; and it is certainly true that of the two most powerful cities of his own world Athens was particularly well equipped with fine public buildings and Sparta was not (it consisted of four adjoining villages, and Amyclae a short distance away).

The ships are assumed to resemble the more old-fashioned ships which Thucydides knew, and the *Iliad's* two figures for crews of ships are taken to represent the maximum and the minimum. Thucydides himself exaggerates by rounding up the *Iliad's* 1,186 ships to 1,200: $1,200 \times 85 = 102,000$ men; $1,186 \times 85 = 100,810$ men; which in fact would compare well with $378 \times 200 = 75,600$ men in the Greek ships used against Persia in 480 (Hdt. 8.48, cf. 82), or 34,300 men in the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 (cf. 6. 31). Even in Thucydides' time forces going away from home took provisions only for a limited period and expected to live off what could be obtained locally after their arrival.

1.12 After the Trojan War Thucydides continues to use the corpus of Greek legend: Odysseus' ten-year journey back to Ithaca was a well-known delayed return; the murder of Agamemnon on his return, by his wife Clytemnestra and her lover

Aegisthus, was a well-known instance of internal strife; and among the settlements founded elsewhere was the alleged foundation of Rome by fugitives from Troy (a story already current in Thucydides' time: Hellanicus *FGrH* 4 F 84). On Boeotia Thucydides is trying to reconcile the tradition of a migration from Thessaly with the mention of Boeotians in the *Iliad* (2.494–510). The truth behind the widespread tradition of an invasion of the Peloponnese by the strand of the Greek people known as Dorians is hard to establish, but it does at least seem to be true that those Peloponnesians who were called Dorians and who spoke the Dorian dialect of Greek were more recent arrivals there than the other inhabitants. For Athens and the Ionians, cf. 1.2; colonies in the rest of the Mediterranean world were founded, in many but by no means in all cases, by Peloponnesians, from the eighth century onwards (cf. note to 1.2–3, and for colonies in Sicily see 6.3–5).

1.13–19 In the rest of the 'archaeology' the main theme is the development of naval power. The Greeks were fond of lists in which, for instance, *A* was the greatest philosopher for *x* years, then *B* for *y* years, and so on; and behind Thucydides' account there seems to lie the notion of a succession of 'thalassocracies', of control of the sea by successive states for specified periods. Such a list, constructed from well-known instances of success and failure at sea, will have had some

connection with reality but will of course have been greatly over-simplified. For a list of this kind, preserved by Eusebius, see Diod. Sic. 7.11.

Another theme is the rule of 'tyrants'. Aristocracies, ruling collectively through annually appointed officials, had in most places supplanted the earlier kingships (whose powers had been limited, as in Homer, by tacit understanding rather than by formal rules). In many but not all cities, particularly in the seventh and sixth centuries, these were challenged by men, often themselves on the fringes of the aristocracy, who traded on local grievances to seize power for themselves. Tyrant was not a formal position to which a man was appointed: some ruled autocratically but others worked through existing institutions; some were popular, at any rate at first when they promised to redress grievances, but in the end their own power became a new source of grievance, and no tyranny lasted longer than a century. Thucydides connects the rise of tyrants with the growth of wealth; more specifically, we may say that in self-sufficient agricultural communities there was little opportunity for social mobility, but the more varied opportunities for gaining and losing wealth in the archaic period produced men as rich as the aristocrats who owned the largest quantities of good land, who began to want political and social recognition.

1.13 The first development in shipbuilding was the distinction between ‘long’ ships for fighting and ‘round’ ships for carrying cargo. The trireme improved on the earlier fifty-oared ‘penteconter’ (1.14) by having three banks of oars and oarsmen, thus gaining additional power without additional length. It is disputed whether the trireme was invented by the Greeks or by the Phoenicians, and how early, but no state seems to have had large numbers of triremes before the fifth century.

Ameinocles of Corinth is not otherwise attested. Corcyra (cf. 1.24–55) was colonized by Corinth c.733, and if Thucydides’ dates (whether reckoned from 421 or from 404) are right nothing can be said about these episodes; but it is possible that they result from generation counts using over-long generations, and should be scaled down to refer to the late seventh century, when Corinthian pottery was reaching Samos (J. B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC* (Oxford University Press, 1984), 108) and a war between Corinth and Corcyra is attested (Hdt. 3.49–53).

Corinth is ‘wealthy’ in Hom., *Il.* 2.570. It probably gained more from exploiting trade across the Isthmus of Corinth between the Saronic and Corinthian Gulfs (to avoid sailing round the Peloponnese) than overland trade along the Isthmus between central Greece and the Peloponnese; c.600 a causeway, the *diolkos*, was constructed to enable ships to be

transported across the Isthmus (cf. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 136–9; Thucydides mentions the transporting of ships but not the *diolkos* in 3.15, 8.7–8).

Cyrus II was King of Persia c.560–530, controlling western Asia Minor from c.546, and Cambyses was King 530–522; Polycrates was tyrant of Samos, very close to the Asiatic mainland, c.532–522. Cyrus and Cambyses did not have a fleet in the Aegean; but Polycrates is credited with various achievements, including an empire on the mainland as well as in the islands (Hdt. 3.39; cf. 3.122), which cannot easily be assigned to the period of his reign, and it may be that as a famous figure he has attracted achievements which in fact belong earlier in the sixth century. However, the dedication of Rheneia is probably his (see 3.104).

Phocaea, an Aeolian city in Asia Minor, colonized Massalia in southern Gaul c.600, and may have come into conflict with Carthage then. Phocaeans who fled from Asia Minor to Corsica c.540 after the Persian conquest had 60 ships with which they won an expensive victory over the Carthaginians and Etruscans at Alalia (Hdt. 1.166).

1.14 Dareius I was King of Persia 522–486; the Persians invaded Greece in 490 and (under his successor Xerxes, 486–465) in 480–479; Herodotus credits Gelo of Syracuse in Sicily with 200 triremes and Corcyra with 60 warships in 480 (7.158, 168). An intermittent war between Athens and Aegina began c.505; in

the late 490s Athens had 50 ships available and obtained a further 20 from Corinth (Hdt. 6.89). In 483/2 Themistocles persuaded the Athenians that a surplus from the silver mines should not be distributed among the citizens but be spent on new ships (Hdt. 7.144; *Ath. Pol.* 22.7, giving the date), as a result of which Athens had a fleet of 200 triremes when the Persians invaded in 480 (Hdt. 8.1 with 14, 8.44 with 46). The war against Aegina was Themistocles' ostensible reason; preparations for the Persian invasion had in fact begun, but the need to resist the invaders at sea may not yet have been clear, and the importance of Athens' ships at Artemisium and at Salamis in 480 may be good luck for his reputation rather than confirmation of his foresight.

1.15 Pheidon of Argos is said to have given his city a brief period of power, probably in the first half of the seventh century (Strabo 35^{8/8}.3.33, cf. Hdt. 6.127). Sparta conquered neighbouring Messenia in the late eighth and seventh centuries, but in the mid-sixth century gave up the attempt to make further conquests and started building up the network of alliances which developed into what scholars call the Peloponnesian League (cf. note to 1.19 below). The war between Chalcis and Eretria is the so-called Lelantine War, fought for the control of a plain in Euboea between the two cities (Strabo 448/10.1.12), probably in the late eighth century; it did not spread to the rest of Greece as a unified war, but several local wars fought about

that time fit into a pattern with friends of Chalcis on one side and friends of Eretria on the other.

- 1.16** For the strength of the Ionians, cf. what is said of Polycrates in 1.13. Croesus was king of Lydia, in western Asia Minor and bounded by the river Halys on the east, from c.560; after Cyrus' defeat of the Medes in 550/49 Croesus tried to expand into the gap, but he was defeated by Cyrus c.546. The islands close to the Asiatic mainland made token submission to Cyrus but did not seriously become his subjects; it is these islands which Dareius subjected in the early years of his reign.
- 1.17** Tyrants tended not to distinguish between what was their own and what was their state's, so in strengthening their family and its image they strengthened their state and its image too, and some states were strong when ruled by tyrants. In Sicily, Thucydides is thinking particularly of Gelo (ruling in Gela from 491/0 and in Syracuse 485/4–478/7) and his brother Hiero (ruling in Syracuse 478/7–467/6)—after the battle of Marathon, despite what is said in 1.18.
- 1.18** Spartan intervention led to the expulsion of Hippias from Athens in 511/0 (cf. 1.20, 6.53, 59), and that was probably the origin of the claim that Sparta had always been opposed to tyrants and had deposed tyrants throughout Greece (see e.g. the list, in which some items are more credible than others, in Plut., *Malice of Herodotus* 859 C–D). The best-attested instances earlier than 511/0 are in Sicyon in the 550s and in

Naxos in the 520s or 510s. In fact, after expelling Hippias from Athens, c.504 the Spartans considered reinstating him but were dissuaded by Corinth (Hdt. 5.90–4). Probably in the sixth century they were not opposed to tyranny on principle but on some occasions their successes in foreign policy happened to result in the overthrow of a tyrant. On Sparta's internal affairs, Thucydides is alluding to a regime described as 'good order' (*eunomia*) and attributed to Lycurgus, which ancient writers assigned to the early eighth century or earlier still (we do not know what information or reasoning lies behind Thucydides' 'four hundred years') but most scholars now date to the early seventh century, after the first phase of the conquest of Messenia. This was a deal by which the aristocrats gave the Spartan citizens a defined position in the state (thus avoiding the risk of tyranny) in return for their support against the conquered peoples of Laconia and Messenia. The political and military organization of the citizens, and a first distribution of conquered land and Helots to work it, can be assigned to that occasion; there was an ongoing development after that, but by the fifth century the Spartans were proud of being different from other Greeks and in particular from the Athenians, and were attributing all their distinctive institutions to Lycurgus.

After Athens and Eretria had supported the Ionian Revolt against Persia in the 490s (Hdt. 5.28–6.42), the Persians

invaded mainland Greece in 490, with Eretria and Athens as their main targets. Eretria was captured, but at Marathon the Persians were defeated by Athens (with help from Plataea; promised help from Sparta did not arrive until after the battle: Hdt. 6.94–124). The Persians returned in 480, with a force which Herodotus implausibly reckoned at over five million. Sparta as the strongest state in Greece was accepted as leader of the resistance; after an attempt to halt the Persians in central Greece, at Thermopylae and Artemisium, had failed, there was no hope of saving Athens, and the Athenians were persuaded by Themistocles to abandon their city and rely on their navy (cf. note to 1.14); the Persians were then defeated at sea at Salamis in 480 and on land at Plataea (and at Mycale in Asia Minor) in 479 (Hdt. 7–9). For developments after that, see 1.89–118.

1.19 After Athens had become self-consciously democratic, by the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1, it took to imposing democracies on some states in its alliance, the Delian League, when they rebelled, and it came to be seen throughout the Greek world as a champion of democracy. Sparta, with a measure of equality among its unusually restricted citizen body, was not a typical oligarchy, but in reaction against Athens it came to be seen as a champion of oligarchy and encouraged oligarchy among its allies in the Peloponnesian League; but it did not often interfere in the members' internal affairs before the fourth century.

For Athens' gradual change from requiring ships to demanding the payment of tribute by its allies cf. 1.96, 99. After Athens' defeat of Samos in 440–439 (1.115–17) Chios and the cities of Lesbos were the only remaining ship-providing members of the Delian League; the cities of Lesbos, apart from Methymna, lost that status when they revolted against Athens in 428–427 (cf. 3.2–50). Between the Persian War and the Peloponnesian War Athens increased in citizen numbers, wealth, and power; in Sparta the earthquake of c.465/ 4 (cf. 1.101–3) in fact began a decline in citizen numbers which was never to be reversed. Nevertheless it is probable that the last sentence of this chapter refers to each side, not only to the Athenian side.

1.20 *Difficulty of getting history right.* Having completed his survey of the growth of power in Greece, Thucydides digresses to insist that he has investigated thoroughly and critically while other Greeks do not. What is said here of Harmodius and Aristogeiton is compatible with the longer account given in 6.53–9 (see notes there), and indeed what is said here is not wholly intelligible without information given only there (which suggests that what is said here was written at the same time as or later than what is said there). The opinion which he rejects as mistaken was not held by Herodotus, who believed as Thucydides does that Hippias was the eldest son of Peisistratus and was the reigning tyrant, and that the tyranny

did not end until Hippias was expelled in 511/0 (5.55–65); but Hippias' expulsion was due to the Alcmaeonid family and to Sparta, and by the time of Thucydides many Athenians did not want to be grateful to the Alcmaeonidae or to Sparta and therefore put more emphasis on the killing of Hipparchus in 514.

The 'false beliefs' at the end of the chapter were held by Herodotus. Hdt. 6.57 says that if the kings (Sparta had not one king but two) are absent from the *gerousia* (the council of elders, comprising the two kings and twenty-eight men aged over sixty) the members most closely related to them 'take on their privileges and cast two votes for the kings they are representing and then one for themselves'—which does seem to be the view attacked here, though some scholars deny it; we have no other evidence on the matter. There is no doubt that Hdt. 9.53 refers to a 'Pitana division' at the battle of Plataea in 479. Pitana was one of the villages of Sparta (cf. note to 1.9–11), and the articulation of the citizen body after the Lycurgan reform was based in part on five 'obes' which seem to have corresponded to the five villages. It is usually thought either that there was a division in the Spartan army based on Pitana but that was not its official name, or that there was a Pitana division in 479 but not in Thucydides' time and Thucydides did not know that the army organization had

been changed. The Roman emperor Caracalla, in an archaizing spirit, created a 'Pitana division' in his army: Hdn. 4.8.3.

1.21 *Previous wars not as great as Peloponnesian War.* 'Stories written more to please the ear' and 'the unreliable realms of romance' are to be contrasted with Thucydides' history (1.22). At this time texts were commonly made public by being read aloud, and it is stated that the Athenians made an award to Herodotus for reading out part of his history (Diyllus *FGrH* 73 F 3, from Plut., *Malice of Herodotus* 862 B; Eusebius under 446/5 in the Armenian version, under 445/4 according to Jerome).

1.22 *How Thucydides has written his history.* In a second digression, arising out of his criticism of other writers, Thucydides gives an account of his history. For discussion, see Introduction, pp. xxx–xxxvi; he proudly reiterates that he has taken the trouble to get the facts right, as others do not (on disagreements between witnesses, cf. 7.44, 71), and maintains that his history has been written not to give immediate pleasure but to be useful. Under the influence of the late-fifth-century intellectuals known as sophists (see also note to 1.76), he was very fond of contrasts such as that between word or surface appearance (*logos*) and deed or underlying reality (*ergon*) (cf. Introduction, p. xxxiv), and his starting this chapter with speeches (*logos*) and continuing with events (*erga*) is a particular application of that contrast.

1.23.1–3 *Greatness of Peloponnesian War.* In the first half of this chapter Thucydides ends this introduction by stating again that the Peloponnesian War was greater than any previous war, even the Persian War (his ‘four battles’ are Artemisium and Salamis in 480 at sea, Thermopylae in 480 and Plataea in 479 on land, with Mycale in 479 omitted as being in Asia Minor). His superlatives begin, reasonably enough, with captured cities, refugees, and slaughter. But he then writes of natural phenomena—earthquakes, eclipses, and droughts—as if it was because of the war that they were particularly frequent, whereas in his usual more sober moods he would have said that their frequency during the war was purely coincidental (cf. Introduction, p. xlv; in fact his history does not mention any droughts). On the plague which afflicted Athens between 430 and 426, see 2.47–54, 3.87.

1.23.4–146 Causes of the Peloponnesian War

1.23.4–6 *Grievances and disputes, real reason.* In the second half of this chapter Thucydides embarks on what will be the theme of the remainder of Book 1, the causes of the Peloponnesian War and the events leading up to the war. For the Thirty Years Treaty of 446/5, see 1.115. Thucydides distinguishes between grievances (*aitiai*) and disputes (*diaphorai*), which were openly proclaimed, and a real reason (*prophasis*), which was true (*alethestate*, the superlative ‘truest’) but unacknowledged. The difference lies not so much in the words chosen (in 1.118

prophasis is used of the grievances) as in the facts that the grievances were openly proclaimed while the alternative explanation was unacknowledged (except by Thucydides), and that he considered his alternative explanation to be the truest. The alternative is by no means absent from Book 1—from the Corcyraeans' warning to Athens that 'fear of your power is fuelling Spartan desire for war' (1.33) to the Spartans' final demand to Athens that 'there would be peace if [Athens] returned their independence to the Greeks' and Pericles' insistence that the grievances were merely pretexts (1.139–40). Presumably, as Aristophanes seems to reflect complaints in Athens that the war had been brought about by Pericles' intransigence over Megara (Ar., *Ach.* 514–38, *Pax* 605–18), other people in general tended to blame the war on one or another of the particular grievances, and Thucydides was insistent that he knew better. Although he refers to 'grievances on either side causing the breach of the treaty', his main grievances are the grievances of the Peloponnesians against Athens, and his real reason is the fear of Athens which compelled Sparta to go to war: technically, it was the Peloponnesians who started the war, and it suited Thucydides the Athenian to explain why the Peloponnesians went to war against Athens.

Although he considers the grievances less important, Thucydides' insistence that he knows better has led him to

give his account of the grievances, in the (vain) hope that 'nobody in future will need to look for the immediate cause'. However, it is a problematic account, in which the episodes of Corcyra (1.24–55) and Potidaea (1.56–66) are reported in detail but the grievances of Aegina and Megara are mentioned only briefly (e.g. 1.67) in the remainder of the narrative. See Introduction, p. xiii–xv.

1.24–55 *Corcyra (435–433)*. Corcyra was a colony of Corinth (cf. note to 1.13), which was topographically on the edge of the Greek world, and had kept outside the main stream of that world's history with its friendships and enmities and was not on good terms with Corinth. A quarrel between the two over their joint colony Epidamnus led to war; Corcyra was victorious at Leucimne in 435; but, when Corinth called on its allies for support in a further attack, in 433 Corcyra appealed to Athens for support. Hoping to avoid an open breach of the Thirty Years Treaty (since Corinth was a member of the Peloponnesian League), Athens granted Corcyra a purely defensive alliance, but at Sybota did have to intervene in defence of Corcyra. Thus Athens and Corinth fought against each other for the first time since the treaty.

1.24 Corcyra is the modern Kerkyra/Corfu, off the north-west coast of mainland Greece; Epidamnus is Durrës in Albania, c.125 miles (200 km) to the north. The Ionian Gulf, between north-western Greece and southeastern Italy, was named after the

legendary wanderings of Io, driven mad by Hera after her seduction by Zeus, and has no connection with the Ionians. Though not consistent, Thucydides tends to supply geographical information on places at the edge of the Greek world but not on places at the heart of it.

Corcyra was founded c.733, and Epidamnus c.625 (so Corinth and Corcyra were not yet on bad terms then). Foundation narratives regularly involve a 'founder-colonist' (*oikistes*) as leader of the venture, and, although the foundation of a colony may often have been a less organized process than the narratives suggest, the involvement of such a leader need not be doubted. The details about Phalius are not necessary for the narrative: it has been observed that Thucydides often gives such details in the case of Corinth, and may have spent some time there during his exile (cf. Introduction, p. xxv).

'People' (*demos*) in Greek can be used either of the whole citizen body or, as here, of the lower class, or democratic party, as opposed to the upper class, or aristocratic or oligarchic party. The Epidamnian 'representatives' were envoys (*presbeis*), men sent to negotiate; these, when their attempt to negotiate failed, then became suppliants (*hiketai*), asking for divine protection and throwing themselves on the mercy of the Corcyraeans. Corcyra was itself fairly democratic at this time but contained a significant number of men with

oligarchic sympathies (cf. the details in 3.69–85), and presumably the exiled oligarchs of Epidamnus had stronger links with Corcyra (cf. 1.26), or links with more influential Corcyraeans, than the democrats controlling the city.

1.25 In ‘enquired of the god’ Thucydides is uncritically using conventional language; this is not good evidence that he was after all a believer (see Introduction, p. xlv). It is more remarkable, perhaps an authentic reflection of what was said in Corinth, that he stresses a religious aspect of Corinth’s hostility to Corcyra. Nothing in the *Odyssey* (books 6–8) suggests a location for fairy-tale Phaeacia, but the identification with Corcyra had become standard, and there was a sanctuary of Homer’s king Alcinous there (3.70).

1.26 Ambracia and Leucas are between the Gulf of Corinth and Corcyra; Apollonia is between Corcyra and Epidamnus (the overland journey was difficult, and not attempted by the larger force of 1.27).

1.27 The 3,000 hoplites here become 2,000 in 1.29: probably the text is corrupt in one place or the other.

1.28 The Corcyraeans have in fact no ‘present alliances’ (cf. 1.31), but in this context it suits them to suggest that as colonists of Corinth they are friends of the Peloponnesians and enemies of Athens, whereas in Athens they will suggest that Corinth is an enemy of both Athens and Corcyra (e.g. 1.35). Arbitration provided an opportunity for point-scoring: a state could

appear virtuous if it was willing to go to arbitration when its opponent was not, but it could minimize the risks if it objected to any suggested arbitrators likely to rule against it, and here each state wanted to dictate the position from which arbitration would be entered into.

1.29 Heralds (*kerykes*), in contrast to envoys (1.24), are men sent not to negotiate but to make a formal proclamation. In ‘bracing’ their old ships the Corcyraeans were fitting *hypozomata*, internal cables tying the bow to the stern: Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 169–71, 196–8, 220–1. Epidamnus after its defeat by Corcyra drops out of the story.

1.30 A trophy (*tropaion*), literally a commemoration of the enemy’s turning to flee, was a monument displaying spoils taken from a defeated enemy. Leucimme was one of the headlands at the south end of Corcyra; despite the apparent implication of 1.29, the battle was presumably fought there, not at Actium (50 miles, 80 km, to the south). For Cheimerium, see note to 1.46–7.

1.31–45 For the debate in Athens Thucydides gives a Corcyraean speech 1.32–6, a Corinthian speech 1.37–43, the Athenian decision 1.44–5.

1.32–6 The Corcyraeans begin with right (*dikaion*, ‘just’), but since they have no existing relations with Athens they have to concentrate on benefit (*xymphora*), a prominent theme when

Thucydidean speakers emphasize the realities of power. Their prediction of war between Athens and the Peloponnesians (1.33) is answered only weakly by the Corinthians (1.42) and is reaffirmed in Thucydides' narrative (1.44): Athens' decision to wind up the Acropolis building programme and devote surplus revenue to the dockyards and walls, probably in 434/3 (ML 58, translated Fornara 119), and its renewal of alliances with Rhegium and Leontini in the west, in 433/2 (ML 63–4, translated Fornara 124–5), confirm that this does not reflect Thucydidean hindsight but the Athenians did this early expect a war to which the west (1.36) would be relevant.

1.37–43 The Corinthians, using a common feature of second speeches, claim that, if the first speech had kept to the point, the second would do so too, but, since the first did not, the second is compelled (1.37) to answer the first. The Corinthians claim that right is on their side, but find it harder to argue that support for them will benefit Athens. Several of their points are far from cogent, and to this reader Corcyra seems to have the better of the argument. Corinth did maintain unusually close links with its colonies (though it was the general Greek understanding that a colony was an independent state), but note that at the end of this episode it had to capture Anactorium (1.55).

1.40 What is said about Samos is not repeated in the narrative of that episode (1.115–17), perhaps simply because Thucydides

remembered that he had said it earlier. The cases were not in fact parallel: Samos was recognized in the Thirty Years Treaty as a member of the Athenian bloc, but Corcyra was not a member of either the Peloponnesian or the Athenian bloc and Corinth had no formal rights over it. If Sparta was indeed willing to support Samos in 440–439, that would have been a breach of the treaty, and Sparta (or some Spartans) will have been more actively hostile to Athens than the narrative of 433–432 suggests.

- 1.41** ‘The accepted Greek norms’ are not formal agreements (though Thucydides uses *nomoi*, which in other contexts means ‘laws’) but the unformulated yet generally accepted principles on which the Greek states dealt with one another. For the twenty ships supplied to Athens, see note to 1.14.
- 1.42** The reference to Athens’ treatment of Megara is probably an allusion not to the grievance which will first be mentioned in 1.67 but to Athens’ taking Megara out of the Peloponnesian League between c.460 and 446 (1.103–15).
- 1.44** It seems to have been Athens’ practice to spread major decisions over two days, with discussion on the first and the vote on the second. Here Thucydides is frustratingly reticent: we should like to know who favoured Corinth and who Corcyra, how many changed their minds and why; and very probably he had been present, and knew and could have told us. Probably, as claimed by Plutarch (*Per.* 29), Pericles was in

favour of supporting Corcyra, and obtained what he wanted but not easily (cf. the note on Lacedaemonius in 1.45). In limiting themselves to a defensive alliance (Thucydides' verbal distinction between *xymmachia* = full alliance and *epimachia* = defensive alliance is not generally observed in Greek) the Athenians were adopting an interpretation of the Thirty Years Treaty by which they would not be in breach of the treaty if they fought only to defend the territory of Corcyra. Even this was not the decision of a state anxious to stay at peace: it would have suited Athens perfectly well if Corcyra and Corinth had weakened each other while Athens remained uninvolved (cf. the Corinthians in 1.40): see Introduction, p. xiv.

- 1.45** An inscription (ML 61, translated Fornara 126) records money taken by the generals named here from the treasury of Athena for this campaign at the beginning of 433/2. Lacedaemonius was a son of Pericles' opponent Cimon, with a name advertising the family's Spartan connections. Plutarch thinks Pericles had him appointed to this campaign to humiliate him (*Per.* 29); more probably, either Lacedaemonius (like Thucydides) had broken away from Cimon's political position or (more likely) he had not and his appointment is a sign that those opposed to the alliance were strong enough to get their man chosen as one of the commanders. Commanders did not necessarily approve of the campaigns on which they were

sent: cf. Nicias and the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 (Books 6–7, with note to 6.17).

1.46–55 Thucydides proceeds to the Sybota campaign of 433.

1.46–7 The geographical detail is not all necessary for the narrative, and it is not clearly expressed. The harbour near Ephyre is the *Glykys Limen* ('sweet harbour') at the mouth of the Acheron; the Thyamis reaches the sea opposite central Corcyra; Cheimerium is the region between those two rivers in general, and the promontory near which the Corinthians camped is Varlam, at a latitude between the south of Corcyra and the island of Paxos. The Sybota islands are just off the mainland, opposite the southern end of Corcyra: this battle was fought in the same area as the battle of Leucimne in 435 (1.29–30).

1.48 Three days' provisions were taken because the Corinthians were not sure that they would return to their camp the same day: if victorious, they hoped to land on Corcyra.

1.49–50 The older style of naval warfare involved grappling and boarding, after which the soldiers would fight on the decks. The Athenians in the fifth century had developed manoeuvres to turn naval battles into sailors' battles at sea, such as breaking through the enemy lines and then turning sharply (*diekplous*: cf. note to 7.36–41), and Thucydides the Athenian regards the older style as unsophisticated. The Corcyraean left was successful against the Corinthian right, and sailed to the camp

at Cheimerium (about 10 miles, 15 km, away), but on the Corcyraean right the Athenians eventually had to join in the fighting. The battle left the Corinthians in command of the water, and they collected wrecks and bodies at mainland Sybota, directly opposite the islands (triremes were often disabled in battle but could not easily be sunk: Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 127–8).

1.50–1 There must have been a second debate in Athens, not reported by Thucydides, which resulted in the decision to send a further twenty ships (Hornblower). This time Thucydides names two generals, the inscription (ML 61, translated Fornara 126), with a date about three weeks later than the previous occasion, names three, and only one name appears in both texts. There have been ingenious attempts to save Thucydides' reputation, but the easiest explanation is that he has slipped here; Dracontides, named in the inscription, is known as an opponent of Pericles from the democratic end of the spectrum.

1.52–3 The Corinthians were afraid that the Athenians would consider the Thirty Years Treaty to be at an end and themselves now to be openly at war with Corinth, but the Athenians continued to insist on their interpretation, that they had committed themselves only to defending Corcyra and the treaty still held.

1.55 In 1.46 there was one ship from Anactorium (inside the Gulf of Ambracia) on the Corinthian side, perhaps sent by a pro-

Corinthian minority. For Corinth's use of the prisoners from Corcyra, see 3.70 and note.

1.56–66 *Potidaea (433–432)*. Potidaea was a colony of Corinth but a tribute-paying member of the Delian League. In this episode Athens put pressure on Potidaea, Potidaea obtained help from Corinth (which in its attempt not to break the Thirty Years Treaty sent not an official Corinthian force but volunteers and mercenaries), and in 432 there was a battle in which again Athenians fought against Corinthians. The Athenians then settled down to besiege Potidaea.

1.56 Potidaea was on the isthmus of Pallene, the western prong of Chalcidice in the north-west Aegean. Thucydides starts by suggesting that Athens acted against Potidaea because of its Corinthian connection after the episode of Corcyra, but he goes on to indicate that king Perdiccas of Macedonia was another cause of concern, and the record of tribute collected suggests that Athens had been putting pressure on Potidaea for some years. It is in fact surprising that until now Athens continued to allow Potidaea to receive officials from Corinth. The 'Thraceward' region is the term used by the Athenians to refer to the Greek states settled on and near the north coast of the Aegean.

1.57 Perdiccas II was king of Macedonia from the mid-fifth century to 413: during his reign he changed sides many times between Athens and Sparta (though he may have seen them as

changing sides with regard to him); his father Alexander I was king in the early fifth century and played a part in the Persian Wars. Derdas was probably ruler of Elimeia, a part of Upper Macedonia south-west of the plain of Lower Macedonia. The Chalcidians here (Thucydides' use of the term is perhaps anticipatory) are not the inhabitants of Chalcidice as a whole but primarily those on the coast near Olynthus, north of the three prongs; and the Bottiaean lived in that northern part of Chalcidice too, perhaps to the west of Olynthus (cf. 2.99).

For 'two' other generals the manuscripts have 'ten', but there were only ten Athenian generals altogether, and some were occupied elsewhere; and (as with the two expeditions to Corcyra (1.45, 51, with notes)) Athens often gave the command of an expedition to three generals. Archestratus was the commander who, for whatever reason, was most prominent in Thucydides' mind, but he was not, and Thucydides' expression does not imply that he was, officially superior to his colleagues.

- 1.58** There had been earlier occasions when attacks on Attica were made or contemplated to distract Athens from another campaign (1.101, 109, 114; cf. 1.105): on this occasion Sparta's promise was not fulfilled until the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 (2.14–23). The negotiations took place in the winter of 433/2, and the campaigning belongs to 432. Olynthus, not previously a large or important city, was

about 7 miles (11 km) north of Potidaea (cf. 1.63), and the Chalcidians who took part in this synoecism (cf. note to 1.5: Thucydides here uses *anoikizein*, particularly appropriate for moving inland) were from cities in the vicinity of Olynthus, including the northern part of Sithone, the middle prong; lake Bolbe, where they were given farmland, is some distance further north. The enlarged city tends to be referred to as Olynthus in literary texts but as the Chalcidians in its own documents.

1.60 In the case of Corcyra, the Athenians limited themselves to a defensive alliance so that they could claim they were not breaking the Thirty Years Treaty (see 1.45); here under the treaty Athens was entitled to coerce Potidaea, and to keep their hands clean the Corinthians sent volunteers and mercenaries, not an official force of the Corinthian state. Aristeus is not the Aristeus sent to Corcyra in 1.29.

1.61 Callias, the general uppermost in Thucydides' mind (cf. Archestratus in 1.57), may be identified with the proposer of the financial decrees of 434/3 (or at any rate the first of them) and the renewed alliances with Rhegium and Leontini of 433/2 (cf. note to 1.32–6). The Athenians' route is problematic. Therme is at the north-east corner of the Thermaic Gulf (Thessalonica), and Pydna is on the west side. Beroea is inland, to the west of Pydna, but to go there would not be to leave Macedonia, and to go via there to Strepsa (the

result of an emendation: probably south-east of Therme though some place it north-west) would be strange (Gomme; contr. Hornblower). Gigonus was on the coast north-west of Potidaea. Some have thought that there was another Beroea, or that Beroea is a copyist's error for Brea, an unlocated place to which Athens had sent settlers in the 440s or 430s (ML 49, translated Fornara 100); the problem remains unsolved. Pausanias was perhaps a brother of Derdas (1.57).

- 1.62** If the mention of Iolaus is to make sense, it must mean that he commanded at Potidaea as deputy for Perdiccas (Hornblower; contr. Gomme). The battle is the one in which Socrates saved the life of Alcibiades: Pl., *Chrm.* 153 A–C, *Symp.* 219 E–220 E; Alcibiades was to return the compliment at Delium (see note to 4.96).
- 1.63** Thucydides gives the distance from Olynthus to Potidaea as 60 stades, implying a stade of 202 yards (185 m), comfortably within his normal range (see Appendix). Gomme points out that, although Potidaea was visible from Olynthus, the road taken by the Athenians from Gigonus to Potidaea was not. The signals will have been raised to indicate that the battle was beginning and the reserve should come from Olynthus to support Aristeus (1.62).
- 1.64** The Athenians built a wall in order to blockade Potidaea. This is what a 'siege' normally amounted to in the fifth century; in their siege of Plataea, 429–427, the Spartans combined a

blockade with the latest in military technology (2.71–8; cf. 3.20–4). Potidaea had its own wall on the south side of the city, and had refused Athenian demands to demolish it (1.56).

1.66 That Corinth had been acting *idiai* could mean either that it had been ‘acting alone’, independently of the Peloponnesian League as a whole (Hornblower) or that it had been ‘acting privately’, using simply volunteers and mercenaries, not officially (Gomme); but the second is the better explanation of why this ‘was not yet the outbreak of the war, and they were still in a state of truce’ (contrast the Theban attack on Plataea in 431, which Thucydides does treat as the beginning of the war: 2.2–6).

1.67–88 *First meeting in Sparta (432)*. In an elaborate piece of scene-setting Thucydides gives us a Corinthian speech (1.68–71); a response by Athenians ‘come there on other business’ (1.73–8); and then, with foreigners removed from the assembly, a speech by king Archidamus advising caution (1.80–5) and a speech by the ephor Sthenelaïdas demanding immediate action (1.86). The vote is in favour of immediate action, and the Spartans then summon a formal congress of the Peloponnesian League.

1.67 Corinth takes the lead, both as the strongest and most independent-minded of Sparta’s allies and as the one which, over Corcyra and Potidaea, has come into direct conflict with Athens. Aegina had been a member of the Delian League since it was subdued by Athens c.457 (1.108): Thucydides gives no

more information than this about its complaint, and does not make it clear whether autonomy was allegedly promised in the Thirty Years Treaty or in a bilateral treaty; cf.

Introduction, p. xiv. Megara had been an ally of Athens between c.460 and 446 (1.103, 114–15): Thucydides does not give much further information about its complaint (1.139 adds a little), but clearly much was made of it at the time (cf. 1.139, 140).

1.68–71 The Corinthian speech introduces the contrast between Spartan slowness and conservatism and Athenian energy and innovation which is to pervade Thucydides' history, and the description of Athens in 1.70 fits well with the speeches of Pericles. If the Spartans had indeed wanted to support Samos in 440 (cf. 1.40), they, or some of them, were not as reluctant to confront Athens as the Corinthians here allege. On Athens' fortification, see 1.89–93 (Sparta wanted to prevent it but was outwitted), and on the Long Walls, see 1.107. Against the Persians Sparta sent only a small force to Thermopylae in 480, but probably in a genuine belief that that would suffice until reinforcements could follow (Hdt. 7.198–239); to say that Xerxes' failure was due to his own mistakes is distinctly one-sided. For the promise to Potidaea, see 1.58. The threat to look for alternative allies must, as noted by an ancient commentator, envisage Argos, which was neutral to 421 and allied with Corinth for a while after that (cf. 5.14, 27–32).

1.72–8 We do not know what the Athenians' 'other business' was.

Thucydides gives them a speech in which, as he states, they do not defend themselves against accusations but justify and indeed flaunt their power: deterrent in the sense that they warn Sparta against attacking Athens. The contrast between older and younger is a frequent motif. On Athens' contribution to the Persian Wars, see 1.18; according to Herodotus, Athens provided 200 out of 378 ships in 480 (8.1, with 8.14, 48; cf. 8.82); on Themistocles, cf. Hdt. 8.40–96 (evacuation of Athens and Salamis), 8.123–5 (in Sparta).

1.75–7 This gives us the first account in a speech of Athens' empire; here as elsewhere speakers unashamedly use the language of political realism (despite 'later', the sequence 'fear–prestige–our own interests' may be logical rather than chronological). For Athens' becoming leader after 479, see 1.94–5; for Athens' unpopularity, see 1.98–9; for the ending of the good relationship between Athens and Sparta, see 1.101–2. On Sparta and the Peloponnesians, see 1.19; after the Peloponnesian War Sparta did in fact become more interfering and unpopular, but it is not impossible that what is said in 1.76–7 could have been written by Thucydides, and indeed said by Athenian speakers, long before then.

1.76 For 'the natural instinct' Thucydides uses the word *physis*, a favourite word of the sophists (see note to 1.22), who in various ways contrasted *physis*, 'nature', which cannot be other

than it is, with *nomos*, in the sense of ‘convention’, what has been decided by some human beings in their own interests and could have been decided otherwise by others. Pausanias in and after 478 provides an example of the misbehaviour of Spartans abroad (1.94–5, 128–34).

Another theme of 1.76–7 is the Athenians’ use of their law courts. They do seem to have been exceptionally given to litigation; like other Greek states they made treaties regulating the trial of lawsuits between citizens of their state and of other states, and one way in which they exercised their power in the Delian League was by transferring major lawsuits from local courts to Athenian courts, which would be more likely to favour Athenians against allies and to favour supporters of Athens among the allies. The point at the beginning of 1.77 seems to be not that because they were at a disadvantage when treaty cases were tried in allied courts they have transferred such cases to Athens (Gomme, Hornblower) but (a) that in treaty cases the Athenians submit to the disadvantage of trials in the other state where that is what the treaty requires, rather than having all such cases tried in their own courts, (b) that some local cases have been transferred to Athenian courts (which for the purposes of this speech are deemed to be impartial); and that by indulging in both of these practices rather than simply imposing their own will they have gained a reputation for addiction to litigation

(thus R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford University Press, 1972), 228–33).

- 1.78** ‘The incalculable element’ and ‘chance’ are important for Thucydides (cf. Introduction, pp. xliii–xliv): his history unlike Herodotus’ involves no divine plan, but there are occurrences, such as the plague at Athens (cf. 2.61), which cannot be predicted and provided for.
- 1.79–85** The first Spartan speech is by Archidamus. His father had died young, and he had himself been king (see 1.20) since perhaps c.469. On Athens’ resources, see 2.13. The Spartans do indeed invade Attica in the early years of the war (e.g. 2.18–23, in 431), and the Athenians do indeed avoid a major battle with the invaders and rely on their sea power for survival (cf. Pericles in 1.143, 2.13: we may wonder how far Archidamus could have foreseen that); the Spartans’ earliest attempt to support a revolt against Athens in the Aegean was a failure (Mytilene in 428–427, 3.2–50); Pericles in his first speech comments on their financial weakness (1.142–3).
- 1.82** The mention here of ‘further allies, Greek or barbarian’ is the first pointer to the involvement of the Persians, for the past half-century the national enemy, in the war (see 2.7): for Sparta, Persia offered the best hope of redressing the financial imbalance, and did in and after 412 provide support (see Book 8); Athens needed at least to prevent Persia from helping Sparta, did make a treaty of some kind c.423 (see note to

4.50), and from 411 to 407 hoped in vain that Persian help might be diverted from Sparta to Athens (see notes to 8.47, 76).

- 1.84** This chapter gives a Spartan view of the contrast between Sparta and Athens: Sparta is brave, disciplined, and not too clever for its own good.
- 1.86** Sthenelaïdas' speech has a truly laconic flavour, and one would like to think that this reflects the speech actually made by him (though no non-Spartan will have heard it: 1.79). The ephors, first reliably attested in the mid-sixth century, were five annually elected officials to whom, while they did not abolish the kings, the Spartans had transferred many of the civilian powers of the kings: in particular, they sat with the *gerousia* (see note to 1.20) and presided in the *gerousia* and the assembly. Deciding by acclamation (regarded as childish by Arist., Pol. 2. 1270 B–1271 A; for a description of the procedure see Plut., Lyc. 26) was probably a survival from an era before the Greeks had taken to counting votes. In constructing a 'constitution' of the Peloponnesian League, de Ste. Croix (*Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 105–23; cf. 339–30) was probably more systematic than the Spartans themselves; but at the end of the sixth century (Hdt. 5.90–3; contr. 5.74–5) it became an accepted principle that if the Spartans required military support from their allies their own decision had to be endorsed by a congress of the allies.

1.87 The 'fourteenth year' is 433/2, the treaty having been made in 446/5; the war proper will begin in the fifteenth year, 432/1 (2.2). Here Thucydides is probably reckoning not by the seasonal years which he uses for his narrative of the war (2.2) but by Athenian official years.

1.88 Thucydides ends this section by repeating his 'real reason' from 1.23.

1.89–118 *'Pentecontaetia': growth of Athenian power, to justify Thucydides' real reason.* Thucydides writes of 'roughly fifty years' in 1.118, and the term *pentecontaetia* for this period of not quite fifty years is used by an ancient commentator on 1.97. This excursus is intended to show how the Athenians became so powerful as to make Sparta afraid. It is not a history of the Delian League, and we may assume that the League engaged in a good deal of activity against the Persians which Thucydides has not mentioned; but even on its own terms it is unsatisfactory, in that Thucydides does not mention the abandonment of regular warfare against Persia but continuation of the League, c.450 (see note to 1.111–12), and after the Thirty Years Treaty of 446/5 (1.115) he mentions only (but at length) the war of 440–439 against Samos (1.115–17), and does not explain here (though he mentions elsewhere some items which help us to explain) why it was that by 432 Sparta was no longer happy with the balance which that treaty tried to establish.

Our other main sources for this period are Diod. Sic. 11.39–12.28 (with the events of 435–432, which he misdates, in 12.30–4, 38–41) and Plutarch's *Lives*, particularly *Cimon* and *Pericles*: for the most part they give differing and additional details for episodes which Thucydides mentions, rather than episodes which he does not mention. From the 450s the Athenians took to inscribing decrees of the assembly and other public documents on stone in exceptionally large quantities, and these give us information particularly on the Delian League of a kind which we do not find in the literary texts.

1.89 The siege of Sestos is included by Herodotus as the last episode in the war of 480–479 (9.114–21), and it is included here by Thucydides because it is the first Greek campaign undertaken under Athenian rather than Spartan leadership. In 479 Leotychidas had commanded at sea and at the battle of Mycale while Pausanias had commanded on the Greek mainland and at the battle of Plataea. Leotychidas will not be mentioned again by Thucydides, but probably in 478 when Pausanias commanded in the Aegean he campaigned against those in northern Greece who had supported Persia, and is said to have been flagrantly guilty of taking bribes in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72).

1.89–93 The story of Themistocles, Sparta, and the rebuilding of Athens' walls became notorious, and is repeated in Plut.,

Them. 19, and other texts. It is one of a number of stories in which, though honoured in Sparta in 480/79 like no other foreigner (1.74), after the Persian Wars Themistocles turned against Sparta while his opponent Cimon was strongly pro-Spartan (see note to 1.101–3). One of Themistocles' fellow envoys to Sparta in this story (1.91), and a confidant of his in other stories, is Aristides, the original organizer of the Delian League (see notes to 1.96–7, 5.18): the main tradition represents the two as rivals (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 28.2), but after 479 they are better seen as on the same side, against Cimon (*Ath. Pol.* 23.3–4 tries to reconcile the two views). Habronichus had been with the Greek army at Thermopylae in 480 and reported what happened there to the navy at Artemisium (Hdt. 8.21).

As in his 'archaeology' (1.8, 10), in 1.93 Thucydides cites archaeological evidence to confirm that the rebuilding was done in haste; but, while there are indeed pieces of sculpture built into the wall, Thucydides may give an exaggerated impression: see Hornblower and the works which he cites.

1.93 On the Peiraeus, see again Plut., *Them.* 19. Some scholars, over-impressed by Hdt. 7.143 on Themistocles' recent prominence, have doubted either that the office mentioned is his archonship or that his archonship was in 493/2 (Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* 6.34.1), but mistakenly. Athens could not rely on the Peiraeus until it was securely in possession of Salamis (late

sixth century: ML 14, translated Fornara 44. B), but the intermittent war against Aegina which began c.505 (Hdt. 5.79–89) will have shown the need for a more secure harbour than the bay of Phalerum: cf. Hornblower. In his emphasis on sea rather than land power Themistocles is represented as foreshadowing Pericles: see note to 1.143. Most of what survives is of the wall as rebuilt in the 390s, and that at least does not support Thucydides' claim that the wall was of solid stone throughout (Gomme).

1.94–5 Pausanias had commanded at Plataea in 479: he was regent for his cousin Pleistarchus (see 1.132). The story of his downfall will be told in 1.128–34. Here as there Thucydides is convinced of Pausanias' guilt where it can never have been proved: presumably the information came from sources in Sparta which he considered reliable. Cyprus had been in contact with Greece in the bronze age; in the classical period some of its inhabitants were Greek or at any rate thought of themselves as Greek, and when the Greeks were aggressive against Persia they tried to claim Cyprus for the Greek world. Byzantium was on the European side of the Bosphorus, and would be important to the Persians if they tried to return to Europe.

It is important to Thucydides that, although it developed into an Athenian empire, the Delian League began innocently, and so for him it was the allies who invited Athens to take the

lead and who refused to accept Dorcis. Herodotus (8.3) and *Ath. Pol.* 23.4 point to an Athenian initiative; at any rate the Athenians could not have become leaders without willingness on both sides. Also, for Thucydides, the Spartans ‘wanted to be rid of . . . the Persian war’; but for *Ath. Pol.* 23.2 they were reluctant to give up the lead and Diod. Sic. 11.50 suspiciously has a debate which unexpectedly led to a decision not to challenge Athens. Sparta had other worries at this time, and although there were no doubt some who thought otherwise Thucydides probably reports the majority view correctly. For the narrow and broad senses of ‘Ionian’ see note to 1.2–3. Not all the members of the Delian League, even at its foundation, were Ionian in the narrow sense, but considerations of kinship were often invoked in interstate affairs, and it suited Ionian Athens to represent the league which it led as an Ionian league.

1.96–7 Thucydides’ account of what, because of its original headquarters, scholars call the Delian League is full of problems. The organization was in fact done by Aristides (5.18, *Ath. Pol.* 23.3–5), though he is not mentioned in connection with the League subsequently. The ‘ostensible purpose’ is puzzlingly limited: many members (especially Aegean islanders) had not suffered from the Persians, elsewhere Thucydides refers to the liberation of Greeks still under Persian rule (3.10), it must have seemed likely that the Persians would

return and desirable to guard against that, and *Ath. Pol.* 23.5 has a full and permanent offensive and defensive alliance. In view of the emphasis on innocent beginnings, ‘ostensible purpose’ is presumably contrasted with what became of the League later rather than with concealed sinister intentions at the time. It need not be doubted that the Treasurers to the Greeks were Athenian from the start: providing them, like providing military commanders, was part of Athens’ function as leader. The levying of regular contributions was something new in a Greek alliance: 460 talents is a surprisingly large figure for the tribute at the start, even if it includes a cash equivalent for ships: I have suggested that it comes from an optimistic assessment list for those who joined or were expected to join (Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire*, Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics, 17 (Oxford University Press, 1985; reissued with addenda, 1993), 7–8; cf. note to 2.13). The treasury ‘was’ Delos, a major Ionian sanctuary, and was moved to Athens in 454/3 (the first of the ‘Athenian tribute lists’, IG i3 259, is the list for spring 453); meetings (in which Athens probably had one vote like each of the allies: cf. note to 3.10–11) ‘took place’ there, and were probably discontinued when the treasury was moved (later we find decisions taken only by Athens). That the allies were ‘autonomous’ (a word perhaps coined to refer to that degree of independence which they hoped to retain in a league under a leader) was probably taken for granted rather

than spelled out: there had not yet been a Greek alliance whose members were not autonomous.

1.97 This is the only place where Thucydides names another historian: Hellanicus of Lesbos, an older contemporary, whose *Atthis (History of Athens)* was the first of a series of such works. From that we have only fragments quoted by other writers, but it is sadly just as true of Thucydides' own account of this period that 'his treatment is brief and the chronology is imprecise' (Thucydides is not necessarily claiming that Hellanicus' chronology was 'inaccurate', i.e. wrong: cf. 5.20, where he uses the same term).

1.98–100 Eion on the Thracian coast was important as a surviving outpost of Persian power in Europe (we learn from Plut., *Cim.* 7 that it was taken over and settled by the Athenians); its capture was perhaps in 476. Scyros, in the northern Aegean, was irrelevant to an anti-Persian league, but it lies on the vital route from the Hellespont to Athens (and we learn from Plut., *Thes.* 36 and *Cim.* 8, that Cimon brought back to Athens what was said to be the skeleton of the legendary hero Theseus); its capture was perhaps in 475. Carystus had been sacked by the Persians in 490, and therefore supported them in 480 (Hdt. 6.99, 8.66, 112, 121; 9.105 mentions this episode): coercing it could be justified as punishing a Persian sympathizer, but it too lies near the route from the Hellespont to Athens. We are not told why Naxos revolted or in what ways it lost its freedom,

but what happened to Thasos (1.101) indicates the likely nature of the settlement: this is mentioned as the first use of force against an existing member.

1.99 Naxos leads to Thucydides' comment on revolts and their suppression. The Athenians were taking a permanent alliance to mean permanent warfare, which the allies had probably not envisaged when they joined the League and which imposed a heavy burden on their manpower if they contributed their own ships and crews: paying tribute in cash was less troublesome but made the allies less able to dissent from Athenian policy or to resist Athenian action against them.

1.100 The Eurymedon enters the sea by the south coast of Asia Minor, not far to the west of Cyprus. It is possible that the Persians were assembling forces there with a view to trying to return to Greece; the Athenians must have felt secure in the Aegean to risk going so far from it. This battle is perhaps to be dated 469, in which case the episodes of Carystus and Naxos will fall in the second half of the 470s.

1.100–1 The revolt of Thasos can be dated fairly securely 465/4–463/2, and this time we are given a reason: Athenian covetousness; this is the clearest instance yet of the Athenians' using the League in pursuance of their own interests. Other island states had possessions on the adjacent mainland, and we may wonder how the Athenians justified their position to the allies. Nine Ways, a short distance inland from Eion, they had

attempted to occupy after taking Eion; they colonized it as Amphipolis in 437/6 (4.102).

An unfulfilled Spartan promise to distract Athens by invading Attica, when the Athenians were still led by the pro-Spartan Cimon and Sparta was to ask for Athenian help shortly afterwards (1.103), is suspicious: more probably this was invented when Athens and Sparta had become enemies and some Spartans asked why the rise of Athens had not been halted before it was too late.

1.101–3 The earthquake killed a large number of Spartan citizens, and began a decline which was never reversed. In addition to the full citizens, the population of Laconia and Messenia included Perioeci ('dwellers around', men free to run the affairs of their own communities but subject to Sparta in foreign policy) and Helots (a word which probably means 'captives', serfs who farmed the land for its citizen owners). Thuria was certainly and Aethaea presumably in Messenia: this was essentially a revolt of the Messenians against Sparta (and was reckoned as Sparta's Third Messenian War). We learn from Plut., *Cim.* 16 that the Athenians were divided, with the pro-Spartan Cimon (who had given the name Lacedaemonius to one of his sons: 1.45) wanting to help Sparta and Ephialtes not. Cimon took 4,000 hoplites (Ar., *Lys.* 1137–44). It was probably while they were in Messenia that in 462/1 Ephialtes got the upper hand in Athens and carried out his democratic

reform (*Ath. Pol.* 25.1–2), and it was probably in reaction to this that the Spartans distrusted the Athenian soldiers, fearing that they might be ordered to change sides, and dismissed them. On returning to Athens Cimon tried to reverse the reform but, by the procedure which enabled the Athenians to send a man into honourable exile for ten years, was ostracized (Plut., *Cim.* 17). The alliance by virtue of which the Athenians had been appealed to and which they then renounced was that made in 481 by the Greeks intending to resist the Persian invasion, still considered to be in force despite the foundation of the Delian League. Argos was the one Peloponnesian state which never acknowledged Spartan superiority; Thessaly was hostile to Sparta as a result of Leotychidas' punitive expedition after the Persian Wars (see note to 1.89).

This episode has given rise to chronological difficulties. If in this excursus Thucydides mentioned each single event in correct chronological sequence, there is not room for a ten-year war between what he mentions before and what he mentions after, so it used to be fashionable to emend the 'tenth' year in 1.103 to a lower figure. But Thucydides need not have mentioned each event in correct sequence. Diod. Sic. (11.63–4) narrates the whole war under 469/8 and in 11.84 briefly mentions its end under 456/5, while giving a duration of ten years; Philochorus (FGrH 328 F 117, translated Fornara 67. A) put the earthquake and the war under 468/7, but

Pausanias (4.24.5, translated Fornara 67. C) put them under 464/3. Most probably Thucydides has mentioned the earthquake and the beginning of the war in the chronologically correct place, and for tidiness' sake has told the whole story as one unit: this will yield a war from 465/4 to 456/5, with a suitable ending date for Athens to be able to settle the refugees in Naupactus, after Tolmides' campaign in 1.108 (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii).

1.101–3 Thucydides now interweaves two narratives spanning c.460–455. Athens' breach with Sparta led to the beginning of the First Peloponnesian War, in which the Athenians began to extend their power on the Greek mainland. It started when Megara, on the Isthmus of Corinth, defected from the Peloponnesian League to Athens; and (while Sparta was still engaged in the Messenian War) Megara's enemy Corinth led the opposition to Athens. Aegina, in the middle of the Saronic Gulf, had been at war with Athens between c.505 and 483/2 (see note to 1.14), and Athens as a naval power was not going to tolerate a hostile island so near.

Long walls, built first for Megara (1.103) and afterwards (but probably planned if not actually started earlier) for Athens, joined an inland city to its harbour town in a single fortified area, which was safe against an enemy's blockade as long as it remained in control of access by sea. In the 440s the Athenians built for themselves a third Long Wall, parallel to

and a short distance south-east of the original Peiraeus wall (Andoc. 3. *Peace* 7, Aeschin. 2. *Embassy* 174, cf. Pl., *Grg.* 455 E, Plut., *Per.* 13).

The Phocians' attack on neighbouring Doris (1.107), which the Dorians of the Peloponnese believed to be their original homeland (the Spartans perhaps shared with Doris one of the two Dorian votes in the Delphic Amphictyony), did elicit action by Sparta. Pleistarchus (see note to 1.94–5) had died without leaving a son; his successor was Pleistoanax, and the regent Nicomedes was Pausanias' brother. By possessing Megara, and its harbour on the Gulf of Corinth, Pegae, the Athenians were able to threaten the Spartans' return both by land and by sea (Thucydides regularly calls the inner part of the Gulf, east of Rhium and Antirrhium, the Gulf of Crisa). It is hard to be sure how serious the internal threat to Athens was, but Ephialtes was murdered after his reform (*Ath. Pol.* 25.4); Plutarch (*Cim.* 17, *Per.* 10) has a story that the ostracized Cimon tried to rejoin the Athenians at Tanagra; he was rejected, but his friends, to disprove accusations of Spartan sympathies, fought exceptionally boldly and were killed. Opuntian Locris (1.108) is northern Locris, east of Thermopylae. Tolmides' campaign attacked the Spartans' harbour town of Gytheium; Chalcis was just outside the narrowest part of the Gulf of Corinth, on the north side; it was probably in this campaign that the Athenians captured Naupactus, just inside, on the north side (cf. 1.103).

Thucydides' only chronological indications are that Oenophyta was fought on the sixty-second day after Tanagra (1.108) and that the Egyptian war fought at the same time as this lasted six years (1.110). An inscribed Athenian casualty list commemorates men who died in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara in the same year (ML 33, extracts translated Fornara 78). The year is perhaps a campaigning year, rather than an official year beginning in mid-summer; it is apparently the first year of both wars, and is likely to be 460 or 459. Tanagra and Oenophyta are perhaps to be dated 457, and Tolmides' campaign 456.

1.104, 109–10 While in the 450s the Athenians set about increasing their power in mainland Greece, they did not abandon the war against the Persians. For Cyprus, cf. 1.94. Egypt was a part of the Greek world in the sense that there had been Greek mercenaries and traders there since the seventh century; from now until the end of the Persian empire it would frequently be in revolt against Persia, and it was seen as another place in which the Greeks could stand up to the Persians. The casualty list mentioned above reveals, as Thucydides does not, that at least at the beginning of this war the Athenians were also active on the coast of Phoenicia.

Persia did not keep large forces in the provinces, but in time could move large forces to where they were needed, and so like other revolts this one began promisingly but ended in

failure. The attempt to pay the Spartans to attack Athens is the first attested instance of what was to be a favourite Persian way of interfering in Greek affairs (but Hdt. 9.2, 41, mentions it as a possibility in the context of 479). Memphis was a short distance upstream from the apex of the Nile delta, Prosopitis (1.109) was in the south-west part of the delta.

The end will have come in 455 or 454. Thucydides gives the impression that all 200 ships of the original force (1.104) and some of the ships in the relief expedition (1.110) were lost, with a corresponding number of men (not all Athenian). Those who find it hard to believe in so large a disaster so briefly mentioned have used the 40 ships of Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14 §36 [32], translated Fornara 72) to support the argument that the Greek force was much smaller, either throughout the war or after the beginning; but it is not clear that Thucydides is wrong. Amyrtaeus appealed to Athens again in 451 (1.112); and a gift of corn by Psammetichus in 445/4 (Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 119, Plut., *Per.* 37) was perhaps an unsuccessful attempt to gain Athenian support for a further rising. The moving of the Delian League's treasury to Athens in 454/3 (see note to 1.96–7) was perhaps prompted by fear of a Persian resurgence in the Aegean.

1.111–12 In campaigns of 454 Athens' expansion loses its momentum: the one success, against Sicyon, like Tolmides' earlier success there (1.108) seems to have had no

consequence. This is the earliest mention of Pericles, both chronologically and in the sequence of Thucydides' history: it is low-key, in the same style as the other mentions of commanders between 478 and 446.

The five-year treaty (1.112) probably belongs to early 451 (so it will have expired when the fighting of 446 took place: 1.114); at the same time a thirty-year treaty was made between Argos and Sparta (5.14). If Cimon was ostracized in 461, and stories of his early recall (Plut., *Cim.* 17–18, *Per.* 10) are untrue, he will have returned to Athens in 451, and the treaty with the Peloponnesians, as well as the campaign in Cyprus in which he was killed, will reflect his influence.

The 'Athenian tribute lists' and other Athenian inscriptions show us that in the late 450s and early 440s Athens had trouble with some members of the Delian League, who in at least one case seem to have had the support of Persia (Erythrae, on the mainland of Asia Minor opposite Chios: ML 40, translated Fornara 71). Thucydides does not mention that; more seriously, he does not mention that the regular fighting against Persia for which the League was founded came to an end after Cimon's death. A majority of scholars believe that it was formally ended by a treaty, the Peace of Callias, known to everybody from the fourth century onwards but not mentioned in any fifth-century text (unless Hdt. 7.151 is an oblique allusion to it). I am among those who think that the

treaty was invented in the fourth century to make more vivid the contrast between the shameful King's Peace of 387/6, by which the Asiatic Greeks were returned to Persia, and the glorious past—but it still seems to be true that the war ended. Yet the Delian League was kept in being, for Athens' own purposes, and this transformation ought to have been mentioned in an account of the growth of Athens' power.

Three bodies had a particular interest in Delphi and its sanctuary of Apollo: the city of Delphi; the Phocians, in whose territory it lay; and the Amphictyony (league of neighbours), a body of mostly central-Greek peoples dominated by the Thessalians, which had gained control of the sanctuary through the First Sacred War at the beginning of the sixth century. Athens seems to have given control of the sanctuary to the Phocians after Oenophyta, while making some kind of agreement with the Amphictyony (*IG* i³ 9, translated Fornara 82). In this Second Sacred War Sparta gave the sanctuary to the city of Delphi and Athens gave it back to the Phocians; since they did not fight directly against each other, they could claim that their five-year treaty was not broken. Plutarch (*Per.* 21) says that Pericles commanded the Athenians; Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 34. b puts the Athenian response 'in the third year', which could be right.

1.113–15 The revolt of Boeotia was in late 447 or early 446, that of Euboea and Megara in 446. Pleistoanax (cf. 1.107), invading

after the expiry of the five-year treaty (1.112), turned back after ravaging the part of Attica nearest to the Megarid, presumably because he had been given assurances that the Athenians would come to terms. But it was believed that Pericles had bribed him, both by Spartans who thought he should have gone on to attack Athens, and by Athenians who saw no cause for shame in bribery which was in Athens' interests (Ar., *Nub.* 859 with schol., translated Fornara 104; Plut., *Per.* 23), and Pleistoanax was exiled (cf. 2.21, 5.16). In Euboea (1.114) the Hestiaeans, in the north, were singled out for harsh treatment because they had killed the crew of an Athenian ship (Plut., *Per.* 23).

The Thirty Years Treaty was made in 446/5: Athens gave up its mainland acquisitions, so that superficially Sparta seemed in the end to have put a stop to the growth of Athens' power; but in return the division of the Greek world into a Spartan bloc based on the mainland and an Athenian bloc based on the Aegean was recognized (cf. 1.31), and the following years were to show that the Athenians' desire to expand had not been curbed (cf. Introduction, p. xiii).

1.115–17 Miletus was on the coast of Asia Minor, a little to the south of the adjacent island of Samos, Priene was to the north of Miletus, and Miletus and Samos had clashed over Priene before. Nothing is known of the involvement of distant Byzantium in this episode beyond what Thucydides says. The

war began in 441/0 and continued into 440/39. Samos was still a ship-providing member of the Delian League (see notes to 1.19, 99), and Athens had continued to tolerate an oligarchy there (probably Athens insisted on a democracy not only at the point mentioned by Thucydides but also after the war). If there was a Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia, the Persians were breaking it by supporting Samos; and, if the Spartans had persuaded the Peloponnesian League to support Samos (see note to 1.40), they would have broken the Thirty Years Treaty. It is perhaps because of Persia's involvement, to show that they would still take action when necessary, as well as because the Samians challenged Athens very effectively (cf. 8.76), that the Athenians intervened here on such a large scale. The Thucydides of 1.117 was neither the historian nor his (probable) grandfather Thucydides the son of Melesias, who had been ostracized. Hagnon and Phormio were both major figures, and Hagnon's son Theramenes will play a major role in Book 8. After the war, it is not clear what the Samians' obligations were once their reparations had been paid, but they were not assessed for tribute in the regular manner.

Important as the episode may be, it is striking that Thucydides narrates it in more detail than the other episodes in the excursus, and that he does not include in this excursus

any other episodes after the Thirty Years Treaty (see Introduction, p. xiii).

1.118 Thucydides ends the excursus by referring back to Corcyra and Potidaea and the other grievances, here using the word *prophasis* (used of his ‘real reason’ in 1.23) of them. He has not said as much as he might about how the Athenians ‘consolidated their empire’ (see note to 1.111–12); he tries to combine the view of Sparta as slow to act, expressed by the Corinthians in 1.68–71, with his view of the real reason for the war, that when Athens did become too powerful Sparta did find it intolerable. The sanctuary at Delphi, which gave its strong support to the Spartans, had presumably come under the control of the pro-Spartan city of Delphi again after the Thirty Years Treaty (cf. 1.112).

1.119–25 *Congress of Peloponnesian League in Sparta* (432). After the excursus justifying his emphasis on his ‘real reason’ (1.89–118), Thucydides resumes the narrative from 1.88: the Spartan assembly has already decided on war, but to commit the Peloponnesian League it needs a majority vote from the League’s members.

1.120–4 Thucydides begins with another Corinthian speech. The motif that Athens’ naval power is a threat to inland as well as to coastal cities is new.

1.121 The suggestion that the Peloponnesians can provide money of their own and borrow from Delphi and Olympia, and can build

a navy to defeat the Athenian navy, answers the caution of Archidamus in 1.80: probably Corinth was the only member of the League with significant wealth in cash, and there is no clear evidence that money was obtained from Delphi and Olympia; and the Peloponnesians seem not to have understood how far Athens' navy surpassed others in skill (cf. 2.83–92). Payment of oarsmen was standard, but many of Athens' oarsmen were non-Athenians (cf. 1.143).

1.122 Revolt among Athens' allies was also mentioned cautiously by Archidamus (1.81). *Epiteichismos*, the building of a hostile fort inside the enemy's territory, makes its first appearance here: the Athenians built such forts in the Archidamian War (first at Atalante in 431: 2.32; most notably at Pylos in 425 and Cythera in 424: 4.2–41, 53–7), but the Peloponnesians did not build a fort in Attica until they occupied Deceleia in 413 (7.19, 27–8). The description of Athens as a 'tyrant city' (1.122, 124) will be used unashamedly by the Athenians Pericles (2.63), Cleon (3.37), and Euphemus (6.85); cf. Ar., *Eq.* 1110–20.

1.124 The idea of solidarity among Dorians and among Ionians, and of the military superiority of the Dorians, occurs on various occasions (more often on the Peloponnesian side: Hornblower), but ethnic solidarity could always be overridden when other considerations seemed more important; cf. note to 1.94–5 on the Delian League as an Ionian league. No Corinthians will have heard Archidamus' speech (cf. 1.79), but the Corinthians then in

Sparta will have been able to discover what he said. It is a greater obstacle to belief in Thucydides' speeches as authentic reports that Pericles' speech in Athens (1.140–4) responds to points made in this speech. See Introduction, p. xxxv.

1.125 The Peloponnesians were not sufficiently prepared to begin the war in 432, but the campaigning season was not yet at an end. 'Nearly a whole year' is probably the right interpretation of Thucydides' 'not a year . . . but less': this congress perhaps met in August (Gomme), and the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica—Thucydides wavers between that and the Theban attack on Plataea (2.2–6) as the starting point of the war—probably began in late May 431 (2.19; cf. note to 2.2–6).

1.126–38 *Digression on past episodes raised in propaganda: Cylon, Pausanias, Themistocles.*

1.126–7 The exchange of propaganda included attempts to weaken the opposing side by exploiting curses. The Athenian curse affected Pericles because his mother was from the cursed family, the Alcmeonids (not named by Thucydides, whose great-uncle Cimon had an Alcmeonid wife too). Cylon was an Olympic victor in 640, and tried to become tyrant in 636, 632, 628, or 624. The story is told also by Hdt. 5.71, Plut., *Sol.* 12 and schol. Ar., Eq. 445 (three versions); *Ath. Pol.* 1 has the end of an account on the same lines as Plutarch's. Trying to become tyrant and killing suppliants could both be represented as wicked, and different slants on the story were

possible. Thucydides may be reacting against a version in which Cylon did make his attempt at the time of the Diasia; he is certainly reacting against Herodotus' claim that control of the state was in the hands of the mysterious 'chiefs of the *naukraroi*', while only Plutarch states explicitly that the man responsible was the archon, Megacles of the Alcmaeonid family. The Dread Goddesses are the Erinyes/Eumenides (Furies), and their altars were on the Areopagus, to the west of the Acropolis. For the invocation of the curse by Cleomenes, in 508/7 against Cleisthenes, see Hdt. 5.70–2, *Ath. Pol.* 20.2.

Pericles has been mentioned in a matter-of-fact way in the Pentecontaetia (see note to 1.111–12), but in 1.127 he is presented for the first time as a major figure; the comment on his refusal to make concessions anticipates 1.139–46.

1.128–34 The curse of Taenarum (the southern tip of the Mani, on the west side of the Laconian Gulf) is disposed of quickly: for the earthquake of c.465/4 see 1.101; the episode mentioned need not have been immediately before that. For Pausanias, see 1.94–5, to which this narrative provides a sequel. 'To help the Greek war-effort' is probably the right interpretation of Thucydides' 'for the Greek war'. That Gongylus of Eretria was used as a go-between is supported by the fact that he was given land by the Persians (cf. Xen., *Hell.* 3.1.6, *An.* 7.8.8); but, apart from the improbability that the letters quoted (1.128–9) would

have survived, Pausanias' offer to marry the King's daughter looks like an elaboration of the rumour reported by Herodotus (5.32) that he married Megabates' daughter. There were two Persian satrapies in western Asia Minor: Hellespontine Phrygia in the north, with its capital at Dascylium near the Propontis, and Ionia, with its capital at Sardis (cf. 8.5–6).

1.130 Pausanias' embracing of Persian luxury at Byzantium may be contrasted with his earlier reaction, in 479 after the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.80–2).

1.131 The dispatch-stick (*skytale*), or rather a strip of cloth which for decipherment had to be wrapped round the stick which he possessed, conveying the order to return to Sparta, has been thought to conflict with the statement that he went to Hermione 'without . . . authority', but he was still regent.

1.132 The bronze 'serpent column' which supported a gold tripod survives in the Hippodrome in Istanbul, and the list of cities is on that (ML 27, translated Fornara 59): we do not know where on the whole monument Pausanias' couplet was inscribed; according to [Dem.] 59. *Neaera* 96–8 the Plataeans prosecuted Sparta before the Delphic Amphictyony and demanded the erasure.

1.134 Pausanias was removed from the temple so that he should not pollute it by dying inside. Here as before Thucydides is confident of Pausanias' guilt in matters which were never proved: it is likely that when Pausanias returned to the

Hellespont region and did not cooperate with the Athenians he did seek to cooperate with the Persians; it is perhaps less likely that he planned to free the Helots, but when they did revolt not long after his death (1.101) he was a convenient scapegoat. Thucydides gives us no indication of chronology, but probably Pausanias was expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians c.470 (cf. Just., *Epit.* 9.1.3) and the rest of the story belongs to the first half of the 460s.

1.135–8 Even with Pausanias Thucydides seems not merely to be providing the information needed to explain the curse cited by Athens against Sparta but in a Herodotean manner to be telling an exciting story for its own sake. The downfall of Themistocles is another exciting story, and it is of no relevance to the exchange of propaganda in 432/1: rather, Pausanias and Themistocles were ‘the two most eminent Greeks of their time’ (1.138), and in his intellectual qualities (1.138) Themistocles is presented as a forerunner of Pericles. Cf. Introduction, p. xxviii. For Themistocles after the Persian Wars, see note to 1.89–93.

1.135 Themistocles’ ostracism marked a decision by the Athenians against him and for Cimon; as a result of the charges mentioned here he was condemned in his absence for medism, treasonable collaboration with the Persians; ironically, though he then became a dependant of the Persians, we have no good reason to think he was guilty of medism before his condemnation. Argos and other states in the northern Peloponnese fought against

Sparta in the 470s–460s; Themistocles' departure from Argos may be due in part to the return to power of the old aristocracy which had lost its supremacy c.494 (Hdt. 6.83).

1.136 That Themistocles first fled westwards is consistent with the very slight indications that he was interested in the west (de Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 176, 378–9).

Plutarch (*Them.* 24) states that he had favoured Corcyra when arbitrating between Corcyra and Corinth; we do not know when or how he had opposed Admetus. In his version of the story (*Them.* 22–9), Plutarch takes Themistocles across the Aegean past Thasos (probably) to Cyme: if we knew which route was correct that would help us to date the episode, but probably these are rival embroideries on the simpler fact that in crossing the Aegean he had to keep out of the hands of the Athenians. Plutarch says that later writers had Themistocles meet not Artaxerxes (who became King in 465) but Xerxes, the King he had fought against in 480, but that is so much more effective dramatically that the less exciting Artaxerxes version must be true: Themistocles was ostracized perhaps c.470, but did not reach Asia before 465.

1.137 The 'message . . . from Salamis' presupposes an alternative version of the (probably invented) story in Hdt. 8.108–10 that after Salamis the Greeks pursued the Persian fleet only to Andros, Themistocles wanted to continue to the Hellespont but

was outvoted, and he then sent a message claiming the credit for the abandonment of that plan.

1.138 For the praise of Themistocles, cf. especially the praise of Pericles in 1.139, 2.60 (by himself), 65. The granting of territory was a regular Persian means of rewarding favourites: Magnesia and Myus were on the Maeander, inland from Miletus, and Lampsacus on the Hellespont; there are coins of Magnesia with Themistocles' name and others with his son's name, and in the hellenistic period there was a festival in his honour at Lampsacus. According to Paus. 1.1.2 Themistocles was given honourable burial—perhaps later.

1.139–46 *Athenian response to Spartan pressure (432)*. After demanding the expulsion of the Alcmeonids, the Spartans next raised three of Thucydides' four 'grievances' (the episode of Corcyra was at an end, so no demand could be made in that connection), and for Megara Thucydides gives a little more information than he gave in 1.67. The final demand echoes Thucydides' 'real reason'. Pericles, having been given one formal introduction in 1.127, here occupies centre stage for the first time and is given another introduction and his first speech (1.140–4).

1.140 For Pericles' insistence on not yielding, cf. 1.127; he will again claim to be unchanging in 2.61, as will Cleon in 3.38. For the extent to which Sparta had for some time been willing to

fight, see note to 1.37–43; if the ‘grievances’ are indeed mere excuses, Thucydides’ ‘real reason’ for the war is confirmed.

1.141–3 For the Peloponnesians as farmers lacking accumulated wealth, cf. Archidamus in 1.80 and the Corinthian response in 1.121 (the Spartans themselves did not farm their land but had Helots to do it for them); for the nature of the impending war, cf. Archidamus; for Peloponnesian disunity, cf. the Corinthians in 1.122; for hostile forts within Attica and the Peloponnesians’ naval hopes (1.142), cf. the Corinthians in 1.122 and 121; for the possibility of the Peloponnesians’ borrowing from Olympia and Delphi (1.143), cf. the Corinthians in 1.121. The word which we translate as ‘captain’, *kybernetes*, denotes the helmsman who, under the trierarch (the rich citizen assigned to a ship to command it and pay its running expenses), was its professional commander. 1.143 anticipates Pericles’ strategy of not resisting invasions of Attica but relying on Athens’ control of the sea and of the Delian League (cf. 2.13); the notion that Athens would be even stronger if it were an island can be found in [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.15, probably written in the mid-420s.

1.144 The advice not to be over-ambitious by trying to extend the empire during the war is praised by Thucydides in 2.65—and is advice which was not followed after Pericles’ death.

1.146 Renewed mention of ‘grievances and disputes’, and of Epidamnus and Corcyra, closes the ring which was opened in 1.23; but the period during which communication was

maintained and the two sides were not yet formally at war is 432/1, after the Peloponnesians' decision to go to war.

BOOK TWO

2.1 Formal beginning of the war

The Peloponnesian War began in the spring of 431. Thucydides signals one formal beginning with the attack on Plataea, but that was 'while the peace still held' (2.2), and he signals a second formal beginning with the invasion of Attica (2.10, 19). Since each state had its own calendar (cf. 2.2), and many started their year in the middle of the campaigning season (cf. 5.20), Thucydides uses his own seasonal calendar, beginning the year in spring (usually early March, but see note to 8.44) and dividing it into summers of about eight months and winters of about four, and in 2.2 anchoring his system to the year-reckoning of three major states. He rarely digresses outside this framework (most notably in 4.50; the backtracking in 8.45 need not go outside the current winter). Probably (though some disagree) precise astronomical dates are intended only when explicitly mentioned (as at 2.78; contr. 2.19).

2.2–32 First summer (431)

2.2–6 *Thebes' attempt to seize Plataea.* The Thirty Years Treaty was made in 446/5 (1.115); the war began in the first half of 431. With the OCT we retain the manuscripts' 'two more months' and 'sixth month' in 2.2, which would imply October 432 for

the battle at Potidaea, early April 431 for the attack on Plataea, early June for the Athenian new year and late June in 431/0 for the invasion of Attica (cf. Hornblower); but there is a strong case for emending to 'four more months' and 'tenth month', and dating Potidaea June 432, Plataea early March 431, the invasion of Attica late May and the Athenian new year early July (cf. Gomme).

Since 519 Plataea, on the north slope of the mountain range separating Attica from Boeotia, and near to the roads between Boeotia and the Peloponnese, had resisted incorporation in the Boeotian federation which Thebes dominated and had been allied to Athens (Hdt. 5.39–42; date, Thuc. 3.68); the Boeotarchs were the principal officials of the federation. As often happened in Greece, Plataea had a minority party which hoped with outside support to get control of the city (NB 5.4, where the upper-class men of Leontini even choose to merge their city with Syracuse). Thucydides indicates in 3.56, 65, that the attack was made at a time of sacred truce. Here and in the later sections on Plataea (2.71–8, 3.20–4, 52–68) he gives a vivid and detailed account: the capture of Plataea did not seriously affect the course of the war; but Plataea was near to Athens so he could easily obtain information and details of ingenious devices he seems to have found interesting in their own right, and the story of this small town, caught up in the war between the great powers and not saved by its ally Athens, helped

him to make important points about the war. The story is repeated in [Dem.] 59. *Neaera* 98–106.

2.5 Here we have a rare instance of Thucydides' mentioning alternative accounts and not deciding between them (cf. Introduction, p. xxxi). Hornblower stresses that the Thebans' charge that the Plataeans were breaking an oath is a reply to the Plataeans' charge that the Thebans were breaking their oath to the Thirty Years Treaty (in A. H. Sommerstein and J. Fletcher (eds.), *Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society* (Bristol Phoenix Press, 2007), 138–47 at 144–5).

2.6 It is striking that before the war had formally begun the Athenians were able to find and arrest all the Boeotians in Attica.

2.7–17 *Final preparations and resources.* The Persians had by Greek standards unlimited resources: help from them offered the Peloponnesians the best chance of matching the wealth of Athens, and in 412–404 finally enabled them to win the war; Athens needed at least to prevent them from helping the Peloponnesians. However, although Athens more than once sent forces to the west (first in 427: 3.86), the western Greeks did not send forces to support the Peloponnesians at all until after the defeat of Athens' expedition of 415–413, and not on a large scale even then (see 8.26).

2.8 This repeats the theme of the greatness of the war from 1.1–23. Except in 447–446 there had not been much fighting in

mainland Greece since 454 (see 1.112–17). For the suggestion, uncharacteristic of Thucydides, that oracles and natural phenomena might be meaningful, cf. 1.23 and see Introduction, pp. xlv–xlv; he has overlooked an earlier earthquake on Delos mentioned by Hdt. 6.98. The enthusiasm for Sparta's intention to liberate Greece suggests that in 431 Thucydides' 'real reason' for the war was not 'unacknowledged' (cf. 1.23): the narrative as a whole does not confirm that Athens was so widely hated, but the claim fits such passages as the Athenian speech in 1.75–8 and Sparta's ultimatum in 1.139.

2.11 Archidamus' speech will not have been heard by Thucydides and probably was not particularly memorable: what Thucydides supplies is consistent with his own view of Athens' unpopularity, and with the caution of Archidamus' speech in 1.79–85 and of Archidamus' actual advance.

2.12 The original model for Melesippus' solemn announcement is Hom., *Od.* 8.81.

2.13 It is not clear how easily the Peloponnesians could have identified Pericles' lands and avoided damaging them. Because Thucydides was an Athenian, and because Athens believed in open government as Sparta did not (see 5.68), it is credible that Pericles made a speech of the kind summarized here and that Thucydides could then or later obtain the detailed figures. Pericles' strategy, of allowing Attica to be overrun and using the cavalry but not risking a major hoplite battle, is that

already indicated in 1.143. As in 1.96, Thucydides gives a surprisingly high figure for the tribute: the 'tribute lists' point to c.400 talents; perhaps his higher figure comes from an optimistic assessment list. Probably the 6,000 talents 'on the Acropolis' were in the treasury of Athena (an ancient commentator on Aristophanes quotes a version of this passage pointing to a regular balance of c.6,000 talents rather than a maximum of 9,700, which might be historically correct: cf. textual note); much of the wealth 'from the other sanctuaries' was now in a consolidated treasury of the Other Gods, kept with that of Athena. The siege of Potidaea cost 2,000 talents (2.70), but it is now thought that another 2,000 talents would have paid not simply for the Propylaea, the entrance building at the west end, but for the whole of the Periclean work on the Acropolis. Athens did indeed borrow from the sacred treasuries (see note to 3.19), and in the last years of the war melted down some other dedications, but the gold on Pheidias' statue of Athena was left untouched until 296/5 (*FGrH* 257a F 4, Paus. 1.25.7): at this date 40 talents of gold were worth 560 talents of silver. As for soldiers, the 'youngest' were those aged 18–19 and the 'oldest' perhaps those aged 40–59; the total number of adult male citizens may have approached 60,000; there were at least 3,000 metics, foreign residents, able to fight as hoplites (cf. 2.31).

2.14–16 It is not clear how thorough the evacuation of Attica was, or how many of those who left their rural homes stayed away after the invaders had left. Classical Attica was divided into 139 demes, local political units; but it now appears that the countryside was largely deserted during the dark age of which Thucydides was unaware (see note to 1.2–19), and resettled during the archaic period. The legendary early kings, from Cecrops to Theseus, were traditionally dated before the Trojan War, and by the late fifth century Theseus had come to be regarded as a harbinger of democracy (e.g. Eur., *Supp.*): as in 1.1–23 Thucydides accepts the legends but interprets them in a rationalist spirit; and as there he cites evidence to support his beliefs about the past. The temples which he mentions were to the south-east of the Acropolis; there was also early occupation north and north-west of the Acropolis (including the area of the classical Agora). There is a fountain in Thucydides' south-eastern area, but the only fountain dated archaeologically to the Peisistratid period is the 'south-east fountain-house' in the Agora. Inscriptions confirm that in the fifth century the Athenians regularly did call the Acropolis *polis*.

2.17 The Eleusinium was between the Acropolis and the Agora. The 'Pelargic' was probably at the north-west corner of the Acropolis—and here Thucydides has a rationalizing interpretation of an oracle, which eliminates the need for foreknowledge (cf. Introduction, p. xliv).

2.18–23 *The Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.* Oenoe is in the far north-west of Attica and not on the direct route from the Peloponnese: it is not clear (and seems not to have been clear to Archidamus' soldiers) what, apart from giving the Athenians a further chance to negotiate, was the point of this diversion. 'In the build-up to the war', more literally 'in setting the war in motion', echoes the Homeric 'set Ares in motion' (e.g. *Il.* 2.381).

2.19 The date and the formal mention of Archidamus mark the last point at which the war could be said formally to have begun. Eleusis and the Thriasian plain are in the west of Attica, the part nearest to the Isthmus of Corinth; from there the invaders did not head for Athens but went to Acharnae, in the north of the central plain. That was indeed the largest of the Athenian demes (Thucydides remembers here that he is not writing for Athenian readers only: cf. Introduction, pp. xxxix–xl).

2.20 We retain the manuscripts' 'three thousand hoplites', but it is generally agreed that, large as Acharnae was, it was not that large: see the textual note for two suggested corrections, but we cannot be sure of the right solution.

2.21 For the invasion of Pleistoanax in 446, cf. 1.114, and for his return from exile see 5.16. For the warlike reputation of the Acharnians, cf. Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, of 425.

2.22 In 431 Pericles was accused of not fighting energetically enough; in 430 he was blamed for the war (2.59). This is one of a few texts which indicate that during the Peloponnesian War

the generals had some involvement with the *prytaneis* (the standing committee of the council of five hundred) in deciding when to convene meetings of the assembly (cf. 2.59, 4.118). Phrygii (not a deme) was in the north-east of the central plain. For the alliance with the Thessalians, cf. 1.102: they did not fight for Athens again, but according to 4.78 most of the people remained pro-Athenian.

2.23 The invaders moved to the north-east of Attica and returned home via Boeotia: Oropus was lost to the Boeotians in 412/1 (8.60), so what is said of it here was written earlier and not corrected (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii).

2.24–32 *Athenian counter-measures*. The final reserve fund of 1,000 talents was used in 412—when the conditions specified here were not fulfilled, so the assembly had first to vote to override those conditions (8.15). The keeping in reserve of the 100 best triremes is more problematic: there was no immediate prospect of a naval attack on Athens, and to keep the best ships out of use seems perverse, but it is possible that this was indeed decided in 431 but not adhered to for long. Another problem concerns the naval campaigns of 431 and 430: they involved large numbers of ships and men and cost large sums of money, but Thucydides writes of them in a disjointed (for 431: 2.17, 23, 25, 30) and low-key manner as if they were unimportant. Various explanations have been suggested: it may be that Thucydides reflects Pericles' cautious public pronouncements

but privately Pericles hoped that demonstrations of invulnerability would lead the Peloponnesians to acknowledge that Athens could not be defeated.

2.25 For Corcyra's link with Athens, cf. 1.24–55; in this chapter we have the first appearance of Brasidas, the most energetic Spartan commander in the Archidamian War.

2.26 Locris without further specification is northern, 'Opuntian' Locris, east of Thermopylae and facing the northern part of Euboea.

2.27 For Aegina's hostility to Athens, cf. the brief mentions in 1.67, 139, 140; for the Helot Revolt, cf. 1.101–3 and for Athens' conquest of Aegina, cf. 1.105, 108. Pericles is said to have called Aegina the eyesore of the Peiraeus (Arist., *Rh.* 3. 1411A). Thyrea was on the east coast of the Peloponnese: the Athenians attacked and destroyed the settlement in 424 (4.56–7).

2.28 A lunar eclipse is reported as a natural phenomenon without ulterior significance (cf. Introduction, p. xlv): the natural explanation was accepted by Pericles (Plut., *Per.* 35) and was attributed to his friend Anaxagoras of Miletus (Plut., *Nic.* 23).

2.29 Thrace was an area in which Thucydides had a personal interest (see Introduction, p. xxiv). A 'consular representative' is a *proxenos*, a man who lives in his own state but acts as a collective guest-friend (*xenos*: see G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge University Press,

1987)) of another state and looks after the interests of that state and of visitors from it (notice the role of the Athenian *proxenoi* in Mytilene in 428: 3.2). For an episode in Thrace in 430, see 2.67; and on the Odrysian kingdom and a campaign in 429/8 which Athens failed to support, see 2.95–101. The digression on the legendary Tereus (who was married to Procne, daughter of the Athenian king Pandion, but raped her sister Philomela, and in revenge Procne killed her own son Itys; in the end Tereus and the two women were turned into birds, Procne into a nightingale) is uncharacteristic of Thucydides (cf. Introduction, p. xxxiii). Possibly a dramatist had connected Teres with Tereus and Thucydides could not resist the temptation to correct the error. No instance of ‘Daulian bird’ survives in Greek literature, but there are several in Latin, e.g. Catull. 65.14. Peltasts are light infantry, particularly from Thrace, named after their shield, the *pelte*.

2.30 Here, as at other points, Thucydides seems to think notes on the islands off the west coast of Greece more necessary than notes on mainland cities.

2.31 The attack on Megara, in response to the dispute mentioned in 1.67, 139, 140, 144, is the first of a series of biannual attacks which the Athenians made until in 424 a plot to betray the city to them left them in possession of the harbour town of Nisaea but not of the city (4.66–74).

2.33–46 First winter (431/0)

2.33 *A Corinthian campaign in the north-west.* This is a reaction to Athens' naval campaign of summer 431 (see in particular 2.30).

2.34–46 *The public funeral in Athens.* The earliest surviving Athenian casualty list is of men killed at Drabescus c.464 (IG i3 1144; cf. 1.100), and according to Paus. 1.29.4 that was the first public funeral, but many think Thucydides' 'traditional' should point to an earlier date. Diod. Sic. 11.33.3 dates the institution of the funeral games (not mentioned by Thucydides) and the speech to 479. If the institution was an old one, Marathon in 490 was not the only exception (Plataea in 479 was another: Hdt. 9.85.2). Casualty lists are commonly arranged by the ten tribes instituted by Cleisthenes. Public tombs were located in the outer Cerameicus, to the north-west of the walled inner city, between the Sacred Gate and the Academy.

According to Dem. 20. *Lept.* 141 the speech was an institution peculiar to Athens. We possess part or all of four other speeches, and Plato's *Menexenus* contains a parody of this speech, purporting to be by Pericles' mistress Aspasia. For studies of Athenian funeral speeches, see J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (New York: Arno, 1981); N. Loraux trans. A. Sheridan, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Harvard University Press, 1986): there tends to be a standard pattern, but this speech is unusual in concentrating on the way of life of contemporary Athens rather than on the glorious achievements of previous generations.

Pericles had made the speech at least once before, for the dead of the Samian war of 440–439 (Plut., *Per.* 8, 28, cf. 1.115–17); his remark that the spring had been taken out of the year (Arist., *Rh.*, 1.1365A, 3.1411A) is perhaps from that speech. It should not be doubted that Pericles made the speech on this occasion; Thucydides probably heard the speech, and it is entirely possible that he reports its main lines correctly. In fact the Athenians who died in this first year of the war will not have been very numerous and will not have died very gloriously, but Pericles/Thucydides uses this speech to expound an Athenian ideal (and there is no balancing speech to expound a Spartan ideal).

2.36 That ‘the same race has always occupied’ Attica was regularly claimed: cf. 1.2, 2.14–16. Pericles was born in the 490s; the Delian League was founded in the 470s by men of his father’s generation, and he was a leading figure in Athens from the 450s onwards. Mention of a topic which one says one will pass over is a common rhetorical device.

2.37 The discussion of democracy is the first of a number of explicit or implicit contrasts between Athens and Sparta. By the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 Athens became self-consciously democratic (the word *demokratia* may have been coined in that context), and within ten years it could respond to provocation by imposing democracy on a member state of the Delian League (Erythrae, late 450s: ML 40, translated Fornara 71). In fact in fifth-century Athens most civilian appointments were

made by allotment, i.e. by 'rotation', and while there were stipends for offices members of the lowest property class were not eligible for appointment. Rusten notes the contradiction between the 'open and free' Athenians and the 'obedient' Athenians. The Spartans' way of life encouraged supervision of one another and uniformity; but Sparta and all Greek states would claim to live under the rule of law, which they saw as a guarantee of freedom rather than an obstacle to it (cf. 1.84, Hdt. 7.104). Athens probably had more personal freedom than many states, certainly than Sparta, but the ostentatious lifestyle of Alcibiades was to give offence (cf. 6.28).

2.38 For Athens' large number of festivals—represented here as occasions for relaxation rather than worship of the gods—and (thanks to its control of the sea) ability to import foreign goods, cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.9, 3.2; 2.7, 11–12, Isoc. 4. *Paneg.* 42.

2.39 Expulsion of foreigners was a Spartan practice (cf. 1.144), and the training system for young Spartans was notorious; there must have been training opportunities for Athenian soldiers, but we have little evidence before the introduction of a programme for 18- and 19-year-olds in the 330s (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 42).

2.40 'Beauty without extravagance, and intellect without loss of vigour' perhaps contrasts Athens both with austere Sparta and with luxurious Persia (L. Kallet, in K. A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular*

Tyranny (University of Texas Press, 2003), 131–4). Athens' political machinery required, and clearly obtained, large-scale participation in public affairs by the citizens, but there were some 'quiet Athenians' (L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford University Press, 1986)). For public discussion of policy, see 2.60, 3.37–8, 42–3. The rejection of self-interest seems to be undermined even here, and other Thucydidean speeches including that of Pericles in 2.60–4 suggest that the Athenians pursued their interests realistically and unashamedly.

2.41 The theme of Athens as an education to Greece was taken up in the fourth century by Isocrates (4. *Paneg.* 47–50). For Thucydides' attitude to Homer, cf. 1.10, 21; in 1.10 he says that Athens' buildings would suggest even greater power than it actually had.

2.43 Here the speech turns from praise for the dead and their city to exhortation to the survivors. It is a common theme in Greek literature that happiness and prosperity are not lasting, and the best life ends at a high point before they are lost (cf. the lesson attributed to Solon in Hdt., 1.29–33).

2.44–5 The message to the bereaved seems bleak to modern readers, and since Pericles was regarded as aloof (cf. Plut., *Per.* 5, 7) ancient readers may have reacted similarly. A good citizen was expected to have a stake in the city by owning land in its territory and producing children to ensure its continuing existence; many bereaved parents may have had other sons still

living, but it is unlikely that many could have expected to have further children. Athenian women were excluded from public, except religious, life, which may have seemed normal rather than oppressive; respectable women were commonly referred to as a man's daughter or wife rather than by their own name.

2.46 State maintenance for war orphans is attributed to Solon by Diog. Laert. 1.55, but according to Arist., *Pol.* 2.1268 B Hippodamus claimed to be creating something novel when he instituted this in Miletus in the fifth century.

2.47–68 Second summer (430)

2.47–54 *The plague in Athens.* Thucydides' account of Athenian ideals in Pericles' funeral speech is followed by his account of the suffering and demoralization of the plague. His account is detailed and overtly matter-of-fact, but that is not inconsistent with his using it to make a point. Apart from that contrast, as in the whole of his history (cf. 1.22) Thucydides seeks to be useful; and perhaps here as elsewhere he wants to show that he can give a better account than others. He uses medical terms, though not the most obscure and technical terms, and without the existence of contemporary medical works it would probably not have occurred to him to give so detailed an account of a disease. (There was a plague in the story of the Trojan War, but that receives only a brief mention in the *Iliad*: 1.43–61.)

2.48 The overcrowding of Athens during the Peloponnesian invasions will have hastened the spread of the disease (Diod. Sic. 12.45.2) and have worsened the suffering of those who caught it (cf. 2.52). Importation from abroad recalls Athens' boasted ability to import goods of all kinds (2.38). Diod. Sic. 12.58.3–5 blames stagnant water and inferior crops after a wet winter, and the failure in 430 of the 'etesian' winds which normally blow from the north-west in the summer: we cannot tell whether this is authentic memory omitted by Thucydides or later speculation. Many attempts have been and continue to be made to identify the disease; but there are good grounds for thinking that after nearly 2,500 years it is likely to be either extinct or so changed that it cannot be equated with any present-day disease on the basis of the symptoms reported here (A. J. Holladay, ed. A. J. Podlecki, *Athens in the Fifth Century and Other Studies in Greek History* (Chicago: Ares, 2002), 123–65; these chapters by Holladay and J. F. c. Poole).

Pious and impious perished alike (2.47, 53), but there was a feeling that the gods needed to be appeased: it may be in response to the plague that a sanctuary of Heracles *Alexikakos* (averted of evil) was established in the city, Delos was 'purified' in 426/5 (3.104), and in 420/19 (after the Peace of Nicias) the cult of the healing god Asclepius was brought to Athens from Epidaurus.

2.53 Thucydides believed in morality if not in religion, and here he blames the plague for a decline in standards in Athens (but it is

clear from 2.51 that some Athenians behaved unselfishly); the late fifth century was also a time when the sophists were challenging all the traditional beliefs, including the existence of gods and of absolute standards of conduct (cf. Introduction, p. xliii).

2.54 Thucydides gives a rationalizing account of a traditional verse: *loimos* and *limos* are first found together in Hes., *Op.* 243; in modern Greek they would be pronounced alike, but they were not in antiquity. For the oracle, cf. 1.118.

We learn from 3.87 that the plague originally lasted for two years and returned in 427/6, and that it killed about a third of the field army (and presumably at least that proportion of the total population): cf. 2.58, where 1,050 out of 4,000 men taken to Potidaea succumbed. There is an account by the Roman poet Lucretius, 6.1090–1286, which is based on Thucydides but has both omissions and additions.

2.55–8 *The summer's campaigns (i)*. This year's Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (2.55, 57) was the longest-lasting (the shortest was in 425: 4.6) and (cf. 3.26) the most damaging. We cannot tell how thorough it was, but probably it did considerable short-term but little long-term damage to Athenian agriculture (cf. V. D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (University of California Press,²1998)); although Laureium (in the south-east of Attica) and the mines are mentioned, the working of the silver mines does not seem

to have been brought to a halt in the 420s (contrast the more serious effects of the Spartans' year-round occupation of Deceleia, from 413: 7.27–8).

2.56 The Athenian naval expedition was as large as but is dealt with as perfunctorily as that of 431 (cf. on 2.24–32): all the places mentioned, apart from Prasiae, were in the Argolid, and Pericles may have hoped to put pressure on Argos to abandon its neutrality (see note to 1.68–71) and join Athens. For Potidaea (2.58), cf. 1.56–66, 2.67, 70; For Hagnon, see note to 1.115–17; Phormio's force (cf. 1.65) is mentioned here to make it clear that it was not among the men exposed to the plague.

2.59–65 *Pericles under attack*. Whereas in 431 Pericles was considered insufficiently belligerent (2.21–2), in 430 he was blamed for the war and the Athenians tried to make peace with Sparta. Sparta may have hoped to continue the war until Athens surrendered unconditionally, but 2.65 suggests that the Athenians withdrew from the negotiations after Pericles had persuaded them to fight on. For Pericles and meetings of the assembly, see note to 2.22.

2.60–4 In this, his last speech in Thucydides, Pericles emphasizes the people's responsibility for decisions taken in the assembly (2.60, 61, 64; cf. Thucydides' comment in 8.1).

2.60 Pericles' account of his own merits is in familiar terms but shocks modern readers when attributed to himself, yet it may reflect what he actually said: for his intellectual qualities, cf.

2.65, and 1.138 (Themistocles), 8.68 (Antiphon), also 2.15, 34; on his patriotism, cf. Alcibiades on his own defection to Sparta (6.92); with his incorruptibility contrast what is said of his successors in 2.65 and of Alcibiades in 6.12, 15.

2.61 For the claim that Pericles is unchanging, cf. 1.86 (the Spartans according to Sthenelaïdas), 1.140 (Pericles), 3.38 (Cleon).

2.62 For the benefits of Athens' sea power, cf. the 'Old Oligarch', [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.5, 11–12; for the empire as the creation of Pericles' father's generation, cf. 2.36.

2.63 The contrast between freedom to rule over others and the 'slavery' of subjection to others is widespread: in Thucydides, 1.76, 3.45, 5.69, 6.18, 87, 7.75, 8.64. Athens enjoyed that highest kind of freedom for most of the time between 478 and 338. On the empire as a tyranny, cf. 1.122, 124 (Corinthians), 3.37 (Cleon); that the Athenians were wrong to acquire the empire is not suggested by Athenian speakers elsewhere and was probably not meant to be taken seriously here. On the 'disengaged', cf. 2.40, 6.18.

2.64 'Blows from the gods' is a conventional expression, not a serious suggestion that misfortunes such as the plague ('which could not have been foreseen') were sent by the gods. For the hatred incurred by Athens as a ruling power, cf. 1.76.

2.65 On the sufferings of the poor and rich, contrast [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.14, claiming that only the rich suffered; but Thucydides is more likely to be right. For his view of the volatility of crowds, cf. 4.28, 6.63. Probably Pericles was deposed from office (Diod. Sic. 12.45.4, Plut., *Per.* 35), put on trial and fined, but re-elected either for the end of 430/29 or normally for 429/8. (This should be distinguished from the trial of Plut., *Per.* 32, which occurred c.437.) He died c. September 429—weakened by the plague but not immediately killed by it (Plut., *Per.* 38). For his strategy, cf. 2.13: departures from it after his death included the major hoplite battles at Delium in 424/3 (unplanned: 4.89–101) and at Mantinea in 418 (5.65–75); the episode at Pylos and the rejection of a Spartan peace offer in 425 (4.2–41); and especially the campaigns in Sicily in 427–424 (passages between 3.86 and 4.65), 422 (5.4–5), and 415–413 (6–7). However, it can be maintained that Pericles' was a strategy for avoiding defeat rather than achieving victory, and things were done later which were or could have been beneficial, such as the occupation of Pylos in 425 and of Cythera in 424 (4.53–7); the campaigns (not in fact successful) against Megara in 424 (4.66–74) and Boeotia in 424/3; the alliance with Argos and other Peloponnesians in 420 (5.40–8).

'The domination of the leading man' represents wishful thinking by Thucydides: Athens' institutions did not allow any one man to achieve overwhelming power (cf. Rhodes, in P. Flensted-Jensen *et*

al. (eds.), *Polis and Politics* . . . *M. H. Hansen* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 465–77), and Pericles was not without opponents either before or after the outbreak of the war. Fourth-century writers could see Pericles either as the last of the good old politicians or as the first of the inferior new; in fact, leaders after Pericles were still rich but mostly no longer from the old aristocracy, and, whereas men such as Cimon and Pericles were both political and military leaders, a divide opened afterwards between political leaders such as Cleon and military leaders such as Demosthenes.

What is said here of the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 is hard to reconcile with the account in Books 6–7 and cannot have been thought at the same time; the end of 2.65 in its present form cannot have been written until after the end of the war (see Introduction, pp. xxvii–xxviii). In Books 6–7 failure seems to be due to ‘mistaken choice of enemy’ compounded by errors made on the spot; the ‘personal accusations’ mentioned here are presumably those which led to the exile of Alcibiades (6.27–9, 53, 60–1). ‘Civil strife at home’ began with the revolutions of 411 (8.63–98). ‘Eight’ years is Shilleto’s suggestion for the manuscripts’ ‘three’, and should denote the Thucydidean years 412/1–405/4, followed by surrender in the ninth year, 404/3. The Sicilians did not send much help to Sparta; on the whole, Athens regained the Aegean islands and the Hellespont region but was less successful on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor; Persia began supporting Sparta in 412 (8.5), and did so more effectively after Cyrus was sent to the Aegean in 407 (Xen.,

Hell. 1.3.8–14, 4.1–7). The final ‘internal disputes’ perhaps refers particularly to Athens’ ongoing problems with Alcibiades; also, after Athens’ defeat at Aegospotami in 405 the demagogue Cleophon wanted to continue fighting but the oligarch Theramenes eventually negotiated peace with Sparta.

With this premature obituary notice Pericles disappears from Thucydides’ history, apart from one cross reference in 6.31.

2.66–8 *The summer’s campaigns (ii)*. The force which attacked Zacynthus was the largest Peloponnesian naval force attested during the Archidamian War. The Spartan admiral (*nauarchos*) was probably at this time appointed for an expedition rather than for a set term, but c.409 Sparta changed to an annual office beginning in the spring.

2.67 The embassy to Persia is the first mentioned after Thucydides recorded in 2.7 that both sides intended to make approaches to Persia: the Corinthian Aristeus was the supporter of Potidaea in 432 (1.60–5); Hdt. 7.133–7 reports this episode in connection with the fathers of the first two of the Spartans; Pollis of Argos, presumably a friend of Sparta, went in a private capacity because Argos was at this time neutral. Pharnaces was satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in north-western Asia Minor.

2.68 This chapter deals with places around the Gulf of Ambracia, in northwestern Greece: Ambracia, a Corinthian colony, was to the north of the Gulf and Argos to the east. As on other matters of early history Thucydides accepts the legendary account, yet

supposes that Argos, colonized by Greeks, had to learn Greek from Ambracia: more probably, in fact, Argos was barbarian by origin but the names of Argos and Amphilochia had led to a false link with the story of Amphilochus. Phormio's expedition was presumably a few years before the Peloponnesian War, and was the cause of the close ties between him and the Acarnanians (cf. 3.7). The participants in the Peloponnesian War were not involved in the episode in this chapter, but they were to be involved in later episodes (see 2.80–2 for the next).

2.69–70 Second winter (430/29)

Athenian campaigns and the capitulation of Potidaea. For Naupactus, where Athens had settled Messenian refugees in the 450s after the Third Messenian War, see 1.103. Caria is at the south-western corner of Asia Minor and Lycia to the east of it: some cities here were members of the Delian League but seem not to have paid tribute regularly, and here as in 3.19 and 4.50 Thucydides is probably referring to special levies rather than the regular collection of tribute.

2.70 The story of Potidaea is continued from 2.58: for the cost of the siege, cf. 2.13 (without a figure); the possessions which the inhabitants could not take became booty for the Athenians. Although the Athenians 'found fault with the generals', they seem not to have deposed or punished them (cf. 2.79).

2.71–92 Third summer (429)

- 2.71–8** *The siege of Plataea (i).* For what preceded this siege, see 2.2–6. Two possible motives for the Peloponnesians' attacking Plataea rather than Athens are to avoid the plague in Athens and to please the Boeotians. For undertakings entered into in 479, cf. 3.58; the festival and games of the hellenistic period (Diod. Sic. 11.29, Plut., *Arist.* 21) are not attested in the classical.
- 2.73** The Athenian promise of support was inconsistent with Pericles' strategy (cf. 2.13), and apart from the garrison of 2.6 no help was sent.
- 2.74** For Archidamus' calling on the local gods and heroes, cf. Brasidas at Acanthus (4.87).
- 2.75** 'Seventeen' days is one possible correction of the manuscripts' 'seventy', which is certainly wrong.
- 2.76–7** The 'siege-engines' (2.76) were battering-rams, the most advanced kind of siege machinery available in the fifth century, and circumvallation (2.77) was at this time the normal form taken by a siege.
- 2.78** The 'rising of Arcturus' before the sun was c.20 September. The story is continued in 3.20–4, 52–68.
- 2.79** *An Athenian campaign in the north-east.* Potidaea had surrendered (2.70), but the Chalcidians based on Olynthus remained hostile to Athens. Xenophon's colleagues were presumably those named in 2.70. Thucydides uses the

campaigns of this summer to make particular points: this chapter shows the Athenian hoplites defeated by cavalry and light infantry.

2.80–2 *A Spartan campaign in the north-west.* This is a sequel to 2.66, 68, and shows the Peloponnesians let down by the indiscipline of their barbarian allies. Of those listed in 2.80, the Thesprotians and Molossians were in fact Greek-speaking. Perdiccas of Macedonia, ‘concealing [his involvement] from the Athenians’, had gone over to the Athenian side in 431 (2.29).

2.83–92 *Naval battles in the Gulf of Corinth.* This episode demonstrates the overwhelming superiority of the Athenians at sea. Naupactus, and Rhium and Antirrhium (as the Molycrian Rhium of 2.86 is often called), were on a long narrow stretch of water, and Phormio with a smaller but more expert fleet wanted to attack in the open water of the Gulf of Patrae to the west of that; the part to the east is called the Gulf of Crisa (cf. 1.107). See the remarks on tactics attributed to Phormio in 2.89.

2.84 For the Peloponnesians’ tactics, cf. the less skilled Greeks against the more skilled Persians at Artemisium in 480 (Hdt. 8.10–11, 16): their best ships were wasted inside the circle, and the Athenians forced them to contract their circle and fall into confusion. (It appears that Magellanic penguins use similar tactics to catch fish: *The Times*, 26 October 2006, 35.)

2.85 The Spartans were given to appointing advisers to commanders who failed to come up to scratch. To present-day readers it is amazing that the Athenian reinforcements urgently needed by Phormio were sent via Crete, not involved in the Peloponnesian War and indeed not greatly involved in the main stream of Greek history in the classical period: it has been suggested that the Athenians hoped to interfere with ships travelling between north Africa and the Peloponnese; it is hard to decide whether Thucydides' low-key remarks here and in 2.92 are intended to imply disapproval.

2.87, 89 Thucydides is unlikely to have known what the commanders actually said, and these speeches will represent what he judged appropriate (cf. Introduction, p. xxxv–xxxvi). For Phormio to risk the second battle, against a fleet nearly four times the size of his, was very daring: it was a risk which he need not have taken, and although he was in the end victorious he could easily not have been.

2.90 The Messenians must have marched out from Naupactus to support Phormio's fleet as the Peloponnesian fleet had an army to support it (cf. 2.86). The open water of this chapter is the middle of the narrow channel, not the much more open water to the west and east.

2.91 The 'sudden and surprising feat' by which the Athenians turned defeat into victory exemplifies the characteristics attributed to them by the Corinthians in 1.70.

2.93–103 Third winter (429/8)

2.93–4 *The Peloponnesian fleet.* The proposal to attack the Peiraeus is attributed to the Megarians, but will have appealed to the energetic Brasidas. The Athenians were not expecting an attack, had taken no precautions, and had ‘no fleet on guard there’ (but must have had many ships in the harbour); since the Peloponnesians had to walk to Nisaea, Megara’s harbour on the Saronic Gulf, there were presumably no ships available at Cenchreae, Corinth’s harbour. This is one of the texts which prove that a trireme had as many oars as oarsmen.

2.94 The promontory named as Boudorum was probably the more northerly of the two embracing the mainland promontory south-east of Megara. Thucydides is scornful of the Peloponnesians’ excuse for abandoning their original plan. Normally it was being kept in the water for a long time that was bad for ships (cf. 7.12; also Hdt. 7.59, Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.10); but when they had dried out they needed to be recoated with pitch (cf. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 277–8), and since the Peloponnesian ships were launched at short notice that had presumably not been done.

2.95–101 *A campaign by Sitalces, the Odrysian.* For Sitalces, cf. 2.29, 67; we are not told what promise Perdiccas had made to him. Athens had supported Philip against Perdiccas c.433/2 (1.57). The peoples enlisted by Sitalces lived in an area bounded by the Black Sea in the east, the Aegean in the south, the longitude of

Chalcidice in the west, and the Danube in the north; for the account of the kingdom in terms of journey times, see Hdt. 4.86, 101. Four hundred talents of silver is comparable to the amount of tribute which Athens collected from the Delian League before the war (see note to 2.13). Gifts were of course both given and taken both in Thrace and in Persia, but the Persian Kings received so much more revenue than they needed that they were accustomed to reward their favourites with lavish gifts (e.g. Xen., *Cyr.* 8.2.7–10). According to Hdt. 5.3, the Thracians were the largest nation after the Indians, and would be the strongest if united; the Persian empire, outside Thucydides' geographical limits, was stronger than Thrace but was a collection of many nations.

2.98 Sitalces' route began well to the north, after which he entered Macedonia by travelling southwards through the Axios valley to the Thermaic Gulf.

2.99 Lower Macedonia was the land around the Thermaic Gulf, and Upper Macedonia the hill country surrounding it to the south, west, and north. For the legendary account of the royal family's origin, see Hdt. 8.137–9, cf. 9.45: classical Greeks accepted the Argeads' claim to derive from the Temenid branch of the descendants of Heracles, in Peloponnesian Argos (cf. 5.80); it may in fact be true, as stated by App., *Syr.* 333, that they were from the Argos in Orestis, west of the Thermaic Gulf near the modern Kastoria. Alexander I was king

in the early fifth century, nominally subject to Persia and used as a go-between in the Persian Wars.

2.100 Archelaus succeeded Perdiccas as king, and attracted a circle of artists and writers, including the tragedian Euripide

2.101 The failure of the Athenians to support Sitalces is surprising: since becoming an Athenian ally in 431 (2.29) he had done nothing for them except allow them to capture the Peloponnesian envoys bound for Persia (2.67), but the Athenians can hardly have failed to hear of the movement of his large army. The great campaign achieved little, and is barely relevant to the Peloponnesian War, but it gave Thucydides the opportunity to give an account, in the Herodotean manner, of a region with which he had a particular connection (cf. Introduction, pp. xxiv, xxxix).

2.102–3 *Phormio in Acarnania*. Astacus must have expelled the tyrant Evarchus, expelled by Athens earlier but reinstated by Corinth (2.30, 33). Athens' 'hoplites from the ships' were the *epibatai*, of whom normally each trireme carried ten. Pericles had failed to take Oeniadae in the 450s (1.111). The geographical phenomenon will not have been directly familiar to readers in most parts of the Greek world, but it is mentioned also by Hdt. 2.10—and even today not all of the islands have been joined to the mainland. Thucydides then switches from physical geography to legend, which he accepts in his usual manner. Amphiaraus was one of the Seven Against Thebes,

attacking one of Oedipus' sons on behalf of another, and he ordered his children to avenge his death on his wife Eriphyle, who had forced him to take part in the campaign; Amphilochoi (2.68) was Alcmeon's brother.

2.103 Phormio after returning to Athens plays no further part in the narrative, and in 3.7 his son is sent to succeed him. Stories of his being fined but having the fine paid for him (Androt. *FGrH* 324 F 8, cf. Paus. 1.23.10) seem to belong to an earlier occasion; probably he simply died, and Thucydides omitted to mention that either here or in 3.7.

BOOK THREE

3.1–18 Fourth summer (428)

3.1 *Peloponnesian invasion of Attica*. The corn was 'growing ripe' about late May. For the Athenians' response with cavalry, cf. 2.19, 22. The Peloponnesians' staying 'for as long as they had provisions' indicates a shorter period than the forty days of 430 (2.57).

3.2–6 *Revolt of Mytilene (i)*. By the device of ring composition the account of the revolt's origin is begun and ended with similar words, 'obliged to make their revolt earlier than they had intended' (3.2), 'obliged to go to war at short notice' (3.4). The Lesbians, like the Boeotians, belonged to the Aeolian strand of the Greek people. The other cities of Lesbos, apart from

Methymna, were Pyrrha, Eresus, and Antissa (cf. 3.18); and the Lesbians were among the few members of the Delian League still not paying tribute but providing ships (see note to 1.19). For consular representatives (*proxenoi*), see note to 2.29; for political union (*synoikismos*) see note to 1.5.

3.3 The forty ships were presumably intended as replacements for those brought back by Phormio (2.103; cf. 3.7). Cleïppides was the father of Cleophon, a prominent demagogue in the last years of the Peloponnesian War. The great panhellenic festivals were protected by sacred truces, but local festivals were often seen by attackers as opportunities rather than impediments (cf. 3.56). It is not clear how Mytilene's obligation to Athens was formulated (Chios and Lesbos together supplied fifty ships for the naval campaign of 430: 2.56), nor whether the crews were kept under arrest merely long enough to hold back the news of Cleïppides' expedition or until the end of the revolt.

3.4 Malea is the peninsula at the south-east corner of Lesbos, but Thucydides clearly wrote and meant 'north', and has probably misapplied the name

3.5 Imbros and Lemnos are islands in the north Aegean which were acquired and settled by the Athenians early in the fifth century. 'From Laconia' is used by Thucydides only here and in 8.55: perhaps Meleas was not an ordinary Spartan citizen but had some special status.

3.7 *Asopius in the north-west.* For Oeniadae and for the disappearance of Asopius' father Phormio from Thucydides' history, see note to 2.103

3.8–18 *Revolt of Mytilene (ii).* The Olympic festival was held at the second full moon after the summer solstice, in 428 on 14 August. Olympia was in the Spartan orbit, and the festival provided an appropriate occasion to publicize Mytilene's need for help, but Mytilene's envoys should have reached Sparta, and Sparta should have been able to summon a meeting of the Peloponnesian League, well before that. Dorieus of Rhodes came from a family of athletes (Pindar, *Olympian* 7 was written for his father), and was victor in the pancratium (all-in wrestling) in 432, 428, and 424 (there is an inscription recording his victories, *SIG*³ 82). Thucydides' primary purpose in mentioning him is to identify the festival (cf. 5.49); but later, perhaps under the influence of Hippias of Elis, it became normal to use the winner of the stadium (foot-race). The single *polis* of Rhodes was not founded until 408/7, and in the official list of victors Dorieus will have been attributed to Ialysus.

3.9–14 The Mytilenaeans' speech concentrates on their justification for revolt, and that moral argument is weakened by the prudential argument in 3.13 that the present is a good occasion.

3.10–11 The parallel between the individual and the state is widespread in Greek, and reaches its culmination in the discussion of justice in Plato's *Republic*. For Sparta's

withdrawing from the Persian War and Athens' staying on, see 1.89, 94–5; the purpose of freeing the Greeks from the Persians is conspicuously absent from 1.96. For the Athenians' originally leading 'on an equal basis', cf. 1.97, 99; for their later 'relaxing their hostility to the Persians', with or without a formal treaty, see note to 1.111–12, and for their 'advancing the enslavement of their allies', cf. 1.99. 'Multiplicity of votes' (3.10) and 'equal voting partners' (3.11) probably point to a structure in which each member including Athens had one vote in the council—but after the moving of the treasury to Athens in 454/3 meetings of the council seem to have been discontinued (see note to 1.96–7). It is not true that the weaker allies were attacked first: Naxos (1.98) and Thasos (1.100–1) were among the strongest, and Naxos presumably and Thasos certainly had until they revolted provided ships.

3.13 In 'reasons and grievances' Thucydides uses the words *prophasis* and *aitia*, used separately of different kinds of explanation in 1.23, together for the same explanation. Athens has made the Greeks their own enemies, so that, paradoxically, Mytilene has to secede from the Greeks in order not to harm them but to free them (C. W. Macleod, *Collected Essays* (Oxford University Press, 1983), 91). For the plague in Athens, see 2.47–54; if the only Athenian naval squadrons currently active were those of Cleippides (3.3) and Asopius (3.7), the Athenians were far from being stretched. For Athens' dependence on the

Delian League, cf. Archidamus in 1.81, 83, Pericles in 2.13; for the argument that Mytilene's navy could end up in the possession of Athens or at the disposal of Sparta, cf. the Corcyraeans' argument in 1.36. Mytilene will indeed find itself 'in worse state than those already enslaved' (in contrast to, for example, Potidaea, 2.70). For suppliants see note to 1.24.

3.15 This was the one occasion when Sparta attempted an invasion of Attica at a time other than the spring, and it collapsed because, while the Spartans did not have to do their own farming, their allies did (cf. note to 1.141–3), and they were busy harvesting their grapes and olives (the grain harvest was earlier). For the *diolkos* across the Isthmus, see note to 1.13.

3.16 The Athenians' manning a fleet 'with metics and their own citizens from all but the two highest classes' is mentioned because normally an unknown proportion of their oarsmen were volunteers from the allied states and slaves (for slaves, see note to 7.13), and the citizens of the third out of the four property classes fought as hoplites: it must have been assumed that men who were not practised oarsmen could still do the job adequately. 'Thirty ships' is probably a piece of carelessness: the reference is to Asopius' squadron, but this raiding must have been done by the eighteen ships which he sent back to Athens (3.7). Alcidas was the Spartans' admiral (*nauarchos*: see note to 2.66–8); all that we know of him is what Thucydides

reports in Book 3, but he seems to have been a disastrous commander.

3.17 This chapter is problematic. Most of the details seem to refer not to 428 but to the beginning of the war, hence the ‘then’ inserted at the beginning of the second sentence of the translation; the hundred ships ‘guarding Attica, Euboea, and Salamis’ are not compatible with what Thucydides states elsewhere, and the drain on the Athenians’ finances is relevant to 3.19 but is not appropriate in this context. Some scholars have thought that the chapter belongs after 2.56; more probably it is correctly placed here but is the work of an interpolator.

3.18 Paches is alleged in late texts to have raped two Mytilenaeans women after killing their husbands (*Anth. Pal.* 7.614), and to have committed suicide in the law court when convicted in his *euthynai*, his examination on retirement from office (Plut., *Arist.* 26, *Nic.* 6). It is again considered noteworthy (cf. 3.16) that his hoplites rowed their own ships.

3.19–25 Fourth winter (428/7)

3.19 *Athenian financial difficulties.* Here as at Potidaea (2.13, 70) a siege was expensive, because the soldiers had to be paid for a long period. A record of borrowing by the Athenian state from its sacred treasuries (ML 72; extracts translated Fornara 134) shows that in each of the years 432/1–430/29 well over 1,000 talents were borrowed, but in 429/8 c.600 talents and after that no more than 300 talents in a year: the Athenians realized that they were using up their reserves too rapidly, cut down on expensive naval expeditions like those of 431 and 430, and took measures to increase their income. It is unclear whether Thucydides means that the property tax (*eisphora*) was now levied for the first time ever or the first time during the war or the first time to raise as much as 200 talents: the possibility of an *eisphora* is mentioned in a decree probably of 434/3 (ML 58, translated Fornara 119, B. 15–19), but it may be that none had occurred before this winter. There may have been a reassessment of the tribute in 428, but, as in 2.69 and 4.50, the ships to the allies mentioned here were sent probably for a special levy rather than as part of the regular collection of tribute. Lysicles is probably the man who was a politician and who lived with Aspasia after Pericles' death (Ar., *Eq.* 132 with schol., Plut., *Per.* 24). The Anaeans were men exiled from Samos and settled on the mainland opposite after the war of 440–439 (3.32, cf. 1.115–17).

3.20–4 *The siege of Plataea (ii): escape of Plataeans.* The story of the siege of Plataea is continued from 2.71–8. After two summers Athens had sent no help, and was not now likely to do so. In [Dem.] 59. *Neaera* 103 the men drew lots to decide which should escape.

3.21 The besiegers' walls and ditches seem to have been unparalleled in their elaboration.

3.22 Thucydides claims that the escapers had their right foot bare to get a better grip—but having both feet bare would have been better still, and he has suppressed a religious explanation, that baring one foot was part of a rite for the gods of the underworld, who were presumably being invoked to help the enterprise (P. Lévêque and P. Vidal-Naquet, in Vidal-Naquet, *The Black Hunter* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 61–88, at 64). To fool the besiegers the escapers set out northwards, towards Thebes, but then turned to the east and made their way southwards to one of the passes leading through Mount Cithaeron to Attica.

3.25 *Revolt of Mytilene (iii).* Nothing is known of Salaethus except what Thucydides tells us. His entry into Mytilene to take charge of the defence preparations prefigures Gylippus' entry into Syracuse in 414 (6.93, 7.1–2), but there is no indication that this account was written or revised after 414 with Gylippus in mind. His enterprise contrasts with the lack of enterprise of Alcidas (3.26).

3.26–86 Fifth summer (427)

3.26 *Peloponnesian invasion of Attica*. With Krüger we print ‘forty ships’ in agreement with the other passages mentioning this squadron: the OCT retains the manuscripts’ ‘forty-two’. Unlike the aborted invasion of late summer 428 (3.13, 15), this was the usual invasion by land only: it was this invasion and Alcidas’ expedition (foreshadowed in 3.16) which were ‘to embarrass the Athenians on both fronts at once’. The previous invasions had been commanded by Archidamus, and the next was to be commanded by his son and successor Agis (3.89): the use of the other royal house this year suggests that Archidamus was ill but not yet dead. For the exile of Pleistoanax, see 1.114, and for his return, see 5.16.

3.27–50 *Revolt of Mytilene (iv)*. Unless the attackers gave up or there was an act of treachery, a siege by blockade would end with the city’s being starved into surrender (cf. Plataea, 3.52). The events of 3.27 make it clear that Mytilene was ruled by an oligarchy. Scholars investigating the popularity of the Athenian empire with its subjects have argued over whether the lower classes had supported the revolt (cf. Cleon in 3.39), and refused to fight now because they were starving, or had been opposed to the revolt from the beginning (cf. Diodotus in 3.47): Thucydides’ narrative seems to support the first view.

3.28 The generals who accepted the surrender of Potidaea in 430/29 were criticized for agreeing to terms which the

assembly considered too lenient (2.70), so Paches referred this decision to Athens.

- 3.29** The Peloponnesians ‘sailing round the Peloponnese’ were to return to Cyllene, in Elis (3.69), and had probably set out from there.
- 3.30** Teutiaplus, himself from Elis, uses for ‘strength’ the word *alke*, a pun on the inappropriate name of the feeble Alcidas, who was the first Spartan commander to venture into the Aegean but was clearly not willing to risk an encounter with the Athenians.
- 3.31** Ionian exiles have not previously been mentioned; the Lesbians were presumably the crews of the two ships mentioned in 3.4–5. Pissouthnes was the Persian satrap at Sardis who had supported the Samians against Athens in 440–439 (1.115).
- 3.32** Ephesus and Chian exiles friendly to Sparta are among those named in an inscription listing contributors to a Spartan war fund, which belongs to the time of the Peloponnesian War though its exact dating is disputed (ML 67, translated Fornara 132, plus a new fragment: text and translation most easily consulted in W. T. Loomis, *The Spartan War Fund*, *Historia Einzelschriften*, 74 (1992)).
- 3.33** Clarus, the seat of an oracle, was a short distance inland from Notium, harbour town to the further-inland Colophon (3.34).

The Salaminia and the Paralus were two triremes which the Athenians used for formal state business, though they could be used as ordinary warships too (cf. 3.77).

3.34 This is one of the few places where Thucydides steps outside his chronological framework, to mention at a single point an episode which had begun in 430 but reached its climax now (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii).

3.35 When Paches sent prisoners from Tenedos to Athens, he was breaking the agreement of 3.28, unless (which is possible) he had received orders from Athens.

3.36 If the Athenians did turn down a serious possibility of saving Plataea, they were remarkably callous; but it is unlikely that the Spartans would have abandoned the siege simply to save Salaethus. Since Mytilene had surrendered unconditionally, the Athenians were entitled to treat it as severely as they wished: they are not known to have acted so severely before the Peloponnesian War, but this treatment was to become common during the war (on the Spartan side, cf. 5.83, and Alcidas in 3.32). Thucydides describes the decision as taken in a 'state of anger', and says that the next day the Athenians thought it 'a savage and excessive decision', cf. 'horrible mission' in 3.49; in the debate Cleon will reject appeals to pity (3.37, 38, 40), while Diodotus will object to decisions taken in anger (3.42, 44). 'The authorities' who were persuaded to hold

a second debate were the *prytaneis* (see note to 2.22): despite 6.14 there was probably no general rule against that.

Cleon was one of the leading figures in Athenian politics, from or before Pericles' death in 429 until his own death in 422 (5.6–12). He was one of the first politicians of a new kind, not from the old aristocracy (his father was a rich tanner), and not regularly holding office (though he was in the end to be a general), but basing his position on his ability to make persuasive speeches in the assembly and law courts. Cf. the characterization of him at 4.21 and in *Ath. Pol.* 28.3, and the picture of him given by Aristophanes (esp. *Knights*): he was ostentatiously populist, with a wild style and wild policies; he was disliked by Thucydides (for whose exile he may have been responsible: see note to 4.122) and by Aristophanes; the word 'demagogue' (*demagogos*, 'people-leader') may have been coined to refer to him and to men like him. The statement that he 'was . . . at that time . . .' must have been written or rewritten after his death (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii).

3.37–40 In his speech Cleon does not pander to the people (contr. 2.65) but stands out against them: the great demagogue criticizes democracy, and in a clever speech he criticizes clever speakers. Echoes of the Mytilenaeen speech at Olympia (3.9–14) are presumably due to Thucydides' sense of what was appropriate, but Cleon in real life may have echoed Pericles in real life as Cleon in Thucydides echoes Pericles in Thucydides.

3.37 When Cleon says, ‘your empire is a tyranny’, after Pericles had said it was ‘like a tyranny’ (2.63), it is not clear whether Thucydides intends Cleon to seem more extreme than Pericles. Thucydides comments on the assembly’s lack of ‘constancy’ in 2.65 and elsewhere. For complaints of excessive cleverness, cf. the Spartan Archidamus in 1.84; for ‘the ordinary folk’, cf. the Syracusan Athenagoras in 6.39.

3.38 ‘I remain of the same opinion’ echoes Pericles in 1.140, 2.61. The Greeks had no concept of a loyal opposition, and men often accused opponents of deliberately espousing wrong policies as a result of bribery. For the sophists, see note to 1.22: many of them claimed to teach skills needed in public life, including that of persuasive speaking, and Aristophanes’ *Clouds* caricatures the philosopher Socrates as a sophist who taught how to make the worse argument prevail.

3.39 For the ‘revenue on which our strength depends’, cf. Pericles in 2.13.

3.41 Diodotus is otherwise unknown, but there is no need to doubt that he did exist and did oppose Cleon in the debates on Mytilene.

3.42–8 In his speech Diodotus defends the principle of debate while reusing the attack on inappropriate cleverness, and he argues that even if it were deserved savage retribution would not be in Athens’ best interests.

3.43 Despite the claim that speakers could be called to account, it was a problem which Athens in the late fifth century had to address that the accounting procedures to which office-holders were subject did not apply to speakers who held no office: the *graphe paranomon*, by which speakers and their decrees could be attacked in a law court (cf. 8.67), may have been introduced about this time in an attempt to deal with the problem. For the people's responsibility for decisions, cf. Pericles in 2.60.

3.45–6 This is a remarkable passage, arguing against the death penalty on the grounds that those who are bound to be put to death have no incentive for restraint in their wrongdoing: cf. Thucydides' own comment in 2.53 on the conduct of those who expected to die from the plague. The contrast between 'human nature' (*physis*) and 'law' (*nomos*, seen as arbitrary human convention) was a favourite of the sophists: see note to 1.76. For argument from what was 'likely' (*eikos*) in the past, cf. Thucydides' reasoning in his 'archaeology' (1.2–19 with notes).

3.46 A refund of Athens' expenses had been demanded from Samos in 439 (1.117).

3.49 The Athenian assembly regularly voted by show of hands—probably without a precise count, but on this occasion, although the majority was small, the decision was presumably not challenged. It has been calculated that the voyage of about

187 nautical miles (345 km) might have taken about forty hours for the first ship and about twenty for the second.

3.50 To kill over a thousand men was still severe; it has been estimated that the adult male population of the whole of Lesbos, including non-rebellious Methymna, may have been c.22,500. For 'landlords' Thucydides uses *klerouchoi*, which as a technical term denotes men given land in a settlement outside Athens but retaining Athenian citizenship. An inscription (IG i³ 66) and a speech (Antiph. 5. *Murder of Herodes* 77) suggest that the Mytilenaeans not put to death retained ownership of their property: either Thucydides is wrong or there was a revision of the original terms not long afterwards.

3.51 *Minoa*. This low-key chapter separates two major episodes, and contains Thucydides' first mention of Nicias, who was to be prominent until his death in Sicily in 413. He came from a family whose wealth was based on the silver mines; like Cleon he was the first member of his family to have a public career, but unlike Cleon he emulated the style of the aristocratic politicians. As a military commander he had his successes, but he seems to have been more eager to avoid failure than to achieve success. For the Athenians' blockade of Megara, cf. 1.67; since autumn 431 they had been attacking Megara twice a year (2.31); in 429 the Peloponnesians had set out from Megara intending to attack the Peiraeus and had raided Salamis (2.93–

4). No island now exists which fits Thucydides' description: probably his Minoa was the present-day promontory Teicho, which projects between two promontories of Salamis, and the harbour of Nisaea was to the west of it.

3.52–68 *The siege of Plataea (iii): fall of Plataea.* Plataea like Mytilene was led to surrender by shortage of food. Places taken by force were to be returned under the Peace of Nicias in 421 (5.17), and it may be that this passage was written after 421 and Thucydides has guessed at an intention in the light of that (Hornblower). The offer made by the uncharacteristically anonymous Spartan commander will have encouraged the Plataeans to hope for more generous treatment than they eventually received. The five Spartan judges were probably one from each of the five *obes* (local units). Plataea's Spartan consul has the suitable name Lacon, and his father may be the Aeimnestus of Hdt. 9.72.

3.53–9 The Plataeans' speech cannot deny that Plataea is a staunch ally of Sparta's enemy Athens, so concentrates on Plataea's services in the past and the hostility of Thebes; as always in Thucydides, the appeal to the gods is in vain.

3.54 It was indeed the Thebans who broke the Thirty Years Treaty by attacking Plataea in 431 (cf. 2.2–6). It would have been tactless to mention Plataea's support for Athens at Marathon in 490, when the Spartans did not arrive until after the battle (Hdt. 6.108, 120); at Thermopylae in 480 not only Plataea but

also Thespieae and (allegedly unwillingly, but cf. below on the Thebans' speech) Thebes were represented (Hdt. 7.202, 222); at Artemisium but not at Salamis some Plataeans rowed in Athenian ships (Hdt. 8.1, 44); the last battle against the Persians in Greece, in 479, was fought in Plataea's territory and Plataeans took part (Hdt. 9.12–89). For the revolt of the Helots, 465/4–456/5, see 1.101–3: this is the only text to mention a Plataean contingent.

- 3.55** Sparta's rejection of Plataea occurred in 519 (cf. 3.68): Plataea, resisting Thebes' attempt to incorporate it in a Boeotian federation, appealed to king Cleomenes of Sparta, but he replied that Sparta was too far away and advised an appeal to Athens (Hdt. 6.108). Fourth-century orators report that after the fall of Plataea the surviving Plataeans were given Athenian citizenship (e.g. [Dem.] 59. *Neaera* 104–6); but Thucydides seems to be reporting an earlier grant of what came to be called *isopoliteia*, the right to exercise the privileges of citizenship when in Athens.
- 3.56** That the Theban attack in 431 was in a festival season is not denied by the Thebans in 3.65 but was not mentioned in 2.2–6. The Plataeans refer here to a 'universally accepted law', in 3.58 to 'Greek law' and in 3.59 to the 'common code of the Greeks', in 3.66 the Thebans refer to the 'legality' of killing in war but describe the killing of men who had surrendered as 'contrary to all law', and the interpolated 3.84 refers to

‘commonly accepted laws’. The Greek word *nomos* covers a range from written laws via ‘unwritten laws’ (Pericles in 2.37) to accepted conventions. There was no formal international law in the Greek world, but there were general assumptions (e.g. about the inviolability of heralds: see note to 3.72; also note to 1.41); each city had its own laws, but there was enough similarity between them for it to be possible to talk of Greek law.

3.57 For the tripod at Delphi, cf. 1.132; for the destruction of Plataea after Thermopylae, cf. Hdt. 8.50.

3.58 The alliance is that made by the Greek states which combined in 481 to resist the Persian invasion (Hdt. 7.145, cf. 7.132). For suppliants, see note to 1.24; it was widely acknowledged that the rights of those making a just supplication should be respected, but the rights of enemies who surrendered were secure only if guaranteed by the terms of surrender—if then: the Plataeans had probably broken an undertaking to the Thebans who surrendered to them in 431 (2.5, cf. the Thebans in 3.66). For the tombs of those killed in the battle of Plataea, cf. Hdt. 9.85.

3.61–7 The Thebans’ speech represents the Plataeans as hostile to their fellow Boeotians and as accomplices of Athens rather than true friends of the Greeks; Thebes’ support for Persia in 480 (in fact not certain before the Greeks’ defeat at Thermopylae, and

inevitable after that) is blamed on an unrepresentative clique ruling the city.

3.61 The tradition was that the Boeotians had arrived in their territory from Thessaly, in which case Plataea in the south may well have been one of the later sites to be occupied; Plataea is included in Boeotia in the Catalogue of Ships (Hom., *Il.* 2.494–510); we have no evidence on the relations between Plataea and the other Boeotians before 519.

3.62 Attitudes to a distant state were often conditioned by attitudes to a neighbour: according to Herodotus, Phocis did not medize because Thessaly did, Argos did not join the Greek alliance because it would not accept the leadership of Sparta (Hdt. 8.30, 7.148–52). ‘Medize’ is used frequently by Herodotus and others of collaboration with the Medes, i.e. the Persians, and the analogous ‘atticize’ will have been coined in the time of the Delian League. Probably ‘democracy’ was coined in Athens in the second quarter of the fifth century, and ‘oligarchy’ was coined to denote its opposite (though opponents of democracy tended to prefer ‘aristocracy’). *Isonomia* (‘equal rights for all’) and other compounds of *iso-* seem to have been in vogue c.500 to denote constitutional government as opposed to tyranny (for which see note to 1.13–19), and Thucydides here and in 4.78 uses *dynasteia* (‘small dominant clique’) to contrast the quasi-tyranny of a small body with a more moderate oligarchy. How a particular regime should be categorized will not always have

been self-evident; it may well be that early-fifth-century Thebes had a typical aristocratic regime, from which Thucydides' Thebans are trying to distance themselves. On Athens and Boeotia in the mid-fifth century, cf. 1.107–8, 113: it has been suggested that Tanagra was disputing Thebes' claim to the leadership of Boeotia.

3.63 The anti-Persian alliance of 481 did not include 'the whole community of Greeks': cf. above.

3.64 There is no evidence that the Plataeans joined with the Athenians against Aegina (on which cf. 1.105, 108) or any other states, but it is not unlikely. For the Spartans' final offer, cf. 2.72. There was a tendency (though not always followed) in the ancient world to believe that people's fundamental goodness or badness does not change, and that good actions by the bad are hypocritical while bad actions by the good are doubly bad because out of character.

3.65 It was all too common for members of a minority party in a state to prefer having the upper hand with outside support to not having it: cf. 2.2–6. Here it appears that the supporters of Thebes were rich and oligarchically inclined, and they wanted the Plataeans to be not 'enemies of none' but friends of Thebes and Sparta rather than of Athens. However, Plataea had been separate from the 'traditions of the whole Boeotian community' for at least ninety-three year

3.66 Thebes' allegation of 'three crimes' trumps Plataea's allegation of 'two terrible ordeals' in 3.57.

3.67 At Coroneia in 447/6 the Thebans were fighting for liberation from Athens, not necessarily for attachment to Sparta (cf. 1.113).

3.68 If the figures here and in 2.74 and 3.24 are all accurate, there are forty-two Plataeans unaccounted for: some at least will have died during the siege, but Hornblower wonders whether some now claimed to have benefited the Spartans and were spared; the women (cf. 2.78), or some of them, may already have been slaves. For Megarian exiles, cf. 4.66; the Plataean supporters of Sparta had presumably gone into exile after the episode in 431. The sanctuary of Hera was outside the city (cf. Hdt. 9.52). Some have doubted the correctness of the 'ninety-third' year, but without good reason.

3.69–85 *Civil war in Corcyra (i)*. The story of the Peloponnesian ships is resumed from 3.33; they perhaps took a southerly route, 'off Crete', to avoid the islands of the Athenian empire. Brasidas had shown himself to be an energetic commander in episodes reported in 2.29, 2.85–94. For the twelve ships at Naupactus, see 3.7 (but the twelve now include the Salaminia and Paralus, in the Aegean in 3.33).

3.70 To explain the civil war Thucydides steps outside his chronological framework (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii). Most of the Corcyraean prisoners will have been taken in the battle of

Sybota in 433 (1.55); they were probably sent back to Corcyra not long before summer 427. For the ransom, we correct the manuscripts' incredibly large 'eight hundred' talents to eighty. Athens' original alliance with Corcyra was purely defensive (1.44), but in 431 Corcyra had joined the Athenians in raiding western Greece (2.25). It cannot be confirmed that there had been a 'former friendship with the Peloponnesians' (contr. 1.31, 32, 37); but this decision for neutrality represents a victory for the anti-Athenian party. It is not clear what was distinctive about Peithias as a 'volunteer' consul. If rich men considered a fine of 1 stater (3 Corinthian drachmas) enormous, they must have taken many thousands of props over an extended period: taking them from a sanctuary was not necessarily sacrilege, but could be viewed as such by their opponents. Alcinous was king of the *Odyssey's* Phaeacians (see note to 1.25).

3.71 The declaration of neutrality here is stronger than that in 3.70. Those who had fled to Athens on the trireme of 3.70 secured the sending of the sixty ships to be mentioned in 3.80.

3.72 Envoys, unlike heralds, were not regarded as inviolable. Archaeologists on the basis of meagre remains have located the ancient city to the south of the modern town, with the harbours on either side of the Kanoni peninsula; but there is no island nearby, and Gomme argued that probably the Hyllaic harbour was where the modern, north-facing harbour

is; the acropolis the headland south-east of that; the other harbour south of the headland; and the agora near that

- 3.73** It is not clear why the slaves supported the democrats: Greek democrats were not opposed to slavery, and Hornblower suggests that the slaves simply expected the democrats to win.
- 3.74** For the involvement of the women, cf. Plataea in 431 (2.4), and for fires, cf. Plataea again (2.4, 77).
- 3.75** Nicostratus will appear as general several times until 418/7, and is probably the Nicostratus of Ar., *Vesp.* 81–4. Thucydides often refers to ‘leaders of the people’s party’, reflecting the fact that these were usually not themselves ordinary, poor men. The island is probably Vido, north of the modern harbour.
- 3.76** For mainland Sybota, cf. 1.50.
- 3.78** For the naval tactics, cf. Phormio near Naupactus in 429 (2.83–4): it is likely enough that both sides were conscious of what had happened there. Alcidas is again feeble, as when he was sent to support Mytilene (cf. 3.29–33). For Leucimme, cf. 1.30.
- 3.80** This is the first appearance of Eurymedon, who held several commands (mostly in the west: we do not know whether he had connections there) until he died at Syracuse in 413. Unlike Nicostratus in 3.75, he made no attempt to restrain the democrats.

3.81 The total width of the isthmus was 4 miles (6 km): the Corinthians are said to have dug a canal in the seventh century (Strabo 451/10.2.8), and there was a navigable channel at some later times; we do not know exactly what the situation was now. Not all democrats will have been poor, lower-class men; and Greeks who incurred large debts were usually not poor. 'Every imaginable form' of death is a favourite Thucydidean expression in such contexts: cf. 3.83, 98. Those who died in the temple of Dionysus had been left to starve—and not removed before they expired, as Pausanias was in 1.134.

3.82–3 Here Thucydides digresses from this particular episode to discuss in general terms the growing evil of civil war and the collapse of moral standards during the Peloponnesian War: cf. his comments on the Athenian plague (2.53). For his view of human nature, cf. 1.22. The word translated as 'party' is *hetaireia*, used of associations particularly of upper-class young men, which might be purely social or might have a lawful or unlawful political dimension (cf. 6.27, 8.65). The point about divine law is that invocation of the gods was a common means of reinforcing pledges. These chapters are ambiguous over cleverness: revolutionaries reached extremes of ingenuity and sought a reputation for cleverness, and simple decency was mocked (as usual in Thucydides, laughter is unkind), but those who were less intelligent and made up their minds quickly had

the better chances of survival; intellectuals do not make the most effective revolutionaries.

- 3.84** This chapter was rejected in antiquity and is rejected by most modern scholars as an interpolation: it is not blatantly un-Thucydidean, but the verdict of antiquity should be accepted.
- 3.85** The episode at the end of this chapter may have occurred later than the summer of 427 (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii). Mount Istone is probably Pantokrator, north of the city and the highest mountain in the island. Corcyra was to send fifteen ships to support Athens in 426 (3.95), and Thucydides will continue the Corcyraean narrative in 4.2, 46–8.
- 3.86** *Athens and the west (i)*. This is the first of a series of disjointed sections on Athenian involvement in the west which will continue to 424 (4.58–65); Thucydides' treatment is avowedly selective (3.90). In these sections he regularly refers to 'Sicily', though the activity which he reports was not limited to Sicily. For the interest in the west of both sides, cf. 1.36, 44 (Athens), 2.7 (Sparta). This is the first appearance of Laches, who was involved in the truce with Sparta in 423 (4.118) and the Peace of Nicias in 421 (5.19), and commanded and was killed at Mantinea in 418 (5.61, 74); Plato's dialogue *Laches* investigates the nature of courage. On the Sicilian cities named here, see 6.2–5; we cannot say how long before this point the war between Syracuse and Leontini had begun. The Leontinian deputation to Athens included the celebrated orator

Gorgias (Pl., *Hp. Mai.* 282 B, Diod. Sic. 12.53–4): the ‘old alliance’ is probably that renewed in 433/2 (see note to 1.32–6). If the Peloponnesians did import corn from the west it would reduce their need to farm their land and give them more freedom to fight, but we do not know to what extent they did. In 424 the Athenian commanders, who by then had a larger force, were punished for accepting the treaty of Gela and not conquering Sicily (4.65): some scholars have wondered whether the Athenians already entertained that ambition in 427.

3.87–8 Fifth winter (427/6)

3.87 *Plague in Athens; earthquakes.* In 413 Sparta’s occupation of Deceleia ‘did immense harm to the Athenians, and . . . was a crucial element in the city’s decline’ (7.27): probably this comment on the demoralization caused by the plague was written before then, but Thucydides could use such superlatives without a specific time reference, so that is not certain. Comparison with the figures in 2.13 indicates that the plague killed about a third of Athens’ population. The bare report of ‘the many earthquakes’ is neither related to the war nor used to display Thucydides’ rationalism. The article suggests that this was remembered as a year of unusually frequent earthquakes; for Thucydides’ temptation to believe that they might after all have some deeper significance, cf. 1.23 and Introduction, p. xlv.

3.88 *Athens and the west (ii)*. The Aeolian Islands (as they are still called) lie to the north of the eastern part of Sicily; Aeolus was the legendary ruler of the winds (e.g. Hom., *Od.* 10.1–27). Nowadays Strongyle is the most fiery island. Similar material, attributed to Antiochus of Syracuse, is found in Paus. 10.11, and Antiochus may be Thucydides' source too (cf. Introduction, p. xxix). For the Sicels, cf. 6.2. Thucydides regularly uses the Athenian/Ionian form Messene, but we follow the normal English practice of using the Dorian form Messana for this city to distinguish it from Messene/Messenia in the Peloponnese.

3.89–102 Sixth summer (426)

3.89 *Peloponnesian invasion of Attica; earthquakes*. Archidamus had died between the previous spring and now (see note to 3.26). The Spartans might have called off their invasion either through fear of physical danger or because they saw a religious significance in the earthquakes: Diod. Sic. 12.59.1 prefers the religious explanation; Thucydides uses these occurrences to link tidal waves (of the kind now known by the Japanese term *tsunami*) with earthquakes. Orobiae, a dependency of Hestiaea, was towards the north-west end of Euboea opposite Opuntian Locris (for which cf. 1.108); Peparethus is one of the islands north-east of that end of Euboea.

3.90 *Athens and the west (iii)*. This is the one point at which Thucydides states that he limits himself to recording ‘the most notable actions’. That must be true of the whole of his history; but his brief and disjointed account of Athens’ activities in the west between 427 and 424 makes us particularly aware that he cannot have recorded every incident, and here we have an independent account supplying details which he omits: a papyrus fragment from Antiochus of Syracuse or a writer following him mentions activities of Charoeades and Laches at the beginning of this summer (*PSI* xii 1283 = *FGrH* 577 F 2, col. i).

3.91 *Melos and Boeotia*. The force sent round the Peloponnese (cf. 3.94–8) introduces us to Demosthenes, Athens’ most adventurous commander in the earlier part of the war. He was sometimes unsuccessful (e.g. 3.95–8), but he learnt from his mistakes (cf. 3.107–14), and he was responsible for Athens’ spectacular success at Pylos in 425 (4.3–23, 26–41). He took reinforcements to Sicily in 413, and was captured and put to death then.

For Melos, cf. 2.9. It is said to have been founded from Sparta (5.84, cf. *Hdt.* 8.48), and it was now the only Aegean island outside the Athenian orbit; inclusion in the optimistic tribute assessment list of 425 (*ML* 69, translated Fornara 136, i. 65) does not prove that it paid. It appears among contributors to a Spartan war fund in an inscribed list whose

dating is uncertain (ML 67, translated Fornara 132: see note to 3.32). For its eventual conquest by Athens in 416, see 5.84–116.

The attack on Boeotia is the first recorded use of the full Athenian army during the war except in the attacks on Megara (2.31): in the event it achieved little, but it showed that the Athenians could defeat the Boeotians if they attacked suddenly and the Boeotians could not obtain Peloponnesian support (but contrast the Delium campaign of 424/3: 4.89–101). This is Thucydides' only mention of Hipponicus, a man from a rich and distinguished family and a later husband of Pericles' wife. Some scholars have thought that the two-pronged attack on Boeotia, and with it Demosthenes' move towards Boeotia from Naupactus (see 3.94–8, at 95), had been planned coherently in advance. However, Nicias' attack on Melos was surely intended seriously, and how long it would take could not have been predicted; Demosthenes' campaign is said to have been prompted by the Messenians at Naupactus, and it was even less certain whether and if so how quickly he could reach Boeotia. Unless Thucydides' account is seriously misleading, a fully coordinated plan does not seem credible; the most we can assume is that Demosthenes knew an attack on Boeotia was intended and thought he might arrive there in the same year.

3.92–3 *Spartan colony at Heracleia in Trachis*. The Greek text here is ‘in Trachinia’, but in the translation we have used the form which Thucydides uses elsewhere. The site was a short distance to the west of Thermopylae (and the head of the gulf has silted up considerably since Thucydides’ time); the Malians lived to the west and north of the gulf, and the Oetaeans to the south-west of them. Doris was to the south of the Oetaeans: whatever the truth behind the legendary ‘Dorian invasion’, the Dorian Greeks of the Peloponnese regarded Doris as their homeland (cf. 1.12, 107). This is the first of a number of passages in which people outside the heartland of central and southern Greece are said to be afraid of Athenian ambitions (cf. 3.113–14, 4.60–1, 63, 92, 6.76–7; and an Athenian reply, 6.82–7); Spartan hankering for power in northern Greece surfaces from time to time (cf. Leotychidas, in note to 1.89).

Consultation of Delphi before the foundation of a colony was commonplace: it is remarkable that Thucydides sees fit to mention it, and in the language used here, but the language need not imply that Thucydides himself believed in the god (cf. Introduction, p. xlv). The founders are all men with significant names, perhaps chosen partly for that reason, but Thucydides does not remark on this: Leon the lion (associated with Heracles), Alcidas (a name borne by Heracles) and

Damagon ('leader of the people'). They presumably did not stay long: other rulers are named in 5.51–2.

3.93 In Euboea the Athenians had no trouble until 411 (cf. 8.95–6), and the colony was not a success, as Thucydides steps outside his chronological framework to indicate, but it was used as a staging-post by Brasidas on his way to the Thraceward region (the text here suggests that the Spartans were thinking of such a journey when they founded Heracleia, but Thucydides may be indulging in hindsight: 4.78; cf. 5.12). For its vicissitudes, see 5.51–2, 8.3; in 395 it was captured by the Boeotians and given to the Thessalians (Diod. Sic. 14.38.4–5, 82.6–7).

3.94–8 *Campaigns in north-western Greece (i)*. Ellomenum is not otherwise attested: W. M. Murray in the *Barrington Atlas* places it on the east coast of the island, but it could have been on the mainland opposite. Leucas was attacked by Athens in 428 (3.7); Zacynthus was an ally of Athens from the beginning of the war (2.9, cf. 2.7), and Cephallenia was won over in 431 (2.7, 30). The Messenians were those at Naupactus; the Aetolians (on whose primitive nature cf. 1.5) lived inland to the north of Naupactus. It is not clear, and Thucydides perhaps did not ask himself, what is meant by 'the rest of the mainland thereabouts'. The light arms of the Aetolians (cf. Eur., *Phoen.* 133–40) were to prove effective in mountainous country against Demosthenes' hoplites. The note on the primitive nature

of the Aetolians, qualified by 'are said', is reminiscent of Herodotus.

- 3.95** For Demosthenes' intention of reaching Boeotia, see note to 3.91, above: by going inland through Aetolia he was not taking the easier route through Ozolian Locris, along the coast, from which he could continue past Amphissa to Cytinium. Phocis had been friendly to Athens in the middle of the century (1.107–8, 111–12), but was reckoned among Sparta's allies at the beginning of the war (2.9). The Corcyraeans would presumably, like the Acarnanians, have preferred to campaign against Leucas.
- 3.96** The digression on Hesiod shows Thucydides in atypically relaxed mood: for the confusion over Nemea in the Peloponnese and this sanctuary of Nemean Zeus, cf. 'the greatest festival of Zeus' in the story of Cylon, 1.126. The sanctuary was perhaps at Oeneum, on the coast; the towns captured by Demosthenes were inland from there, south of the river Daphnus (now Mornos).
- 3.97** Aegitium was to the east of Teichium, again south of the river.
- 3.98** The Athenians' archers would have run out of ammunition before the Aetolians' javelin-men. For the use of fire, cf. Sphacteria in 425 (4.29–30). The Athenian hoplites here are apparently the marines of 3.95 (for this service the Athenians sometimes used hoplites, sometimes *thetes*: 6.43, 8.24). One hundred and twenty dead was a high proportion of a body of

300, and these were the worst Athenian losses which Thucydides has reported since the beginning of the war (at Delium in 424/3 the Athenians were to lose nearly 1,000, but from a total of c.7,000: 4.101, with 4.90, 93–4); ‘in the course of this war’ probably refers to the Archidamian War, not to the Peloponnesian War as a whole. Probably Demosthenes was deposed after this defeat; but (whether or not he knew that he had been deposed) since no successor had arrived he later acted as general to save Naupactus (3.102), and the Acarnanians invited him and he agreed to command their forces (3.105–14).

3.99 *Athens and the west (iv)*. This is the shortest of Thucydides’ sections on the west. Although, as usual, he begins with a reference to Sicily, this episode took place on the ‘toe’ of Italy.

3.100–2 *Campaigns in north-western Greece (ii)*. The envoys will have been sent about the time of Demosthenes’ invasion of Aetolia, and this is possibly the occasion of an inscribed treaty between Sparta and Aetolia (ML 67 *bis*, in the 1988 reissue). The Spartan commanders are an early instance of Sparta’s using not a king but a citizen (often with other citizens as advisers) to command land forces which did not include Spartan citizens: the technical term ‘harmost’, frequent in Xenophon, is used by Thucydides only at 8.5.

3.101 Delphi was sympathetic to the Spartans (cf. 1.118). Literary writers do not always use the forms of names attested in

inscriptions, and we have retained the manuscripts' versions of the city names, but according to inscriptions 'Ipnea' should be 'Hypnia': the places are probably mentioned in order from east to west

3.102 Molycrium was west of Naupactus, at or near Antirrhium, where the gulf is at its narrowest. On failing to take Naupactus Eurylochus moved further west, to an area which was perhaps already controlled by the Achaeans of the northern Peloponnese, as it was in the early fourth century: like Demosthenes in Aetolia, he was persuaded to abandon one set of allies in order to support another, with disastrous results.

3.103–16 Sixth winter (426/5)

3.103 *Athens and the west (v)*. Inessa was an inland site south-west of Mount Aetna: for a time in the middle of the century it had been the second home of the city of Aetna founded originally at Catana by Hiero of Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 11.49, 76, 91).

3.104 *Athens' purification of Delos*. Cf. 1.8, where this figures in an argument to support Thucydides' view of early Greece. Birth and death were regarded as polluting, and to be kept away from sanctuaries (cf. Pausanias' death, 1.134). Thucydides is perhaps disparaging Athens' willingness to act in response to oracles; for the earlier purification by Peisistratus, likewise in response to oracles, cf. Hdt. 1.64. Olympia and Delphi were in

the Spartan orbit, so in attending to Delos Athens was perhaps attempting to redress the divine balance; Diod. Sic. 12.58.6–7 explains the purification as an appeasement of Apollo after the plague, but by disturbing the dead the Athenians were committing sacrilege in the name of religion. On all this, see Hornblower, who wonders whether Thucydides himself had some connection with the purification—but probably he could not have taken part both in that and in the naval side of the campaign of 3.105–14, of which he shows detailed knowledge. Rheneia is about 750 yards (700 m) from Delos: for the episode involving Polycrates, perhaps towards the end of his reign, cf. 1.13. For Athens' later attempt to go beyond this purification, see 5.1, 32. The first celebration of the new festival will have been c. February 425; probably in 417, Nicias led the Athenian delegation with a great show of magnificence (Plut., Nic. 3–4: cf. note to 6.16), but there is no good evidence linking him with the purification. Hornblower argues that the Ephesian festival is not that of Artemis but the Panionia, the Festival of All the Ionians, and suggests that that was originally held at the Panionium on Cape Mycale and moved back there in 373.

The Hymn to Apollo is one of the poems transmitted to us as the *Homeric Hymns*: a hymn to Delian Apollo (from which Thucydides quotes lines 146–50, 165–72) followed by a hymn to Pythian (i.e. Delphic) Apollo. Some ancient writers

attributed the hymn to Cynaethus of Chios, perhaps of the late sixth century (Hippostratus *FGrH* 568 F 5 = schol. Pind. *Nem.* 2.1c); the Delian part of the hymn is perhaps to be dated to the early sixth century (G. S. Kirk, in *Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, i (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 110–15); Thucydides in attributing the hymn to Homer is echoing current opinion. Thucydides' text differs at many points from that transmitted in the manuscripts of the hymn, but probably he was correctly quoting the version known to him. The last line quoted reflects the tradition that Homer was blind and was from Chios. By Ionia's 'troubles' Thucydides probably refers to the conquest of mainland Ionia first by the Lydians and then particularly by the Persians, and the Ionian Revolt against the Persians, in the sixth and the early fifth century.

3.105–14 *Campaigns in north-western Greece (iii)*. Not all the sites mentioned in these chapters have been securely identified. Map 4 shows the identifications of W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, viii (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1992), 1–78; and also, in brackets, two alternative identifications by N. G. L. Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford University Press, 1973), 471–85, with 473 fig. 21, which some scholars think more likely to be right (Hammond's Argos is a more substantial site than Pritchett's, but is c.3 miles, 4.5 km, inland). The manuscripts sometimes use the singular Olpe and sometimes the plural Olpae: we follow Pritchett in believing

that the same place is meant, and in the translation we consistently use Olpae. They sometimes use the singular Idomene and sometimes the plural Idomenae, this time for an easily intelligible reason (see note to 3.112, below), and we consistently use Idomene.

Joint assizes of the Acarnanians and Amphilochians were probably instituted after the episode in which Phormio was involved, not long before the Peloponnesian War, mentioned in 2.68. For Demosthenes' status, see note to 3.98, above. The twenty Athenian ships had perhaps been sent to replace those which he had had, which by now will have returned to Athens without him: that Demosthenes was not now an Athenian general did not prevent this force from cooperating with him.

3.106 The Peloponnesians' route will have taken them to the west of the two lakes on the eastern border of Acarnania, to Limnaea, at the south-eastern corner of the Gulf of Ambracia.

3.107 The ravine was that of the river which reaches the coast between Olpae and Metropolis. Demosthenes' ambush shows that he had learnt from his defeat at Aegitium (cf. 3.97): the sunken path will have been in the ravine. The Peloponnesians' mixed formation was probably adopted so that the better troops from the Peloponnese could stiffen the others; since the army did not include Spartan citizens (cf. 3.100), it is not clear who will have formed Eurylochus' company.

3.108 The incautious pursuit by the Ambraciots shows that they had not learnt the lesson of 429 (cf. 2.80–2); it must be not just they but the whole army who ‘made their escape . . . to Olpae’.

3.109 Macarius and Menedaius were Eurylochos’ citizen advisers (cf. 3.100), who took over the command after he had been killed. Mercenaries have not been mentioned before: they may be identical, or overlap, with the allies of 3.100.

3.111 The Greek text of the second sentence has no second element with *de* to answer a first element with *men*: the translation gives what we take to be the intended meaning, but we are not sure precisely what Thucydides’ text was.

3.112 The Greek text varies between the singular Idomene (here) and the plural Idomenae: in view of the two hills the variation is easy to understand; the larger hill is the more southerly. The ‘pass’ will have been to the west of the two hills, and the mountain route to the east. For men caught still in bed, cf. the Spartans on Sphacteria, 4.32. There was not a single Dorian dialect, but there was a family resemblance between the Dorian dialects, and Demosthenes presumably thought that the Ambraciots would take any Dorian-speakers to be Peloponnesian and friendly; in 4.3, 41, Demosthenes was to make more specific use of the dialect of the Messenians from Naupactus. For light-armed troops against hoplites, cf. the Aetolians opposing Demosthenes (3.97–8); but despite

Thucydides' 'unfamiliar country' the Ambraciots were less than 10 miles (16 km) from their own city. The Amphilochians probably were barbarian in the sense of non-Greek (see note to 2.68); but here 'barbarian' implies uncivilized. For 'few out of many', cf. 1.100, 7.86.

3.113 This vivid informal dialogue is unique in Thucydides: it provides an impressive climax to an impressive narrative, and is reminiscent of tragedy. For the superlative ('the greatest disaster'), cf. 3.98 on Aegitium; probably here as there 'this war' is the Archidamian War; cf. 7.30 on the disaster at Mycalessus in 413. On casualty figures Thucydides uniquely, and to great effect, withholds what he claims to know because it would not be believed: cf. the Behistun Inscription of the Persian King Dareius I (Brosius 44, §58). For his confidence in an unfulfilled conditional statement, cf. 2.94, on the Peloponnesians' aborted attack on the Peiraeus in 429/8.

3.114 Dedications were made about this time by 'the Messenians and Naupactus' at Olympia (*SIG*³ 80 = ML 74, translated Fornara 135) and Delphi (*SIG*³ 81 = *F. Delphes* III. iv 1 + *SEG* xix 392); for the statue at Olympia, see e.g. c. M. Robertson, *A Shorter History of Greek Art* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 126, with pl. 171. It is interesting that not even the Athenians could be sure of getting their booty home by sea; in fact not all was lost (*IG* ii² 403, 7–12 refers to repairs in the fourth century to a statue of Athena Nike dedicated after this

success). The treaty reflects distrust of a powerful Athens, and amounts to an agreement by the Acarnanians and Ambraciots to resist further intervention in their region by both Athenians and Peloponnesians: although the Athenians had had the better of the fighting, they derived no benefit from it. The Corinthian colony of Anactorium had supported the Peloponnesians (2.9, 20–2), but in 425 Athens helped the Acarnanians to capture it (4.49). The Acarnanians will support the Athenians in Boeotia in 424/3 (4.77).

3.115–16 *Athens and the west (vi)*. Himera was originally Chalcidian, i.e. Ionian (cf. 6.5), but had been resettled from Dorian Acragas (Diod. Sic. 11.49.3, cf. Hdt. 7.165). Thucydides does not explain why Laches was superseded: he appears to have been deposed and recalled to Athens (schol. Ar., *Vesp.* 240), but his ongoing career suggests that he was not put on trial or at any rate not convicted. Pythodorus was an associate of the philosophers Parmenides and Zeno, of Elea in Italy (Pl., *Prm.* 126 B, 127 A–D, etc.). The forty ships now prepared (cf. 4.2), added to the original twenty and those of Pythodorus, would make over sixty, i.e. more than the Athenians originally intended to send in 415 (6.8). Sophocles may be the man of that name who was to be one of the Thirty oligarchs ruling Athens in 404/3 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.2). The Locrians must have recaptured their fort after Laches had left (cf. 3.99).

3.116 For Thucydides' interest in volcanic activity, cf. 3.88. There is a vivid account of the previous eruption by Pind., *Pyth.* 1.21–8: it is dated 479/8 by the Parian Marble, *FGrH* 239 A 52. Thucydides' third eruption must have been earlier than that; his silence on the eruption of 396/5 (Diod. Sic. 14.59.3) does not prove that he had died or stopped working by then, though it is likely that he had done so (cf. Introduction, p. xxv).

BOOK FOUR

4.1–49 Seventh summer (425)

4.1 *Athens and the west (vii)*. The corn came 'into ear' about late April, after Thucydides' spring had begun in early March (see note to 2.1), and it was ripe about late May (see note to 3.1). Internal dissension in Rhegium has not been mentioned before.

4.2–6 *Pylos (i)*. This is an episode which Thucydides singles out for detailed and vivid treatment. It was an exciting episode; it was important for its effect on the course of the war, and would have been even more important if the Athenians had succeeded in following it up by provoking a Messenian revolt (cf. 4.41). At various points he stresses the element of chance, and we may suspect that he has over-emphasized that and played down elements of planning—because the success was due in part to Cleon, of whom he disapproved (cf. esp. 4.27–8), and because he thought the Athenians in refusing to settle with the Spartans

were in an un-Periclean way ‘grasping for more’ (4.21, 41, cf. 4.17).

Civil strife in Corcyra had been continuing since 427 (3.69–85). For Demosthenes in 426, see 3.94–8, 100–2, 105–14; now he was probably a general elect for 425/4. He must have given some indication of his plans, to influential supporters (perhaps including Cleon: see note to 4.28) if not to the assembly, to have obtained the permission mentioned here.

4.3 Laconia for Thucydides includes Messenia. The storm must have arisen by chance, but Pylos seems to have been a site which Demosthenes had in mind (though he had not been able to bring tools for fortification). He occupied the headland to the north of the island of Sphacteria (cf. Map 5); the present-day lagoon did not exist, or at any rate was too shallow for warships; the Spartans’ name Coryphasium will be used in treaties (4.118, 5.18).

4.4 ‘The troops’ should perhaps be deleted from the first sentence (it is unlikely that Demosthenes would have communicated with them through the commanders of the tribal contingents); presumably both soldiers (probably more than the usual ten per ship) and sailors took part in the fortification.

4.5 The Spartan festival was presumably not a major one, since it had not prevented the dispatch of the army to invade Attica.

As Hornblower remarks, in Thucydides men who think something can easily be done are usually mistaken.

4.6 It is not clear why the Spartans invaded Attica too early; their longest invasion, in 430, had lasted about forty days (2.57).

4.7 *An episode in the north-east.* Thucydides interrupts the account of Pylos to chronicle a campaign elsewhere of little importance. This Eïon is not the city at the mouth of the Strymon (1.98, 4.50, 102, etc.) but was somewhere to the north of the three prongs of Chalcidice. The ‘Chalcidians’ here are those who in 433 were incorporated in the *polis* of Olynthus and given land near lake Bolbe (1.58), and the Bottiaeanes also lived north of the three prongs (cf. 2.99).

4.8–23 *Pylos (ii).* For Spartan use of the isthmus of Leucas, cf. 3.81; the Spartan camp was probably to the north-east of the great bay, near the modern Gialova. Thucydides reveals casually that the Athenian fleet had not ‘pressed ahead’ (4.5) to Corcyra, but was waiting at Zacynthus, about 70 miles (115 km) from Pylos. Having sent two of his ships to summon the rest, Demosthenes now had three ships, and about 600 men.

In general, Thucydides seems well informed on the topography of this campaign, but two figures in the manuscripts’ text of 4.8 are factually wrong: the passage to the north of Sphacteria is about 110 yards (100 m) wide, but the passage to the south is twelve times as wide, and the length of Sphacteria is about 4,800 yards (4,400 m). We

believe (though not all do) that the errors are more probably due to a copyist than to Thucydides himself, and have accepted two emendations: 'eight or nine < stades> ', i.e. 'less than one mile', rather than 'eight or nine (sc. ships)' for the southern passage (implying a stade at the short end of Thucydides' range: see Appendix), and 'twenty-five' rather than 'fifteen' stades for the length of the island ('two and three-quarter miles': implying a stade in the middle of his range: this second emendation is widely accepted); cf. textual note.

The Spartans did not in fact block the entrances (cf. 4.13): we do not know the basis for Thucydides' statement that they intended to do so. The 'divisions' from which the men to go to Sphacteria were picked were the *lochoi*: according to 5.68 there were six regular *lochoi* and one of liberated Helots in 418, but it is possible that there were in fact six *morai* each of two *lochoi* (see note to 5.68), and that the 420 men represent one *enomotia* of 35 men from each of the twelve *lochoi* (A. J. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (Oxford University Press, 1969), 376–7). Helots generally accompanied the hoplites on campaign as attendants (cf. Hdt. 7.229, 9.10).

4.9 Demosthenes' ships will have been in the small bay to the south-east of the headland. The Messenians probably arrived (from Naupactus) not by chance but because Demosthenes had been in touch with them. Most of the men will have been stationed on

the east side of the fort, and Demosthenes with his squadron to the south-west; he had not expected to be outnumbered at sea, because he had not thought the Spartan ships from Corcyra would arrive before the Athenian ships.

4.10 In his speech Demosthenes is made to predict the Spartans' actions correctly. He rejects the Thucydidean and Athenian virtues of intelligence and calculation—but then (as noted by Gomme) goes on to perform the calculation.

4.11 The Spartans originally had 60 ships (4.2, 8): the other seventeen were perhaps watching for the Athenian fleet. We are not told how large their land force was (scarcely as large as the 12,000 of Diod. Sic. 12.61.2) or who commanded it. Brasidas had been an adviser to Alcidas at Corcyra in 427 (3.69), and presumably had gone to Corcyra again with this fleet: Hornblower follows up the suggestion of J. G. Howie that in Book 4 and the beginning of Book 5 Thucydides has constructed a distorted picture in order to present the *aristeia* (heroic career) of Brasidas, like the *aristeia* of a Homeric hero.

4.12 For the gangway (for disembarking) and outrigger (through which the highest-level oars were threaded) of a trireme see Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 236 ('gangplank'), 161–7, 198 fig. 56 (outrigger). On the reversal of circumstances for the land power Sparta and the sea power Athens, cf. 4.14; and there are other passages in the Pylos narrative which focus on reversal or paradox.

- 4.13** Asine was on the coast of the Messenian Gulf; Prote was about 9 miles (15 km) north-west of Pylos.
- 4.14** If the Spartan ships were in the north of the bay, using the southern as well as the narrow northern entrance will have increased the distance travelled by many of the Athenians' ships but will have enabled the whole fleet to get into the bay more quickly. For every man's thinking that his personal involvement was essential, cf. 2.8, and contrast Pericles' depiction of the Peloponnesians in 1.141.
- 4.15** The Spartans had not been overwhelmingly defeated, as suggested here and (even more) in 7.71, but the defeat may have been seized on by men who were already interested in ending the war. The 'authorities' are probably the five ephors and the *gerousia* of twenty-eight elders plus the two kings.
- 4.16** For the truce Thucydides may be quoting, or be close to, the actual words: he does not use official formulas, but we should not expect that of an agreement made not by the regular bodies but by the men in command on the spot. That the Spartans should have agreed to hand over all the warships in Laconia is a surprising concession (noted by Hornblower). The food allowance was generous: nearly 4 imp. pints (2.2 litres) of meal, and a quarter of that volume of wine (cf. Hdt. 6.57 on the allowance for Spartan kings dining at home, using the somewhat larger Spartan measure; contr. 7.87 on the much less generous allowance for the Athenians captured by

Syracuse in 413). Kneaded barley-cakes were moistened and eaten uncooked; the ‘attendants’ were Helots (cf. 4.8).

4.17–20 The Spartans in Athens are in a weak position, and can only invite the Athenians to make peace while their position is strong because they cannot count on its remaining strong indefinitely—but, as all too often when the side in a weak position offered to make peace, the side in a strong position did hope its position would remain strong indefinitely. For speaking ‘at some length’, contrast Sthenelaïdas in 1.86, and Brasidas’ ‘brief demonstration’ in 5.9.

4.18 ‘Wise men’ are men of prudence (*sophrosyne*), commonly considered a Spartan virtue. It was a major theme of Herodotus’ history that good fortune cannot be relied on to continue (e.g. Hdt. 1.30–3, on Solon’s visit to Croesus). The argument at the end of 4.18 is that, if the Athenians make peace while they are winning, they will seem both strong and intelligent, but, if they continue fighting and eventually lose, their earlier successes will seem due not to strength but to luck.

4.19 In offering peace and alliance the Spartans are offering to abandon their current allies and the cause of Greek freedom, as they will do in 421 (5.14–24). On making friends by placing others under an obligation, cf. Pericles in 2.40; ‘taking risks in defiance of judgement’ is said to be characteristic of the Athenians by the Corinthians in 1.70.

4.20 ‘Something irremediably divisive’ would be the death of the Spartans on Sphacteria (cf. 4.15, where ‘coming to grief’ renders another euphemism); after the truce has failed the Spartans will in 4.38 tell the men to do ‘nothing dishonourable’. Formally it was clear that the Peloponnesians had begun the war in 431, through the Theban attack on Plataea (2.2) and the invasion of Attica preceded by the sending of a herald (2.12), and the Spartans later acknowledged this (7.18); but in 432/1 each side accused the other of breaking the Thirty Years Treaty. When Athens and Sparta made peace and alliance in 421, the rest of the Greek world did not ‘pay [them] the greatest deference’.

4.21 The Athenians had wanted a treaty in 430 (2.59, 65); Aristophanes in his *Acharnians* of early 425 perhaps indicates that some continued to want peace. By not giving Cleon a full speech in reply, Thucydides perhaps emphasizes the Spartans’ reasonableness and Cleon’s unreasonableness; for the description of him, cf. 3.36 with note. According to Plut., *Nic.* 7, Nicias (cf. 4.27) was in favour of peace; Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 128 seems to have said that the vote had to be taken three times (but surely in the assembly, not in the council). The ‘previous settlement’ is the Thirty Years Treaty of 446/5 (1.115).

4.22 For doubts cast on the honourable intentions of a Spartan embassy, cf. Alcibiades in 420 (5.44–5): we do not know what

further concessions the Spartans might have been willing to make, but Cleon's demands included the return of places which it was not in Sparta's power to give.

4.23 It is not clear whether the 'apparently trivial infringements' of the truce were trivial only in the eyes of Sparta or this view is being endorsed by Thucydides; similarly the Athenians' 'injustice over the ships' may be the view simply of Sparta or also of Thucydides himself. Athens' 'two ships constantly sailing round' were not enough for an effective blockade, and we should expect others to have been stationed near the likely escape routes (cf. J. B. Wilson, *Pylos 425 BC* (Warminster; Aris & Phillips, 1979), 98–9). The twenty additional ships were presumably sent after the failure of the negotiations.

4.24–5 *Athens and the west (viii)*. The enmity between Locri and Rhegium is repeated from 4.1; but the invasion mentioned here is not that of 4.1, which had ended with the Locrians' withdrawal, but another. Twenty Athenian ships had gone in 427 (3.86), and Pythodorus had taken 'a few' (3.115); we do not know if more than one had returned to Athens with Laches. Even in this passage, whose main focus is elsewhere, Sphacteria is in Thucydides' Greek simply 'the island'. At its narrowest point the strait between Italy and Sicily is c.1¾ miles (2.8 km) across, but Messina and (more so) Rhegium were further south. For Scylla and Charybdis, see Hom. *Od.* 12.234–59: the identification was regularly accepted by later Greeks, but this is

the earliest surviving text to mention it; the Tyrrhenian Sea is north of the gap, and the Sicilian south (6.13 distinguishes between the Ionian Gulf, close to Italy, and the Sicilian, the open water further south); the waters are not in fact very dangerous.

4.25 ‘Night now ended the action’ is a common ending to battle narratives, but of course it may have been a common ending to battles in real life. Peloris is the headland at the extreme north-east of Sicily. The grappling-iron will have been thrown from the land (but they will be mounted on ships is 7.62, 68), and the Syracusan ships were then towed to keep them so close to the land that the enemy ships could not attack. It is not clear what the successful Syracusan manoeuvre was: ‘nose-on’ is possibly but not certainly correct. The Sicels were the native inhabitants of eastern and central Sicily (cf. 6.2): they are ‘the barbarians’ below (but by now they were hellenized). It is not made clear whether the Leontinians and others were on their way to Naxos or this was just a convenient rumour. The Athenians when they joined in the attack must have returned from Camarina: we are not told the outcome of that episode.

4.26–41 *Pylos (iii)*. This section begins surprisingly, with the Athenians in difficulties, after the previous section ended with them in an apparently strong position. They had about 14,000 men: there was no local supply of food; there is no spring on

the acropolis now. The 'open sea' includes the great bay, but its northern shore was in the hands of the Spartans. There were seventy-two days (cf. 4.39) between the battle of 4.14 and the fighting on Sphacteria. For Helots running the blockade the 'monetary value' was the sum to buy a replacement promised to any who lost a boat.

4.27 The Athenians' fear of the onset of winter is mentioned, but that was still some way ahead: the meeting of the assembly mentioned here will have been about the end of July. Thucydides attributes to Cleon disreputable motives which he must simply have inferred from his perception of Cleon's character. Reports insisting on the need for prompt action may have been sent by Demosthenes. Theogenes is one of the men who will swear to the treaties of 421 in 5.19, 24; we do not know whether he was chosen as an associate or as an opponent of Cleon. Probably Nicias, elected as a general for 425/4, had already been appointed to command at Pylos but was in no hurry to go there.

4.28 Cleon had not, as far as we know, held any military office, and he seems to have been taken aback when Nicias offered to hand over the command to him: this element in the campaign was not planned. For Thucydides' view of crowds, cf. 2.65, 6.63. Probably Cleon became an extraordinary eleventh general for 425/4. He had probably been in touch with Demosthenes, and Demosthenes had probably told him

privately and/or the assembly in a report what kind of troops he needed: the contingents from Lemnos and Imbros (islands in the north-east Aegean settled by Athenians), peltasts (Thracian light infantry), and archers had perhaps been summoned by the assembly which had given the command to Nicias. The twenty-day promise was irresponsible, but it was to be fulfilled (cf. 4.39); it is striking that Thucydides suggests that failure accompanied by the death or discrediting of Cleon would have been a worthwhile outcome.

4.29 Demosthenes was by now an ordinary general for 425/4 (see note to 4.2–6), and the assembly made him and Cleon joint commanders of the campaign. For ‘large force . . . damage’ we should perhaps follow Gomme in emending to ‘force . . . much damage’: the issue at this point is visibility, not the relative size of the forces.

4.30 In 426 Demosthenes had suffered in Aetolia when the enemy deliberately set fire to a wood (see 3.98), and some scholars suspect that the fire here, described by Thucydides as unintended, was in fact intended. Afterwards Demosthenes will have been able to see not only how many the Spartans were but also where they were positioned. The force which Cleon brought had probably been requested by himself (Gomme) rather than by Demosthenes (Hornblower). The Athenians’ landing-places were probably where the island narrows about a third of the way from south to north, with

the Spartans' first guard-post south from there; the source of water 'Grundy's Well'; and the ancient fort on Mount Elias (see Map 5).

4.32 The main Athenian force will have landed near the centre of the island, on each side. We do not know how many ships Cleon had brought; the lowest-tier oarsmen will have had to stay on the ships to control them. Probably more Messenians had come from Naupactus, in addition to those mentioned in 4.9; stone-throwers and slingers have not been mentioned before.

4.33–5 Much of this is narrated from the viewpoint of the Spartans: Thucydides may have questioned the Spartan prisoners in Athens.

4.34 The Athenians' 'abject terror at the thought of facing Spartans' is ir-rational, since the commanders were confident that they had the right forces for the job, and Thucydides may have exaggerated it to highlight the successful outcome.

4.36 The Messenians had been at Naupactus for thirty years, and it is unlikely that anybody among them already knew of a route; they probably climbed to the summit from the east coast (this kind of mountaineering exploit was to be repeated more spectacularly by Alexander the Great's forces at the Sogdian Rock in 327: Arr., *Anab.* 4.18–19). At Thermopylae in 480 the Persians had sent a contingent by a route through the hills (revealed by a man with local knowledge) to descend in the

rear of the Greeks holding the pass (Thucydides uses the same Greek word for path, *atrapos*, as Hdt. 7.175); there the Spartans did not surrender (Hdt. 7.210–19). The Spartans here lacked food not because there was none left (cf. 4.39) but because they had not been able to eat that day.

4.38 No Spartans were allowed to go to the mainland because the Athenians did not want to lose any of their captives. Paus. 1.15.4 mentions shields taken from the Spartans: for one with the dedicatory inscription ‘The Athenians from the Spartans from Pylos’, see J. M. Camp, *The Athenian Agora* (London: Thames& Hudson, 1986), 71–2 with figs. 45–6.

4.39 The Athenians did not all return home: a garrison was left at Pylos (cf. 4.41), and Eurymedon and Sophocles with the original fleet continued to Corcyra and Sicily. It is not clear whether Cleon’s twenty days are to be counted from the assembly of 4.27–8 or (as in Plut., *Nic.* 7) from his leaving Athens, but the fighting on Sphacteria and his return to Athens will have occurred during August.

Aristophanes’ *Knights* of 424 shows that Cleon took the lion’s share of the credit and was rewarded with the right to dine in the *prytaneion* (town hall) and a front seat in the theatre; whether the suggestion that Demosthenes resented this is historically correct or is Aristophanic invention we do not know.

4.40 Probably ‘the whole war’ of which this was the most surprising event is simply the Archidamian War (cf. Introduction, p. xxvi); for the surprise of Athens’ failure in Sicily in 415–413, see 7.87. Expectation of the Spartans’ conduct will have been based on Thermopylae (see above). ‘Good men and brave’ are *kaloi k’ agathoi*, a term used with various emphases to refer to upper-class men and the virtues (including military) associated with them: Thucydides uses it only here and in 8.48. ‘Spindle’ as a metaphor for arrow is used in tragedy, and here it may recall the notion of the three Fates as spinners (Hom., *Od.* 7.197).

4.41 By keeping their Spartan prisoners the Athenians were able not only to prevent further invasions of Attica but to maintain continuous pressure on the Spartans. Spartan citizen numbers were declining (see notes to 1.19, 5.68), which will have added to the seriousness of the loss of these men. Thucydides makes much of raids from Pylos and, later, Cythera (cf. 4.55, 5.14; also 5.35): certainly the morale of the Spartans was damaged, but the Athenians seem not to have achieved the large-scale destabilization which they hoped for and the Spartans feared.

4.42–5 *An Athenian campaign in the Corinthiad.* Thucydides gives a detailed account (he perhaps took part in the campaign: Gomme), but the campaign was not important except that it resulted in the establishment of another Athenian raiding-post

in the Peloponnese. The horse-transports were perhaps modified triremes with oarsmen on the highest level only (Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 156, 227–30). For the so-called Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese, see 1.12 with note: Corinth seems to have been a younger city than Sparta or Argos, and stories of its foundation were fitted awkwardly into the story of the Dorian invasion (see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 38–54). Argos, neutral in the Archidamian War (cf. 5.14), evidently had enough contact with both sides for Athenian plans to pass through Argos to Corinth. The signals were presumably torch signals.

- 4.43** By attacking the Athenian right wing with their left the Corinthians were reversing normal hoplite tactics (cf. 5.71): this reversal was most notoriously used in Thebes' defeat of Sparta at Leuctra in 371. The Corinthians' withdrawal was to the south-east slopes of Mount Oneium. A paeon is a prayer for victory (or, as in 2.91, a thanksgiving after victory).
- 4.44** The contribution of the Athenian cavalry is celebrated in Ar., *Eq.* 595–610. The older men were a category within a hoplite army normally used for garrison duty: for Athens, cf. 1.105, 2.13. It is striking that Nicias behaved like a defeated commander to recover his last two dead (cf. Plut., *Nic.* 6).
- 4.45** 'Methana' with 'peninsula' should perhaps be deleted, as in the OCT. In the next few years Troezen reached an agreement with Athens (cf. 4.118) and Halieis became an ally (*IG* i³ 75),

but Epidaurus remained anti-Athenian. The purpose of the landing near Solygeia is unclear, but this activity was presumably intended to put pressure on Argos and to ease communication if Argos could be tempted out of its neutrality.

4.46–48.5 *Civil war in Corcyra (ii)*. Ptychia is probably modern Vido, the island mentioned without name in 3.75.

4.47 It will have been public knowledge that the Athenians were bound for Sicily, and Eurymedon had acquiesced in an earlier massacre (cf. 3.81). Hornblower compares the manner of the slaughter with what the Nazis did at Auschwitz and elsewhere.

4.48 For those who killed themselves before their enemies could kill them, compare the earlier episode (3.81). The women whose fate was slavery have not been mentioned before. ‘This war’ is probably the Archidamian War (cf. Introduction, p. xxvi); the passage was probably written before the episode of (probably) 411 mentioned by Diod. Sic. 13.48. Victory for Athens’ friends was of no immediate help to Athens: Thucydides does not mention Corcyra again until its involvement in the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 (e.g. 6.30, 7.26, 33).

4.48.6 *Athens and the west (ix)*. The Athenians had withdrawn from the fighting in 4.25. Thucydides gives no details of further fighting before the end of this war (4.58–65).

4.49 *A campaign in north-western Greece.* For Anactorium, cf. 2.9, 80–2; the treaty of 426/5 had bound Ambracia not to support Anactorium (3.114). In 421 Corinth would object that Anactorium was not to be returned under the Peace of Nicias (5.30).

4.50–1 Seventh winter (425/4)

4.50 *Negotiations with Persia.* For Aristides' colleagues, see 4.75; for money-raising expeditions, cf. 2.69, 3.19. There was certainly a new assessment of the allies' tribute in 425, involving significant increases (*IG* i³ 71; extracts ML 69, translated Fornara 136), but this expedition was probably not sent to collect regular tribute.

For negotiations with Persia, cf. 2.7 with note to 2.7–17. By 'Assyrian characters' Thucydides probably means Aramaic, the normal language of secretaries in the Persian empire and earlier in the Assyrian empire. Sparta's problem presumably was that it had embarked on the war ostensibly to liberate the Greeks (cf. 2.8) but the price for Persian support, as in 412–411, would be the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia (cf. 8.18 with note). We can probably infer from *Ar.*, *Ach.* 61–127 that there had been at least one Athenian approach to Persia. Thucydides now strays outside his chronological framework (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii): Artaxerxes died at the end of 424 or the beginning of 423. Thucydides does not tell us, but it appears from *Andoc.* 3. *Peace* 29 and an Athenian decree (ML

70, translated Fornara 138, with an important new fragment ML addenda (1988), p. 313) that once Dareius II was established on the throne Athens did make a treaty with him: Athens will certainly not have been willing to abandon the Asiatic Greeks, but a non-aggression pact could have satisfied both sides. This is one of Thucydides' most culpable omissions: apart from one sentence in 5.1, the Persians are not mentioned again until 413/2 (8.5–6).

4.51 *Athenian suspicion of Chios.* After the revolt of Mytilene in 428, Chios and the Lesbian city of Methymna were the only members of the Delian League still providing ships. The revolt of Mytilene had been preceded by wall-building (3.2). Chios obeyed Athens, but this was not abject submission. An inscription listing contributors to a Spartan war fund (see note to 3.32) includes 'exiles of the Chians who are friends of the Spartans': it is not certain whether these were exiled now and paid shortly afterwards or are the men exiled c.411 (Diod. Sic. 12.65).

4.52–88 Eighth summer (424)

4.52 *Eclipse and earthquake; activity of Mytilenaeans exiles.* The eclipse (on 21 March) and earthquake are mentioned simply as interesting occurrences; for Thucydides' awareness of the connection between solar eclipses and the new moon, cf. 2.28. Thucydides has not explained when and how the Mytilenaeans had been exiled, or where their base was (cf. Introduction, p.

xli); for exiles harassing their island state from the mainland, cf. Corcyra, 3.85. Two thousand Phocaeen staters were equivalent to 8 Athenian talents: this ransoming of a whole city is an unusual occurrence. The Actaeon cities were those from Antandrus to the Hellespont (cf. 3.50, where the term is not used), and probably 'the Aeolian towns on the mainland' are the same (Gomme). For the timber, cf. Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.10.

4.53–7 *An Athenian campaign against Cythera and Laconia.* An inscription records payments to Nicias and his colleagues c.10 May (ML 72. 20–2). The same three generals will swear to the truce of 423 (4.119). Cythera is explained in a manner normally used by Thucydides for more remote places; we do not know whether Spartan commissioners and garrisons were sent to other Perioecic communities, but Cythera was in a particularly sensitive position (cf. Hdt. 7.235, quoting the wish of the sixth-century Chilon that Cythera were at the bottom of the sea; Xen., *Hell.* 4.8.7–8). 'Laconia' here includes Messenia.

4.54 The manuscripts have 2,000 Milesian hoplites, certainly too many (though accepted by Hornblower) and perhaps repeated in error from 4.53. Scandeia was on the east side of the island, and Cythera in the centre. The Athenians already possessed Scandeia, but after the agreement 'took [it] over' formally. Asine is the city of that name on the west side of the Laconian Gulf, not the better-known Asine in Messenia (cf. 4.13); Helos was at the head of the Gulf (many Greeks thought, probably

wrongly, that it was the origin of the term Helot: contrast note to 1.101–3).

- 4.55** Sparta had a body of *hippeis*, ‘horsemen’, in fact hoplites who acted as a royal bodyguard; the cavalry and archers recruited now were probably not Spartan citizens. For Spartan pessimism and lethargy, cf. 1.69–71, 118, and what Hermocrates says of the Greek Sicilians in 4.63; for events ‘contrary to any reasonable prediction’, cf. 2.61, 4.65. In fact the run of Spartan reverses and Athenian successes will not continue beyond this point.
- 4.56** Cotyrta and Aphroditia were on the east side of the Laconian Gulf, Epidaurus Limera and Thyrea on the east coast of the Peloponnese. The note on the Aeginetans is repeated from 2.27 (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii); they are not mentioned in the account of the Helot revolt in 1.101–3, and their support for Sparta is not mentioned in 2.27.
- 4.57** ‘The islands’ are the Cyclades; the word ‘tribute’ indicates that Cythera was to be treated as a member of the Delian League, a humiliation for Sparta. The Aeginetans are not known to have done anything hostile to Athens since the beginning of the war and their expulsion from Aegina.
- 4.58–65** *Athens and the west (x)*. Gela, on the south coast of Sicily, colonized from Rhodes and Crete (cf. 6.4), has not been mentioned before. This is the first appearance of Hermocrates, who will be always important in opposition to Athens but not

always in power in Syracuse. It is surprising that the perfunctory and disjointed narrative of this war should end with a major speech (4.59–64): perhaps the speech was written after 415–413, when Sicily and Hermocrates seemed more important than they did in the 420s.

4.59 The point of Hermocrates' opening remark is that Syracuse is less in need of the peace for which he will argue than the other cities. The reasons why men accept the risks of warfare are well put.

4.60 'If we have any sense' will recur in 4.61 and 4.64. For the Athenians' alliance with Leontini and their alleged ulterior motive, cf. 3.86. 'Clearing the way' for dominance is a metaphor from tree-felling. The Athenians were to come with a larger force in 415–413 (cf. Books 6–7), but not because the Greek Sicilians were exhausted and not with a successful outcome.

4.61 The Chalcidians belonged to the Ionian strand of the Greek people: in 6.77 Hermocrates will express Dorian contempt for the Ionians (on which cf. 1.124 with note). For the view that domination is natural, cf. the Athenians in 1.76, 5.89, 105. Since Sicily is a long way from Athens, the Athenians could campaign there only because they had been invited by allies who could provide a base.

4.62 On the praise of peace Hornblower compares Milton, Sonnet 16, lines 10–11: 'Peace hath her victories | No less renowned

than war'. 'Instead of gaining . . . found themselves losing' is the strongest form of the device of 'presentation by negation' (Hornblower).

4.63 Treaties in the fifth century were made sometimes for all time (e.g. Athens' alliances with Rhegium and Leontini: ML 63–4, translated Fornara 124–5), sometimes for a fixed period (e.g. the Thirty Years Treaty of 446/5: 1.115).

4.64 Hermocrates suggests that it is more important that the Athenians are foreign invaders, from outside Sicily, than that they have ties of kinship with the Chalcidians within Sicily; he is careful not to say that Syracuse, already powerful in Sicily, will be able to dominate the island if its opponents are denied Athenian support.

4.65 Morgantina, in the interior, was not at all near either to Camarina or to Syracuse. Thucydides says nothing else about Morgantina, and not enough about Camarina (cf. 4.25) to make sense of his narrative. There must have been a lapse of time between the making of the treaty at Gela and the punishment of the generals at Athens: probably this section has been placed at the point appropriate to the latter (G. S. Shrimpton, *History and Memory in Ancient Greece* (McGill–Queen's University Press, 1997), 277–8). It is not clear why Eurymedon was treated more leniently than his colleagues: perhaps he was tried last, and popular anger was beginning to be assuaged. Eurymedon was sent to Sicily again in 414/3 (cf.

7.16); Sophocles was perhaps to be one of the Thirty oligarchs who ruled Athens in 404–403 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.2); nothing further is known of Pythodorus. For the Greeks' tendency to blame bribery when a success was not achieved, cf. note to 3.38. Thucydides' narrative has told us nothing of what happened after the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements (cf. 4.48.6), and has not suggested that the Athenians were in a position to take control of Sicily before that; for their western ambitions in 424, cf. Ar., *Eq.* 174, 1304–4 (mentioning not Sicily but Carthage). In relying on their current good fortune they were ignoring the warning of the Spartans in 4.17–18; cf. Hermocrates on the incalculability of the future in 4.62–3.

4.66–74 *Athens and Megara (i)*. In 2.31 Thucydides mentioned that the Athenians invaded the Megarid each year, but not that they did so twice each year: probably that extra detail was not deliberately withheld (contr. Hornblower), but it was a deliberate choice not to mention each invasion in its place as each Spartan invasion of Attica was mentioned in its place. For Megara's two harbours and the long walls joining Nisaea to the city, cf. 1.103; Sparta had allowed the exiles to occupy Plataea from 427 to 426 (cf. 3.68). Hippocrates' father Aripbron was the elder brother of Pericles. Hippocrates here makes his first appearance in Thucydides, but an inscription shows that he had already served as general in 426/5 (ML 72, translated Fornara 134, 3). Here we have a classic instance of party leaders'

preferring to be on the winning side in their city even at the cost of submission to an outside power: cf. 3.65.

4.67 'Had agreed the plans and made the practical arrangements' is literally 'had made all their arrangements in deeds and words', a very artificial use of one of Thucydides' favourite contrasts. Minoa had been captured by Athens in 427 and no longer belonged to Megara (cf. 3.51). The Plataeans will have been men who escaped from the city in 428/7 (cf. 3.20–4). Enyalios was an epithet for (e.g. Hom., *Il.* 17.210–11) or an alternative name for or embodiment of (e.g. Ar., *Pax* 457) Ares. The gates will have been in the long walls, on the side towards Athens; the commander will have been the Spartan commander of the garrison in Nisaea.

4.68 The gates in this chapter are those from the city to the area between the long walls; the threatened fighting inside the city would be between pro-Athenian and anti-Athenian Megarians.

4.69 Men and materials had to be obtained from Athens because investing Nisaea was not part of the original plan.

4.70 Facts about Brasidas' north-eastern campaign emerge gradually, probably not through deliberate narrative dislocation to heighten the dramatic effect but because, not yet far from the manner of oral composition, Thucydides mentions details only as they become relevant. He shows detailed knowledge of Brasidas' campaigns, and often attributes thoughts to him: he will have had little opportunity

to meet Brasidas after he was exiled, and his most likely source is Clearidas (cf. 4.132: suggested by H. D. Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Bristol Classical Press, 1989), 78–83). Tripodiscus was about 7 miles (11 km.) west of Megara; the cities from which Brasidas obtained soldiers were all fairly near.

4.72 The Boeotians were concerned for Megara both because its territory adjoined theirs and because they claimed to be the founders of Megara (e.g. Hellanicus *FGrH* 4 F 78; for a rival Athenian claim, cf. note to 4.118).

4.73 It is surprising to read that the Athenian generals thought ‘they had already succeeded in most of their objectives’: they seem to have given up too easily; they had given Brasidas the victory by default, and had made it certain that they would not get control of Megara. We have not been told how the Athenian force had been selected, and whether it did indeed comprise their best hoplites.

4.74 The Athenians presumably left a garrison in Nisaea. For the Megarians’ use of a military review, cf. Xen., *Hell.* 2.4.8–10: the point of open voting was that it could be seen who, if anybody, dared to vote for acquittal (contrast the secret vote at Acanthus, 4.88). We do not know how long Megara remained oligarchic: Thucydides’ language perhaps implies that it was not so when he wrote the last sentence of this chapter.

4.75 *The Athenians in the north-east.* For the Mytilenaeen exiles and Antandrus, cf. 4.52. For the money-raising ships, cf. 4.50, where Aristeides is the only general named. Demodocus is probably the Demodocus of [Pl.] *Theages* (see esp. 127 E). Lamachus had probably first served as a general in the 430s (cf. Plut., *Per.* 20); he is mocked for his belligerence in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (566–625, etc.), and was to die in Sicily in 414. For Anaea, cf. 3.19, 32. Heracleia Pontica, about 125 miles (200 km) from the Bosphorus on the south coast of the Black Sea, was a colony of the Megarians and Boeotians (cf. Ps.-Scymn. 972–5): we do not know whether it was now on good terms with Megara; its inclusion in the tribute assessment of 425 (*IG* i³ 71, iv. 126–7) does not guarantee that it was on good terms with Athens; and it may be mere coincidence that Lamachus went there when Athens was trying to get control of Megara. Editors have commonly emended Calex to Cales, from Arr., *Bithyniaca* 20, but we cannot be sure that Arrian in the second century AD used the same form as Thucydides (Hornblower, following D. M. Lewis).

4.76–7 *Athens and Boeotia (i).* Demosthenes had been based at Naupactus in 426 and had been interested in advancing on Boeotia from there (cf. 3.95 with note to 3.91). Thucydides implies that the first approach was made to Demosthenes and Hippocrates while they were in the Megarid, but they returned to Athens and set out with fresh forces: since the plan depended

on secrecy, we may wonder how much was divulged to the assembly. The cities were organized in a federation led by Thebes, and both the federation and the individual cities were oligarchic (cf. 5.38, *Hell. Oxy.* 19 Chambers). A Thespian is more likely than a Theban (most manuscripts) to have been opposed to the federation. Ptoeodorus is a characteristically Boeotian name, derived from Apollo Ptoeus, whose sanctuary was north of Thebes. The three places chosen for intervention were in the south-west, the north-west, and the south-east of Boeotia: how good the Athenians' chances of success were depends on how much actual or potential support there was for them to exploit. Chaeroneia here is a dependency of Orchomenus, but in the federation as organized in the 390s it was grouped with two cities east of Orchomenus (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.3 Chambers). Orchomenus was the city most likely to challenge Thebes for dominance: Thucydides distinguishes it from the Orchomenus in Arcadia (mentioned in 5.61); for its being 'Minyan', cf. Hom., *Il.* 2.511. Delium was a sanctuary of Delian Apollo.

4.77 We should probably not infer from 'he had sent' that (contrary to normal practice) Hippocrates was technically superior to Demosthenes. The Acarnanians were not breaking the treaty of 426/5 (cf. 3.114), since on this campaign they would not be fighting against any other participants in that treaty; after this they will not be mentioned again until 413 (7.57). For

Oeniadae, cf. 2.102, 3.7; it will not appear in Thucydides again.

4.78–88 *Brasidas in the north-east (i)*. For Sparta's colony of Heracleia, cf. 3.92–3: unless that section was written with hindsight, it suggests that a campaign like this was already being contemplated in 426. Pharsalus, the principal city in south-western Thessaly, was on the Athenian side in 431 (cf. 2.22) but was to be aligned with Sparta in the 370s (Xen., *Hell.* 6.1.2–17). Thucydides reports the names of several men (good Thessalian names, Hornblower; Torymbas is probably the Thessalian name behind the manuscripts' Torylaus), though they do not make a significant contribution to the narrative. Larisa was the principal city in north-eastern Thessaly: in 431 it had supported Athens with commanders 'from each party in the city' (cf. 2.22). It was common to pass under arms through the territory of states with which one was not at war, but such states might well feel threatened, and it may be that the frequency of the practice and of the perceived threat increased during the Peloponnesian War (cf. the treaty quoted in 5.47). Thucydides envisages a situation in which the majority of the Thessalians, and perhaps the formal decision-making bodies, were pro-Athenian but oligarchic cliques had a degree of influence not reflected in the formal structures; for his view of narrow oligarchies, cf. 3.62. For guest-friendship, see note to 2.29 and Herman, *Ritualised Friendship*, discussing this instance

on p. 119. 'Knew of no hostility' seems to be formal diplomatic language: cf. RO 42. 8, probably of 362. While the Spartans in general were slow, Brasidas is often reported as acting quickly (cf. W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton University Press, 1984), 128 n. 45).

4.79 Thucydides explains the origin of Brasidas' expedition here, when he enters the region. The appeal had been sent before the episode at Megara, when Athens' run of successes ended. The Chalcidians who appealed openly will have been those incorporated in Olynthus (cf. 1.58). Perdiccas was last mentioned, as allied to Athens but secretly supporting Sparta, in 429 (3.80).

4.80 Although since Athens' success at Pylos the Spartans had been afraid of a major Helot uprising, none occurred (cf. note to 4.41). The 'elimination' of 2,000 active Helots had happened at some unspecified time in the past (and the Spartans will have been afraid of 'young' rather than of 'stupid' Helots, the alternative reading): Thucydides evidently believed the story, but we cannot tell how, or how reliably, he learned of it; Diod. Sic. 12.67.4 has the men killed at home.

4.81 Thucydides suggests here that the Spartans were glad to send the expedition, but a different impression will be given in 4.108. This chapter bestows high praise on Brasidas; but, although he will claim that he has come as a genuine liberator (4.85–7), he will threaten to use force against those who do

not cooperate with him voluntarily (4.87). Bargaining for 'mutual return and recovery of places' was to take place in the Peace of Nicias in 421 (5.17). The 'Sicilian affair' is the episode of 415–413: this passage was written or revised after that (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii).

- 4.82** Probably Athens' 'closer watch' on the allies was simply a matter of greater alertness: there had been no secret about Brasidas' plans, and probably Thucydides and Eucles (cf. 4.104) had already been sent to the region.
- 4.83** The Lyncestians lived to the west of the Macedonian plain, well away from the area in which the Athenians were interested. If Perdiccas were to defeat Arrhabaeus, he might cease to need Brasidas, and cease to join Brasidas in supporting the Chalcidians. When he was paying half of Brasidas' maintenance, presumably the Chalcidians were paying the other half; by reducing but not ceasing his contribution he retained a hold over Brasidas (Hornblower); and there was to be another joint campaign against Arrhabaeus later (cf. 4.124–8).
- 4.84** The grape harvest would be in September: its mention is not simply an indication of date, but helps to explain why Acanthus went over to Brasidas (cf. Xen., *Hell.* 7.5.14, Aen. Tact. 7.1). The last mention of 'people' in this chapter refers not to 'the people at large' but to a citizen assembly. Brasidas' persuasive speech can be contrasted with the laconic speech of

Sthenelaïdas in 1.86: although Thucydides cannot have heard the original, to an unusual extent its authenticity is supported by references to it in the narrative (cf. Introduction, p. xxxvi). Hornblower notes that it is the basis of a ‘periodically adjusted manifesto’, with similar speeches made in other cities later. For the question of Athens’ popularity with the member states of the Delian League, cf. note to 3.27–50: each side in the debate can find some support in this episode.

4.85 For the liberation of Greece, cf. 2.8; for Sparta’s expectation that invasions of Attica would bring victory, cf. 5.14. Brasidas argues, as speakers today still argue, that those who exert themselves on behalf of others (without consulting them) deserve their gratitude and support. A first rejection would have shown only that he was unpersuasive, not that he was untrustworthy. At Nisaea he had had a larger force, which in hoplites outnumbered the Athenians: Thucydides will remark in 4.108 that his claim here was untrue.

4.86 The implication of the ‘oaths’ is that the Spartans at home were, or Brasidas thought they were, less committed to the freedom of the cities than he was. If ‘autonomy’ (cf. note to 1.96–7) was incompatible with the presence of a Spartan governor, the promise was soon to be broken, apparently by Brasidas himself (cf. 4.132). It was not yet Spartan practice to impose oligarchies on its allies, as Athens sometimes imposed democracies on its allies (cf. 1.19 and note); for the desire of

the allies to choose for themselves rather than have even a congenial constitution imposed on them, cf. 8.48, 64.

4.87 For calling on the local gods and heroes, cf. Archidamus at Plataea (2.74); Brasidas assumes that if Acanthus does not openly join Sparta it will continue to pay tribute to Athens. When the Peloponnesian War ended Sparta would not resist the temptation to take over the Athenian empire.

4.88 This is one of the earliest references to a secret vote in Greece: contrast the open vote at Megara (4.74). Brasidas' speech was attractive, but Thucydides commonly uses that word of what is deceptive, and 4.108 will describe his words as 'enticing (but untrue)'. Stagirus (or Stagira) is best known as the birthplace of the philosopher Aristotle.

4.89–116 Eighth winter (424/3)

4.89–101.4 *Athens and Boeotia* (ii). It appears that the principal reason for the Athenians' failure was the leaking of the plot; but it may be that the plot was leaked when it was because of Demosthenes' approach, and certainly the fact that Hippocrates had not yet gone to Delium made it easier for the Boeotians to act firmly in the west.

4.90 Probably Hippocrates went at what he thought was the agreed time, when news from Siphiae had not yet reached Athens. It was unusual, though not unprecedented, for metics to be used on a campaign outside Attica; the 'foreigners' were

presumably from the member states of the Delian League. Around 7,000 hoplites (cf. 4.93–4) is a surprisingly low number, set against the 13,000 of 2.13 and the 4,400 killed by the plague of 3.87: perhaps this quick mobilization fell short of the available total. Given the threats elsewhere, the Boeotians probably did not send all their manpower to Tanagra. As elsewhere (cf. especially the siege of Plataea, 2.75–8, 3.20–4), Thucydides is interested in the details of sieges and fortifications; but, despite his detailed knowledge of these works and of the topography, as a general in the north (cf. 4.104–5) he cannot have been present

- 4.91** The eleven Boeotarchs (cf. 2.2) came from the eleven electoral units of Boeotia (cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 19.3 Chambers): two were from Thebes in its own right, and since the destruction of Plataea (before which there may have been only nine) Thebes had claimed a further two on account of Plataea and its dependencies. Pagondas was identical with, or else from the same family as, the Pagondas of Pindar, fr. 94b Maehler; Arianthidas is probably identical with the [—]thus included in the ‘navarchs monument’ at Delphi with which the Spartan Lysander commemorated his victory over Athens in 405 (ML 95, d), and Hornblower wonders whether he supported Pagondas (Thucydides’ Greek does not state, and it need not be true, that ‘all . . . except for one’ were against fighting). Oropus, on the coast south-east of Delium, with an important

sanctuary of Amphiaraus, was claimed both by Athens and by Boeotia: it was currently in Athenian hands, not incorporated in Attica but ruled as subject territory, and hence its status could be variously referred to by Boeotians and Athenians.

4.92 For the Euboeans, in 447/6, see 1.113–14; Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 130 mentions an Athenian campaign in 424/3, about which Thucydides says nothing. Pagondas' point about boundaries is that other Greek states fight neighbours to settle where the boundary between them should be drawn, but Athens wants to conquer Boeotia. For a precedent from the middle of the century Pagondas selects the Boeotian victory at Coroneia, in 447/6 (cf. 1.113); Hippocrates in 4.95 will select the Athenian victory at Oenophyta, c.457 (cf. 1.108).

4.93 Probably the Thebans took the right wing on account of their leading position in Boeotia. The Athenians' eight-deep formation (see 4.94) was typical, but the Boeotians seem to have been fond of a deeper formation which added weight to the attack. For the different depths of different contingents, cf. the Spartan army at Mantinea in 418 (5.68).

4.94 Most of the Athenian force had gone to build the fort, not to fight (cf. 4.90); it is hard to believe that their number was 'several times greater' than that of the Boeotians.

4.96 This and the battle of Mantinea in 418 (5.70–4) were the two most substantial hoplite battles of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians were at a disadvantage in advancing uphill, but it

was still better to advance than to stand and await the enemy's charge. The 'gruelling fight with shields shoving against shields' is typical of hoplite battles as traditionally viewed: that view has been challenged, but is probably correct for most hoplite battles if not for all. The Thespians' grave has been found (see Pritchett, *GSW*, iv.132–3, and part of their casualty list, *IG* vii 1888; the casualty list from Tanagra, *IG* vii 585, may belong to this campaign too): altogether there may have been c.300 Thespian dead. Since the men who 'had fallen back' and the men who 'were encircled' were not the same, the manuscripts' text at that point cannot stand. Among the Athenians who fled was the philosopher Socrates, found and supported by Alcibiades (Pl., *Symp.* 221 A–B, *Lach.* 181 B). The Locrians who supported the Boeotians were the north-eastern, Opuntian, Locrians.

- 4.97** The exchange of messages which begins here, Thucydides' longest passage in indirect speech, recalls the dialogue between an Ambracian herald and the Acarnanians in 3.113. This episode may be reflected in Euripides' *Suppliants*, in which the Thebans refuse to let the Argive women recover their dead. The 'established laws of the Greeks' are general understandings, not formal written laws.
- 4.98** Apart from their support for Brasidas at Megara (cf. 4.70, 72), the Boeotians are not recorded as having acted against Athens recently. The Athenians argue disingenuously: they did not

control the sanctuary by virtue of controlling the surrounding territory, but had conquered it in order to use it for military purposes (probably knowing that it had a water supply). For the Boeotians' alleged origin in Thessaly, cf. 1.12. Greeks did do in war things which they might have felt inhibited from doing otherwise, but it would not normally have been thought that the mere fact of war automatically legitimized any breach of normal restrictions. It was, however, normal for victors to return the dead to enemies who acknowledged their defeat.

4.99 It appears that the battlefield was in the territory of Oropus; but, if the Athenians claimed possession of Delium because they currently occupied that, by the same criterion the battlefield now belonged to the Boeotians.

4.100 The Boeotians seem to have expected the recapture of Delium to be more difficult than it proved to be; for uses of fire, cf. 2.77, 4.115.

4.101 The ships taking the Athenians home will not have hurried, and their voyage will have taken days rather than hours. The casualties of 7.1 per cent on the winning side were a little above average for a hoplite battle; 14.3 per cent on the losing side about average (and the losing commander was often killed).

4.101.5 *The death of Sitalces*. For Sitalces, cf. 2.95–101; also 2.29. The Odrysians and their kings have not been mentioned since

429/8 and will not be mentioned again: this is an unusually disconnected insertion in Thucydides' narrative.

4.102–8 *Brasidas in the north-east (ii)*. For Amphipolis, Eion, and Argilus, see Map 6. The fact that Amphipolis was an Athenian colony made its going over to Brasidas particularly shocking. The earliest attempts at settlement were on the hill with a summit at 133 m., slightly to the north. (The settlements are dated by schol. Aeschin. 2 *Embassy* 31 (67 Dilts), translated Fornara 62.) For Aristagoras of Miletus, who went to Myrcinus, further north, in 496/5, see Hdt. 5.124–6 (Thucydides agrees with Herodotus that he was 'in flight' as the Ionian Revolt faced defeat, but gives information not given by Herodotus). The Athenians killed at Drabescus were the men sent in 465/4 at the time of the war with Thasos (cf. 1.100; the scholiast gives the wrong archon beginning Lysi-). Hagnon's foundation was in 437/6: he seems to have been venerated as a hero while still alive (cf. 5.11). For Eion, cf. 1.98. At Amphipolis a large circuit wall has been found, but not a wall cutting off the whole loop of the river.

4.103 Argilus' 'people who had citizenship in Amphipolis' were presumably Argilians who had joined in Hagnon's colony; whether they could still or again be regarded as citizens of Argilus would be for Argilus to decide. The bridge at Amphipolis was about two-thirds of a mile (1 km) from the north-west corner of the city wall. Settlement patterns varied,

and we cannot be sure how many of the Amphipolitans had their permanent homes outside the city walls.

4.104 Nothing is known about Eucles and the forces with him except what is said here and in 4.106 (for the chronology, see note to 4.82). Thucydides here plays a part in his own history, but writes of himself austere and as he might have written of any other general; we are not told why or by whose decision he had gone to Thasos, or whether his not being at Eion was blameworthy. He did at least succeed in securing Eion, but he was exiled (cf. 5.26).

4.105 For Thucydides' family, see Introduction, pp. xxiv–xxv: his mining rights and personal connections were inherited from Miltiades' wife, the elder Hegesipyle, and his wealth would if necessary have enabled him to hire troops at his own expense. The principal mining area was around Mount Pangaeum, between the Strymon and Thasos. The 'Athenians in the city' are presumably not the Amphipolitans of Athenian origin (mentioned in 4.106) but Eucles' garrison troops.

4.106 The colonists of 437/6 can hardly have been fewer than the 10,000 of 465/4 (cf. 1.102), and Athens would have been able to supply only a small proportion of them. Probably there was an emergency assembly, addressed by Brasidas and by Eucles, which voted to accept Brasidas' terms. We do not know what became of Eucles: it is possible but not certain that he let Amphipolis go too easily, but after this decision there was no

point in his staying. Thucydides discreetly makes the point that he himself did the best he could in the circumstances.

4.107 The active Brasidas still made an attempt on Eion. Perdiccas was last mentioned in 4.83, reducing but not entirely stopping his support for Brasidas.

4.108 Fir was the preferred wood for shipbuilding, and Macedonia and Thrace were the best sources of it. Amphipolis as a colony did not pay tribute to Athens: it may have supplied money as a charge on the mines (L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides' History*, 1–5.24 (University of California Press, 1993), 175–6). The lake, lake Cercinitis, was drained in the 1930s. The ‘subsequent revelation’ of Athenian power, successful except in the battle in which Cleon was killed, was in 422–421. This chapter fits uncomfortably with 4.81, which gives a wholly favourable picture of Brasidas and does not suggest that there were any disadvantages in going over to him (cf. Introduction, p. xxviii).

4.109.1 *Athens and Megara (ii)*. This short interruption notes, presumably in its chronological place, another setback for the Athenians.

4.109.1–116 *Brasidas in the north-east (iii)*. Acte is the eastern prong of Chalcidice. For Mount Athos, the shipwreck of a Persian fleet in 492, and the canal dug before Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in 480, see Hdt. 6.44–5, 7.22–3. Thucydides probably mentions the cities in correct anti-clockwise order (Herodotus’ order is

different). The name Pelasgian was given by the Greeks to various non-Greek peoples: for the belief that Pelasgians settled in Athens for a time but were expelled and moved to the north-Aegean island of Lemnos, cf. Hdt. 6.136–40.

4.110 Torone was on the west side of Sithone, the middle prong.

Thucydides' point in calling it (and Olynthus in 4.123)

Chalcidian is not clear: Torone may not have been a colony of Chalcis in Euboea, and Olynthus certainly was not (see Hdt. 8.127); and Torone can hardly have been part of the Chalcidian state centred on Olynthus (see note to 1.58, and 4.114 below). Possibly all the cities of Chalcidice were thought, wrongly, to have originated from Chalcis (cf. Hornblower). The temple of the Dioscuri was north-east of the city; Canastraeum was the east-facing tip of Pallene, the western prong.

4.112 Aen. Tact. 8.3, 21.1, in the fourth century, warns against leaving in the countryside materials which could be used by an attacker.

4.114 In Amphipolis (cf. 4.105), Brasidas' proclamation was to men considering whether to go over to him; here it was to men who had fled from a city he had captured (and the only Athenians were the garrison troops). Here 'Chalcidian' refers to the state centred on Olynthus (note the Olynthian who was the first to enter the city, 4.110); but Brasidas ought to have offered Torone freedom in alliance with him, not

incorporation in the Olynthian state. His ‘meeting’ was an ad hoc assembly of the citizens who had not fled to Lecythus; but a lawful assembly could be convened only by the authorities of Torone. ‘From that point on they would be held to account’: Brasidas again combines sticks with carrots, and will not tolerate further opposition after he has made his offer.

4.115 We are not told whether the Toronaeans in Lecythus joined the Athenians in flight or returned to the city.

4.116 Thirty minas of silver—3,000 Athenian drachmas or 2,100 heavier, Aeginetan drachmas—was an enormous sum for a soldier whose pay would be not more than 1 drachma a day: the text may be corrupt. Thucydides does not record his own view, but Brasidas regarded the collapse of the defenders’ building as due to divine intervention, and Thucydides regarded Brasidas’ view and his resulting action as significant (cf. Introduction, p. xlv).

4.117–33 Ninth summer (423)

4.117–19 *The year’s truce.* Thucydides’ readers know that there were Spartans interested in peace (cf. 4.41, 108), but this is his first indication that there were Athenians interested in peace (it is uncertain how much desire to end the war lies behind Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, of early 425, before the success at Pylos). He writes as if both sides were unanimous, which is unlikely to be true; presumably there were preliminary talks

before the formal agreement was made. The text in the middle of the chapter is difficult, and some words may be missing (cf. textual notes): the argument seems to be that currently the Athenians were under pressure and had not put their Spartan prisoners to death; but, if Brasidas tried to go on from strength to strength, either (*a*) he might succeed but the Athenians might react by killing the prisoners, or (*b*) he might fail in which case the Athenians might no longer be interested in peace.

4.118 Thucydides here begins a practice, continued in Books 5 and 8, of directly quoting treaties. This is more probably an experiment in narrative technique than a sign of incompleteness intended to be converted to paraphrase in the final polishing (cf. Introduction, p. xxxii). Of the four documents here, the first two appear to be messages from the Peloponnesians to Athens, based on decrees of the Peloponnesians; the third is a decree of Athens, formulated in the normal style of Athenian decrees; the last is a record, from the Spartan side, of the ratification of the treaty: Thucydides probably obtained these from an Athenian source.

Athens had not been formally excluded from Delphi during the war, but Delphi sympathized with the Peloponnesians (cf. 1.118), and the route to it from Athens lay through Boeotia and Phocis; there must have been some financial matter about which Athens had complained. Coryphasium was the Spartan

name for Pylos (cf. 4.3); for possible identifications of Boupphas and Tomeus, see Map 5. See for Cythera 4.54, 57; for Nisaea 4.69, 73; for Minoa 3.51, 4.67. For Troezen, see 2.56, 4.45; but Thucydides has not previously mentioned the agreement. For oared vessels the manuscript text refers awkwardly to talents and to 'measures': probably 'talents' is to be deleted and the 'measures' are amphorae; the effect will have been to allow boats of up to thirty oars. Heralds would normally have safe conduct without special provision, but embassies would not (cf. note to 3.72). Greek states had a tendency to give men full authority on particular occasions without specifying precisely how full: the intention here seems to have been that the men sent were authorized to swear to the treaty unless the other party proposed modifications.

In the Athenian decree the manuscripts omit 'council and'; but in inscribed decrees of the second half of the fifth century the council is invariably mentioned, and the omission is more likely to be due to a copyist than to Thucydides. The date 14 Elaphebolion was perhaps c.25 March 423, which fits a Thucydidean year beginning early March (cf. note to 2.1). For the involvement of the generals in convening the assembly, cf. 2.22, 59. Towards the end of the chapter there are clearly words missing from the manuscripts' text: 'if it is agreed to send and receive embassies' gives the sense required.

4.119 Presumably the whole Spartan alliance was bound by the treaty, though not all members are mentioned as swearing to it; Athens apparently committed its allies without consulting them. Since each city had its own calendar with its own irregularities, it is not surprising that 12 Gerastius in Sparta = 14 Elaphebolion in Athens here but a different equation applies in 421 (5.19). The Spartan Athenaeus son of Pericleidas has names advertising a family with Athenian connections (cf. the Athenian Cimon's son Lacedaemonius, 1.45); Pericleidas had asked Athens for help against the Messenians in the 460s (Ar., *Lys.* 1138–44). Philocharidas will reappear in the diplomacy of 421–420 (5.19, 24, 44). The Corinthian Aeneas may be a nephew of the Aristeus of 1.60, so not from a pro-Athenian family; for Euphamidas, cf. 2.33, 5.55. The three Athenians commanded against Cythera as generals for 425/4 (4.53), and had evidently been re-elected for 424/3.

4.120–32 *Brasidas in the north-east (iv)*. For Thucydides' mention of an alleged Trojan War foundation, cf. the Elymians in Sicily (6.2). Brasidas praises Scione because, unlike other cities, it volunteered to join him; but despite his promises, he withdrew most of his forces to fight Arrhabaeus, and the Athenians arrived in his absence (4.124–9), and in the Peace of Nicias Sparta abandoned Scione to Athens (5.18).

- 4.121** The honours for Brasidas resemble those for victorious athletes (Pericles was thus honoured when he delivered the funeral oration after the Samian war of 440–439: Plut., *Per.* 28), but are not quasi-religious.
- 4.122** The ambassadors in their journey must have counted the days from the ratification of the truce: on the defection of Scione, Thucydides, uncharacteristically, gives alternative versions and chooses between them (cf. Introduction, p. xxxi). Cleon, making his first appearance since the Pylos episode, takes a hard line on Scione: it is possible that he was responsible for Thucydides' exile, and that this contributed to Thucydides' dislike of him. The Athenians felt free to act here, because they believed the truce to have been broken, but they did not take military action elsewhere.
- 4.123** By accepting the defection of Mende, Brasidas was surely breaking the rule that each side should possess what it possessed when the truce was ratified (cf. Connor, *Thucydides*, 137): the narrative makes it likely that the minority favourable to Brasidas were inclined to oligarchy (cf. 4.130). For 'Chalcidian Olynthus', cf. note to 'Chalcidian Torone', 4.110.
- 4.124** We are not told how hard it was to resist Perdiccas' pressure, but Brasidas' abandonment of his new allies at this point looks irresponsible. The Chalcidians of this campaign are those of the state centred on Olynthus. Thucydides here distinguishes

the (Lower) Macedonians both from Greeks and from outright barbarians. The pass of 4.128 is the Kirli Dirven pass, west of lake Petres, and the battle will have been fought north-west of that, but perhaps not beyond Monastir as suggested by N. G. L. Hammond (*A History of Macedonia*, i (Oxford University Press, 1972), 104–8 with maps 7 and 8).

4.125 For the panic of large armies, cf. what is said in 2.65, 4.28, 6.63, 8.1, on the moods of a crowd within a city; for Brasidas' formation for the withdrawal, cf. the Athenian retreat from Syracuse in 413 (7.78).

4.126 Probably Brasidas was speaking to his whole army, but chose (or Thucydides chose on his behalf) to address all the men as Peloponnesians; the allies who have deserted are not any part of his force but Perdiccas' force. The word translated 'family clique' is *dynasteia*, for which cf. 3.62; whereas even in Sparta and under the regimes which it favoured among its allies the hoplites had a measure of political power. Brasidas' military point is that knowing that the enemy's reality will not live up to the appearance justifies courage, while failure to know about a real strength may lead opponents to take unjustifiable risks.

4.127 His prediction of the enemy's empty show is borne out: this kind of characterization was to become a regular way of describing a barbarian horde (cf. 2.81)—not simply as a literary motif but because by comparison with the Greeks and

Romans the armies of less sophisticated peoples were like that.

4.128 There is a ridge on each side of Brasidas' road, the later Via Egnatia, and the one to his right (west) would offer the better opportunity. His men's angry treatment of the Macedonians was spontaneous, but he allowed it to happen. Perdiccas' eventual agreement with the Athenians will be mentioned in 4.132.

4.129 Thucydides backtracks to mention what had happened in Chalcidice while Brasidas was in Lyncus (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii). The obedience of Chios after the episode of 4.51 is mentioned in a fragment of Eupolis' comedy *Poleis* (fr. 246 Kassel and Austin). The temple of Poseidon was outside Mende, to the west. The manuscripts' seven hundred hoplites in Polydamidas' force are too few (cf. 4.123), and we should expect a mention of light-armed troops too. Methone, on the west side of the Thermaic Gulf, was a city within the Delian League whose loyalty Athens worked hard to retain (cf. ML 65, translated Fornara 128). Thucydides is frustratingly vague about how the Athenians 'came close to defeat'.

4.130 The Athenians' sack of Mende was an unfair reaction, when they had been opposed by a minority and had been let into the city by democrats who refused to fight against them: the previous constitution was presumably democratic, and any ill

will from punishing the pro-Spartan faction would be incurred not by the Athenians but by the pro-Athenian democrats.

4.132 An Athenian treaty with Perdiccas and Arrhabaeus (*IG* i³ 89) has sometimes, but not in *IG* i³, been assigned to this context. The Spartan Ischagoras will reappear in the diplomacy of 421 (5.19, 21, 24). There was a Spartan law forbidding men of military age to leave Sparta without permission (Isoc. 11. *Bus.* 18): Ischagoras and his colleagues could surely have obtained permission, and perhaps did, but perhaps Thucydides' informant complained of a breach of the law. Spartan city governors of the kind mentioned here were later given the title *harmost* (*harmostes*: cf. 8.5 with note): the Greek text does not make it clear who had not wished the appointments to be left to chance, but it is fairly certain that Brasidas appointed the governors, and to that extent at least he broke his earlier promises (cf. 4.85–8). Clearidas will refuse to hand back Amphipolis to Athens after the Peace of Nicias (cf. 5.21, 34).

4.133.1–3 *Boeotia; Argos*. Because of the one-year truce, Thucydides has little other material for the summer of 423. There were to be further bouts of Athenian sympathy in Thespieae, in southern Boeotia, in 414 (6.95) and in the fourth century; the battle against the Athenians was that at Delium (cf. 4.96). It is surprising that Thucydides sees fit to mention the fire which destroyed the temple of Hera, c.5 miles (8 km) north-east of

Argos (where the building of a new temple had already been begun): his most likely reason is that the priestess was used as a basis for chronology (cf. 2.2).

4.133.4 *Brasidas in the north-east (v)*. For the siege of Scione, cf. Ar., *Vesp.* 209–10, of early 422.

4.134–5 Ninth winter (423/2)

4.134 *Mantineia and Tegea*. The two cities, c.10 miles (16 km) apart in southeastern Arcadia (cf. 5.64), were old rivals, and both had interests in western Arcadia. It is striking that this quarrel between members of the Peloponnesian League could break out when the Peloponnesian War was suspended but not ended. Presumably the right wing of each army was successful (cf. 5.71); Pausanias saw the Mantinean dedication at Delphi (10.13.6).

4.135 *Brasidas in the north-east (vi)*. It appears that, to ensure that sentries stayed awake at night, a bell had to be passed from one to the next (cf. Ar., Av. 1160); when one man went to pass on the bell, his own section of wall was for a short time unguarded.

BOOK FIVE

5.1–12 Tenth summer (422)

5.1 *Delos*. The translation, with Canfora's emendation, reproduces what Thucydides must have meant, but the manuscripts' text

would mean ‘came to an end until the Pythian games’. The games were held about August in the third year of each Olympiad: the truce must have been extended for about five months, and (although Thucydides stresses Cleon’s eagerness to attack Scione) the Athenian assembly must have agreed to that extension.

The purification was reported in 3.104; the offence was perhaps the massacre of Aeolian pilgrims (Hyp. fr. A.1.4 in the Loeb *Minor Attic Orators*, ii). Atramyttium was at the head of the gulf north-east of Lesbos, and there is no evidence that it ever belonged to the Delian League. Pharnaces was the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. note to 1.128–34).

5.2–3 *Brasidas in the north-east (vii)*. Thucydides’ presentation suggests to an uncharacteristic extent that Cleon obtained the assembly’s permission to do what he wanted. He will have been one of the regular generals for 422/1, and in this short campaign (about August–September) he was successful: his capture of Torone by direct assault was a rare achievement. The Still Harbour was to the south of the city. Torone seems to have become Brasidas’ headquarters; there can have been no secret about Cleon’s expedition, and on the facts presented by Thucydides Brasidas’ absence appears culpable.

5.3 Panactum was probably at Kavasala, north of Eleusis and east of Plataea. The narrative is unnecessarily disjointed: this sentence

could as well have been placed after the sentence about Cleon which follows.

5.4–5 *Athens and the west (xi)*. Thucydides backtracks to continue the western narrative from 4.65. Phaeax first appears in comedy in Ar., *Eq.* 1377–80; he was one of the men who attracted votes in the ostracism of (probably) 415, for which see note to 6.6. Leontini had moved towards democracy, and the upper-class citizens chose to merge their city with Syracuse rather than have their land taken from them. Whatever the western Greeks thought, the Athenians will not have thought that their western alliances were ended by the treaty of 424. Acragas, not previously mentioned by Thucydides, was on the south coast of Sicily west of its mother-city Gela, and after Syracuse was the richest and strongest city on the island.

5.5 Locri had not joined in the treaty of 424; it was now contemplating a treaty; but we hear no more of that, and in 415 it was anti-Athenian again (cf. 6.44).

5.6–12 *Brasidas in the north-east (viii)*. For the topographical details, see Map 6. In these chapters Thucydides frequently attributes thoughts to Cleon and Brasidas. Neither lived long to report his thoughts to others; information on Brasidas may be derived from Clearidas (cf. note to 4.70). The Odomantians (cf. 2.101) lived east of the Strymon, inland from Amphipolis. Cerdylum was perhaps the hill at 339 m., directly west of Amphipolis.

5.7 The comments on Cleon's leadership seem unfair: he had been successful at Torone; his forces were a fair match for Brasidas' forces, but it was reasonable to wait for his reinforcements and to attack Amphipolis after they arrived. The statement that his troops had been reluctant to serve under him is remarkable, and we may wonder whether it has been projected back from their discontent at this stage. It is hard to see the point of reconnaissance in force: perhaps Cleon hoped to tempt Brasidas to fight in circumstances in which the Athenians could win. Marshall's emendation, which we accept, makes 'his purpose in waiting . . .' part of what he said to his troops. The hill in front of Amphipolis is perhaps that at 133 m. to the north-east of the city.

5.8 Brasidas took his whole force back to the city: he needed his men with him, not on the far side of the river. Although his hoplites were not Spartan citizens, it is surprising that he should have considered his army inferior in quality to Cleon's. The Athenian hoplites were presumably citizens (literally 'undiluted'), and possibly a selected body of the better hoplites; Cleon had taken Lemnians and Imbrians (Athenian cleruchs) to Pylos in 425 (cf. 4.28).

5.9 Different parts of Brasidas' speech are addressed to different parts of his force; in view of the content of the earlier part, the opening 'Peloponnesians' is not unreasonable.

5.10 The Thracian Gates were at the north-east corner of the city.

Cleon appears to have continued further north, so could not himself see what was happening in Amphipolis; feet of men and horses could not have been seen under the gates from his hill, so if this is a true report and not just vivid writing some Athenians must have risked going very close to the city. Cleon seems not to have given detailed instructions in advance for the withdrawal to be carried out when signalled. Apparently the Athenian force had been facing west or south-west, with its left wing nearest to Eïon, and the whole phalanx now made a quarter turn to the left, to face south or south-east, with the unshielded right flank exposed to the enemy. The palisade, joining the north-west corner of the city wall to the bridge, seems to have been built after Brasidas had occupied Amphipolis: Brasidas will have taken the road skirting the northern stretch of the wall. Cleon as commander will have been on the right wing in the original formation, which became the rear in the withdrawal. His death is made to seem as disgraceful as possible: his men were inclined to fight back but he was not, and he was killed by a barbarian peltast. Brasidas fought bravely, and learnt of his victory before dying.

5.11 Religion plays a significant part in Thucydides' treatment of Brasidas (Hornblower), and after his death Brasidas was venerated as a hero. More remarkably, the buildings in honour of Hagnon show that he, though still alive, had been venerated

as a hero (I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 228–32); this is one of the first secure instances in Greece of religious honours for a living man. Fear of the Athenians is not surprising: what had been defeated was a small army, and Athens might well have sent a larger force to avenge the defeat and recover Amphipolis. The disparity between casualties on the winning and losing side was greater in such circumstances than in a regular hoplite battle (cf. note to 4.101).

5.12 Heracleia continued to have a chequered history: see next 5.51–2.

5.13–24 Tenth winter (422/1)

5.13 *Brasidas in the north-east (postscript)*. Rhamphias and his men, though ‘aware . . . that the Spartans had their minds predominantly on peace’, must have been sent at the prompting of Spartans who were not thinking of peace. But Brasidas’ death removed the Spartan most eager to continue the war, and Athens’ defeat increased the likelihood that Athens would agree to terms acceptable to Sparta.

5.14–24 *The Peace of Nicias*. The previous offer which Athens had rejected was made in 425 (4.17–22, cf. 4.41). For the Spartans’ original expectations, cf. 4.85, 7.28, but note the warning of Archidamus in 1.81. The Helots were not rebelling on the scale which Athens hoped and Sparta feared (cf. note to 4.41); for

the earlier revolt, cf. 1.101–3. Thucydides has not previously mentioned the treaty between Sparta and its Peloponnesian rival Argos: the fact that after its expiry Argos would be free to fight against Sparta would be a major consideration in the next few years.

5.15 Thucydides' point seems to be that the captives included important men, with important relatives who were not captured but still in Sparta. In his account of the one-year truce (4.117–19) the motive which he stressed was Athens' desire to break Brasidas' run of successes in the north-east.

5.16 On the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas, cf. Ar., *Pax* 261–86: even in Brasidas' case Thucydides suggests a personal rather than a patriotic motive. Nicias, however, though his reluctance to take risks is emphasized, is allowed to think of the citizens' as well as of his own advantage. Pleistoanax' return from exile (cf. 1.114, 2.21) has not been mentioned before: his exile lasted perhaps from 445/4 to 427/6; apart from his working for peace we know nothing of his activities since his return. What follows has a strongly Herodotean flavour (Hornblower). Pleistoanax' grandfather Cleomenes was said to have corrupted the Delphic oracle in the 490s (Hdt. 5.62–5). The 'demigod son of Zeus' was Heracles, the supposed ancestor of the Spartan kings; ploughing with a silver ploughshare seems to be an allusion to famine. Mount Lycaeus was in southwestern Arcadia. Pleistoanax' father Pausanias had died when trapped in a sanctuary (cf.

1.134). The dances and sacrifices will belong to a later reconstruction of Sparta's origins—perhaps made for this occasion.

5.17 The possibility of the Peloponnesians' building a hostile fort was mentioned in 1.122 (the Corinthians), 1.142 (Pericles). The conferences apparently involved ten Spartans and ten Athenians, and no allies of either (cf. Diod. Sic. 12.75.4). The return of conquered territory did not apply to Potidaea and Aegina (already in the Athenian bloc at the beginning of the war) or to north-western Greece (covered by the treaty of 3.114). Sparta's meeting was of all the Peloponnesian League, including Boeotia, but probably not Sparta's new allies in the north-east. The objectors' reasons will emerge below (esp. 5.29–31); in addition, all the allies might object that Sparta had embarked on the war to liberate the Greeks from Athens (2.8, cf. 4.85–7) but now was accepting a return to the position of 431 in order to recover its prisoners from Pylos. The Boeotians (5.26 with note) and Chalcidians (6.10) made 'ten-day' truces with Athens; later the Corinthians asked for one but Athens refused (5.32). The fact that several of Sparta's allies refused to join the peace, and that Sparta was not punctilious in enforcing the peace (cf. 5.21, on Amphipolis), was a serious flaw: superficially the terms indicated that Sparta had failed to break the power of Athens, but Athens was unwise to agree to this incomplete peace.

5.18 None of Athens' allies, inside or outside the Delian League, were consulted or invited to swear; for Sparta's allies, cf. above; but the intention was that all the allies of each should be bound by the treaty. For Delphi, cf. the one-year truce (4.118). Amphipolis was never recovered by Athens, and was finally taken by Philip of Macedon in 357. Aristeides was responsible for the original assessment of the Delian League's tribute (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 23.5), presumably at a lower level than Athens was demanding after 425 (cf. note to 4.50). Sane is not the Sane on Athos (4.109) but the Sane on Pallene (Hdt. 7.123). For Coryphasium as the Spartans' name for Pylos, cf. 4.3: because of Sparta's incomplete implementation, Athens refused to return Pylos and other places occupied, but it eventually withdrew the Messenians from Pylos (5.35); Cythera fought for the Athenians in 413 (7.57). Olympia and the Isthmus were within the territory of states which refused to join the peace, Elis and Corinth, but the pillars may still have been set up there; the Amyclaeum was the sanctuary of Apollo and Hyacinthus at Amyclae, about 3 miles (5 km) south of Sparta proper. Sparta's allies noticed with anger that they were not to be consulted about amendments (cf. 5.29).

5.19 The Greek dating formulas state 'on the xth day of the waning month': Athens counted the days backwards in the last decade of the month, and our translation assumes that Sparta did likewise. Sparta's seventeen men are the two kings, the five

ephors, and ten others; Athens' seventeen include ten in tribal order from Procles to Leon; and the two sets of ten will have been those involved in the conferences of 5.17. The Athenian Lampon was a man active in religious matters from the 440s onwards.

5.20 We are still just in Thucydides' year 422/1; his next year begins in 5.24. Thus according to his own scheme the war lasted slightly less than ten years—yet most scholars accept that the Greek text means 'plus a few days': that is presumably based on some kind of calculation in terms of solar years (Andrewes). In any chronological scheme precise dating requires not simply the year but the point within the year; because of the differences between states' calendars the same point could belong to different years (as we reckon them) in different states; and what Thucydides particularly needed to say here was that the length of the Archidamian War might be nine, ten, or eleven years according to the calendar being used. Cf. his objection to Hellanicus' chronology, in 1.97.

5.21 The allotment (cf. 5.35) was not mentioned in the treaty as quoted by Thucydides; it is not clear why the two sides should not have been required to implement the treaty simultaneously. The Chalcidians of Olynthus had refused the treaty, so were not bound to implement it; but they were some distance from Amphipolis, and could hardly have

prevented Clearidas from handing over Amphipolis if he had been determined to do so.

5.22 Lloyd-Jones's emendation assumes that the allies left Sparta and returned—about two weeks later. For what the Spartans thought about Argos we accept the explanation and emendation of Gomme. Lichas is to make a number of later appearances: most relevantly here, he was Argos' consular representative in Sparta (cf. 5.76). Mantinea and Elis did join Argos and Athens (5.47), but there was no likelihood that Corinth or Megara would join Athens.

5.23 The terms are largely symmetrical; but Athens was to support Sparta against a rising of the Helots, whereas there was no danger of a rising of the chattel slaves at Athens. The Dionysia at Athens was slightly before the anniversary of the treaty (cf. 5.20); the Hyacinthia at Sparta was perhaps about the same time (cf. 5.41).

5.24 The oath-takers are the same as in 5.19, but there are differences in the order of the names: it is possible that in that respect the manuscripts correctly report what Thucydides wrote and that he correctly reproduced the documents which he saw. Athens did restore Sparta's prisoners although Sparta failed to restore Amphipolis. The end of the chapter as it now stands reflects Thucydides' later realization that the Peace of Nicias had not ended the war; but he may originally have written something like ' . . . the men captured on the island.

The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, which lasted continuously for these ten years, has now been written.'

5.25–35 Eleventh summer (421)

5.25–6 *Thucydides' second preface.* Thucydides came to realize that the Peace of Nicias had not ended the war, and so wrote this second preface to introduce his narrative of the war's continuation: in 5.25 he looks ahead over the period of increasingly insecure peace to the renewed outbreak of open war. The ephor and archon are those named in 5.19. The six years and ten months seem precise but are problematic: if we count from the making of the Peace, which seems to be implied, we reach midwinter 415/4, where there is not a crucial change; the points at which Athens and Sparta ceased sparing each other's territory were Athens' raid on Laconia, in summer 414 (6.105), and Sparta's occupation of Deceleia, in spring 413 (7.19).

5.26 Here Thucydides echoes 1.1, and, for 'chronological order, by summers and winters', 2.1. This chapter must have been written after the end of the war, but Thucydides' surviving narrative ends in the autumn of 411 (cf. Introduction, pp. xxv–xxviii). By 'the Mantinean and Epidaurian campaigns' Thucydides means those which begin in 5.53, including the battle of Mantinea in 418, which is recounted in 5.64–75. A 'ten-day' truce is probably one which could be ended at ten days' notice (e.g. Andrewes), though some scholars believe it

had to be renewed every ten days (e.g. Hornblower). ‘Plus a few days’ uses the same Greek verb as was used in 5.20: Plut., *Lys.* 15 allows us to date Lysander’s entry into Athens, after Athens had accepted Sparta’s peace terms, in late April 404, and it is reasonably certain that that acceptance was slightly over twenty-seven years after the attack on Plataea in 2.2–6; for Thucydides’ uncharacteristic acknowledgement that the oracle was right, cf. Introduction, p. xlv. The restoration of exiles was prescribed in the peace treaty of 404 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.20); behind a reference to Thucydides’ being recalled ‘after the defeat in Sicily’ (Marcellin., *Vit. Thuc.* 32, cf. Paus. 1.23.9) perhaps lies an offer which he did not accept. For a suggestion that he spent part of his exile in Corinth, cf. Introduction, p. xxv.

5.27–32 *Formation of Argive alliance.* For fear of joint domination by Sparta and Athens, cf. the end of 5.29, and earlier, 4.20; also Ar., *Pax* 1080–2. Argos had never acknowledged Sparta’s supremacy, and defections from Sparta’s alliance would give it the opportunity to challenge Sparta’s leading position. The suggestion that open application to the assembly should be avoided is the first sign of the lack of trust which was to bedevil the negotiations of the next few years (cf. esp. 5.38).

5.28 The details in 5.40 may indicate that by the beginning of Thucydides’ summer 420 the treaty had expired. For the

advantage to Argos of noninvolvement in the Archidamian War, cf. Ar., *Pax* 475–7.

5.29 For Mantinea's pursuit of its local interests during the Archidamian War, cf. 4.134. This is the first of a number of passages in which Thucydides notes the affinity of states with similar constitutions (cf. 5.31, 44; also 5.76, 81–2); Hornblower stresses the ongoing connection between Mantinea and Argos. On the provision for amendment Thucydides here uses the words of the alliance between Sparta and Athens (5.23), but the substance appears in the Peace of Nicias though in different words (5.18).

5.30 For the rules of the Peloponnesian League, cf. de Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 105–23, 339–40—though probably the reality was less clear and coherent than his presentation of it. For Sollium, cf. 2.30, for Anactorium, 4.49: these had been taken by the Acarnanians, allies of Athens but not members of the Delian League and perhaps not committed to the Peace of Nicias—but by 413 Anactorium was in Athenian hands (7.31).

5.31 For Lepreum, between Olympia and Messenia in territory claimed by Elis, see T. H. Nielsen, in Hansen and Nielsen, *Inventory*, 543–4. We cannot date the war with Arcadia, but it was probably after 479, when Lepreum was independent of Elis (Hdt. 9.28, with 9.77). Lepreum was reconquered by Elis before the end of the fifth century (Xen., *Hell.* 3.2.23–5); with

its region of Triphylia it was made independent by Sparta at the beginning of the fourth century, and was later incorporated into Arcadia. The clause cited by the Eleans does not appear in the Peace of Nicias as quoted in 5.18: Andrewes suggests that they were trying to apply within the Peloponnesian alliance the principle stated in 5.17, 'that each side should give back what they had won in the war'; Hornblower prefers to think of a pre-war agreement between the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians will be those centred on Olynthus.

5.32 For the fate of Scione, cf. 4.122, 5.18; but according to 4.123 the children and women had been evacuated to Olynthus. For the Plataeans, cf. note to 3.55: Gomme pointed out that they could preserve their identity better in Scione than by being absorbed into Athens. For the Delians, cf. 5.1. Thucydides says no more about the war between the Phocians and Locrians, but 5.64 considers both as potential allies of Sparta in 418. Mantinea had joined the Argive alliance (cf. 5.29), and Mantinea and its neighbour Tegea are often found on opposite sides (cf. 4.134). It is not clear why Athens treated Boeotia and Corinth differently: Hornblower notes that Corinth was estranged from Sparta but Boeotia was not.

5.33–35.1 *Summer campaigns.* Parrhasia was the far south-west of Arcadia; Sciritis proper was northern Laconia to the east of the Eurotas, but land further west may at this time have been considered part of Sciritis.

5.34 Here we encounter for the first time ‘previously liberated cohorts’ (*neodamodeis*): Thucydides never explains, but they seem to have been Helots who, unlike those serving under Brasidas (cf. 4.80), were liberated when recruited into the army; presumably the citizens of Lepreum agreed to receive them, as a larger citizen body would strengthen them in their independence. After its anxiety to recover the prisoners from Pylos, it is remarkable how Sparta distrusted them after their return.

5.35 Dium had remained loyal to Athens in 424/3 (4.109), but was to defect to Sparta in 417 (5.82).

5.35.2–8 *Non-fulfilment of treaty*. After the Peace there were various incidents which one side could have regarded as a breach of it by the other (notice particularly 5.56), but it did not suit either side to regard the Peace as at an end until 413 (cf. Introduction, p. xix). The immediate ‘mutual mistrust’ here differs from, and cannot belong to, the same spell of thinking and writing as ‘As time went on’ in 5.25: cf. Introduction, p. xxviii. For the allotment and Sparta’s failure to return Amphipolis to Athens, cf. 5.21. As with the ex-Helots settled by Sparta in Lepreum, presumably the citizens of Cranii agreed to take these Helots: we are given no indication of how numerous they were.

5.36–9 Eleventh winter (421/0)

Spartan intrigues with Boeotia. The first sentence of 5.36 is the best indication that Sparta's official year began in the autumn—probably at the new moon after the equinox. The

manuscripts' text in the middle of 5.36 is very clumsy:

‘persuade Boeotia first itself to ally with Argos and then with Boeotia to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta’, and then after a long parenthesis it is Cleoboulus and Xenares who want ‘greater freedom to conduct a war outside the Peloponnese’: we have therefore adopted a series of emendations favoured by Gomme and Andrewes. For Panactum, cf. 5.3. Cleoboulus and Xenares expected Boeotia to cooperate in Sparta's plans, although it had not joined in the Peace of Nicias; they also assumed that Boeotia would be able to align the Argive alliance with Sparta, though 5.37 shows the Argives thinking otherwise.

5.37 A later reference, 5.47, suggests that the highest officials in Argos at this time were the Artynae, though other texts point to a board of Demiurgi.

5.38 The Boeotarchs (cf. 2.2, 4.91) began not by responding to Argos but by swearing solidarity with other states outside both the Argive alliance and the Peace of Nicias. *Hell. Oxy.* 19. 2–4 Chambers states that in the individual cities of Boeotia the full citizens possessed of a property qualification were divided into four councils which in turn prepared business for the other three, and that each of the eleven units of the federation

supplied one Boeotarch and sixty members of the federal council; it appears from this passage that the federal council was divided into quarters in the same way as the citizen bodies of the individual cities. Here by expecting tame acquiescence and not divulging their ulterior purpose the Boeotarchs failed to obtain the agreement which they would have obtained if they had divulged it; but Andrewes points out that that purpose might then have become known to the Argives, who did not share it.

5.39 It is a sign of the unfinished nature of this part of his history (cf. Introduction, p. xviii) that Thucydides twice repeats in this chapter what he has already said in 5.36 about the Spartans' hopes for Panactum and Pylos. The Boeotians, who presumably remained members of the Peloponnesian League, and who in 5.38 wanted to remain on good terms with Sparta, now wanted a direct alliance like that which Sparta had made with Athens. That alliance, as quoted in 5.23, does not include the clause mentioned here, but it may have been assumed, or else added under the provision for amendment. We have to wait until 5.40 to be told that it is the Boeotians who demolished Panactum, and until 5.42 to be told their pretext.

5.40–50 Twelfth summer (420)

5.40–8 *Various intrigues.* Thucydides perhaps places Argos' knowledge of the demolition of Panactum too soon (though Hornblower is unworried): the Spartans discover that it has

happened in 5.42. It was a hindrance to Sparta's dealings with Athens that Panactum was demolished, and either the Argives were or Thucydides was irrational about this (to save Thucydides from that, Gomme wanted to emend 'demolish' to 'hand over'). What Argos aimed at, peace with Sparta and neutrality, was in effect a renewal of the thirty-year treaty which seems by now to have expired.

5.41 According to Paus. 2.38.5, there was eventually an arbitration in favour of Argos. For Cynouria, cf. 4.56 (and 2.27, which does not use the name). Thucydides does not mention Anthene elsewhere; we should expect him to mention the surviving Aeginetans as occupants of Thyrea. For the battle 'once before', in the mid-sixth century, fought originally by three hundred champions on each side, see Hdt. 1.82.

5.42 Thucydides' language suggests that he does not accept the Boeotian claim: the Peace of Nicias had stated that Panactum was to be returned to Athens (5.18), but the Boeotians had not sworn to the Peace.

5.43 For a comment on Alcibiades' flamboyant and selfish character we have to wait until 6.15: though more relevant there, it is not irrelevant here. He was born in 451/0 (Davies, *APF*, 18, cf. Plut., *Alc.* 15), and after his father's death at Coroneia in 447/6 (cf. 1.113) he was brought up by Pericles, who was a cousin on his mother's side. He was first mentioned in comedy in 427 (Ar. fr. 198. 6 Kock/Edmonds = 205. 6 Kassel and

Austin, from *Banqueters*); that he was involved in the reassessment of the Delian League's tribute in 425 (cf. note to 4.50), as alleged by [Andoc.] 4. *Alc.* 11, is unlikely, but we can accept what Thucydides says of his looking after the Spartans captured at Pylos in that year; he is now attested as the proposer of a decree in 422/1 (*SEG* 1 45). For once Thucydides does not say that 'in word' he considered alliance with Argos a better policy but 'in deed' he was motivated by pique (cf. Introduction, p. xxxiv), but accepts both considerations as genuine. The likeliest occasion for the renunciation of the consular position by his grandfather, another Alcibiades, is the breach between Athens and Sparta in 462/1 (cf. 1.102); it seems not to have saved him from being ostracized (Lys. 14. *Alc.* 1. 39, [Andoc.] 4. *Alc.* 34). We learn, but not until 8.6, that 'Alcibiades' was a Spartan name, which had entered this family because of its Spartan connection.

- 5.44** For links between Argos and Athens in the legendary past (if that is what is meant) see e.g. Aesch., *Eum.* 762–74. In the fifth century Argos had been an ally of Athens from c.462/1 (cf. 1.102) until the making of its thirty-year treaty with Sparta. For the absence of the Corinthians from this alliance (contr. 5.27, 31), cf. 5.48. Of the Spartan envoys, Philocharidas was one of the Spartans involved in making the one-year truce of 423 and the Peace of Nicias (4.119, 5.19); Leon could be the founder of Sparta's colony at Heracleia (cf.

3.92), but the name is not rare; Endius belonged to the family with which Alcibiades' family was connected (8.6).

5.45 It is hard to accept the story of deceit exactly as Thucydides tells it. Greek states had a tendency to give men full authority (make them *autokratores*) on particular occasions without specifying how and how far their powers were enhanced, but it is unlikely that Sparta was willing to make major concessions to Athens, or undertook to accept whatever terms its envoys could be persuaded to agree to in Athens. Presumably Alcibiades did deceive the Spartans somehow, but we cannot reconstruct exactly what happened. Thucydides sees no ulterior significance in the earthquake (cf. Introduction, p. xlv), which in fact merely delayed the outcome.

5.46 Gomme noted that Nicias was trying to play the strong man, but could hardly expect the Spartans to rebuild Panactum. The oath sworn to him by the Spartans was presumably additional to the annual renewal prescribed in 5.23.

5.47 The copy of the treaty published in Athens has survived (Tod 72 = *IG* i³ 83). There are a number of verbal disagreements (though fewer than used to be supposed: see Hornblower), as there are between inscriptions when multiple copies of a text survive: the Greeks do not seem to have thought word-for-word identity mattered. It is possible, but cannot be verified, that Thucydides has reproduced verbatim the text which he saw (Gomme suggested the copy set up at Olympia). Argos,

Mantineia, and Elis were already allies, so this treaty takes the form of an alliance between Athens and all of them, whether individually or collectively. The alliance begins with defensive provisions, but the reference later to ‘a joint external campaign’ shows that it is a full offensive and defensive alliance. For the issue of passage through the allies’ territory, cf. 4.78 with note to 4.78–88. 3 Aeginetan obols = 4.3 Athenian obols, and 1 drachma is double that in each system (see Appendix). Athens swore for all its allies, as in the Peace of Nicias (see note to 5.18). We should expect the treaty to specify which city magistrates were to swear for Athens, as for the other participants: the generals are the most likely, but practice varied from one occasion to another, and on some occasions a large number of men swore. The Olympic festival was held about August; the Panathenaea at the end of the first month of the Athenian year, about July (see Appendix); the Olympics and the Great Panathenaea were each quadrennial, the Olympics falling in 420 (cf. 5.49–50) and the next Great Panathenaea in 418. The intention seems to have been that renewal should be about the same time in alternate years (Hornblower). Documents of Elis were regularly published at Olympia, so the copy there will have served both for Elis and for the alliance as a whole (Andrewes).

5.48 For the original alliance as a defensive alliance, cf. 5.27; the subsequent upgrading of that to a full alliance has not been

mentioned before. Andrewes notes that Corinth's objection to Sparta was only to its making peace with Athens, and as the likelihood of renewed war increased Corinth returned to its normal allegiance.

5.49–50 *Sparta banned from Olympic games.* As in 3.8, Thucydides identifies the festival by the winner of the pancratium. Phyrus has not been identified; for Lepreum (which the Spartans did not regard as belonging to Elis), see note to 5.31. Festival truces covered those travelling to attend the festival and the territory of the state holding the festival (Hornblower).

5.50 Harpine was upstream from Olympia. When Sparta went to war against Elis c.402–400, that was to take revenge for its exclusion now (there is no reason to believe, as some have done, that Sparta was excluded on subsequent occasions too: see Hornblower). Gomme, characteristically, suggested that the earthquake merely served as an excuse for ending discussions which were clearly going to achieve nothing.

5.51 Twelfth winter (420/19)

Heracleia in Trachis. Xenares is probably the man first mentioned as ephor in 5.36 (Andrewes, Hornblower: Gomme was agnostic).

Mostly Argos. On Spartan misrule in Heracleia, cf. 3.93, where the same Greek expression is used. Alcibiades will have been general for 420/19. Isoc. 14. *Team of Horses* 15 perhaps refers

to this episode; for Patrae, cf. note to 2.83–92. Gomme regarded the flamboyant campaign as typical of Alcibiades.

5.53 Hornblower notes that it was in 420/19 that the cult of Asclepius was introduced into Athens from Epidaurus (see note to 2.48). The war between Argos and Epidaurus will continue until 418/7, when Argos makes peace with Sparta after the battle of Mantinea (5.77, 80). Thucydides expects his readers to know about the temple of Apollo, strictly Pythaeus, which was perhaps at Asine, south-east of Argos; Epidaurus perhaps had a lesser share in its administration; we have retained the otherwise unattested *botamion* and translate it ‘pasture-rights’, on which see Hornblower (who takes the Botamia to be a festival), but some manuscripts have *parapotamion*, ‘the area across the river’ (see textual note). Corinth and Epidaurus were old friends (cf. 1.27), but it is not clear how Epidaurus’ defection would ‘keep Corinth quiet’.

5.54 Leuctra (or Leuctrum) was in the north-west of Laconia: going there would suggest that Sparta’s objective was Elis, but would not exclude a turn towards Mantinea. The cities referred to are apparently those of Sparta’s Perioeci (Hornblower, contr. Gomme and Andrewes). For Sparta’s mustering an army without stating the objective, cf. Hdt. 5.74 (but this decision was probably not taken by Agis on his own, as that by Cleomenes was: cf. the kings’ right to make war claimed in Hdt. 6.56). On *diabateria*, sacrifices before crossing

the frontier, which are attested particularly for Sparta, see Pritchett, *GSW*, iii. 68–71. For Sparta's avoidance of campaigning at the time of the Carneia (the month corresponded approximately to our August), cf. Hdt. 6.106, 7.206; Argos was to manipulate its calendar again in the 380s (Xen., *Hell.* 4.7.2–3, cf. 5.1.29). The Carneia did not prevent or delay the battle of Mantinea in 418 (cf. 5.75); see also on 5.82.

5.55 Thucydides is perfunctory in his treatment of a conference which achieved nothing: Andrewes points out that it could have been instigated either by Athenians wanting to preserve the Peace or by Athenians wanting to score points against Sparta. Euphamidas may be the man of that name mentioned in 2.33, 4.119. Caryae was in the north-east of Laconia, on the route to Argos via Arcadia.

5.56 Thirteenth winter (419/18)

Argos. Sparta's winter naval expedition was unexpectedly daring. Andrewes suggests that Argos was regarding not the whole of the sea but the Saronic Gulf as Athenian 'territory'; the Athenian reaction was to declare the Spartans to be in breach of the Peace of Nicias, but not yet to declare the Peace to be at an end.

5.57–60 *Spartan attack on Argos.* See Map 7. 'Middle' indicates that this episode was later than the normal beginning of the campaigning season, in Thucydides' spring: he does not explain why Sparta acted now rather than earlier. For the use of attendant infantry with cavalry, cf. Xen., *Hell.* 7.5.23–4, *Hipparch.* 5.13, and Caes. *BG* 1.48.5.

5.58 Methydrium was to the west of Mantinea, which the Spartans were avoiding. The Corinthian contingent set out 'before dawn' (the meaning of the manuscripts' text) on its route to the Argive plain, but Agis must have started earlier and travelled by night.

5.59 The Argive army was between the Boeotian contingent and Agis' contingent; Agis' contingent was between the Argive army and the city of Argos. Thucydides apparently judges Agis' position to be more favourable (but see Hornblower); whether that is correct depends on how near the Boeotian contingent was; the commanders on each side were willing to

make a truce, but the soldiers on each side thought their commanders had thrown away an opportunity of victory. It is possible that the non-arrival of the Athenians was due to a reduced enthusiasm for conflict at this stage (cf. next note but one), but Andrewes thought it might be due only to logistical problems.

5.60 ‘The officials’ with Agis will have included the polemarchs, the officers ranking next below himself (cf. 5.66), and two of the ephors (Xen., *Lac.* 13.1, 5). That this was ‘the finest Greek army ever raised so far’ is surprising in the light of such passages as 2.9, 11; some commentators have inferred from ‘seen’ that the exiled Thucydides himself saw this army. The Charadrus, dry at most times in the year, ran round the north and east of the city of Argos: Hornblower notes the contrast between the (more disciplined) Spartan and the Argive reactions.

5.61–3 *Argive attack on Orchomenus and Tegea.* Gomme was excessively sceptical of such political explanations, but it is possible that Alcibiades had not been elected general for 418/7 and that that reflects a change of mood in Athens.

5.62 Elis’ interest in Lepreum is clear, but the loss of Tegea would have done much more to weaken Sparta.

5.63 If the truce had led to a treaty between Sparta and Argos (cf. 5.59), Agis could have claimed that it was justified; but Argos’ joining in the attack on Orchomenus showed that it would not,

and so weakened his position. He was perhaps tried by the *gerousia* (including the other king) and the ephors (D. M. MacDowell, *Spartan Law* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1996), 133–4; Hornblower). For demolition of the house, cf. the treatment of Leotychidas after his campaign of probably 478 in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72); Agis probably could not have paid so large a fine (equivalent to more than 23 Athenian talents), though Andrewes suggests that the kings were exempt from the ban on owning silver. Advisers had previously been imposed on unsuccessful admirals (e.g. 2.85). The manuscripts' text would mean 'withdraw . . . from the city', but Haase's 'from enemy land' fits what Agis had done and makes better sense of the Greek verb. Agis' command at Mantinea was unfettered (see. 5.66), and we hear no more of threats to him after his victory at Mantinea.

5.64–75.3 *Battle of Mantinea*. See Map 8. Sparta's route up the Eurotas valley via Orestheium was not the most direct but was the easiest (cf. its use in 479: Hdt. 9.11). The temple of Heracles has been located in the northern part of the hourglass-shaped plain, south-east of Mantinea (W. K. Pritchett, accepted by Andrewes in his addenda (vol. v, p. 457) and by Hornblower).

5.65 The Argive position was probably on the lower slopes of Mount Alesium, east of Mantinea. 'Curing one mistake with another' was a proverbial phrase, found in Hdt. 3.53 and in

tragedy; and ‘for this or another reason’ is Herodotean too (e.g. Hdt. 4.147): this is a surprising way for Thucydides to write of Agis’ change of tactics. By ‘returning to Tegean territory’ Agis moved into the southern part of the plain: the watercourses were probably not the same then as now, but he seems to have interfered shortly to the south of the gap (Andrewes, vol. v, pp. 457–8; Hornblower). The facts that he went ‘out of sight’ of the Argives, and that when returning northwards (5.66) he was caught unprepared by the Argives, are easier to explain if we can assume that the Pelagos wood, first mentioned in the second century AD by Paus. 8.11.1, 5, already existed and blocked the view through the gap where the plain narrows (accepted by Andrewes, doubted by Hornblower).

5.66 The Spartans had been in frightening situations before, notably at Thermopylae in 480 and at Pylos in 425 (4.2–41); the point here is that they had never before been so seriously surprised. As Gomme remarks, Sparta was not unique in having subsidiary units and commanders in its army, but the Spartan system was exceptionally elaborate and efficient.

5.67 For the Sciritae, see note to 5.33–35.1; Hornblower argues that Brasidas’ veterans include his mercenaries as well as his Helots. Because of the dynamics of a hoplite phalanx, to be explained in 5.71, the right wing was the most honourable position, and the left wing ranked next (cf. Hdt. 9.26–8). On

the Argive side, Hornblower follows T. H. Nielsen in suggesting that the ‘allies from Arcadia’ were Maenalian, opposed to those fighting for Sparta. This is the first mention of Argos’ select force, with which we may compare the Sacred Band of 300 Thebans (e.g. Plut., *Pel.* 18–19), and the *eparittoi* of the Arcadian federation (e.g. Xen., *Hell.* 7.4.33), in the fourth century.

5.68 After complaining of Spartan secrecy and claiming that accurate numbers could not be given for either side (Hornblower compares Hdt. 4.81, 7.170), Thucydides gives an account of the Spartan army which would permit a calculation: 3,584 + 600 Sciritae ? + 300 Knights = 4,184 or 4,484 Spartans (it is not clear whether the Knights of 5.72 are included in this structure). However, there is a slightly different account of the Spartan army in Xen., *Lac.* 11.4; and, while it is possible that each is correct for the time to which it refers, there is a good case (accepted by Andrewes and Hornblower) for believing that each is a slightly inaccurate account of the same structure. If so, Thucydides should perhaps have said, ‘They had seven regiments [*morai*: six regular regiments and one of liberated Helots]. . . . There were two divisions [*lochoi*] to each regiment, four companies [*pentekostyes*] to each division, and four units [*enomotiai*] to each company.’ The result would then be 6,144 regular army + 1,024 Brasidean veterans + 600 Sciritae ? + 300 Knights =

7,768 or 8,068 Spartans (including Perioeci, perhaps 60 per cent of the total), from a five-sixths levy (cf. 5.64). Spartan citizen numbers were declining (cf. notes to 1.19, 101–3); but this correction would put more of the decline after 418 and less before (see e.g. de Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 331–2). Variation in depth of line between contingents of a mixed army was common, but it is surprising to find it even within the Spartan contingent.

- 5.69** For the alternatives of sovereignty (sc. over others) and subjection, with nothing between, see note to 2.63; for Argos' claim to supremacy in the Peloponnese, see note to 1.101–3; if Sparta were defeated in a major land-battle in the Peloponnese, the threat to Athens would indeed be at an end.
- 5.70** The advance to music was surely standard, and not only for Sparta (but the Spartan version was perhaps particularly intimidating: cf. Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.10, Plut., *Lyc.* 22); it is surprising even that Thucydides insists on its secular purpose, but it is presumably mentioned here because this was the great hoplite battle of the Peloponnesian War.
- 5.71** All Greeks will have known of hoplites' tendency to shift to the right, and of the reason for it, but the fact is needed to explain what happened on this occasion.
- 5.72** What is striking is that, when Agis decided on corrective action, two of the polemarchs disobeyed. Thus the Spartans began the battle with a gap in their line, and they ought now

if ever to have been defeated—but their general good order (not just ‘courage alone’) was still enough to secure victory over allies not sufficiently practised in fighting together. The ‘so-called Knights’ were in fact hoplites (cf. Hdt. 8.124).

5.73 This chapter ends with a comment which is slightly surprising: the Spartans may have been exceptionally resolute in persisting to the ‘turning point’ (the point where the opposing phalanx gave way), but it was characteristic of Greek armies in general not to engage in long pursuits.

5.74 This was not only the largest-scale hoplite battle in the Peloponnesian War (the last battle on a comparable scale had been that at Tanagra c.457: 1.107–8). It was also of major significance, since victory restored Sparta’s standing in the Peloponnese (cf. 5.75), whereas defeat would have undermined it fatally (cf. 5.69). For the ‘settlers from Aegina’, cf. 2.27.

5.75.1–3 Pleistoanax set out with the reinforcements presumably because it was known that reinforcements were on their way to the other army (cf. 5.75.4–6); if Hdt. 5.75 is correct, the rule stated there about one of the kings must have been relaxed (Hornblower). For the Corinthians and others, cf. 5.64.

5.75.4–6 *Epidaurian attack on Argos*. Uncharacteristically, at this point Gomme suggested that Athens’ sending its forces in instalments was the result of political disagreement, and it was Andrewes who responded that the initial sending of too

small a force, on this occasion and on others, was due to overconfidence. We may wonder how the battle would have turned out if these men and the Eleans had arrived in time.

5.76–81 Fourteenth winter (418/17)

Peace in the Peloponnese. Thucydides' winter began some months after Carneius (cf. on 5.54), and it is perhaps better to delete 'the Carneia now celebrated' as an interpolation. For the link between democracy and alignment with Athens, cf. in general note to 1.19, and for Argos, 5.29, 31, 44. What Thucydides proceeds to give us—for a settlement which lasted only a short time—is a preliminary agreement on the conditions for peace and the basis for an alliance (Spartan decree in 5.77), followed by a 'treaty and alliance', which is in fact a treaty of alliance, not dealing with the other issues (5.78–80, with text quoted 5.79). Sparta had sent Lichas to Argos before (5.22).

5.77 This document (both this and the next are quoted in Doric Greek) begins with current issues which must be resolved if there is to be peace: for the Orchomenians, cf. 5.61 (not referring to children), for the men in Mantinea, cf. 5.61; Maenalian hostages have not previously been mentioned. Argos cannot compel Athens to withdraw from Epidaurus, but is to join Sparta in opposition if Athens will not withdraw. No children held by Sparta have been mentioned. The sacrifice is to Apollo Pythaeus (cf. 5.53); what exactly the solution was is

hard to fathom (cf. Hornblower). The remainder of the document prepares for the alliance, covering the Peloponnese as a whole, and the allies of Sparta and of Argos (in Crete?) outside the Peloponnese. With Argos allied to Sparta, opposition is now to be expected only from outside the Peloponnese, and in particular from Athens, and it seems to be envisaged that Sparta and Argos are to be joint leaders of an enlarged Peloponnesian alliance. That would be a major development, in which Sparta's existing allies might not tamely acquiesce (cf. the fears expressed about the alliance of 421 between Sparta and Athens (5.27, 29)).

5.78 It is not clear whether the allies had time to respond between the agreement of 5.77 and the alliance of 5.79.

5.79 The alliance first repeats points from the agreement; Hornblower follows M. Ostwald in thinking that all rule over Peloponnesian cities by other Peloponnesian cities is forbidden. Then it is stated more clearly that joint campaigns are to be the joint responsibility of Sparta and Argos. Provision for the resolution of disputes is added, on standard lines.

5.80 We do not know of any territory which either might have returned to the other, but there may have been prisoners of war to be returned. Perdiccas has not been mentioned since 5.2, where he was pro-Athenian: 5.83 indicates that he did become an ally of Sparta and Argos. For the alleged Argive

origin of his family, cf. 2.99. Demosthenes' trick enabled Athens on its own to hand over the fort, not in conjunction with the other garrison forces: Andrewes notes that if the Athenians had realized that Argos' new alignment would not last long they might have delayed over this. The treaty which they renewed with Epidaurus will have been the Peace of Nicias.

5.81 Mantinea's truce was for thirty years (Xen., *Hell.* 5.2.2), and Mantinea rejoined the Peloponnesian League. Nothing is said about Elis, but it was in control of Lepreum once more by c.402 (Xen., *Hell.* 3.2.25). It is possible but not certain that the thousand Argives mentioned here were the special force of 5.67; probably there was some joint action before the Spartans went without the Argives to Sicyon (where presumably there was already some form of oligarchy). It is probably this counter-revolution in Argos to which Aen. Tact. 17.2–4 refers.

5.82 Fifteenth summer (417)

Mostly Argos. Of the Achaean cities, only Pellene had supported the Spartans in 418 (5.58–9). Achaea had closer connections with central Greece than with the rest of the Peloponnese, and its loyalty to Sparta seems to have been weak (cf. 2.9, where again Pellene is singled out; 3.92). The Gymnopaediae at Sparta was held in midsummer (cf. Pl., *Lg.* 1.633 C): the Spartans may have intercalated days to postpone the date of the festival (cf. Argos in 5.54), but Hornblower

doubts that; for a story connected with this episode, see Paus. 2.20.1–2. Argos did not formally renew its alliance with Athens until spring 416 (*IG* i³ 86 with ML 77, this part translated Fornara 144, 29–30). Plut., *Alc.* 15 attributes the long walls to Alcibiades. Some Mantineans continued to sympathize with Athens (cf. 6.29), and they may have been among the other Peloponnesians who assisted.

5.83 Fifteenth winter (417/16)

Argos; the north-east. Corinth supported Sparta in 418 (5.57, 64, 75). Its abstention from this attack on Argos is not explained: it attacked Athens in 416 (5.115), but abstained from another Spartan campaign in 416/5 (6.7). The one sentence devoted to Hysiae contrasts strongly with the extended treatment of Athens' dealing with Melos which is to follow (cf. Introduction, p. xxxviii).

ML 77 (cf. above: a financial record for 418/7–415/4) shows that there was Athenian activity in the north-east which Thucydides does not mention: Nicias' aborted campaign seems to be that referred to in lines 20–1 of this inscription and dated about May 418/7, i.e. before the Argive counter-revolution of 5.82.

Mostly Athenian attack on Melos. Hornblower notes that much of Book 5 'has been about the greater and stronger imposing their will on the smaller and weaker'. Alcibiades was presumably a general for 417/6 (stated by Diod. Sic. 12.81.2). Thucydides does not

mention him in connection with Melos, and neither does Diod. Sic. However, [Andoc.] 4. *Alcibiades* 22–3 alleges that he recommended the enslavement of the Melians, and bought and had a son by a Melian woman—an allegation which on chronological grounds is not impossible but which could not have been made until after spring 415, the latest possible date for that text if it were an authentic text written for the occasion to which it ostensibly belongs (the ostracism which resulted in the banishment of Hyperbolus, for which see note to 6.6). That allegation reappears in Plut., *Alc.* 16. For Melos, see 2.9, 3.91 and note to 3.91; its alleged Spartan origin will be invoked in the dialogue which follows; we know nothing about its conduct after the Peace of Nicias to explain this Athenian attack; its being the only Aegean island outside the Delian League was an ongoing provocation to Athens, but Andrewes concludes from the substantial use of allied forces that the attack was not blatantly unjustified. The two generals are not mentioned elsewhere by Thucydides.

Here uniquely Thucydides gives us not opposing speeches but a formal dialogue (5.85–113). It is credible that in an oligarchic state the Athenians were asked to present their case not to the assembly but to ‘the authorities and the privileged few’ (cf. the dialogue proposed by Sparta for negotiations with Athens in 4.22). Thucydides will not have found out easily what was said, since he was in exile from Athens (F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and his History* (Cambridge University Press, 1963), 33, assumed that the Melians who betrayed the city to Athens (5.116) were spared); but his

dialogue can reasonably be judged by the same criteria as his speeches, and accepted as his honest reconstruction, on the basis of such information as he did obtain, of the kinds of argument that he would expect to be used. That is not incompatible with his emphasizing, to an extent which may not fairly represent what was actually said, the Athenians' ruthless insistence on the realities of power. (Cf. Introduction, pp. xxxvi, xlv–xlvi.) Hornblower cites as a precursor Hesiod's parable of the hawk and the nightingale (*Op.* 203–11).

5.85 At 4.88 Thucydides describes Brasidas' speech at Acanthus as a 'seduction'. Melian oligarchs may have kept the Athenians from the assembly as a matter of course, rather than for the reason which Thucydides makes the Athenians allege.

5.86 At 4.88 Thucydides notes that Acanthus was influenced not only by Brasidas' speech but also by his threat of force.

5.89 For renunciation of the argument from the Persian Wars, cf. Euphemus in 6.83; also 1.73. The Athenians claim not that might is right (as some sophists would have done, and cf. Dem. 15. *Liberty of Rhodians* 29) but that when one party is overwhelmingly superior in might the question of right does not arise.

5.90 The Melians reply that it is advantageous that those superior in might should not do all they are capable of (cf. the Athenians in 1.76, Diodotus in 3.44–7). For prediction of the overthrow of the Athenian empire, cf. Pericles in 2.63–4:

when Athens was finally defeated, in 404, it was treated more leniently by Sparta than some of Sparta's allies wished (Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.19–20).

5.94–5 For rejection of a counter-suggestion of friendship and neutrality, cf. Brasidas at Acanthus (4.97).

5.96 In describing Athens' subjects as its colonies the Melians are accepting the representation of the Delian League as an Ionian league (cf. notes to 1.2–3, 94–5).

5.97 On the importance of islanders to Athens, cf. 4.120–2.

5.104 Andrewes regarded the absence of a reply to the Melians' claim of a 'righteous [in a religious sense] stand against injustice' as 'more damaging to Athens than anything else in the Dialogue'. Neither the gods (or what Thucydides might call 'chance': cf. Introduction, p. xliii) nor the Spartans did in fact help Melos, but Hornblower stresses that it was not unreasonable for the Melians to hope for Spartan help.

5.105 For a belief in nature (*physis*) which was characteristic of the sophists cf. Introduction, pp. xlv–xlvi; the ascription to the gods as well as to men of the principle that 'wherever they can rule, they will' (cf. especially 1.76) is striking. If the dialogue had not been kept on a level of generality, Sparta's willingness to betray the freedom of the Greeks when it was in Sparta's interests to do so, which no doubt did 'brand them faithless in the eyes of their friends' (5.106: cf. notes to 4.50, 5.17, 8.18),

could have been cited in support of the disparaging comment on Sparta.

5.107 Pericles in a very different spirit had spoken of the burdens accompanying the pursuit of honour (2.63–4).

5.108 Melos is not particularly near to the Peloponnese (c.75 miles, 120 km), but is nearer to Laconia than any other substantial island among the Cyclades.

5.110 The ‘Cretan sea’ is the southern Aegean.

5.111 The Athenians had not abandoned an attack on others because of a threat to Attica: at the beginning of the 450s a Peloponnesian attack did not make them give up their siege of Aegina (1.105); in 446 Pericles returned from Euboea to face the Peloponnesian invasion but went back to Euboea afterwards (1.114)—and in 413 the Peloponnesian occupation of Decelea (7.19) would not make the Athenians give up their siege of Syracuse (which Andrewes thought Thucydides had in mind when he wrote this passage). For the use of shame here, cf. Phrynichus in 8.27. Only here are we told that what Athens offered to Melos was ordinary tribute-paying membership of the Delian League.

5.112 Hornblower notes that only here, in the Melians’ last utterance, is a form of address used. We do not know the basis for the seven hundred years of Melos’ freedom: it is possible that Melos was actually settled from Sparta in the ninth or

eight century (P. A. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (Routledge, ²2002), 94), but the fifth-century belief was more important than the reality (I. Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 74–8).

5.115 For the resumption of raids (by former Helots or their descendants) from Pylos, see 5.56. Just as Athens did not declare the Peace of Nicias to be at an end in 5.56, Sparta now did not declare the Peace to be at an end and resume fighting to distract the Athenians from Melos. Corinth had neither sworn to the Peace of Nicias nor obtained a separate treaty with Athens subsequently.

5.116 Sixteenth winter (416/15) (beginning)

Argos; Melos. Philocrates will have been a general for 416/5; probably Cleomedes and Teisias were re-elected for this year and remained on Melos. Melos was fertile, and it is possible that its population was as much as 5,000 in all, 1,250 adult males. Hornblower notes the irony of the Spartan colony's becoming an Athenian colony. Thucydides' elaborate presentation of this episode, in which the Athenian sledgehammer crushed the last nut in the Aegean, immediately before his elaborate presentation of the Sicilian campaign of 415–413, in which the Athenians disastrously overreached themselves, is surely intentional (cf. Introduction, pp. xxi, xxxvili). Ar. Av., 186, of 414, does not suggest any sensitivity about Melos; but, no doubt partly because of Thucydides'

presentation of it, Athens' treatment of the Melians became one of the most notorious acts of Athenian imperialism (e.g. Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.3, Isoc. 12. *Panath.* 62–6).

BOOK SIX

6.1–7 Sixteenth winter (416/15) (conclusion)

6.1 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (i): planning.* In Thucydides' text as our manuscripts transmit it, almost the whole of Books 6–7 is devoted to the Athenians' Sicilian expedition of 415–413; but the beginnings and ends of those books do not coincide with new summers or winters in the narrative, and the division into books is not due to Thucydides himself (cf. Introduction, p. xxvi). The impression given by these books is that the Athenian project was over-ambitious (suggested in this chapter), but that even so it might have succeeded in the short term if Nicias had been less dilatory in 414 (cf. 6.103, 7.2; also 7.48–9, 73). This is at odds with the suggestion in 2.65 that the failure was due not to misjudgement but to political dissension in Athens and consequent failure to support the project properly. That passage and this narrative were certainly thought, and almost certainly written, at different times: probably the narrative not long after the events (but see note to 6.15), and the comment in 2.65 after the end of the war, by which time there had been a good deal of political dissension in Athens (cf. Introduction, p. xxviii).

The force sent in 427–424 had by 424 comprised sixty ships or slightly more (cf. 3.115): originally sixty were intended in 415 (cf. 6.8), but probably more soldiers with them, and more ships were eventually sent (cf. 6.25, 31, 43). In view of the campaigns of 427–424 and 422, and earlier contacts, the claim that ‘most Athenians were ignorant’ of Sicily, which suits his suggestion of misjudgement here, is perhaps the most unfair claim in Thucydides’ history; Plut., *Nic.* 12 writes, we do not know on what basis, of excited conversations and sketch maps. The circumference of Sicily is c.575 miles (930 km); Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 135 suggests a voyage of five days and nights; Thucydides was presumably thinking of daytime only. The width of the strait at its narrowest point is c.1¾ miles (2.8 km), implying 20 stades of 153 yards (140 m) (shorter than his usual stade, but surely just estimated: see Appendix).

6.2–5 *Early history of Sicily.* See Map 2; and on all the cities of Sicily and Italy, see T. Fischer-Hansen *et al.*, in Hansen and Nielsen, *Inventory*, 172–248, 249–320. What Thucydides’ argument needs here is an account of Sicily in 415: what he actually gives is an account of its early history and in particular of the foundation of Greek colonies there. Presumably he had discovered information which he wished to publicize; and Hornblower follows H. c. Avery in stressing the passages which compare the Athenian expedition with a colonizing expedition

(esp. 6.23). Thucydides' main source seems to have been Antiochus of Syracuse (*FGrH* 555), who wrote a history of Sicily down to 424. His intervals of time can be translated into absolute dates from the destruction of Megara Hyblaea (6.4) c.483/2, and it has been argued that Antiochus counted back in 35-year generations from that and other points in the early fifth century. In some cases other texts give divergent dates, which are likely to have been arrived at equally artificially.

Thucydides' dates are accepted by A. J. Graham in *CAH* iii. 3², 103–9, and archaeological evidence suggests that they are at any rate approximately correct. Earlier traces of Greek presence are not necessarily evidence of a Greek *polis*; in many cases (as Thucydides sometimes notes) the *polis* took over an already occupied site. In Thucydides' order, the dates are within a year or two of: Sicel migration 1034/3, Naxos 734/3, Syracuse 733/2, Leontini and Catana 729/8, Megara Hyblaea 728/7, Selinus 628/7, Gela 689/8, Acragas 581/0, Acrae 663/2, Casmenae 643/2, Camarina 598/7.

6.2 By the time of Thucydides it was generally believed that the *Cyclopes* and Laestrygonians of Hom., *Od.* 9–10 lived in Sicily; Euripides located his *Cyclops* near Mount Aetna (cf. the location of the Phaeacians in Corcyra: 1.25, 3.70). For Thucydides' qualified acceptance of the epic account, cf. 1.10. That the Sicanians were the original inhabitants of the island and were pushed to the west by the Sicels migrating from Italy was

generally believed; archaeologically the two peoples are not distinguishable, and by the classical period they had become substantially hellenized. The Sicanians are not mentioned again apart from a Sicanian town in 6.62. (The term for Greek Sicilians is Siceliots.) Trinacria seems to be a version of Thrinakie in Hom., *Od.* 11.107. Thucydides is the earliest surviving author to write of Trojan fugitives in Sicily; the actual origin of the Elymians is unknown (they had a third city, Entella). No other text takes Phocians to Sicily (except Paus. 5.25.6, perhaps derived from Thucydides): some have thought of the Phocaeans from Asia Minor (who colonized elsewhere in the western Mediterranean, and cf. Sicilian Phocaeae in 5.4), but here Thucydides is writing of barbarians, and a better emendation would be to Phrygians (later assimilated to the Trojans: cf. Paus.); but Hornblower after discussion tentatively retains Phocians. Thucydides' Opicans were the Oscans, of southern Italy. Archaeological evidence suggests that the Phoenicians did not precede the Greeks in Sicily, but arrived in the west about the same time as the Greeks arrived in the east, and they did not attempt to expand eastwards before the fifth century; the Phoenician colony of Carthage is c.150 miles (240 km) from Motya.

6.3 Naxos is the first landing-point for ships sailing to Sicily via southern Italy; the Chalcidians had already founded colonies in the bay of Naples (cf. 6.4); the name Naxos suggests the

involvement of Aegean Naxos (as claimed by Hellanicus, *FGrH* 4 F 82). The aristocracies of various Dorian cities claimed descent from Heracles (for Corinth cf. 1.24); for the 'island' of Ortygia, see Map 9.

6.4 'Betrayal' is defended by Hornblower, who notes that 'it offers an unexpected native perspective'. For the destruction of Megara Hyblaea, see Hdt. 7.156; Hornblower remarks that this is the first of many Herodotean echoes in Book 6. Archaeologists have been torn between Thucydides' date of c.628/7 for Selinus and 651/0 (Diod. Sic. 13.59.4). The name of a Megarian co-founder of Selinus seems to have dropped out, and can be supplied from *SEG* xliii 630 as Myscus or Euthydemus (cf. Hornblower). The name Lindii recalls Lindos on Rhodes; Hdt. 7.153 mentions one settler from the island of Telos but omits Crete. Thucydides mentions Dorian institutions in Gela perhaps because Rhodes was unambiguously Dorian but the status of Crete was less clear. Cumae was founded on the mainland of the bay of Naples, c.650, from the earlier colony on the island of Pithecusae and from Cyme in Asia Minor: for secure contact with Greece the settlers there needed to control the strait between Sicily and Italy (for the identification with the Homeric Scylla and Charybdis, cf. 4.24); Zancle was founded c.730, and Rhegium on the Italian side soon afterwards. For the Samians and others, fleeing from the Persians c.494 at the end of the Ionian Revolt, see Hdt. 6.22–4;

the refoundation of Zancle as Messana is attributed to Cadmus from Cos by Hdt. 7.164, while confused late texts associate the change with Anaxilas and with Messenians fleeing from the Peloponnese (Strabo 268/6.2.3, Paus. 4.23.6–10).

6.5 A scholiast on Pind., *Ol.* 5 dates the revolt of Camarina *Ol.* 57 = 552–548, but the archaeological record shows no break in the mid-sixth century. Hdt. 7.154–6 has the city awarded to Hippocrates by arbitrators c.493/2; Gelo ruled in Syracuse 485/4–478/7; Diod. Sic. 11.76.5 reports the refounding by the Geloans under 461/0.

6.6 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (ii): planning.* In saying that the Athenians 'had become eager' to make war, Thucydides uses a word commonly applied to irrational impulses (Hornblower). For 'real reason' he uses the same words as in 1.23, *alethestate prophasis*; for the ambition and for Chalcidian Leontini as an Ionian city, cf. 3.86 (where kinship is the *prophasis* = ostensible motive, contrasted with the ambition which is the real motive), 7.76–7; and for the current state of the Leontinians, cf. 5.4. A much-discussed Athenian inscription, from a year when the archon's name ended - *on*, is concerned with the exchange of oaths between Athens and Egesta (ML 37, translated Fornara 81): examination seems finally to have established that the year was not in the 450s but was 418/7 (Antiphon); for Thucydides not to have mentioned the alliance under that year, or as something recent here, would be

shocking but not an omission of which he was incapable, but the problems are less if we can believe that what happened in 418/7 was the renewal of an alliance made c.427, ‘in the time of Laches’, and that *pace* Dover and Hornblower the Greek here can mean ‘the previous war over Leontini’. It is interesting, if true, that the Athenians were cautious about Eggesta’s ability to pay—but yet were to be deceived (cf. 6.46).

Another event mentioned not here but only in 8.73 is the ostracism, to be dated to spring 416 or more probably spring 415, proposed by Hyperbolus, which was expected to result in the removal of either Nicias or Alcibiades, but in fact resulted in the removal of Hyperbolus himself. Thucydides perhaps omitted it in its place because it failed to resolve the conflict between the two men and their policies.

Diod. Sic. 13.2.6, cf. 30.3, has a secret meeting of the council and generals which discussed what to do with Sicily when it was conquered; in 8.1 Thucydides will refer to oracles and soothsayers, but here he says nothing about the consultation of the Delphic or any other oracle (cf. Hornblower).

6.7 *Various campaigns.* Cf. the Corinthians’ abstention from a Spartan campaign in 417/6 (5.83); but in 416 they made their own attacks on Athens (5.115). Orneae had been on the Argive side in 418 (5.67). For Methone, cf. 4.129. The Chalcidians will again be those centred on Olynthus (contr.

Dover): in 421 they had not accepted the Peace of Nicias but had joined the Argive and Corinthian alliance (cf. 5.36, 31), but we have not previously been told that they, like the Boeotians (5.26), had a ten-day truce with Athens.

6.8–62 Seventeenth summer (415)

6.8–26 Athens' Sicilian expedition (iii): preparations. The crew of a trireme numbered c.200, so what is said here implies pay of 1 drachma per man per day (cf. 6.31). 'Attractive' is the word used to describe Brasidas' speech at Acanthus (4.88, cf. 4.108, where it is 'enticing (but untrue)') and what the Athenians could have said to a Melian assembly (5.85, where we translate 'seduction'). It will be revealed in 6.46 that the Egestans' promises are indeed false. A fragmentary inscription, if correctly assigned to 415, indicates that this first assembly not only decided on an expedition of sixty ships, but in deciding on three generals considered and rejected the alternative of just one (presumably Alcibiades); and a later assembly may have set aside a sum of 3,000 talents (ML 78, major fragments translated Fornara 146). For the appointment of generals 'with absolute discretionary power', cf. note to 5.45. We are not told how far Nicias made his opinions clear at the first assembly.

6.9 At the second assembly we are given two speeches by Nicias, with one by Alcibiades between them: Nicias' predictions are borne out by subsequent events, while Alcibiades' are not. Nicias in his first speech stresses the insecurity of Athens'

position in Greece, argues against the plan to conquer Sicily and attacks Alcibiades' motives for championing the plan. The Egestans were Elymians (cf. 6.2). Nicias was undefeated, but his reputation will have been for competence combined with caution; and he had been behind the truce of 423 and the peace of 421. 'To preserve what you have and not risk present advantage for an uncertain future' matches the policy attributed to Pericles in 1.144, 2.65, cf. 2.13, 63; also 4.62 (Hermocrates), 5.87 (Melian dialogue).

6.10 Despite Sparta's hopes (2.7), the Sicilian Greeks had not yet intervened in the Peloponnesian War, and even after the failure of this Athenian campaign they did so only on a small scale (cf. 8.26); but Hornblower stresses that large-scale intervention could still have been predicted at the time. Corinth was the state most clearly 'in open war' with Athens (cf. 5.115).

6.11 Because Sicily is a long way from Athens, and is a large island which had many cities, it would indeed have been difficult for Athens to retain control if the attempt at conquest succeeded: Euphemus will make the same point in 6.86. However, the argument that an empire would not attack another empire is not plausible. The transposition of 'but if we suffer . . . enemies at home' to after 'We all know . . . put to the test', accepted in the OCT, spoiled the logic and ought never to have been made. The last words of the chapter are difficult,

but seem to suggest that Sparta is more of an enemy because it is oligarchic and thus opposed to the Athenian democracy.

6.12 The plague had ended in 427/6 (3.87), and the Peace of Nicias had been made in 421: since 421 Athens will have had comparatively little expenditure and few casualties; there seems to have been a decision to repay with interest the sums borrowed from the sacred treasuries, but despite Andoc. 3. *Peace* 8 we do not know how much actually was repaid, and an inscription covering 418–414 shows that borrowing had not totally ceased (ML 77, translated Fornara 144). After stressing that the Egestans are barbarians, in 6.11, Nicias here denigrates the Leontinians as a ‘bunch of exiles’. Alcibiades was born in 451/0, and is first attested as general in 420/19 (cf. note to 5.43); Nicias was born before 469 (Davies, *APF*, 404). Horse-breeding was regularly associated with wealth (e.g. *Ar.*, *Nub.* 12–18). We are left to guess how a general might improperly enrich himself, but helping himself to booty would be one possibility. Hornblower notes that Nicias’ considerable wealth (cf. Davies, *APF*, 403–4) is mentioned only in 7.86.

6.13 Seating in the Athenian assembly was not regulated (e.g. M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 137–8); members voted as individuals (normally openly, by raising their hands). There were no parties with a party discipline, but leading politicians

would tend to have groups of supporters, attached to them for different reasons and with different degrees of loyalty, and these could be called on to attend and vote on crucial occasions. Opposition between older and younger members is not mentioned on other occasions in Athens (though the categories are often contrasted, e.g. for Athens in 6.24), but it suits Nicias' argument to suggest that the young Alcibiades' supporters are hot-headed young men, lacking the experience and wisdom of age. For the Ionian Gulf, cf. 1.24; the Sicilian Sea is here distinguished from it as the open water further south, but contr. 4.24. Pericles in his funeral speech suggested that Athens did help others with 'no calculation of self-interest, but an act of frank confidence in our freedom' but that that did then place the others under an obligation to help Athens (2.40); Alcibiades will reply in 6.18; Euphemus will repeat that it is in Athens' interests to keep the enemies of Syracuse strong and independent (6.83–7). For the Greek tendency to approve of intervention to help those who (are perceived to) have been wronged, cf. P. A. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. v, esp. p. 201.

- 6.14** The Greek vocative is *prytani*: the fifty members of the council from one tribe acted as the *prytaneis*, standing committee and presiding committee, for a tenth of the year, and each day one of them was chairman. There seems to have been no formal

ban on reconsidering a decision, unless that decision was accompanied by an 'entrenchment clause' forbidding reconsideration (and note the reconsideration of the decision about Mytilene, 3.36–50), so breaking the *nomoi* here cannot mean more than breach of custom.

6.15 Opposition between Nicias and Alcibiades has been shown most clearly in Nicias' attempting to preserve the peace of 421 while Alcibiades worked for alliance with Argos and confrontation with Sparta on land in the Peloponnese (5.44–8); they were also men of very different temperaments and social standing (see notes to 3.51 for Nicias, 5.43 for Alcibiades). For the third general, Lamachus, cf. 4.75, 5.19, 24. In 6.90 Alcibiades will speak in Sparta of ambitions to conquer Carthage; here Thucydides himself takes those ambitions seriously (it is hard to be sure whether the references to Carthage in *Ar.*, *Eq.* 173–4, 1303–4, are comic exaggeration or reflect suggestions actually made in the mid-420s). Thucydides here expresses faith (perhaps excessive) in Alcibiades' strategic ability, but acknowledges that his lifestyle led the Athenians to distrust him; for fear of tyranny, cf. note to 6.53.3–59. Even if most of Books 6–7 was written shortly after the events (see note to 6.1), the allusions here to Athens' downfall must be later.

6.16 Alcibiades defends first his personal position and then the Sicilian project. His extravagant participation in the Olympic

games was in 416 (some texts say he came first, second, and third: Eur. *ap.* Plut. *Alc.* 11, Isoc. 16. *Team of Horses* 34); it was probably in 417 that Nicias, less self-centredly, had acted lavishly as leader of the Athenian delegation to the festival of Apollo on Delos (Plut., *Nic.* 3–4). ‘Sponsorship of productions’ was organized through the system of liturgies, by which the richest citizens were called on to accept personal and financial responsibility for a ship in the navy (as ‘trierarchs’: cf. 6.31) or a group of performers in a festival. In the light of 6.15, readers are presumably expected to find the passage on justified pride arrogant, though it probably seemed less offensive in classical Greece than it would in our world. Given the unsuccessful outcome, what is said of the Argive alliance and the battle of Mantinea is a forced attempt to make the best of a bad job.

- 6.17** Scholars have tended to think that the Athenians collectively did the counterpart of ‘tak[ing] advantage of what . . . both can offer’, i.e. appointed both so that each would counteract the excesses of the other; but more probably both had been appointed because each had a sufficient body of supporters in the assembly (cf. note to 1.45, a comparable instance). Sicily had suffered many population movements from the early fifth-century tyrants and from the reaction which followed their downfall; cf. more recently the fate of Leontini in 5.4. The conflict between Hermocrates and Athenagoras (6.32–41) and

the fact that there were men willing to betray Syracuse to Nicias (cf. 6.103, 7.48–9, 73), will show that there was indeed internal dissension in Syracuse. ‘This war’ represents Alcibiades as sharing Thucydides’ view that all of what we now call the Peloponnesian War was one war (cf. 5.25–6). Some but not all of the Sicels did support Athens: see 6.88, 98, 103, 7.1, 32, 57–8, 77, 80. In the early stages of building their empire the Athenians had not faced opposition in Greece: see 1.96–102.

- 6.18** Alcibiades here responds to Nicias’ remarks on Athens’ western allies: what he says of the need to persist with imperial policies echoes Pericles in 2.42, 63. For the attribution of Athens’ success to ‘our fathers’, cf. Pericles in 1.144, 2.36, 62; for the argument against quietism, cf. Pericles in 2.63–4. The argument (originally medical) for a blend of different elements will be used by Athenagoras in 6.39.
- 6.19** Nicias’ second speech (6.20–3) concentrates on the theme announced here; we may wonder if Thucydidean hindsight has contributed to it (cf. Introduction, p. xxxv).
- 6.20** Syracuse was comparatively democratic, though Athenagoras will suggest that oligarchic sympathizers were looking forward to an opportunity to seize power (6.38–9), and after the failure of the Athenian expedition there was a move further in the direction of democracy (Arist., *Pol.* 5.1304 A 27–9, Diod. Sic. 13.33–5). The seven cities are presumably

Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, Acragas, Messana, Himera, and Camarina (identified by a scholiast: cf. 6.3–5; Megara Hyblaea and Leontini did not currently exist, Acrae and Casmenae were not major cities). Shortage of cavalry was to prove a problem for the Athenians (cf. esp. 6.70–1).

- 6.21** On arrival the Athenians found it harder to gain allies than they had hoped (cf. 6.44, 50–2). The Greeks disliked winter voyages, but contact was not impossible: see 6.74, 88, 7.16.
- 6.22** Having declared a belief in the temple treasures of Selinus (6.20), Nicias disbelieves in those of Egesta—justifiably (cf. 6.46). Pericles had remarked on intelligent planning (1.144, 2.40, 60), and on the plague as a blow beyond reasonable expectation (2.61). In contrast to 425 (4.28), Nicias’ offer to resign his command was not this time accepted.
- 6.24** Nicias achieved his second objective, a larger force, but it was sent with greater confidence; it might have been easier for the original force to withdraw unscathed at the end of 415, or if it stayed and failed the failure would not have been so costly in men and resources (Dover). Thucydides’ word for ‘passionate desire’ is *eros*, used only here and in Diodotus’ speech (‘desire’, 3.45); Nicias in **6.13** used a compound, which we render ‘disastrous allure’.
- 6.25** Plut., *Nic.* 12, *Alc.* 18, calls the unnamed Athenian Demostratus, perhaps by over-hasty inference from Ar., *Lys.* 387–97, but Hornblower is not sure he is wrong (on

Demostratus' identity, see the inconclusive discussion of Davies, *APF*, 105–6). The Cretan archers came as mercenaries (cf. 7.57).

6.26 For the compilation of recruitment lists, see note to 6.31.

6.27–9 *Religious scandals in Athens (i)*. The Herms (representations of the god Hermes) first made in Athens were square in section, with an erect phallus and a head on top (cf. Hdt. 2.151); probably, in addition to damage to the face (perhaps seen as more impious than damage to the phallus), the phallus was broken where that was still intact (cf. Ar., *Lys.* 1093–4). Presumably both the scale and the timing of the act (shortly but not immediately before the departure: cf. note to 6.30–52) led the Athenians to take this more seriously than previous mutilations. A plot against the democracy is unlikely (though it is significant that one was suspected); a last-ditch attempt to create unfavourable omens by attacking the patron god of travellers and prevent the Sicilian expedition (not by the pious Nicias, but by other opponents of the expedition) is more likely; Andocides (cf. 6.60) claims that the act was planned as a pledge, a wrongful act to bind the members of a *hetaireia* (cf. note to 8.48) to which he belonged, but that he both objected and was injured and unable to take part (Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 60–8).

6.28 It is clear that after the mutilation there were men ready with accusations against Alcibiades and associates of his. The

Mysteries (without further specification, the Eleusinian Mysteries) involved secrets disclosed only to the initiated: it was impious to disclose these improperly, and probably also to hold mock celebrations even if only initiates were present.

6.29 Most able-bodied citizens fought as soldiers or rowed in the navy at some time, and there was not normally a sense of opposition between fighting men and civilians (though from 412, when Samos became the main base of the Athenian navy, there was opposition between the Athenians at Samos and those at home: 8.72–3, etc.). No doubt men who had been persuaded by Alcibiades to vote for the expedition and were about to serve on it would not want to lose him as commander.

6.30–52 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (iv): voyage to Sicily, Syracusan reaction.* The mutilation of the Herms was perhaps in late May, and the departure of the expedition in early June. No doubt this was an exceptionally well-attended and dramatic occasion, but it also suits Thucydides' purpose to give an elaborate account of it, to be contrasted with the total failure of 413. On Corcyra as a staging-post, cf. 1.36; Iapygia is the southernmost point of the 'heel' of Italy.

6.31 For the force of 430, cf. 2.56, 58 (where allied soldiers are not mentioned). For trierarchs, cf. note to 6.16 (the system was one which encouraged competition). Probably 1 drachma a day was an exceptional payment, because of the long absence

from Athens, and 3 obols (8.45) was normal: see Pritchett, *GSW*, i. 14–24 (who accepts 3.17 as authentic, as we do not). ‘Petty officers’ is the best interpretation of *hyperesiaí* (cf. Dover). ‘Good’ service-lists might simply be lists which include those who should be included and omit those who should not (Dover, whence our translation ‘up-to-date’), but there are some indications that in the fifth century there was scope for preferential enlistment of men who were willing and experienced.

6.32 Hornblower remarks that by providing a Syracusan debate after the Athenian debate Thucydides ‘suggests a larger parallel between the two cities’. Hermocrates correctly believes in the Athenian expedition (and even knows about Nicias’ reluctance: 6.34), Athenagoras wrongly does not and suggests that rumours have been put about by oligarchic plotters (nothing we know about Hermocrates supports that, but see note to 6.72–88.6), and a general gives qualified support to Hermocrates. None of the speakers mentions Athens’ interventions in the 420s.

6.33 On the failure of the Persians, cf. the Corinthians in 1.69; the Delian League was founded ostensibly in the interests of all the Greeks, and according to Thucydides on the initiative of the allies (cf. 1.94–7).

6.34 Thucydides has already accepted Alcibiades’ ambitions concerning Carthage (6.15); but it is hard to believe that the

Carthaginians feared an attack by Athens. Corinth is mentioned not only as the strongest member of the Peloponnesian League after Sparta but as the mother-city of Syracuse (cf. 6.3). We agree with Dover (though not all have done) that the Syracusan navy was probably much less skilled than the Athenian (cf. 7.36), and that if it had gone to Taras to fight against the Athenians it would probably have been heavily defeated; whether Thucydides thought that, we cannot tell.

- 6.35** For the description of Athenagoras, cf. the descriptions of Cleon in 3.36, 4.21; and he resembles Cleon in denouncing his opponents as conspirators (e.g. *Ar.*, *Eq.* 235–9). We know nothing about him, but he need not be an invented character. His judgement of the situation is wrong, but that does not mean that every statement attributed to him was considered by Thucydides to be wrong.
- 6.36** For another claim that the war in Greece is ‘far from settled’, cf. Nicias in 6.10, and Thucydides himself in 6.1.
- 6.37** On cavalry, cf. Nicias in 6.20; the Athenians in fact took just thirty horses (6.43). Nicias in 6.23 had said that the Athenians would be virtually founding a city in Sicily; and cf. 7.75.
- 6.38** Syracuse was ruled by the Deinomenid tyrants from 485 to 466, and was unstable for some time after that, but there is no evidence of trouble after c.450: Dover and Hornblower have wondered whether this was written with hindsight after the

seizure of power by Dionysius I in 406–405. Hermocrates, already prominent in 424 (4.58–65), was presumably somewhat older than Alcibiades, i.e. over 35.

6.39 Surprisingly, we are here given the view held by some classical Greeks that democracy displays ‘no sense’ (cf. Alcibiades in 6.89) ‘or equity’, but the rich should have the political power (because by owning the most property they have the greatest stake in the state), and in reply a defence of moderate democracy: the rich are the best financial stewards, if only because they are thought least likely to succumb to bribery and other temptations (Arist., *Pol.* 4. 1293 B 38–9: cf. Athens’ limiting the treasurers of Athena to the highest property class: *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, 47.1); the ‘people of sense’ or intelligence (*xynetoî*) are the best at developing policy; and ‘the general public’, literally ‘the many’, are best at listening and deciding (which is not quite the same as the argument accepted hesitantly by Aristotle, that the many are better collectively than their individual members: *Pol.* 3. 1281 A 40–1282 A 41). The ‘Old Oligarch’ claimed that in democratic Athens the common people leave the dangerous offices to the rich but are eager to hold the profitable ones ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.3).

6.40 Successful democracies, such as the Athenian, succeeded in persuading rich men not to regard the regime as hostile to

them but to cooperate with it and pursue honour through it (cf. the note on trierarchs, 6.16).

- 6.41** It is not clear whether the generals had a constitutional position which entitled them to end the debate, but Thucydides' language does not imply that they did. The upshot is that preparations are to be made on the assumption that the Athenians are coming, but Hermocrates' expedition to Taras is rejected.
- 6.42** The three generals were constitutionally equal, so the assignment of squadrons by lot was appropriate; for other allotments cf. 6.62, 8.30. *Pace* Hornblower, the fact that these generals had 'absolute discretionary power' (6.26) is irrelevant.
- 6.43** Hornblower compares this list with the Catalogue of Ships in Hom., *Il.* 2.484–760; it is placed here because it was at Corcyra that the whole expeditionary force was assembled; a complete catalogue of the forces eventually involved on each side will be given in 7.57–8. Dover argued that troop-transports were modified triremes, rowed at least in part by the soldiers, but could be reconverted to serve as fighting ships; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov suggest that these had broader hulls than normal triremes (*The Athenian Trireme*², 151–6), but that horse-transports were converted triremes with oarsmen only on the highest level (pp. 156, 227–30). Marines were often *thetes*, members of the lowest census class

(but contr. 3.98, 8.24, with note to 3.98). The thirty cavalry are not heard of again.

6.44 A siege of Syracuse seems already to have been contemplated. Hornblower, comparing 7.33 on Metapontium, wonders if Thucydides has exaggerated the hostility of the Italian Greeks. Locri had been made an Athenian ally in 422 (cf. 5.5), but clearly was one no longer. Considerations of kinship were often invoked but often overridden (cf. e.g. 1.95, 7.57, with notes to 1.94–5 and 7.57); Rhegium had an alliance with Athens which had been renewed in 433/2 (cf. note to 1.32–6).

6.45 Thucydides here closes a ring (cf. Introduction, p. xlii) by reusing words used in 6.32 of the initial Syracusan reaction.

6.46 Hornblower notes Thucydides' failure here to mention that now or later Athens did receive substantial sums of money from Rhegium and other states (*IG* i3 291). No doubt there had been wishful thinking by the original Athenian investigators, but it is hard to believe the story exactly as Thucydides tells it (cf. the trick in 5.45; as Dover remarked, Egesta was remote and had no near neighbours). Eryx was on a hill by the coast, c.16 miles (25 km) west of Egesta: the wealth of the sanctuary did not prove that Egesta was wealthy (Dover), and silver was much less valuable than gold (Hornblower).

6.47–50 Nicias, disapproving of the expedition and unsurprised at the Athenians' cool reception and the lack of funds from Egesta,

wanted to do the bare minimum and withdraw while it could be claimed that the expedition had been sent under a misapprehension; Alcibiades, with his taste for intrigue, wanted to make friends and influence people (but when he departed into exile he undermined the Athenians' attempt to win over Messana: 6.74); Lamachus wanted to make an immediate attack and catch Syracuse unprepared. Commentators mostly think that Lamachus' plan was the best and was judged the best by Thucydides (cf. 7.42). Whether it was the best depends on how unprepared Syracuse was: 6.32–41, 45, does not make that clear, but Thucydides could have exaggerated to enhance the unexpectedness of the outcome. For what is said about the position of Messana in 6.48, cf. 4.1; for the impact of a force immediately on arrival, in 6.49, cf. 5.9, 7.42; for catching men outside their city, cf. 2.5, 4.103. Unsurprisingly, the two generals in favour of the expedition made common cause, agreeing on the plan of the persuasive Alcibiades.

6.50 Alcibiades' ship will have been literally his own: cf. his ancestor Cleinias' ship in 480 (Hdt. 8.17). At Messana, Alcibiades' charm failed to work, and Hornblower notes that Thucydides does not give him a speech (comparable to Brasidas' speech at Acanthus: 4.84–7). Naxos gave the Athenians money (*IG* i3 291, 1–2). Here and later Thucydides expects his readers to have a general knowledge of Syracusan topography; it is remarkable if the Athenians were able not

only to make their proclamation but also to reconnoitre afterwards without interference.

6.51 Catana also gave the Athenians money (*IG* i3 291, 15–16).

6.52 Camarina was presumably divided (Hornblower): the agreement mentioned will have been made with Athens in 427 (cf. 6.75), and without renouncing that Camarina will have made an alliance with Syracuse in 424 (cf. 6.67, 88).

6.53.1–2 *Religious scandals in Athens (ii): recall of Alcibiades.* For the Salaminia, cf. 3.33 with note. Thucydides' aristocratic bias shows in his comment on the respectability of the accused and the worthlessness of the accusers.

6.53.3–59 *Harmodius and Aristogeiton.* Thucydides lets the religious scandals prompt a detailed account of the killing of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, on which he expostulates briefly in 1.20. It seems that fears about Alcibiades (6.61, cf. 6.28) led him to think of the Peisistratid tyranny; fears of Spartan intervention (6.61) led him to think of the Spartan intervention which ended the tyranny; that episode had been dealt with adequately by Herodotus, but he was carried away by his confidence that the normal (though not Herodotean) view of Hipparchus' killing was erroneous to correct the error. In fact he protested too much: even in his account of the episode attentive readers will find remarks which presuppose that Hipparchus was not killed only because of a personal grudge. Hornblower notes that Thucydides tells the story in

Herodotus' manner, but emphasizes the homosexual dimension which Herodotus omitted (Hdt. 5.55–62). With this narrative, cf. *Ath. Pol.* 17.3–18, in general agreement with Thucydides but with some divergences.

6.54 Tyrant was not an office to which a man was appointed: although Thucydides was right to make Hippias the eldest son, it may be better to think of joint rule by Hippias and Hipparchus (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 18.1). As well as playing down the assassination, Thucydides plays down Aristogeiton (but not Harmodius, whereas for Herodotus the two men were from the same immigrant family); *Ath. Pol.* 18.1–2 by an inept combination of sources seems about to make Hipparchus the Peisistratid in love with Harmodius but then gives that role to his brother Thessalus. Writers who made the killing of Hipparchus the ending of the tyranny made the tyranny degenerate after Peisistratus' death (e.g. Diod. Sic. 10.17.1); Thucydides makes it degenerate only after Hipparchus' death; *Ath. Pol.* 16.7, 19.1, makes it degenerate at both points. *Ath. Pol.* 16.4 attributes to Peisistratus a 10 per cent tax: perhaps that is generic (as the English 'tithe' can be) and Thucydides is correct (Dover). A fragment of the inscribed archon list survives for the 520s: it includes members of leading families evidently induced to collaborate with the regime, together with Hippias in 526/5 and (probably) the younger Peisistratus in 522/1 (ML 6, translated Fornara 23, fr. c). For the altar of

the Twelve Gods (by the Panathenaic Way, south-east of the Stoa of the Basileus), see *The Athenian Agora: A Guide to the Excavation and Museum*⁴ (Athens: A.S.C.S.A., 1990), 96–7 no. 31. The inscription on the altar of Apollo survives (ML 11, translated Fornara 37): its lettering is not particularly faint, but probably it was enhanced with paint which had worn away by Thucydides' time.

6.55 Thucydides gives reasons for his beliefs about earlier history as he does not with contemporary history (cf. Introduction, pp. xxxii–xxxiii). He cites another inscription to show that Hippias was Peisistratus' eldest son: that he was named first is more cogent than that he was the only one with children (Hdt. 5.65 is perhaps just careless); the pillar seems (despite Hornblower's agnosticism) to have recorded a condemnation of the Peisistratids. By 'legitimate' sons Thucydides means (anachronistically) those born to Peisistratus by his Athenian wife; *Ath. Pol.* 17.3–4 reduces the three to two by supposing Thessalus to be an alternative name for one of his two sons by his later, Argive wife.

6.56 *Ath. Pol.* 18.2 (probably through carelessness) makes the festival for which the girl was rejected the Panathenaea; the assassination occurred at the Great Panathenaea of 514/3. *Ath. Pol.* 18.4 (cf. 15.4–5) explicitly denies that the men in the procession carried arms and after the killing were disarmed by

Hippias: we do not know on what grounds, or which author is right (Dover; Hornblower thinks Thucydides is right).

6.57 *Ath. Pol.* 18.3 has Hippias on the Acropolis to receive the procession: probably all that was genuinely remembered was that Hipparchus was at the Leocoreium (unidentified: against the suggestion that it was the ‘crossroads enclosure’ between the Stoa of the Basileus and the altar of the Twelve Gods (*The Athenian Agora: A Guide*⁴, 86–7 no. 27) is the fact that that site has produced no evidence of cult activity earlier than the second half of the fifth century (J. M. Camp, *The Athenian Agora* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1986), 47–8, 78–9)). The Cerameicus extended inside and outside the Sacred Gate and the Dipylon Gate to the north-west of the Agora. *Ath. Pol.* 18.4–6 has a story of Aristogeiton’s being tortured and—truthfully or not—naming accomplices.

6.59 Hippoclus of Lampsacus was one of the Greek rulers taken by Dareius on his Scythian expedition of c.514 (Hdt. 4.138): what was surprising about this marriage alliance is that Lampsacus had been an enemy of the Athenian-ruled settlement in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.37–8). The epigram is attributed to Simonides by Arist., *Rhet.* 1.1367 B 20–1. For the story of Hippias’ expulsion in 511/0, see Hdt. 5.62–5, *Ath. Pol.* 19; for Hippias at Marathon, see Hdt. 6.102, 107–8, cf. 6.121.

6.60–1 *Religious scandals in Athens (iii): verdicts in Athens, flight of Alcibiades.* The reference in 6.27 is only to ‘overthrow of

democracy', but 6.15 mentioned tyranny in connection with Alcibiades, and after the excursus tyranny is naturally mentioned along with oligarchy. The unnamed informant was Andocides, as we learn from his defence speech in 400 (Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 49–69, claiming that he was involved with the mutilators but did not mutilate any Herms himself).

Thucydides thought him not worth naming (Hornblower, following c. B. R. Pelling; Plut., *Alc.* 20.6 remarks that Thucydides does not name any of the informants); he may have obtained information from Andocides (Hornblower notes that both were in exile in the last years of the Peloponnesian War and both had north-Aegean connections); this is one of the rare passages in which he admits to uncertainty (cf. Introduction, p. xxxi). We have substantial fragments of the 'Attic *stelai*', recording the sale of property confiscated from the men condemned (*IG* i³ 421–30: extracts ML 79, translated Fornara 147. D): if the aim of the mutilators was to prevent the Sicilian expedition (cf. note to 6.27–9), it is ironic that in the end they helped to pay for it.

6.61 The purpose of profaning the Mysteries, in private, was presumably to give a guilty thrill to those involved; the inscriptions show that some men were condemned on both charges. For Boeotian hopes of exploiting Athens' troubles, and the mobilization (not all men to the same place), cf. Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 45. The Theseium in the city was not the

popularly called Theseium, in fact the Hephaesteium, on the west side of the Agora, but in an area not yet excavated, east of the Panathenaic Way between the Agora and the Acropolis (J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), 578–9). For the Argive hostages, cf. 5.84; for Alcibiades' role in persuading Mantineans and Argives to join the Sicilian expedition, cf. 6.29.

6.62 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (v)*. Thucydides' treatment of this episode is perfunctory. As Hornblower notes, after Alcibiades' departure Nicias and Lamachus must have discussed what to do; in effect, they decided to continue with his plan. Some other writers made Hyccara (which was slightly nearer to Egesta than to Himera) a Sicel town (e.g. Diod. Sic. 13.6.1): Thucydides seems to suggest that it would have been expected to support Egesta; 120 talents was perhaps the price of 7,200 captives. With Dover we prefer 'sent' to 'sailed round to their allies', since most of the Sicels lived inland; Hybla was inland from Catana.

6.63–93 Seventeenth winter (415/14)

6.63–71 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (vi): the Athenians' first attempt on Syracuse*. For Thucydides' view of the volatility of the common people, cf. 2.65, 4.28, and for eagerness to go out and fight, cf. 2.21–2.

- 6.64** The Athenians' lack of cavalry is important in this episode. For the topography of Syracuse, see Map 9. Thucydides assumes a considerable amount of topographical knowledge in his readers; it is not clear whether he had been to Syracuse or simply had detailed information. The sanctuary of Olympian Zeus (two columns remain standing) was somewhat under 1 mile (over 1 km) inland, west of the Great Harbour and south of the river Anapus.
- 6.66** Dover argued that Dascon was the southern half of the western shore of the Great Harbour; in the *Barrington Atlas*, R. J. A. Wilson's text makes it the headland, Punta Caderini, at the north end of that stretch, but it is wrongly marked on map 47. The road to Helorum passed the sanctuary and continued to the south.
- 6.67** We might have expected the Athenians to take the attacking position on the right wing; for their eight-deep formation, cf. note to 4.93; Hornblower remarks on this early instance of a division between attacking force and reserve force. Camarina's contribution will be represented as half-hearted in 6.75, cf. 88.
- 6.68** The Athenians were successfully carrying out a bold plan, and Nicias' speech is surprisingly pessimistic (his use of the same motif in 7.75 is far more appropriate), but it fits a commander whose heart was not in the enterprise.
- 6.69** The battle seems to have been fought north of the Anapus, and Thucydides uses it to mention features characteristic of hoplite

battles. The divinatory sacrifice, mentioned only here, occurs before the hoplite engagement but after the skirmishing has begun. For independent and subject allies of Athens, cf. Euphemus in 6.85.

6.70 It is not credible (though many have believed it) that Thucydides is contrasting inexperienced Syracusans with experienced Athenians. He could be contrasting the inexperienced with the experienced on both sides, but we have accepted Hornblower's argument that he is writing wholly about the Athenian force. For 'drove back' Thucydides uses *othein*, the verb commonly applied to that pushing against the enemy which was characteristic of hoplite phalanxes.

Victorious Greek armies did not normally pursue over a long distance (cf. note to 5.73), but after this battle the Athenians would probably have chased the Syracusans back to the city if not prevented by the cavalry.

6.71 According to Diod. Sic. 13.6.4, the Athenians did take possession of the temple (but before the battle: perhaps this is just careless writing); according to Plut., *Nic.* 16 they set out to raid the temple but were prevented by Nicias. The upshot was that the Athenians had carried out an enterprising plan and won a victory, but derived no benefit from it.

6.72–88.6 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (vii): winter preparations.* The Athenians in fact went first to Catana, then to Naxos (6.74), but later in the winter back to Catana (6.88). The introduction of

Hermocrates is surprisingly full for a man who has been mentioned several times before (esp. 4.58, 6.32, but neither with the praise bestowed here); the Spartan Brasidas was credited with both intelligence and courage in 4.81, and as an expounder of wise policies Hermocrates recalls the Athenian Pericles. Complaints about multiplicity of command go back to Hom., *Il.* 2.204–5. Despite the generals' 'absolute discretionary power' (cf. note to 5.45), when things went badly they were to be deposed (6.103). This passage is echoed by Xen., *Anab.* 6.1.18.

6.74 Alcibiades' undermining of the Athenian intrigues at Messana is mentioned only here, when the Athenians discover it.

6.75 The new Syracusan wall, after a loop to the west round Temenites, probably ran to the north: the effect was to increase considerably the length of wall which the Athenians would have to blockade. For Camarina's diplomatic position, cf. note to 6.52. Hornblower notes that the battle between Athenian and Syracusan forces (6.66–70) is now followed by a battle of words. The Athenian Euphemus cannot be identified (the name is not rare): unlike Cleon's opponent in the Mytilene debate, Diodotus (cf. 3.41), he is not given even a patronymic; but he could be, or be related to, the Euphemus who proposed an amendment to Athens' decree for Eggesta (ML 37, translated Fornara 81, 15).

6.76 Hermocrates' speech is a good instance of ring composition (Hornblower), beginning and ending with Athenian imperialism, enclosing the theme of Ionians and Dorians, with Camarina's fear of Syracuse (justified by what was reported in 6.5, although Camarina was originally founded by Syracuse) at the centre. For 'displace populations' Thucydides uses the adjective *anastatos*, which he uses elsewhere only of Syracuse's treatment of Camarina (6.5). For the revolt of Euboea and its suppression in 446, cf. 1.114. Hermocrates accepts the innocent beginning of the Delian League (cf. 1.94–5) which Euphemus in 6.82–3 will reject; the reference to Ionians and colonies (which does not cover all the early members of the Delian League—and Thucydides probably did not ask himself which states he meant by 'colonies') enables Hermocrates to concentrate on the Athenians' treatment of their own kin. For the change in the nature of the League, cf. 1.99, and 1.115 on the origin of the Samian war.

6.77 In 'you know them already' and 'examples' Thucydides 'daringly . . . allows Hermokrates to parody the Periclean funeral oration' (Hornblower, comparing 2.36–7). Here we have a variant on the stereotype of Dorians as more valiant than Ionians (cf. 1.124). For the notion that those not in danger yet will be in danger later, cf. the Corinthians in 1.120.

6.78 The Athenians had tried in 422 to arouse fears of Syracusan domination (5.4). For the metaphor of 'regulating', cf.

Alcibiades in 6.18, where the cognate verb is translated ‘ration ourselves’.

6.79 For the claim that an alliance should be made only for virtuous purposes, cf. the Corinthians on Corcyra in 1.39–40. In the recent battle Syracuse had not been on its own, and indeed Camarina had been among its allies (cf. 6.65, 67).

6.82 Euphemus’ speech is often compared with the Athenian speech at Sparta in 1.73–8, but Euphemus, while claiming that it is not in Athens’ interests to have designs on the Sicilians, is more aggressive—and indeed, in contrast to Hermocrates in 6.76 and Thucydides himself in 1.94–5, he suggests that from the foundation of the Delian League the Athenians did set out to be stronger than the Peloponnesians, and that they justly subjected Ionians and islanders who had joined the Persians in attacking them (in fact by no means all of the islanders had). The Athenians in 480 abandoned their city but refused to defect to the Persians (Hdt. 8.40–1, 136–44, 9.4–5).

6.83 For refusal to give a more unselfish justification of the empire, cf. 5.89, in the Melian dialogue.

6.84 Euphemus implies that the Athenians want to weaken Syracuse but not destroy it (Dover). He speaks of ‘liberating’ the Chalcidians of Leontini, a verb normally used of themselves by Athens’ enemies and not used by Hermocrates in 6.76.

- 6.85** For Athens' empire as a tyranny, cf. 1.122 (Corinthians), 2.63 (Pericles), 3.37 (Cleon). After the suppression in 427 of the revolt of Mytilene (cf. 3.50), Lesbian Methymna and Chios were the only members of the Delian League still providing ships, but that was a status which they had managed to retain, not one which was guaranteed to them (cf. note to 1.19); the 'completely free' islanders are from the states around the Peloponnese, whose contingents had joined Athens' expedition at Corcyra (6.30, 32, 42; cf. the catalogue in 7.57).
- 6.86** Hornblower wonders whether 'larger' is deliberately ambiguous between 'than is needed' (C. F. Smith, the Loeb editor) and 'than in the 420s' (Dover). Although it suits Euphemus' argument, it is surprising to find here an echo of Nicias' point (6.11) that Athens could not retain control of Sicily against opposition, and a suggestion that the Athenian expedition might fail.
- 6.88** The Camarinaeans, afraid of the ambitions of both but more directly threatened by Syracuse, remain theoretically perched on the fence but prepared to continue with grudging help to Syracuse. Money from the Sicels is mentioned in *IG* i³ 291 (cf. note to 6.46). This approach to Carthage stands in contrast to Athens' alleged hopes of conquering it (6.15, 90): contact continued, and in 406 Athens praised Carthage and may actually have made it an ally (ML 92, translated Fornara 165).

6.88.7–93 *Alcibiades in Sparta*. For the threat to the Italian Greeks, cf. 6.90, 104. The enthusiasm of the Corinthians is contrasted with the caution of the Spartans: cf. what the Corinthians say to the Spartans in 1.71. According to Isoc. 16 *Chariot Team* 9, Plut., *Alc.* 23, Alcibiades went first to Argos, and to Sparta only after hearing of his condemnation in Athens: if that is correct, Thucydides' account is misleading. The 'relevant authorities' mentioned with the ephors are presumably the kings and *gerousia*.

6.89 Alcibiades' speech begins and ends with a defence of his current stance. For the renunciation of the consular position and Alcibiades' services in the 420s, cf. 5.43. Those who would criticize his inclination to the people would be upper-class men who had not behaved similarly. Hornblower suggests that Thucydides is repeating the Alcmeonidae's opposition to tyranny from Hdt. 6.121, 123, rather than reporting what Alcibiades actually said—which is possibly but not necessarily correct. The line between upper class and 'people' could be drawn in different places according to circumstances and the needs of an argument (cf. 8.92). Thucydides regularly writes of 'leaders of the people' who are not themselves ordinary men (cf. 3.75). Until the failure of the Sicilian expedition, upper-class Athenians did acquiesce in the democracy, and men of all classes benefited from the empire (cf. overseas possessions listed in the 'Attic *stelai*', cited in note

to 6.60–1). What Alcibiades says is appropriate for his Spartan audience, but it is hard to fit ‘a more moderate form of politics’ to what we know of him: while flaunting his superiority he had tried to beat the populist demagogues at their own game. Here, like Athenagoras in 6.39, he takes ‘people’ to mean the whole populace, not just the lower-class majority; Hornblower notes that conservatives have quoted the argument for maintaining a successful regime as if it were Thucydides’ own opinion, and as if democracy were not immediately afterwards condemned as ‘acknowledged folly’.

6.90 For the aims of the expedition, cf. 6.1, 6, 15: this is the most extravagant version. On the timber of southern Italy, cf. 7.25 and R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford University Press, 1982), 462–6.

6.91 If Syracuse had fallen to Athens, the other western Greeks might well have followed at the time: Athens’ problem would have been retaining control (cf. 6.11, 86). For men who row their transport ships but then fight as hoplites, cf. 3.18: 7.1 shows that this proposal was adopted. Deceleia will be occupied by the Spartans, and with the effects which Alcibiades predicts, but not until 413 (cf. 7.19, 27–8). The reference to the law courts is puzzling: Dover suggests that with many of the citizens under arms sessions of the courts might be suspended for lack of jurors.

6.92 Alcibiades tries to rebut the objection that as an exile disloyal to his own city he may not become loyal to and trustworthy by Sparta (cf. the Mytilenaeans in 3.9). In 8.76 Athenian democrats on Samos will claim that (they are the true Athens and) the oligarchic city has revolted from them. For enemies and friends, cf. Soph., *Aj.* 679–82; for the good will attracted by Sparta, cf. 2.8 (but Hornblower notes that after Euphemus' Athenian claim to liberation, in 6.87, Alcibiades does not use that language). Rule by force was often contrasted with rule by law (e.g. Arr., *Anab.* 4.11.6, *SIG*³ 274. VI. 1–2; cf. Pind. fr. 169 Snell and Maehler).

6.93 It is not clear how much effect Alcibiades had, or was believed by Thucydides to have had: Spartan help was sent to Syracuse, but on a small scale (in addition to Gylippus, the two ships of 6.104); Deceleia was not fortified until 413. It may be that the Spartans had been thinking in general terms and Alcibiades proposed Deceleia as the site; but Deceleia was known to the Spartans and spared in their invasions in the Archidamian War (cf. Hdt. 9.73). Asine will be the city of that name on the coast of the Messenian Gulf (cf. 4.13).

6.94–105 Eighteenth summer (414) (beginning)

6.94 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (viii): Athenian campaigns.* For Syracuse's taking over of Megara, cf. 6.4. The river Terias was between Megara and Catana; Centoripa was inland from Catana (it is mentioned as an Athenian ally in 7.32), and

Inessa (not in the *Barrington Atlas*) and Hybla between them. Corn burned at this time of year will have been stored corn, not growing corn (Dover). ML 77. 73–6 records payments from the treasury of Athena of the 300 talents and a further 4 talents, 2,000 drachmas about mid-March and early April.

6.95 *Mainland Greece*. Cleonae had been an ally of Argos at the battle of Mantinea (5.67); for the Spartans' turning back in response to an earthquake, cf. 3.89. For Thyrea, disputed between Sparta and Argos, cf. 5.41. The sale of booty regularly occurred but is not regularly mentioned: 25 talents was presumably an exceptionally large outcome. For Athenian sympathizers in Thespieae, in southern Boeotia, cf. 4.133.

6.96–103 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (ix): siege of Syracuse begun*. See Map 9; Thucydides gives some comments on locations, but not consistently or fully. Epipolae was mentioned in 6.75 but is described only now; the steep edges (not quite as steep as the reader of Thucydides might imagine) were everywhere except at 'the approaches'; the whole plateau was visible from inside the Syracusans' new wall of 6.75, but not from inside the old city wall. Hornblower notes that in Thucydides' presentation, as Syracuse corresponds to Athens, Epipolae corresponds to Deceleia. The Syracusan generals had been elected at the beginning of winter (6.73), but apparently their year of office began in the spring; the meadowland will have been west of the Great Harbour, north of the Olympieum.

6.97 Thapsus was between Megara and Syracuse; Euryelus (where there are remains of a fourth-century and hellenistic fort) was at the 'waist' of Epipolae, about 4½ miles (7 km) west of the north-south stretch of coast; Leon will have been on the coast north or north-east of Euryelus (and at least double Thucydides' 6-7 stades/¾ mile (1-1.3 km) from it); Labdalum towards the east end of the northern ridge of Epipolae.

Despite the confidence of Hermocrates (6.72-3), the Syracusan defence starts badly, with amazement and defeats in 6.97-8, and again, leading to talk of capitulation, in 6.102-3.

6.98 The 650 Athenian cavalry were still no match for the Syracusan (1,200 in 6.67). Syce, 'fig tree', will have been towards the southern edge of Epipolae; despite the word, the Athenian fort was not necessarily circular. The Athenian army was regularly organized in tribal regiments, and 'Athenian' hoplites here is presumably to be taken literally, but Athenians made up less than a third of the hoplites attacking Syracuse.

6.99 The Athenian plan was to build walls northwards and southwards from the 'circle', so that Syracuse would be completely cut off by land, and the Syracusans needed to prevent that. Trogilus, the northern destination, was probably the inlet of S. Panagia. The stockades would be temporary defences to protect the Syracusans while they were building their counter-wall: Dover suggests that they were at the edge of the plateau, and this first wall on the slope below that and

above the marsh. Use of olive wood from the sanctuary will have been an act of impiety, presumably thought to be justified by the emergency.

6.100 Syracuse had probably just three tribes (cf. the three generals, 6.73), and Dover suspects that only a certain age-range within one tribe was left to guard the wall. Attacking at lunch-time was an often-used stratagem (e.g. Hdt. 1.63, 6.78). Thucydides could surely have discovered which Athenian general took which position: after this anonymity, the death of Lamachus in 6.101 and the illness of Nicias in 6.102 are all the more striking. The ‘pyramid’ presumably made sense to those who knew Syracuse at the time: in most manuscripts it is corrupted to ‘gate’.

6.101 Here we have the second Syracusan counter-wall. For a combination of ditch and stockade, cf. Xen., *Hell.* 5.4.38; for another use of doors along with other timber, see Hdt. 8.51. The river will be the Anapus. According to Plut., *Nic.* 18 Lamachus and a Syracusan cavalryman killed each other in single combat.

6.102 The ‘two-acre outwork’ (10 *plethra*/c.2¼ acres, c.9,000 m²) Dover places east of the ‘circle’ (AA on Map 9). In 7.15 we shall be told that Nicias suffered from a kidney disease: that was possibly but not certainly his illness now. For his use of fire to keep the enemy away cf. Xen., *Hell.* 7.2.8, Aen. Tact. 32. 12.

6.103 The double wall to the sea is the southern wall, to the Great Harbour. Hornblower wonders whether the depth of the Syracusans' despair has been exaggerated for greater contrast with Gylippus' arrival and their eventual victory; but we must surely accept as authentic the approaches to Nicias and the deposition of the generals—despite the 'absolute discretionary power' and the 'sworn guarantee' of 6.72. In the Greek world unsuccessful commanders were frequently suspected of having been bribed by the enemy (cf. 4.65). The Heracleides elected cannot be the same as the Heracleides deposed (cf. 6.73): Xen., *Hell.* 1.2.8 has Syracusans called Heracleides and Eucles commanding in the Aegean in 409, but Hornblower warns that Heracleides was a common name in Syracuse (Eucles was not, but here one manuscript has Eurycles).

6.104 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (x): Gylippus in Italy.* Leucas (1.30) and Ambracia (2.80) were both colonies of Corinth. On Gylippus' father Cleandridas (cf. 6.93) we have with the OCT and Hornblower accepted the reading of one manuscript and Valla; Dover supposed what that states to be impossible as an occurrence and with most manuscripts read 'relying on the fact that his father had once held Thurian citizenship'. Cleandridas was exiled from Sparta with Pleistoanax in 446/5 (cf. 1.114, 3.21, with Diod. Sic. 13.106.10, Plut., *Per.* 22). 'Gulf of Terina' is an error on Thucydides' part: that was on

the west side of the 'toe' of Italy, but he means the sea on the east side.

6.105 *Mainland Greece.* The Spartan raid on the Argolid is a resumption of the raid of 6.95, abandoned because of an earthquake, and the Argives' raid on the east coast of Laconia is a sequel to their raid then. Athens' blatant violation of the Peace of Nicias is explained in what follows: since the Peace the Athenians had not attacked Spartan territory and the Spartans had not attacked Athenian territory, but now the Athenians did attack Spartan territory. Consequently the Spartans considered that the Peace had finally been ended by the Athenians, and so in 413 they did invade Attica and occupy Deceleia (cf. 7.18–19). Pythodorus is probably the man of that name in 5.19, 24; Laespodias will reappear in 8.86.

BOOK SEVEN

7.1–9 Eighteenth summer (414) (conclusion)

7.1–8 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xi): Gylippus' arrival in Syracuse.* For Nicias' earlier view, see 6.104. Alcibiades had advised the sending of men who would first row and then fight as hoplites (6.91). Archonides of Herbita had cooperated with Ducetius in founding Cale Acte on the north coast (Diod. Sic. 12.8.2, 446/5), and the Archonides mentioned here will be that man or his son; a later Archonides founded Halaesa (Diod. Sic. 14.16.1–

4, 403/2); an Athenian decree for (probably) Thucydides' Archonides was reinscribed in 385/4 (*IG* i³ 228).

7.2 Gongylus was to be killed in the battle of 7.5 (Plut., *Nic.* 19).

For the Peloponnesians' arriving just in time to prevent Syracuse's capitulation, cf. 6.103; Thucydides writes similarly of the arrival of Athens' second decision about Mytilene just in time to prevent the implementation of the first (3.49).

Alcibiades' proposal was that a Spartan should be sent to take overall command (6.91); Dover notes that as the campaign progresses Gylippus becomes less prominent; Hornblower, perhaps too subtly, thinks what is said here is deliberately ambiguous.

7.3 Plut., *Nic.* 19 has a more detailed account of this episode. At the end of this chapter, the Greek text does not specify the 'Little' Harbour, and in 7.4 it does not specify 'Little' and 'Great', but that passage makes the meaning clear.

7.4 The building of this counter-wall (SC₃ on Map 9) was crucial in preventing the Athenians from completing their blockade, as is stressed at the end of 7.6, and Nicias seems to have been culpable in not completing the Athenian wall to Trogilus before Gylippus arrived. We are given reasons for the fortification of Plemmyrium, but it was to prove disastrous: cf. 7.23–4.

7.5 Gylippus' acceptance that the first defeat was his fault is remarkable.

7.6 The ‘next opportunity’ was on the next day, according to Plut., *Nic.* 19.

7.7 For the Corinthian commander we follow most manuscripts and the OCT in reading Erasinides: Hornblower prefers one manuscript’s Thrasonides, as being the commoner name.

7.8 Thucydides’ version of the letter will be given in 7.11–15, in the context of its receipt in Athens; Dover notes that other letters from commanders are attested.

7.9 *Amphipolis*. An Athenian inscription has been restored with a payment to Euetion and colleagues at the beginning of 414/3, but *IG* i³ 371, 3–4, leaves the name unrestored. Perdiccas when last mentioned (6.7) was opposed to Athens: this is Thucydides’ last mention of him, and also of Amphipolis—which was never recovered by Athens and was taken by Philip II of Macedonia in 357.

7.10–18 Eighteenth winter (414/13)

7.10–17.2 *Athens’ Sicilian expedition (xii): Nicias’ letter to Athens.*

Hornblower notes that the messengers must have had their oral session with the council; and that the Thucydidean letter (whose relationship to the original must be comparable to that of the speeches: cf. Introduction, pp. xxxiv–xxxvi) functions like a speech, but is more technical and introduces factual material not in the narrative. The ‘city clerk’ was not the principal

secretary of the state but a skilled man elected to read documents to the council and assembly (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 54.5).

7.11 Formally, the force had been sent to support Egesta against Selinus, to re-establish a Leontini independent of Syracuse and to achieve what more it could (6.8). The arrival of Gylippus is mentioned, but the departure of Alcibiades (6.53, 60–1) and the death of Lamachus (6.101) are not. For the transformation of besiegers into besieged, cf. the Athenians at Pylos (4.29).

7.12 For the need to dry out triremes, cf. note to 2.94.

7.13 Editors used to emend the text to distinguish between sailors and slaves, but it now seems to be established that Athens did use slave oarsmen and that ‘our’ sailors, the slaves, and the foreigners are three categories of sailors (cf. Hornblower). For the prospect of making money, cf. 6.24; for slaves from Hyccara, cf. 6.62.

7.14 The first comment on the Athenian character refers to the men in the Athenian force, and the second to the Athenians at home, two aspects of democratic volatility; the thought will be attributed to Nicias again in 7.48.

7.15 That the Athenians in Sicily should be either recalled or reinforced repeats what is attributed to Nicias in 7.8. For Nicias’ illness, cf. 6.102 (but Hornblower thinks his kidney disease may have been new). It was not only the Athenians at

home who failed to prevent the Peloponnesians from reaching Sicily (silence of 6.93, 104) but also Nicias (6.104, 7.1, 7).

7.16 As Hornblower stresses, Thucydides reports the decisions taken, with no hint of the debate which must have preceded them. Menandrus and Euthydemus were presumably elected as additional generals for 414/3 (cf. Cleon in 425/4: note to 4.28). Menandrus is probably the general of 405/4 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.16), Euthydemus probably the oath-taker of 5.19, 24. Demosthenes was last heard of in 418/7 (5.80); Eurymedon in 424, when he was campaigning in Sicily and was fined for acquiescing in the treaty of Gela (4.65). The reinforcements were given one of Athens' most enterprising generals and one with Sicilian experience: whether they were already generals for 414/3 (and likely to be re-elected for 413/2) or elected early for 413/2 (and authorized to act immediately) is not stated, but the first is more likely (Develin, *AO*, 152–3, contr. Dover; no comment in Hornblower). The figure of 120 talents is found in one manuscript and Valla's translation, and ought not to have been bracketed as an editorial insertion in the OCT.

7.17.3–18 *Preparations of Peloponnesians*. Naupactus has not been mentioned since 4.66–7, but the fact that Athens did not interfere with the first Peloponnesian reinforcements, and the sending of twenty Athenian ships in 7.17.2, do not prove that

there had been no Athenian ships there since 421 (Hornblower, contr. Dover).

7.18 Athens' sending of reinforcements to Sicily would reduce the manpower left in Athens and improve the prospects for the fortification of Deceleia (Dover thought the lack of ships to inflict reprisals on the Peloponnese particularly important). For the attack on Plataea, cf. 2.2–6, 3.56. For the Spartans' refusal to go to arbitration, cf. 1.140; the embassies of 1.126 were not sent in the spirit of Archidamus' proposal of 1.82, 85. For Athens' raid on Laconia, cf. 6.105; for raids from Pylos, cf. 5.56, 115; Thucydides has not mentioned recent Spartan offers of arbitration.

7.19–87 *Nineteenth summer (413) (beginning)*

7.19–20 *Mainland Greece, including Deceleia.* According to Diod. Sic. 13.9.2 Alcibiades went with Agis: if he returned when the fort had been built (cf. 7.27), Plut., *Alc.* 23 need not conflict with that, *pace* Dover. Deceleia, on the southern slopes of Mount Parnes, north-north-east of Athens, was in fact nearer to the Boeotian plain than to the city of Athens. For Sparta's 'previously liberated cohorts', cf. 5.34. For the strengthening of pro-Spartan elements in Thespieae and Sicyon, cf. 6.95, 5.81, respectively.

7.20 Charicles is probably the man of that name who was apparently democratic and zealous in his search for religious

offenders in 415 (Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 36) but was one of the Thirty in 404/3 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.2). We seem to have too many generals for 414/3, and it is possible that Charicles, and Conon in 7.31, were not generals but admirals (*nauarchoi*) (cf. Hornblower on 7.31). Cawkwell has suggested that most of the island states in the Delian League were not obliged to supply soldiers (*Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War*, 115–20, noting the small number of islands mentioned in 7.57); the other ‘subject allies’ must be those on the mainlands of Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor (those mentioned by Cawkwell were not subject allies). For cooperation between Demosthenes and Charicles, cf. the arrangement of 4.2.

7.21–5 Athens’ Sicilian expedition (xiii): Plemmyrium, Great Harbour.

Although Hermocrates was again influential, nothing stated by Thucydides 7 suggests that he had been reinstated as general and 7.73 suggests that he had not (cf. 6.103). Already in the 490s Athens had fifty ships and acquired another twenty from Corinth (Hdt. 6.89). For the hope that an inexperienced fleet could defeat an experienced Athenian fleet, cf. the Spartans in 429 (2.83–92).

7.22 The Athenians were in a good state of alertness if they manned sixty ships in response to the Syracusans’ before daybreak.

7.23 The motif of men on land concentrating on the sea-battle will be repeated in 7.71. For the Syracusans’ initial success which turned to failure, cf. again the Spartans in 429 (2.90–2).

7.24 Triremes used their sails for voyaging, not for fighting, so the sails would be stored on land when fighting was expected. Before the Athenians fortified Plemmyrium (7.4), it had apparently been unoccupied: now the stores there had been lost, and it was garrisoned by the Syracusans.

7.25 The Syracusans' morale was now good, and they intercepted ships coming to the Athenians as the Athenians had failed to intercept ships coming to the Syracusans. For Thespieae, cf. 7.19. With the skirmishing in the harbour we see Thucydides' interest in ingenious military devices, cf. e.g. the siege of Plataea (2.71–8, 3.20–4). The translation's '250- ton' renders 'of 10,000', which we take to be 10,000 talents. For the emphasis on the Syracusans' disorder, cf. the Spartans' belief that their first defeat in the Gulf of Corinth could not have been due to lack of skill (2.85).

7.26 *Demosthenes' voyage to Sicily (i)*. Cythera should have been returned to Sparta after the Peace of Nicias (5.18), but 7.56 confirms that it was not. The notion of a refuge to encourage and receive deserting Helots goes beyond what Thucydides has said before.

7.27–30 *Mainland Greece: Deceleia, Mycalessus*. For the Dians, cf. 2.96. What is said of the effects of Sparta's occupation of Deceleia is written from a standpoint later than summer 413—how much later, we cannot tell, but Athens' ability to rely on Euboea (cf. 2.14) ended in autumn 411 (8.95–6). The longest of

the earlier invasions, lasting forty days, was in 430 (2.57). 'Even the regular garrisons would overrun the countryside' attempts to make sense of the transmitted text: that is probably corrupt, but no convincing emendation has been proposed. We do not know the basis for the number of deserting slaves: the manuscripts are divided between 'many . . . skilled workers' (which we accept) and an expression for 'most' which Thucydides does not use elsewhere; they presumably include but are not limited to slaves working in the silver mines (a recent study suggests that these numbered not more than 11,000).

7.28 Normally, but evidently not always, sea transport was preferred to land transport for heavy and bulky goods. For Oropus, cf. 2.23. The cost of importing food and other goods would fall directly on the individual consumers, but this would render them less able to support the state's war-effort. For expectations of the Athenians' willingness and ability to persevere in the war, cf. 5.14, 8.2, 24. Evidence for the Delian League's tribute after 421 is scanty and not reliably datable, but the annual amount collected was probably nearer to 1,000 than to 500 talents. Whether the Athenians later (perhaps in 410) reverted to the tribute from this tax is uncertain also.

7.29 Diitrephes is probably a relative of Nicostratus son of Diitrephes (3.75). It is not clear how far he controlled or could have controlled what happened, but the episode did not

prevent him from serving as general again in 411 (8.64).

Mycalessus was c.4 miles (6.5 km) from the coast immediately south of the narrows: it was not one of the constituent cities of the Boeotian federation (it seems to have been a dependency of Tanagra), but it was not very small. The horror of this episode is summed up twice, at the end of 7.29 and of 7.30: it was a barbarian atrocity inflicted on innocent and unexpected victims; for the indiscipline and savagery of barbarians and near-barbarians, cf. 2.81, 3.94, 4.124–8.

7.31 *Demosthenes' voyage to Sicily (ii)*. Pheia was on the headland north-east of the mouth of the Alpheius, Alyzia opposite Leucas (so north of Zacynthus and Cephallenia); Anactorium had been given to the Acarnanians in 425 (cf. 4.49, 5.30). For Eurymedon's mission, cf. 7.16. Conon was to be important in the last years of the Peloponnesian War and in the 390s: here he was perhaps not a general but an admiral (cf. note to 7.20); with his reluctance to engage twenty-five enemy ships with his eighteen, contrast Phormio in 2.83–92. There is no allusion here to Eurymedon's role in Corcyra in 3.80–1, 4.46–8.

7.32–3 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xiv)*. For Centoripa, cf. 6.94; (H)alicyae was an Elymian city between Egesta and Selinus: its alliance with Athens was inscribed on the same stone as the decree for Egesta, for which see on 6.6. For Syracuse's rival Acragas, cf. 5.4, where it responded favourably to the Athenian

Phaeax: as Hornblower remarks, it is surprising that it did not positively support the Athenians now.

7.33 With Camarina ‘news of the capture of Plemmyrion achieved what rhetoric could not’ (Dover, contrasting 6.75–88).

Messana, not mentioned after 6.74, was another state which remained neutral. For Iapygia, cf. 6.30: the Messapians lived on the ‘heel’ of Italy. Hornblower suggests that Metapontium was an exception to the Athenians’ hostile reception in Italy mentioned in 6.44; 7.35, 57 indicate that Thurii was won over.

7.34 *Battle in Gulf of Corinth*. Cf. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 163–7. Erineus, on the coast, and Rhype, inland, were slightly further east than Naupactus. Diphilus had presumably succeeded Conon. The ‘catheads’ (*The Athenian Trireme*², 211) were ear timbers projecting to each side of the bow, in front of and protecting the outriggers (for which cf. note to 4.12) and supporting platforms for the anchors: the Corinthian ships attacked the prows of the Athenian and then continued along one side. For varying assessments of victory and defeat, cf. 1.70.

7.35 *Demosthenes’ voyage to Sicily (iii)*. Identifications are not certain, but possibly the river Hylias was slightly nearer to Croton than to Thurii (*Barrington Atlas*), and Petra was Leucopetra, south of Rhegium.

7.36–41 *Athens’ Sicilian expedition (xv): battle in Great Harbour*. The ‘previous sea-battle’ was that of 7.25; and presumably the

Syracusans had heard of the Corinthians' modification of their ships for the battle of 7.34. The Athenian manoeuvres were *periplous*, sailing round the enemy's line (cf. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov, *The Athenian Trireme*², 293), and *diekplous*, by which (probably) individual ships sailed through gaps in the enemy's line, perhaps first shearing away an enemy ship's oars and then turning abruptly to ram (contr. *The Athenian Trireme*², 43, 60). As with the hoplite battle in 6.69–70, Thucydides makes points here which apply to other sea-battles too.

7.39 Plut., *Nic.* 25 attributes to Ariston the naval tactics of 7.36 (as does Diod. Sic. 13.10.2), and reports that he died in the final sea-battle. Attacking when the enemy were eating was a favourite device: cf. e.g. Hdt. 1.63 (Peisistratus), Thuc. 8.95, Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.27–8 (one version of the battle of Aegospotami): Plut., *Nic.* 20 attributes that also to Ariston, and claims that Nicias did not want to fight a sea-battle before the reinforcements arrived but was forced into it by Menandrus and Euthydemus (who presumably were re-elected as regular generals for 413/2).

7.41 The 'dolphins' were downward-facing semicircles (Hornblower), suspended until they could be dropped on an enemy ship: this was another favourite device (cf. Ar., *Eq.* 762, Pherecrates fr. 12 Kassel and Austin; also Thuc. 2.76, the Plataean response to battering-rams, and Diod. Sic. 13.78.4, blocks of stone).

7.42–6 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xvi): arrival of Demosthenes, night battle.* Dover calculates that 'seventy-three' ships is exactly right, if Eurymedon had left nine ships in Sicily and joined Demosthenes with one, and suggests that *malista* denotes not approximation but a calculation by Thucydides. Until the final outcome of the campaign Thucydides maintains the tension by highlighting moments of expected Athenian victory and moments of expected Syracusan victory—and for the genuine uncertainty, cf. 7.49. Here the strategy proposed by Lamachus in 6.49 is endorsed, but it is not made clear whether the endorsement is Demosthenes' or Thucydides' or both.

7.43 The siege-engines will be battering-rams, as used at Plataea (cf. 2.76). In Map 9 we adopt Dover's view that the Syracusans' three camps were attached to the south side of their counter-wall, but Hornblower prefers to think of camps to the north of that wall and not far from the south–north wall of 6.75. For the six hundred, cf. 6.96–7.

7.44 For the difficulty of finding out what happened, cf. in general 1.22, 50, and on the final battle in the Great Harbour, 7.71; also Eur., *Supp.* 846–56. Dover (p. 478) points out that the space was not particularly confined: Thucydides was either misinformed or carried away. On the hazards of using passwords, cf. Aen. Tact. 24–5; paeans (see note to 4.43) are not in Thucydides used by Athenians or Ionians. The cliffs of Epipolae (see note to 6.96–103) will have been dangerous

enough at night for frightened men who did not know the terrain.

7.45 There were 2,500 deaths on the Athenian side, according to Diod. Sic. 13.11.5, 2,000 according to Plut., *Nic.* 21.

7.46 Sicanus was one of Hermocrates' colleagues in 6.73, deposed in 6.103, but apparently reinstated later (cf. 7.70).

7.47–50 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xvii): Athenian withdrawal delayed.* The debate is represented as one between Demosthenes and Nicias: Eurymedon is mentioned only as agreeing with Demosthenes, and Menandrus and Euthydemus not at all (Hornblower). This is probably a fact about Thucydides' narrative rather than a fact about the actual debate, but it may well be a fact about what actually happened that the views of the ordinary soldiers and sailors now become increasingly prominent. Hornblower wonders if malnutrition was contributing to the Athenians' sickness; the marshes outside Syracuse caused trouble for attackers on other occasions too (cf. Diod. Sic. 13.114.1–2, in 405; 14.70.4–71, in 392; perhaps also the plague of 15.24.2–3/73.1, before 368).

7.48 The reference to an 'open vote' implies at least a much larger meeting of officers, and probably a meeting of the whole force or at least all the Athenians in it. Nicias' opinion that there were still men in Syracuse wanting to surrender to Athens (cf. 6.103) seems to be endorsed by Thucydides in 7.49, cf. 7.73. Dover considers Nicias' argument 'as disgraceful a proposition

as [of] any general in history: rather than risk execution, he will throw away the fleet and many thousands of other people's lives, and put his country in mortal peril'—but at least the risk was genuine and Demosthenes and Eurymedon will have been conscious of it (cf. Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*, 319, citing Demosthenes' refusal to return to Athens after his defeat in Aetolia, 3.98, and Eurymedon's fine for accepting the treaty of Gela, 4.65).

7.50 The Peloponnesians' detour via Libya was not intentional like the detour via Crete of the Athenian force mentioned in 2.85, 92, but like the Athenians the Peloponnesians delayed to take part in a campaign unconnected with the Peloponnesian War. Euesperides was the later Berenice, modern Benghazi; Cyrene was a colony of Thera, itself allegedly a colony of Sparta, Euesperides was a colony of Cyrene, and there is an inscription of c.350–320 in which it appoints two Syracusan consular representatives (*SEG* xviii 772). The Peloponnesians continued along the north African coast to obtain a short sea crossing to Sicily. The eclipse was on 27 August: it is not clear whether Thucydides means that lunar eclipses can occur only at the full moon, as he states in 2.28 that solar eclipses can occur only at the new moon. The eclipse alarmed 'most of the Athenians', and the soothsayers prescribed a delay of 'thrice nine days' (cf. 'thrice nine years' in 5.26). Thucydides himself would not have regarded the eclipse as ominous, and perhaps

thought that the educated Nicias should not have done (cf. Introduction, pp. xliii–xliv); Pl., *Lach.* 198 E 2–199 A 1 maintains that a general should be not the servant but the master of the seer.

7.51–72 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xviii): last battles in Great Harbour.* Thucydides has said that there were Syracusans giving information to Nicias; he does not say how information about the Athenians reached the Syracusans. The Athenians will have abandoned their horses in order to escape into the fortifications.

7.52 The Athenian line perhaps originally ran north-west to south-east, facing north-east, with Eurymedon trapped in the northern part of the Great Harbour (Dover); Diod. Sic. 13.13.2–3 gives the positions of other commanders, on both sides, and has Eurymedon trapped at Dascon, for which see note to 6.66.

7.53 For the Etruscans, cf. 6.88, 103. Lysimeleia is probably the marsh of 6.66.

7.55 Despite the plural 'cities', which anticipates 7.56, Thucydides' main point in this chapter is the similarity of Athens and Syracuse, which is implied throughout his narrative and stated most explicitly here (cf. 8.96). That Syracuse afterwards 'changed from *politeia* to democracy' (Arist., *Pol.* 5.1304 A 27–9, cf. Diod. Sic. 13.33–5) is not incompatible with Thucydides' regarding as democracy the current regime, even as modified

to allow for three powerful generals (cf. the implications of Athenagoras' speech, 6.36–40; generals, 6.72–3, 103).

7.56 Here Thucydides moves from Athens and Syracuse to the large number of allies on each side, thus preparing the way for the catalogue which follows.

7.57 Compare the more concise catalogue of allies on each side in 431 (2.9); also the Homeric Catalogue of Ships (Hom., *Il.* 2.484–760), and Herodotean catalogues, including the list of nations in Xerxes' army (7.61–96) and the list with ethnic origins of the contingents in the Greek fleet (8.43–8). Dover's analysis shows how Thucydides mingles criteria of status, geography, and race in organizing these lists; attention is particularly focused on contingents fighting on the other side than the criteria would lead one to expect. For 'the Aeginetans [in fact Athenians] occupying Aegina at the time', cf. 2.27. For the status of Chios and Methymna, providing ships, and independent on sufferance but not under guarantee, cf. 6.85 with note. The Plataeans will be those settled in Scione in 421 (cf. 5.32); for the Messenians comprising 'the inhabitants of Naupactus and the garrison at Pylos', cf. 1.103 and 4.41, 5.35, 56; for the Megarian exiles, cf. 6.43. The Aetolians last appeared, as enemies of Athens, in 426 (3.94–102); the Acarnanians were still grateful to Demosthenes for his support in 426/5 (3.105–14).

7.58 One would expect the ‘Spartiate commander’ to be Gylippus, and that is probably what Thucydides means, but another Spartiate commanded the force of Helots and men from the newly liberated cohorts, Eccritus (7.19: not mentioned elsewhere). The Sicyonians, brought as members of the Peloponnesian League, are contrasted with the Arcadian mercenaries.

7.59 The width of the harbour mouth at its narrowest is c.1,100 yards (1 km), so Thucydides’ 8 stades imply an unusually short stade (see Appendix); but distances across water were particularly hard to estimate.

7.60 For meetings attended by more than the generals, cf. 7.48 with note. The ‘contingent commanders’ were the taxiarchs, commanders of the tribal regiments (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 61.3); probably in this force, distant from Athens, each tribe had a taxiarch, irrespective of normal appointments (Dover); we do not know how the allied contingents were organized, or whether their commanders were admitted to councils such as this. Dover points out that here only the slaves are likely to have included men too old or too young for active service. The cross-wall is AD on Map 9. Hornblower notes that the process of manning the ships is not completed until 7.65. Evidence for the date of the battle at the Assinarus (7.84) suggests that the Athenians had waited for the ‘thrice nine days’ of 7.50 (contr. Dover, note to 7.72.4).

- 7.61** After a long period without speeches (none so far in Book 7), we are given a set of speeches before the crucial battle and one more after, all the Athenian speeches being by Nicias. For the Athenians this was the last chance of avoiding disaster, and the pessimistic notes sounded by Nicias are at any rate appropriate to his character.
- 7.62** The Athenians' response to the Syracusans' modification of their ships (7.36) is reported through this speech: fighting a land-battle from ships was the older style of naval warfare, which Athenian fifth-century developments had seemed to render obsolete (cf. 1.49).
- 7.63** The sailors who are not Athenians but 'honorary Athenians' were metics who had settled in Athens (cf. note to 2.13: thus Hornblower, following a scholiast; contr. Dover): if this reports what Nicias actually said, it was a tactless remark when the sailors also included men from the subject states.
- 7.64** Everything from the beginning of 7.62 has been addressed to the sailors, and the Athenians of this chapter are the Athenian sailors (Hornblower; contr. Dover). The fear that the victorious Syracusans would immediately sail against Athens will be repeated in 8.1, but will not be fulfilled (as Nicias predicted in 6.11). The idea that the men are the city will recur more emphatically in Nicias' speech after the battle (7.77), and cf. Thucydides' use of it in 7.75.

- 7.65** For information reaching the Syracusans from the Athenians, cf. 7.51. Other Thucydidean speeches have been attributed to a plurality of speakers (e.g. the Corcyraeans and the Corinthians, 1.31–44): this attribution to the Syracusans and Gylippus is particularly awkward, but ‘our country’ in 7.68 implies a Syracusan speaker and Syracusan hearers.
- 7.66** The remark on Athens’ imperial power echoes Pericles’ last speech (2.64), and the Athenian intentions echo those reported by Alcibiades in Sparta (6.90). ‘Enslave’ here is probably metaphorical of those subjected to an imperial ruler, but contrast 7.68, with note, below.
- 7.67** For javelin-men in the Syracusan navy, cf. 7.40. The Athenians’ options, ‘a break-out to sea or . . . a retreat by land’, have been presented to Thucydides’ readers in the narrative (7.60).
- 7.68** In 6.72 it was the Syracusans who suffered from disarray (‘lack of system’), but the Athenians had already suffered from it in the night battle on Epipolae (7.43: ‘disorder’). The suffering and indignities suggested here are those all too often inflicted on the conquered, as at Melos (5.116), and go beyond subjection. Hornblower stresses the appropriateness to the fertile Sicily of the agricultural metaphor at the end of the chapter.
- 7.69** As Hornblower suggests, the ‘conventional language’ of Nicias’ supplementary appeal was surely commoner in real life than in the pages of Thucydides. For the ‘unregimented liberty’ of

Athens, cf. Pericles in 2.37; for the appeal to ancestors and ‘the gods of our fathers’, cf. the Plataeans in 2.71, 3.59. The ‘barrier across the harbour mouth’ is that of 7.59.

7.70 The Athenians had about 110 ships (7.60) and the Syracusans about 76 (7.70, with 7.52), so the total was indeed ‘nearly two hundred’. Thucydides’ account of this great sea-battle, abounding in superlatives, is ‘more of an atmospheric evocation and a report of emotions and morale . . . than a piece of conventional military history’ (Hornblower); there are echoes of it in Polyb. 1.44.4–5 and elsewhere, and in Sall., *Iug.* 60. Sicanus was a fellow general of Hermocrates, deposed with him but evidently reinstated (cf. 6.73, 103, 7.46); for Agatharchus, cf. 7.25; Pythen had come with the Peloponnesian ships (6.104). For collisions when there were many ships in a confined space, cf. the battle of Salamis in 480 (Hdt. 8.84–90).

7.71 For the difficulty of seeing what was happening, cf. the night battle on Epipolae (7.44, with note).

7.72 Cf. the Ambraciot herald’s reaction to shocking defeat in 3.113. With the refusal of the Athenian sailors to embark again we have one moment of mutiny.

7.73–4 *Athens’ Sicilian expedition (xix): Athenian withdrawal delayed.* We may doubt whether the continuing danger from the Athenians after their ignominious withdrawal from Syracuse would be as great as is suggested. The ‘authorities’ must at

least include the generals; Hermocrates had not been reinstated (see note to 7.21–5). The Syracusans do not risk giving an order which might lead to mutiny on their side—but Hornblower wonders whether the authorities were as strongly in favour of Hermocrates' plan as Thucydides suggests. Later instances of Syracusan drunkenness are recorded, for instance in 355 (Diod. Sic. 16.18.5–19.1). For Syracusans in touch with Nicias, cf. 6.103, 7.48–9. The trick practised now recalls the trick practised by the Athenians in 415 (6.64–5).

7.75–87 *Athens' Sicilian expedition (xx): Athenian withdrawal and defeat.* In 7.75 Thucydides contrasts the humiliation of this withdrawal with the confidence of the dispatch of the expedition in 6.30–2. The day of withdrawal is the third day from the battle by inclusive counting. This is the beginning of a diary in which, if the naval battle was on day 1 and the withdrawal on day 3, the arrival at the river Assinarus (7.84) was on day 10: if Plut., *Nic.* 28 gives the date of the battle, and the Athenians did wait a month after the eclipse of 27 August in 7.50, this will be equivalent to 29 September–8 October. For disasters too great for tears, cf. Bacchyl. fr. 2 Snell and Maehler, Hdt. 3.14. For the departing men as a city in flight, cf. note to 7.64 (normally the population of a captured city was not allowed to leave, but contr. Potidaea, 2.70, Amphipolis, 4.105–6): Hornblower sees an allusion to the fall of Troy. The figure of 40,000 (with 240 triremes lost) recurs in Isoc. 8. *Peace*

86, but it cannot be right unless a large number of slaves is included, and what is said of desertions makes that unlikely (cf. Hornblower, vol. iii, appendix 2). The end of ch. 75 reads as if it were intended to end a stretch of narrative: cf. note to 7.87.

7.76 Now that the disaster which he both feared and helped to bring about has arrived, Nicias appears in a more positive light.

7.77 Hornblower finds it hard to derive much encouragement from Nicias' introduction; but remarks by the Melians in 5.85–113 and Thucydides' final comment on Nicias (7.86) suggest that Greeks could even when it was unrealistic cling to a hope that they would not suffer more than they deserved. The conclusion echoes Ajax in Hom., *Il.* 15.734–8. Macleod, *Collected Essays*, 143–4, noted an echo of 1.143, in Pericles' first speech, which 'sharply reminds us that the whole expedition flouts the defensive policy of Pericles'.

7.78 For the hollow-rectangle formation, cf. 4.125 (another retreat), 6.67. The army originally headed inland, hoping to be able to turn north towards Catana (cf. 7.80 and Diod. Sic. 13.18.6). Probably, as suggested by P. Green, *Armada from Athens* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 321–4, its route was west as far as the modern Capocorso bridge and then north-west, the Acraean Rock was the south face of Monte Climiti, and the ravine was Cava Castelluccio: cf. Kagan, *The*

Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, 340–9, with 341 map 12, accepting all Green's identifications.

7.79 While Thucydides notes that the thunderstorm was not unusual at that time of year, he suggests that the men saw it as a sign of divine displeasure (cf. Introduction, p. xlv).

7.80 For the lighting of fires to conceal departure, cf. the Greeks at Artemisium in 480 (Hdt. 8.19). The 'other side of Sicily' is the south-west coast as opposed to the east coast: a message about this change of plan must have been sent to the Sicels; the army will have reached the Helorum road (cf. 6.66) and the southern part of the east coast near the modern Cassibile. The Cacyparis will be the modern river Cassibile; Green makes the Erineus the Asinaro = Fiume di Noto (pp. 330) and the Assinarus the Tellaro (*Armada from Athens*, 334–5), and that is more likely than the view of Dover and Hornblower that the Assinarus is the Asinaro and the Erineus therefore a river between that and the Cassibile.

7.81 Blaming Gylippus anticipates the disagreement between (some) Syracusans and him after the capture of the surviving fugitives (7.86, with note).

7.82 In the event, Demosthenes was executed and the prisoners were not adequately supplied with the basic needs of life (7.86–7). That only 6,000 men in his contingent lived to surrender casts further doubt on the 40,000 of 7.75. It is not clear whether we are to think of money filling four shields as

a surprisingly large or a surprisingly small amount: see Hornblower.

- 7.83** Nicias attempted not total surrender but a deal: as Dover notes, the Athenians could raise money more easily than they could replace lost men.
- 7.84** The account of this last episode is ‘one of the most appallingly memorable chapters’ in Thucydides (Hornblower). It seems to be suggested that the Peloponnesians in the Syracusan force were particularly vindictive.
- 7.85** Together, 7.82 and 7.87 suggest that only 1,000 men in Nicias’ contingent were taken alive. One man who made it to Catana was the speaker of Lys. 20. *Polystratus* 24–7, who was back in Athens by 410; another was the Callistratus of Paus. 7.16.4–6, killed in subsequent action against the Syracusans.
- 7.86** The quarries were below the southern escarpment of Epipolae, east of the Athenians’ wall from the ‘circle’ to the Great Harbour; the difficulty of escaping from them is remarked on by Cic., 2 *Verr.* 5.68. Thucydides reports only what actually happened; but Diod. Sic. 13.19.4–33.1 and Plut., Nic. 28 have stories behind which seems to lie a debate in which the demagogue Diocles (who was to head a democratic revolution in 412) argued for what was eventually done, while both Hermocrates and Gylippus urged milder treatment. Nicias’ wealth, not mentioned when it could be set beside that of Alcibiades, in 6.8–26, was derived from the silver mines (cf.

Xen., *Vect.* 4.14, Plut., *Nic.* 3–4). Thucydides' obituary verdict on him is surprising, both because there is no comparable verdict on Demosthenes (since the council of war following the nocturnal defeat on Epipolae, 7.47, the Athenian chapters have focused principally on Nicias) and because it is not the verdict we should expect, given that Thucydides has represented Nicias as damagingly over-cautious and that he himself does not elsewhere express admiration for the kind of virtue attributed to Nicias. The Greek text specifies the *arete* with which Nicias conducted his whole life, and that must refer not to manly courage but to what Nicias is made to claim in his last speech, 'constant observance of the gods and constant justice and fairness in [his] dealings with men' (7.77). Thucydides does seem to have thought that, despite his faults, Nicias was a good man who did not deserve such a shameful end; cf. what he says of 'simple decency' in 3.83.

7.87 For the prisoners' rations, contr. the more generous allowance of the truce at Pylos (4.16). Presumably those kept for the full eight months were ransomed or sold as slaves after that. For 'total annihilation', cf. Hdt. 2.120 (on Troy). The ending of Book 7 at this point is not due to Thucydides himself (cf. Introduction, p. xxvi); we have already had one apparent ending, in 7.75, and 8.1 (the last chapter devoted to summer 413) will show the Athenians shocked but resolving to continue the struggle.

BOOK EIGHT

8.1 Nineteenth summer (413) (conclusion)

Athens' reaction to defeat in Sicily. With the initial disbelief Hornblower compares the Syracusans' disbelief in 415 (6.32, 45). For the responsibility of citizens for decisions in the assembly, cf. Pericles in 2.60, 64, Cleon in 3.43. The religious support for the expedition has not been mentioned before, but it suits the sceptical Thucydides to note that the support proved unfounded (cf. Introduction, p. xliv). Despite the Athenians' fears (cf. 7.64), the Sicilian Greeks would not send much help to the Peloponnesians (cf. 8.26, 35). A main source of timber for shipbuilding was Macedonia (cf. Andoc. 2. *Return* 11; ML 91, translated Fornara 161); another was the Troad (cf. 4.52). For the importance of Euboea, cf. 2.14, 7.28. It is not made clear how the *probouloi* appointed to oversee the agenda (Thucydides uses the cognate verb) interacted with the council and (cf. note to 2.22) the generals: in Ar., Lys. 387 ff. a *proboulos* is a target for mockery (cf. perhaps *Thesm.* 808–9); the two *probouloi* known are Hagnon (cf. 1.117 with note to 115–17) and the tragedian Sophocles; they perhaps had to be over 40 (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 29.2). For what 'tends to happen in a democracy', cf. 2.65, 4.28, 6.63.

8.2–6 Nineteenth winter (413/12)

Preparations for war in Greece. For the excitement, cf. 2.8, at the beginning of the war, but it is hard to imagine who the

neutrals mentioned here might be: as Andrewes notes, Thucydides is carried away in piling up the odds against the nevertheless resilient Athens. What is now foreshadowed is not liberation of the Greeks from Athenian domination, as in 2.8, but domination of the Greeks by Sparta.

- 8.3** For the Oetaeans, cf. 3.92; Heracleia, last mentioned as in Boeotian hands, may by now have been recovered by Sparta (it was Spartan in 409: Xen., *Hell.* 1.2.18). We do not know whether the hundred ships were all built: what is most surprising is that only fifteen were required from the naval power Corinth (cf. 1.36).
- 8.4** The fortification of Sounium shows that the Athenians were not totally excluded from the countryside by the Spartan occupation of Deceleia; the fort in Laconia is that of 7.26.
- 8.5** Applicants from the more northerly part of the Aegean and Asia Minor were rivalled by applicants from the more southerly part, each with a Persian satrap behind them, and Sparta had to choose between two strategies: immediately the southern strategy was adopted, owing to Chios' ships (8.6) and Alcibiades' links with Miletus (8.17), but it was the northern strategy, with the possibility of cutting off Athens' corn supplies, which was eventually to win the war for Sparta. Alcámenes' father was probably the Sthenelaïdas of 1.86. The word for 'governing commander' is *harmostes*, used only here by Thucydides but frequently by Xenophon (e.g. *Hell.* 1.3.15)

of Spartans commanding garrisons or non-citizen armies. At a distance from Sparta, Agis had to make decisions on his own, but it is not clear whether he had been given enhanced powers (and notice 8.7); there is no sign now of the advisers with whom he was saddled in 5.63. Apart from the last sentence of 5.1, this is Thucydides' first mention of the Persians since 4.50 (and, in view of their importance from now to the end of the war, he might have given them more prominence earlier if he had lived to produce the final version of his history). Probably Tissaphernes had defeated Pissouthnes and replaced him as satrap at Sardis at the end of the 420s (cf. Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 15.53 [52]), and had more recently been appointed 'military governor of the west'—a position whose implications are unclear, but Pharnabazus was not obviously subordinate to him. Amorges may have been in revolt, and supported by the Athenians, for a few years (perhaps since c.414): according to Andoc. 3 *Peace* 29 it was that support which finally induced the Persians to support Sparta, and it may also be that which induced Dareius to demand 'arrears' of tribute from cities in the Athenian orbit.

8.6 Pharnabazus was satrap at Dascylium: we learn from 8.8 that he sent money. For Alcibiades and Endius, cf. 5.44–5: if Alcibiades had indeed made a fool of Endius in 420, this further cooperation is remarkable. Foreign connections were often reflected in naming practices: see Herman, *Ritualised*

Friendship, 19–22. Changes of plan as the result of an earthquake were not uncommon (cf. 3.89, 6.95, and Introduction, p. xlv), but, if it was the earthquake which here led to a change of commander and the scaling-down of the expedition, that is striking.

8.7–28 Twentieth summer (412)

Chios leads revolt of Ionia. In the case of Chios, the approach to Sparta was concealed not only from Athens but also from the Chian citizens (cf. 8.9). For hauling ships across the Isthmus, cf. 3.15. Agis' powers were not such as to prevent the Spartans from commandeering the ships being prepared for his plan (cf. 8.5).

8.8 Rhamphias is probably the man of that name in 1.139, 5.12; his son Clearchus was to be the original commander of Cyrus' 10,000 Greek mercenaries, and was killed in the battle of Cunaxa, in 401.

8.9 Hornblower suggests that the earthquake of 8.6 may have reinforced the Corinthians' scruples. In 8.7 we were at the beginning of spring: the Isthmia seems to have been celebrated about the time of the solstice, but the truce will have begun earlier. Aristocrates is probably the man of that name in 8.89. For the guarantee of good faith, cf. that demanded of Chios by Athens in 4.51. Probably Chios was

ruled by a moderate oligarchy (cf. 8.24), and probably not all the men with political rights were involved in this plot.

8.10 For the location of Speiraeum, see Map 3, and Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 6, with 21 fig. 5.

8.11 The ‘other people of the area’ must be Epidaurians. The Peloponnesians’ contempt for the Athenians (8.8) had proved unfounded, and the confidence of 8.2 quickly evaporated.

8.12 According to Plut., *Alc.* 23, *Ages.* 3, Alcibiades had had an affair with Agis’ wife: that may be true even if it is not true that he was the father of Agis’ putative son Leotychidas (Xen., *Hell.* 3.3.1–4, not naming the father; Plut.)—which would mean that Agis lived to be nearly 60 without fathering a son who survived.

8.13 The Peloponnesian ships of 6.104, 7.2, and 7.7 total 17, but Gongylus’ ship may have been lost when he was killed (Plut., *Nic.* 19). Hippocles had perhaps succeeded Diphilus at Naupactus and, like his predecessors there, may not have been a general (cf. 7.31, 34); some ostraca were cast against him, presumably when Hyperbolus was ostracized (see note to 6.6).

8.14 Principal places in the eastern Aegean mentioned in Book 8 are shown on Map 1. Corycus was the southern extension of the Erythrae peninsula; Clazomenae was on the gulf of Smyrna, east of Erythrae (the people had moved from the mainland to their island, apparently in the mid-sixth century: Str.

645/14.1.36, Paus. 7.3.9); the location of Polichna is uncertain.

8.15 In 431 the Athenians had decreed that their last 1,000 talents were to be used only if Athens was attacked by sea (2.24). For Strombichides' father Diotimus, cf. 1.45: the family was consistently democratic and anti-Spartan (cf. Davies, *APF*, 161–5), and Strombichides was put to death by the Thirty in 404 (Lys. 30. *Nicomachus* 14, cf. 13. *Agoratus* 13). Thrasycles was one of the men who swore to the treaties of 421 (5.19, 24). Slaves listed in a Chian inscription of about this date may be men enlisted as sailors and then freed (L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques* (Paris: Champion, 1938), 118–26).

8.16 Samos was deprived of its navy in 439 (1.117), but as Andrewes suggests may have been allowed to keep one or two ships. Teos was due south of Clazomenae; the Athenians' wall was probably a recent one, built to protect the city against Tissaphernes.

8.17 For the long-standing rivalry of Samos and Miletus, cf. 1.115 with note to 1.115–17. In antiquity Miletus was on the coast and Lade (on which the Ionians based themselves for the deciding battle of the Ionian Revolt, in 495: Hdt. 6.7–8) was an offshore island: now Miletus is inland and Lade is a hill near the coast.

8.18 This treaty is the first of three between the Spartans and the Persians in 412–411 (the others are quoted in 8.37, 58). While

the third has a more elaborate preamble which may reflect a higher status, the first two took immediate effect and were not merely preliminary drafts. Whatever territory the Persians seriously intended to claim, they were here alarmingly extensive about what they could claim (cf. Lichas in 8.43), and even abandoning the Asiatic Greeks to Persia (as in 8.58) would conflict directly with Sparta's original aim of liberating the Greeks from Athens (cf. note to 4.50); Amorges was currently in revolt from the Persians (cf. 8.5), while there were no rebels from Sparta against whom Persia might be invoked; there were not yet sufficient Spartan forces in the east for the maintenance of them to be an issue. Apart from a general commitment to a joint war against Athens, the advantages here were all with the Persians.

8.19 For Anaea, south of Ephesus, cf. 3.19 with note—and Ephesus must by now have joined the revolt. North of Ephesus, Dios Hieron was west of Notium (cf. note to 3.33), and Lebedus west of that; Aerae was west of Teos. Diomedon was to be strongly democratic in 411 (8.73), and was one of the generals involved in and executed after the battle of Arginusae in 406 (Xen., *Hell.* 1.7.29). In 8.16 the Athenians had fled from a larger enemy fleet; here the Chians fled from a larger Athenian fleet.

8.20 Thucydides presents Astyochus as tactless and incompetent. Probably at this stage the Spartan admiral-in-chief was still

appointed for a particular campaign (cf. note to 2.66–8) rather than (as from c.409) for a year. Teos seems not to have had active enthusiasm for either side, but to have tried to stay out of trouble (and is not mentioned again until it was raided by the Spartans in 406: Diod. Sic. 13.76.4).

8.21 Probably the Athenians had installed a democracy in Samos in 439 (cf. note to 1.115–17): in that case, probably, they tolerated a return to (at any rate, comparative) oligarchy later, and what happened now was the overthrow of that regime (which itself was pro-Athenian in 8.16) (Andrewes, *contr.* Hornblower). The fragmentary *IG* i³ 96 seems to reflect Athens' settlement with the new regime.

8.22 The chapter begins with a Chian initiative, but it turns out that both land and sea forces were commanded by Laconians, the sea force by one of the Perioeci. Methymna was the one city on Lesbos which had not joined in the revolt of 428–427, and (like Chios) continued to contribute ships to the Delian League (cf. 3.2, 5, 50; 6.85, 7.57).

8.23 The Athenians seem to have given up the blockade of Cenchreae, to concentrate on the Aegean (Hornblower). Leon is probably not the Leon of 5.19, 24; like Diomedon, he was democratic in 411 (8.73), and he is probably the Leon of Salamis put to death by the Thirty in 404/3 (Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.39). Hornblower remarks that Astyochus ought to have made straight for Mytilene. In summer 411 Mytilene and

Methymna were to be on the Athenian side but Eresus on the Spartan (8.100). Daphnus, unlocated, was on the Athenian side in 407 (ML 88, translated Fornara 163).

8.24 The Oenoussae islands were at the north end of the strait between Chios and the mainland; the Athenians proceeded anticlockwise from Cardamyle, in the north-east of the island. For the Athenians' marines, see notes to 3.98, 6.43, and for their service-lists, see note to 6.31. Chios had been largely untroubled since the Persian reprisals in 493 at the end of the Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 6.31–2); for its prosperity, cf. Alcibiades in 8.45. 'Prudence' (*sophrosyne*) and 'well-ordered government' (*kosmos*: here the verb is used) often though not always have oligarchic overtones; in this comparison with Sparta Thucydides is praising primarily stability, but his comments on democracy (e.g. 2.65, 4.28, 6.63, 8.1) suggest that he did not consider that conducive to stability. For expectations of Athenian collapse, cf. 8.1–2; in general the Athenians proved more successful at recovering control in the islands than on the mainland, even though it was the mainland which Sparta was willing to hand over to Persia.

8.25 Phrynichus, an important man in Book 8, was by now in his sixties (Andrewes), but there is little evidence for his earlier career. Onomacles was an extreme oligarch in 411 (decree *ap.* [Plut.] X *Orat.* 833 F), who escaped after the overthrow of the Four Hundred and was one of the Thirty in 404/3. Scironides

(if that is the right form of the name: see Andrewes and Hornblower) was to be deposed in 8.54; no more is known of his career. For perceptions of Ionians and Dorians, cf. notes to 1.124, 4.61, 6.77.

- 8.26** Hermocrates had not had his way over the treatment of the captives in 413 (cf. note to 7.86); he still had some influence, and we learn in 8.29 that he came with the Syracusan contingent, but the Sicilian contribution to the war in the east was not large. Leros (only one manuscript does not garble the name) is in fact c.34 miles (55 km) south-west of Miletus; Teichioussa was on the mainland, c.16 miles (26 km) south-east of Miletus; the evidence of the tribute lists shows that both were in some sense Milesian (cf. M. H. Hansen, in Hansen and Nielsen, *Inventory*, 114). Alcibiades presumably came from Miletus.
- 8.27** For an Athenian strategic retreat, cf. 8.16. Phrynichus did not have superior authority (cf. note to 1.57): he had to, and managed to, persuade his fellow commanders, allied as well as Athenian. For 'risks of its own making', cf. Pericles in 1.144; for the reputation for intelligence, cf. 2.34 on the man chosen to deliver Athens' funeral oration. It appears that Thucydides' verdict was, as it still is, controversial. The Athenians had 68 ships to the Peloponnesians' 80: Andrewes (supported by Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War*, 178, and by 8.30) thought Phrynichus' caution mistaken, and Hornblower at least judges

Thucydides' praise surprising; Thucydides may here have misapplied the Periclean caution of which he approved (cf. 1.143, 2.13). Samos was to be the Athenians' main base in the eastern Aegean for the rest of the war. The Argives were probably both humiliated by their defeat of 8.25 and annoyed at the decision not to fight now.

8.28 Iasus (claiming to have been founded first from Argos and afterwards from Miletus: Polyb. 16.12) seems not to have been as rich as Thucydides thought. For the assumption that a fleet in the Aegean would be Athenian, cf. 3.32 (when that assumption had greater justification). A Daric stater was equivalent to 20 Athenian drachmas (Xen., *Anab.* 1.7.18), well below the market value of slaves.

8.29–60 Twentieth winter (412/11)

8.29–44 *Campaigns in the Aegean.* At 8.5 Tissaphernes' rate of pay was not specified; when the King was eventually consulted, he approved only the half-drachma rate (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.5). For Astyochus as admiral, cf. 8.20, 33. This is the first of a number of passages in which Greeks from the west are not easily cowed; the upshot here was that Tissaphernes paid 30 talents for 55 ships, whereas at the half-drachma rate he would have paid 30 talents for 60 (how much was actually paid to the individual sailors we do not know).

- 8.30** Strombichides must have returned to Athens since his last appearance, in 8.17. For allotment, cf. 6.42: Hornblower is perhaps too surprised that the matter was not decided in Athens.
- 8.31** A plan for Chios must have been decided since 8.24. Tamos was an Egyptian, who in 401 commanded a fleet for Cyrus against Tissaphernes, and then fled to Egypt and was killed there (Xen., *Anab.* 1.2.21, 4.2; Diod. Sic. 14.19.2–6, 35.3–5). The narrative of this winter shows that naval operations could continue in the winter but ran serious risks from the weather. Phocaea and Cyme were north of Clazomenae.
- 8.32** For the failure of Lesbos' first attempted revolt, see 8.22–3. We are going to encounter internal disagreements on both the Spartan and the Athenian side: uncharacteristically, on this occasion Astyochus was more enterprising than his opponents.
- 8.33** By taking over the main fleet at Miletus Astyochus entered fully into the command to which he had been appointed. A message about the prisoners must have reached Pedaritus from Erythrae; despite the disagreement of 8.32 he and Astyochus could cooperate when necessary. Hornblower wonders if the prisoners had indeed intended to work for the Athenians, but finally accepts that it was the Athenians who were deceived.
- 8.34** Arginum was the point nearest to Chios on the Erythrae peninsula; Mimas was the northern extension of the peninsula,

and Phoenicus on its west side. The fortification alluded to at the end of the chapter must be that on Chios to be mentioned in 8.38, but Thucydides' text does not make that clear here.

8.35 Hippocrates is probably the man who was second-in-command to Mindarus at Cyzicus in 410 and was killed at Calchedon in 408 (Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.23, 3.5–6). For Dorieus, originally from Rhodes, see 3.8 with note to 3.8–18. In Thurii the supporters of Athens got the upper hand in 413 (7.33, 57), but will have lost it after Athens' defeat in Sicily. Hornblower rejects recent arguments and accepts that classical Cnidus was not at the tip of the long peninsula, near the Triopium (a sanctuary of Apollo which was a major sanctuary of the Dorians), but some way to the east. The merchant ships from Egypt may have been carrying corn to Athens.

8.37 In the first treaty (8.18) the emphasis was on Dareius' owning territory; here it is on his and the Spartans' not attacking each other's territory, but the potential extent of his claim was not reduced. This time the Spartans undertook not to exact tribute from cities in Dareius' sphere; in return Persia undertook to pay for Spartan forces—but only if invited by the Persians, and with nothing said about the rate of pay. 'Party to this agreement' (Dover *ap.* Andrewes) is the best interpretation of a phrase which troubled some editors: the final clause strengthens the non-aggression provision of the first clause.

- 8.38** Therimenes' cutter was presumably overwhelmed by a storm. Delphinium was to the north of Chios town. Tydeus' father was perhaps the tragic poet Ion. The 'tight control' seems to denote a narrower oligarchy than the regime of 8.9, 24. Plut., *Lacaen. Apophth.* 241 D–E has a story that some Chians went to Sparta to complain about Pedaritus.
- 8.39** The solstice was on 24 December. For the ships requested by Pharnabazus and for Clearchus, cf. 8.6–8. For the advisers, cf. 2.85, 3.69, 5.63: Lichas (for whom cf. 5.22 with note) seems to have been not one of eleven equals but the leader; in the event, Astyochus was not deposed, and Antisthenes is not heard of again (except in 8.61) in the Peloponnesian War. Now that Melos was in Athenian hands (5.116), it was risky of the Spartans to put in there. Caunus was north-east of Rhodes.
- 8.40** Material on the slaves at Chios is collected at Ath. 6.265 B–266 F: here as in 8.24 Thucydides compares Chios with Sparta (assimilating Sparta's Helots to chattel slaves); presumably Chios' slave population was 'denser' in proportion to the free than Athens', but not in total numbers.
- 8.41** Meropis was at the north-east end of the island of Cos (and is marked as Cos on Map 1); until 366/5 there was another city, Astypalaea, at the south-west end. Syme and Chalce were, respectively, north and west of Rhodes.
- 8.42** For attempts to work out which ships were where, see Andrewes and Hornblower: the problems are reduced if the

Athenians used a harbour on the south side of Syme.

Charminus' defeat is mocked in Ar., *Thesm.* 804. Teutloussa was a small island immediately south of Syme; Halicarnassus was north-east of Cos.

8.43 The Athenians did not 'attack' but simply 'touched at' Loryma (Hornblower), on the promontory east of Syme: they took a roundabout route to avoid sailing past Cnidus. With the emendation *eneinai*, which we accept, the spelling-out of what territory Persia might claim is a part of the indirect speech attributed to Lichas (and not an authorial explanation by Thucydides). Lichas' stance was to change (cf. 8.84); but later Callicratidas was to object to receiving Persian support at too high a price (Xen., *Hell.* 1.6.6–11).

8.44 We learn from 8.61 that some ships remained at Miletus. At this time Rhodes had three principal cities: they jointly went over to the Spartans; and by synoecism (cf. note to 1.58) in 408/7 a new city of Rhodes was founded at the north-east tip of the island, where the modern Rhodes town is (Diod. Sic. 13.75.1). Inscriptions of Lindus point to a constitutional structure resembling that of Athens (*IK Rhodischen Peraia* 251, *SIG*³ 110 n. 4), whereas a decree attributed to the Rhodians collectively just before the synoecism was enacted by a council without an assembly (*SIG*3 110): Hornblower warns about making the same assumption for all three cities, but it seems that as at Chios (cf. 8.9 with note, 8.24) the men

favouring Sparta were oligarchically inclined. Dorieus, mentioned in 8.35, is not mentioned here: Hornblower wonders whether he was under judicial sentence; and he notes that Athens had allowed the Rhodians to retain some ships (cf. Samos, 8.16). We retain the manuscripts' 'eighty days', which Andrewes calculates cannot have ended earlier than 5 April (and which with 8.60 proves that Thucydides did not have a fixed date for the end of winter).

8.45–56 *Intrigues of Alcibiades*. 'In the meantime and even earlier' marks the beginning of the most extensive chronological dislocation in Books 2–8 (cf. Introduction, p. xxvii), and there are points, to which Thucydides might have attended in his final revision, where it is imperfectly dovetailed with the rest of the narrative. As Hornblower stresses, the Peloponnesians' suspicion of Alcibiades was an accelerating process, not a datable event. The death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus were reported in 8.24–5; but Alcibiades was still cooperating with the Spartans in 8.26, and this chapter need not take us back earlier than the beginning of Thucydides' winter 412/1. For Alcibiades and Agis, see 8.12 with note. Earlier, 8.36 suggested that what is said here about pay is not a repetition of what was stated in 8.29 but a later reduction, not from one drachma but from the rate fixed in 8.29; for Athenian rates of pay, cf. note to 6.31. Alcibiades acted as spokesman for Tissaphernes in his dealings with both sides: how much

influence he had with Tissaphernes, and how correctly he represented Tissaphernes' own position, is not certain (cf. 8.56 with note below).

8.46 This is the first mention of the Phoenician fleet: as Andrewes points out, Phoenicia was outside Tissaphernes' satrapy, and the fleet was the King's rather than his. In the 390s the Spartans, when fighting for the Asiatic Greeks against Persia, did prove more willing than the Athenians had been to penetrate the interior of Asia Minor (whether Thucydides lived long enough to discover that is uncertain: cf. Introduction, p. xxv); but the Athenians remained unhappy with conceding Persia's claim to the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, and did so only when forced to accept the King's Peace of 387/6.

8.47 For Alcibiades' view of democracy, cf. 6.89, and Phrynichus' comment in 8.48. Both the 'most powerful' Athenians at Samos and the wider 'better class of people' are presumably upper-class men who could be expected to favour oligarchy.

8.48 If the pamphlet of the 'Old Oligarch' ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.*) is correctly dated to the mid-420s (e.g. the edition of J. L. Marr and P. J. Rhodes (Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 2008)), there were already in the time of Cleon men who disliked the democracy; in 415 there was a probably unjustified fear that the religious scandals were a sign of a plot against the democracy (cf. 6.27 with note to 6.27–9); since 413 the democracy was no longer

justified by success, and the bribe offered to the poorer Athenians, who would lose politically from a change to oligarchy, was financial support from Persia to win the war. For 'fraternities' (*hetairika* = *hetaireiai*), cf. 6.27 and 8.54 with notes. Thucydides thought highly of Phrynichus (cf. 8.27): Phrynichus' cynical view of Alcibiades is endorsed, his suggestion that the Persians would not support the Athenians was to be borne out, and so was his view that a change to oligarchy would not make Athens more popular with the allies (cf. 8.64). For the 'great and good', *kaloï k' agathoi*, cf. 4.40 with note (where the different context justifies a different translation): Phrynichus himself seems not to have been from an upper-class background (cf. Lys. 20. *Polystratus* 11–12). The 'Attic *stelai*' listing property confiscated from the men condemned after the scandals of 415 (cf. note to 6.60–1) show that rich Athenians had been able to acquire land in allied territory on a large scale. What is said of the nature of an oligarchic regime may have been retrojected by Thucydides from what actually happened in 411 (Hornblower after N. G. L. Hammond).

8.49 Peisander, mocked in comedy as a glutton and a coward, had been an enthusiastic investigator of the scandals of 415, and with Charicles (see 7.20 with note) is remarked on as a man who afterwards changed sides (Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 36).

8.50 As Hornblower remarks, Thucydides was interested in clever tricks, and perhaps also told this story ‘partly . . . to entertain, relief before the horrors of the revolution’. Phrynichus’ ‘plan A’ was an attempt to discredit Alcibiades with Astyochus, which failed; his ‘plan B’ involved a letter which this time he expected to be shown to Alcibiades, and this succeeded because he prepared the Athenians for the letter which Alcibiades sent in reaction to it. We are now about the time of the solstice (8.39): Magnesia was south-east of Ephesus, on the Maeander.

8.52 The Peloponnesians’ move to Rhodes was in 8.44. Thucydides here confirms statements attributed to Alcibiades in 8.46 and to Lichas in 8.43 (cf. Introduction, p. xxxvi).

8.53 Andrewes had Peisander and colleagues leave Samos immediately after 8.49 and delay for some time in Athens; better, Hornblower follows more recent studies in having them leave Samos about mid-February. It is generally accepted that Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* was produced at the Lenaia of 411, in February, and his *Thesmophoriazusae* at the Great Dionysia of 411, in April. *Lysistrata*, in which a *proboulos* is mocked (cf. note to 8.1) but there is no sign of anything sinister afoot, was perhaps performed just before Peisander’s arrival; in *Thesmophoriazusae* Aristophanes allowed himself discreet hints (esp. 361–2, 1143–6) but no more. ‘If the democracy was abandoned’ (8.48) became in Peisander’s

propaganda ‘a modification of their democracy’, ‘a more prudent form of government’, and an emergency measure which could be reversed later. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces (‘heralds’) were the hereditary groups (known as *gene*) which provided the principal functionaries of the Eleusinian cult: see R. Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford University Press, 1996), 293–7, 300–2. For initial objections, cf. the reaction at Samos (8.48); Andrewes notes that it is hard to visualize Peisander’s dealing with objectors exactly as reported here.

8.54 The ten sent back with Peisander were probably one from each tribe. For Iasus and Amorges, cf. 8.27–8, where Athens’ support for Amorges is not made so clear. The ‘cabals’ (*xynomosiai*) are best seen as groups at the sinister end of the range of the fraternities mentioned in 8.48.

8.55 Here the dispatch of Leon and Diomedon (8.54) feeds into the period of Peloponnesian inactivity at Rhodes (end of 8.44), and Thucydides resumes the single thread of the narrative. The Chian strand is continued from 8.40. For the designation ‘Laconian’, cf. 3.5.

8.56 We are not told where the meeting with Tissaphernes took place. What Alcibiades said was presumably public knowledge. On his influence with Tissaphernes, cf. note to 8.45–56; Thucydides believed that, even if the strategy was Alcibiades’, Tissaphernes while willing to put pressure on the Spartans by

talking to the Athenians was not willing to switch his support to the Athenians (which he would have found hard to justify to the King). If even these oligarchic Athenians were willing to abandon mainland Asia Minor and also the offshore islands, that is remarkable (cf. note to 8.46). If there was a Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia in the middle of the century (cf. note to 1.111–12), that might have forbidden the Persians to bring ships into the Aegean; even without that, it is credible that the Persian challenge to Athens' naval power in the Aegean was more than even these Athenians could concede.

8.57–9 *Third Spartan–Persian treaty.*

8.58 For the higher status of this treaty, see note to 8.18; it no longer seems that the regnal year dates this to the end of March or later (Hornblower, *contr.* Andrewes), but if the text of 8.44 is sound (see note) it could be as late as early April while still falling within Thucydides' winter. The move from Caunus (8.57) to the plain of the Maeander for ratification is not explained. Hieramenes may have been a representative of the King (D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 104); 'the sons of Pharnaces' in effect denoted Pharnabazus. This time Persia's territorial claim was restricted (immediately but still not definitively) to mainland Asia Minor, but there it was absolute. Maintenance was now limited to the Peloponnesians' ships already present—possibly though not certainly at the half-drachma rate of 8.45—and anything

provided after the arrival of the King's ships (which never did arrive: cf. 8.87) would be only a loan.

8.60 *Oropus captured from Athens by Boeotians.* For Oropus as Athenian territory, cf. 2.23; for Euboean hostility to Athens, cf. 8.5.

8.61–109 Twenty-first summer (411) (unfinished)

8.61–63.2 *Campaigns in the Aegean.* Dercylidas was harmost in Abydos later in the war (Xen., *Hell.* 3.1.9), and was to be prominent in the 390s: he was ingenious, and fond of being away from Sparta (Xen., *Hell.* 3.1.8, 4.32). Pedaritus' death was reported in 8.55, and Astyochus and the Peloponnesians left Rhodes in 8.60, so Leon will have arrived during Thucydides' winter 412/1. The word which we translate as 'lieutenant' is *epibates*, which normally denotes a marine; its precise significance here is unknown. For the Samian exiles at Anaea, cf. 3.19, 8.19. For the ending of fighting at nightfall, cf. 1.51.

8.62 For the capture of Sestos from the Persians by the Athenians and others in 479/8, cf. 1.89.

8.63.3–71 *Revolution of the Four Hundred in Athens.* For the revolution among the Samians, cf. 8.21: the leaders of those who opposed 'the most powerful men' then have in turn become the most powerful men. That Alcibiades was 'unwilling' to join the Athenian oligarchs reflects a judgement on his

performance in 8.56 (Andrewes); that he was ‘hardly suitable’ perhaps reflects Phrynichus’ judgement in 8.48, reinforced by the episode of 8.50–1.

8.64 Diitrephes is probably the man of 7.29; his command in the Thraceward region has not been mentioned before. In ML 83, translated Fornara 153, we have two Thasian laws offering rewards to men who give information on plots, best attributed to the oligarchic regime which was installed now. Thasos was recovered by Athens and made democratic again in 407 (Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.9, cf. SEG xxxviii 851, A. 4, 19, B. 2–3, 20).

“‘Sensible’ government’ (*sophrosyne*), an expression often associated with Sparta and with oligarchy (cf. note to 4.18), seems from what follows to be ironic, as ‘the specious “law and order”’ (*eunomia*), also associated with Sparta (cf. 1.18 with note), openly is.

8.65 Some of the ‘various cities’ visited are to be mentioned in 8.69. For the ‘fraternities’ or ‘cabals’, cf. 8.48, 54. Androcles’ role in 415 is mentioned by Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 27; he is the only man other than Cleon of whom Thucydides uses the term ‘demagogue’. It appears that Alcibiades’ failure to gain Tissaphernes’ support for Athens was not yet known in the city. Civilian stipends would not be needed if political power was restricted to the richer citizens, and their abolition could be represented as a desirable economy in Athens’ straitened circumstances (cf. 8.86); ‘the citizens most capable of serving

the state with both property and person' was a formula used at this time to denote those of hoplite status and above: cf. *Ath. Pol.* 29.5; 8.97 and *Ath. Pol.* 33.1 on the intermediate regime of 411/0; Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.15, 48 for Theramenes in 404. For the number, cf. 8.72: it is unlikely that there were by now as few as 5,000 citizens of hoplite status and above; it suits the different contexts that 5,000 is a maximum here but a minimum in *Ath. Pol.* 29.5.

8.66 We have two accounts of what happened now: by Thucydides, who was a contemporary but outside Athens, and who emphasizes the violence and intimidation (and, as Andrewes notes, writes as if all the oligarchs were extremists); and in *Ath. Pol.* 29–32, which was written nearly a century later, and is based partly on Thucydides and partly on a source using documents to show how the revolutionaries tried to make their revolution seem respectable by democratic criteria of respectability. There is tendentiousness in both accounts, but on details which serve no partisan purpose *Ath. Pol.* is likely to be right. Identifying the council as of five hundred and appointed by lot stresses that this was the normal democratic council; appointment by lot, to select from men considered equally eligible, was not restricted to but was often considered characteristic of democracy. Athens was much larger, and much further from being a 'face-to-face' community, than most Greek cities. Lys. 25. *Overthrowing Democracy* 9 mentions

Phrynichus and Peisander as two men who changed from democracy to oligarchy; Andoc. 1. *Mysteries* 36 mentions Peisander and Charicles (the latter, for whom see 7.20 with note, is not mentioned in 411–410 but was one of the Thirty in 404/3).

8.67 *Ath. Pol.* 29.2–3 has thirty commissioners, the ten *probouloi* (cf. 8.1) and twenty others (cf. Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 43, Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 136), and quotes the decree giving them their instructions. *Ath. Pol.* does not mention that the assembly was held at Colonus: that may particularly have deterred poorer, and more poorly armed, citizens from attending, but there must have been some respectable pretext. *Ath. Pol.* 29.4 gives more detail than Thucydides on the suspension of the normal safeguards; 29.5 begins with more detail on the abolition of civilian stipends, and continues with the entrusting of the state to ‘not less than five thousand’ (cf. 8.65 with note) for the duration of the war, and the appointment of a hundred men to register the Five Thousand. Then *Ath. Pol.* 30 gives a constitution ‘for the future’ and 31 a constitution ‘for the immediate crisis’ which begins with a method of appointing the Four Hundred totally different from that of Thucydides, these constitutions said to be the work of another board of a hundred. Probably the Four Hundred (recalling Solon’s council, which preceded Cleisthenes’ five hundred: *Ath. Pol.* 8.4, 31.1) were appointed as stated by Thucydides, and the

two constitutional documents, reflecting disagreement among the oligarchs once they got down to details, were published when the Four Hundred formally inaugurated their rule (for which see 8.70). The process of registering the Five Thousand was at least begun (cf. Lys. 20. *Polystratus* 13–14), but under this regime the list was never published and no meetings of a body purporting to be the Five Thousand were held (cf. 8.92–4).

8.68 *Ath. Pol.* attributes the positive proposals as well as the suspension of safeguards to the commissioners: it may be that Peisander was one of the commissioners and claimed to be speaking on their behalf. With the leading men of different kinds Hornblower compares the three speakers in the Persian constitutional debate in Hdt. 3.80–3. There was an orator Antiphon in whose name are preserved three individual law-court speeches and three ‘tetralogies’, each comprising two prosecuting and two defending speeches in hypothetical homicide cases. Thucydides’ Antiphon will be the author of the three individual speeches; the author of the tetralogies may be another man; and ‘Antiphon the sophist’ (*Vorsokr.* 87), from whom we have fragments critical of conventional beliefs, may be yet another. The life of Antiphon (the orator) in [Plut.] *X Orat.* 832 B–834 B ends with two documents on the trial of Antiphon and other oligarchs. *Ath. Pol.* 32.2 has a list of the leaders apparently derived from Thucydides but omitting

Phrynichus—an omission due perhaps not to the author but to a subsequent copyist. Theramenes was the son of Hagnon, one of the *probouloi* (see note to 8.1): he was to fall out with the extremists in 411 (8.89–97), remained active under the democracy, and in 404 he played a major part in bringing the regime of the Thirty into existence, but again fell out with the extremists and on that occasion was put to death by them. *Ath. Pol.* 28.5 remarks that opinions on him were divided.

Thucydides, though he clearly disapproved of the regime of the Four Hundred, writes approvingly of these men. The tyranny was ended by the expulsion of Hippias in 511/0 (6.59), so this was exactly the hundredth year after by inclusive counting, and the Delian League was founded in 478/7 (1.94–7): despite the statement that ending the Athenians' freedom was 'not an easy task', 8.69–70 shows that the democrats failed to resist.

8.69 Pay for jurors, probably in the 450s, was Athens' first civilian payment (*Ath. Pol.* 27.3–4); the others were probably introduced between then and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. *Ath. Pol.* 32.1 gives dates: the democratic council's year (at this time distinct from the calendar year) was due to end on 14 Scirophorion = 9 July; it was in fact paid off on 14 Thargelion = 9 June, and the Four Hundred's formal inauguration (Thucydides does not clearly distinguish the two occasions) was on 22 Thargelion = 17 June. We need

to allow time between the Colonus assembly and 9 June, and between the commissioners' appointment and the Colonus assembly, so Peisander will have arrived in Athens towards the end of May.

8.70 Thucydides here uses the normal *prytaneis* for the presiding officers, whereas in 8.67 he uses *proedroi* ('presiding board', the title of a new board created in the fourth century, after his death) for the five men who formed the core of the Four Hundred: neither is a reliable guide to the terminology actually used. Inscriptions show that some democratic officials remained in office to the end of 412/1. Though disliking the regime, Thucydides notes that there was not a wild reign of terror (contr. Chaereas in 8.74). At 8.63, despite failing to get Persian support, the oligarchs had still been 'determined to maintain the war-effort'; but once in power they tried to negotiate an end to the war.

8.71 However, they did not simply capitulate, and they trusted the cavalry and others they sent out to resist Agis. The delegation to Sparta mentioned here should be distinct from that of 8.86.

8.72–7 *Return to democracy by Athenians at Samos.* Certain kinds of business in the assembly required a quorum of 6,000, and even if we limit the claim to the period after 431 it can hardly be true that attendance had never reached 5,000 (though it may have been true recently with the navy based at Samos).

8.73 What is said of the Samians begins with a summary of 8.21, 63, and then adds the 300 conspirators. Hyperbolus was a demagogue in the mould of Cleon, who was a serious politician but for some reason was considered particularly contemptible by Thucydides and others (cf. Ar., Pax 679–87, Plato Com. fr. 203 Kassel and Austin *ap.* Plut., *Nic.* 11, *Alc.* 13): for his ostracism, see note to 6.6. Thrasyboulus (of the deme Steiria: there was another prominent Thrasyboulus, of Collytus) was to be prominent in the remainder of the war, as a supporter of Alcibiades (cf. 8.81), in 403 took the lead in fighting back against the Thirty, and remained active until he died on campaign c.389. Thrasyllus seems to have been more strongly democratic, and was one of the generals executed after the battle of Arginusae in 406. For the Paralus, see note to 3.33; for slaves as well as foreigners in the other crews, see note to 7.13.

8.74 Chaereas was to serve as a general in the Hellespont in 411/0 (Diod. Sic. 13.49–51); his account of the ‘horrors’ is to be contrasted with 8.70. ‘Free men flogged like slaves’ (a more literal translation would be ‘flogging as a punishment for everybody’) reflects the fact that free men were not normally subject to corporal punishment. Sexual abuse was commonly alleged against tyrants: e.g. Hdt. 3.80.

8.75 At the end of the war the Athenians showed their gratitude to the loyal Samians: ML 94, trans. Fornara 66, and RO 2 (parts

of the same inscription).

8.76 Having declared enmity against Athens under the Four Hundred, the Athenians at Samos held assemblies and appointed officials as if they were a separate *polis*. The Samian war was that of 440–439 (1.115–17). The oligarchs had claimed to be reverting to older and better Athenian practice (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 29.3, 31.1; and note on the Four Hundred at 8.67): democrats in reply claimed that for Athens the traditional constitution was democracy. The Athenians continued to hope—in vain, and it is not clear with how much encouragement—that Persian support might be diverted to them, until the cooperation between the King’s son Cyrus and the Spartan Lysander began in 407. For the idea of a large force as a city on the move, cf. the Athenians at the beginning and end of the great Sicilian expedition (6.63, 7.75).

8.78–80 *Peloponnesian fleet to Hellespont*. The Peloponnesians’ dissatisfaction was cumulative, but notice especially the long period of inactivity at Rhodes (8.44).

8.79 Mycale is the promontory directly opposite Samos, on the south side of which the Greeks defeated the Persians in 479 (1.89, Hdt. 9.96–107): at its narrowest point the strait between the north side and Samos is about 2 miles (3 km) wide. For Strombichides’ squadron, cf. 8.62.

8.80 For Clearchus and Pharnabazus, cf. 8.8, 39. Byzantium was a colony of Megara: Helixus and Clearchus were still there in 408

(Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.14–22). As Hornblower remarks, Byzantium was important, and this note of its revolt is surprisingly low-key.

8.81–2 *Alcibiades joins Athenian fleet at Samos.* Until his return to Athens in 407 Alcibiades was a commander of the fleet, appointed by the fleet, but as far as the polis was concerned remained under the sentence passed on him in 415. For the Phoenician fleet, cf. 8.46, 58–9, 78: we have not previously been told that it was at Aspendus, in the gulf of Pamphylia north-west of Cyprus.

8.83–5 *Mindarus succeeds Astyochus as Spartan admiral.*

8.84 For Dorieus, cf. 3.8 with note to 3.8–18, 8.35. Hornblower remarks on the tendency of Spartan officers to use violence against other Greeks, as they might against Helots. Lichas had himself earlier been unhappy with Persia's terms (8.43, 52): for the suggestion that they must be accepted for the duration of the war cf. the Athenian oligarchs' suggestion that oligarchy must be accepted for the duration of the war (8.53; *Ath. Pol.* 29.5). We do not know when he died (cf. note to 8.87–8, and for one alternative suggestion see Introduction, p. xxv).

8.85 Mindarus was to be defeated and killed in the battle of Cyzicus in 410. For the Carian Gaulites, cf. Mys (Hdt. 8.133–5) and perhaps Pigres (Xen., *Anab.* 1.2.17): they will in fact have been trilingual, in Carian, Greek, and Aramaic. Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.27–31 seems to date Hermocrates' exile to 410, and some

scholars have believed that, but more probably Thucydides is not anticipating here but correctly dates the exile to 411. It seems that the various deputations convinced the Spartans of Tissaphernes' unreliability (Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 110–13).

8.86 *Alcibiades restrains Athenian democrats at Samos.* On the oligarchs' propaganda, note the willingness to negotiate with Sparta but also the resistance to Agis in 8.70–1, and the envoys' instructions in 8.72. Alcibiades' restraining the democrats in 8.82 was probably an earlier intervention, not an anticipation of this. It is striking that Alcibiades earned his strongest praise from Thucydides when, like Pericles (2.65), he restrained the crowd (Hornblower compares also Solon fr. 37. 6–7 West *ap. Ath. Pol.* 12.5)—but we with hindsight might say that, since Athens was defeated in the end, it would have been less damaging if the defeat had come now. Alcibiades accepted the restricted body of full citizens, and by implication the abolition of civilian stipends, but not the despotic council of the Four Hundred. The story of the Parali is continued from 8.74. Laespodias is probably the man of 6.105; Melesias may be a son of Pericles' opponent Thucydides son of Melesias and an uncle of the historian (cf. Introduction, p. xxiv).

8.87–8 *Tissaphernes goes to Aspendus.* For Tamos, cf. 8.31. Here, uncharacteristically, Thucydides briefly admits to uncertainty (cf. Introduction, p. xxxi), but by the end of the chapter he has

decided on the correct explanation: a suggestion of D. M. Lewis that the ships may have been needed against a revolt in Egypt (cf. *Sparta and Persia*, 133), was accepted by Andrewes but is rejected by Hornblower. Philippus is probably the man of 8.28: the fact that he went instead of Lichas may, but does not necessarily, mean that Lichas was dead or dying (cf. note to 8.84).

8.88 For Caunus, cf. 8.39; Phaselis was beyond it, on the gulf of Pamphylia south-west of Aspendus.

8.89–98 *Four Hundred replaced by Five Thousand in Athens*. This is the first mention of uneasiness among ‘the rank and file of the oligarchic movement’. For Theramenes, see note to 8.68. Aristocrates, probably the Aristocrates of 5.19, 24, and 8.9, was to be a general under the restored democracy in 407/6 and 406/5; a choregic dedication of his survives (*IG* i3 964). Thucydides does not allow for any genuine dislike of the current regime, but regards that as a mere smokescreen covering selfish ambition (cf. Introduction, p. xxxiv).

8.90 Aristarchus is a common name, and we cannot identify this holder of it; Xen., *Hell.* 2.3.2 adds Aristoteles (one of the Thirty in 404/3) and Melanthius (unknown). This is the first mention of the fortification at Eëtioneia, for which see Map 10. Hornblower defends the usual interpretation against the alternative suggested by Andrewes: Eëtioneia itself was to be a fortress, walled on both sides; the other tower was at Acte,

on the south side of the harbour entrance. It is possible that Thucydides has been careless and that ten men including Antiphon and Phrynichus were sent to Sparta (Develin, *AO*, 162).

8.91 Las was north of Laconian Asine. Hornblower cites ML 82, translated Fornara 152, in which Eretria honours Hegelochus of Taras, and he suggests that Hegelochus was a son of the seer Teisamenus of Elis (Hdt. 9.33), that he acted as seer for the battle of 8.95, and that his son was the Hegias who acted as seer for the battle of Aegospotami in 405 (Paus. 3.11.5). Agesandridas' father may be the Agesandrus of 1.139. According to *Ath. Pol.* 32.3 the Spartans were demanding the dissolution of Athens' naval empire; according to Thucydides (but what he gives us may be no more than his own conjecture) retention of the empire was the oligarchs' preferred option but they would not insist on it; it will in fact have been an obstacle to a settlement that the oligarchs in Athens were in no position to commit the navy at Samos. At the end of the war Athens did have to accept demolition of the Peiraeus and Long Walls and the loss of all but twelve warships (e.g. Andoc. 3. *Peace* 11–12; cf. 5.26).

8.92 According to Lys. 13. *Agoratus* 70–1, Lycurg., *Leocrates* 112, the plotters were Thrasyboulus of Calydon and Apollodorus of Megara; an inscription of 409 (ML 85, translated Fornara 155) records honours for Thrasyboulus and lesser honours for

several others, and orders an investigation into charges of bribery in connection with honours for Apollodorus. For Aegina as an Athenian settlement since 431, see 2.27. Alexicles is not otherwise known. Hermon was sent to Pylos in 410/09 (ML 84, translated Fornara 154, 10). If the manuscripts' text is right, some of the Four Hundred did not agree with the hostile response to Theramenes; but perhaps we should with Andrewes and Hornblower accept the deletion of *plen*, to make the text mean that those who did not approve (of the kidnapping of Alexicles) made a hostile response to Theramenes. The ambiguous Theramenes in the presence of the Four Hundred concealed his support for the mutineers. According to Lycurg., *Leocrates* 115 the restored democracy put Alexicles and Aristarchus to death. Thucydides of Pharsalus was probably related to the Menon of 2.22. That the mutineers really wanted democracy will again be a Thucydidean inference: Andrewes stressed that the next day they were willing to compromise (8.93).

8.93 Mounichia was on the east side of Peiraeus, and the theatre of Dionysus was between that and the harbour of 8.90. The Anaceium (temple of the Anakes, i.e. Castor and Pollux) was on the north slope of the Acropolis (Paus. 1.18.1–2): for a possible location, see S. G. Miller, in M. H. Hansen (ed.), *Sources for the Ancient Greek City State* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy, 1995), 210–11, with 242 and fig. 1. The

precinct of Dionysus, south of the east end of the Acropolis, contained the theatre and to the south of it a small temple (Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens*, 537–52, with 540 fig. 677).

8.94 Thucydides offers two possible explanations of Agesandridas' movements but firmly accepts the second (cf. Introduction, p. xxxi).

8.95 Thoricus and Prasiae were on the east coast of Attica, a short distance north of Sounium, where the east coast meets the south-west-facing coast. For the importance of Euboea, cf. 2.14, 7.28, 8.1. Thymochares was perhaps defeated by Agesandridas again later this year, in the Hellespont (Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.1; but the beginning of *Hell.* is problematic): he may belong to a family which produced several leading men between the mid-fourth century and the mid-third. In Xenophon's version of the battle of Aegospotami in 405 the Spartans succeeded with a similar trick (Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.27–8; but contr. Diod. Sic. 13.106.1–5). Oreus, at the north end of Euboea, is elsewhere referred to by its earlier name, Hestiaea (1.114, 7.57).

8.96 Hornblower notes the piling up of disasters for Athens: the defeat in Sicily (8.1), the revolt of Chios (8.15), and now the loss of Euboea. For the Spartans' lack of boldness, cf. especially their aborted attack on the Peiraeus in 429 (2.93–4): even if Thucydides is exaggerating, an attack on the

Peiraeus now would have had very serious consequences. For the contrast between the Spartans and the Athenians, cf. the Corinthians in 1.70–1. Hornblower notes that the Syracusans followed the Athenians in willingness to innovate—by copying a Corinthian innovation (7.36 with 7.34); 7.55 compared Athens and Syracuse in a different way.

8.97 The Pnyx was to the west of the Acropolis: the democracy had been set aside by an assembly held not there but at Colonus (8.67). Probably the decision taken now was to retain the oligarchic principles of no civilian stipends and a limited citizen body (cf. 8.65) but to return to the democratic principle that the assembly (thus limited) rather than the council (which was perhaps of 500 but elected) should be the powerful body (cf. Alcibiades in 8.86, the mutineers in 8.89, 92), and this is what Thucydides means by a blend. *Ath. Pol.* 33 paraphrases Thucydides' narrative and judgement, adding only the date: this change occurred about the beginning of the third month of 411/0. The function of the commissioners will have been to draft laws for the new constitution: we know nothing more about them or their laws, but in 410 the restored democracy embarked on a recodification of Athens' laws (Lys. 30. *Nicomachus* 2–3). For the status of Alcibiades, cf. note to 8.81–2: he acted as a commander of the fleet in the time of this regime and of the restored democracy, but did not return to Athens until 407.

8.98 A farm belonging to Peisander was given to Apollodorus of Megara (cf. note to 8.92: Lys. 7. *Olive Stump* 4); for Aristarchus, cf. Xen., *Hell.* 1.7.28. The archers were the Scythian force maintained to keep order (Andoc. 3. *Peace* 5, schol. Ar. *Ach.* 54).

8.99–109 *Campaigns in the Aegean and Hellespont.* The Aegean narrative is continued from 8.87; for Hippocrates, cf. 8.35, and for Pharnabazus' invitation, cf. 8.80. Icaros was west of Samos.

8.100 For Thrasyllus, cf. 8.73. Eresus had revolted before but the Athenians had recovered it (8.23). For Cyme, south-east of Lesbos, cf. 8.22, 31. The kinship connection is between the Boeotians and the Aeolians of Lesbos: cf. 7.57.

8.101 We do not know how large a sum Chian 'fortieths' represent. Phocaea was south-west of Cyme, just outside the gulf; from Cyme the Peloponnesians crossed to the north side and the strait between Lesbos and the mainland (Hornblower sees the mention of Arginousae as an anticipation of the battle in 406 which Thucydides did not live to write about); Eresus was on the south-west-facing coast of Lesbos, and the Athenians there would not know about ships sailing through the strait. Hamaxitus will have been reached before Larisa; Sigeium was just outside the Hellespont, and Rhoeteium inside it on the Asiatic side. Hornblower notes Thucydides' stress on the speed of the voyage: 189 nautical miles (349 km) in two days, two-

thirds on the second day (for the single ships sailing from Athens to Mytilene in 427, see note to 3.49).

8.102 Sestos (cf. 8.62) was on the European shore of the Hellespont, opposite Abydos (for which cf. 8.61); Elaeus was just inside the Hellespont, and the islands of Imbros and Lemnos (cf. note to 4.28) outside. Protesilaus was said to have been the first Greek killed in the Trojan War (cf. Hdt. 9.116, 120); it is of course accidental that his sanctuary occurs both at the end of Herodotus' history and at the end of what survives of Thucydides' unfinished history.

8.104 The Peloponnesians' line extended from Abydos in the direction of the Aegean as far as Dardanus (north-east of Rhoeteium); the Athenians' line was opposite; the headland of Cynossema on the European side made each end of these lines invisible to the other. For the Peloponnesians' over-confidence which turned victory into defeat, cf. the second battle in the Gulf of Corinth in 429 (2.90–2). Hornblower notes the irony of the Syracusans' defeat after their victory over the Athenians in Sicily in 413.

8.106 The river Meidius was probably that flowing into the Hellespont opposite Cynossema (Rhodius in Strabo 595/13.1.28 and in *Barrington Atlas*, map 51).

8.107 Cyzicus was in the Propontis, on the isthmus of the major peninsula projecting into it; Harpagium was to the west of

that, and Priapus further west. For the eight ships from Byzantium, cf. 8.80.

8.108 The movements of Alcibiades are continued from 8.88: the earlier narrative suggests that he greatly exaggerated his influence. In Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.8 he collected 100 talents from the region of Halicarnassus. For Antandrus, cf. 4.52, 75: Hdt. 7.42 called it Pelasgian (i.e. non-Greek); for the Delians at Atramyttium, cf. 5.1, 32.

8.109 For Miletus and the Persians, cf. 8.84; nothing has been said before of a garrison at Cnidus. On Persian interest in Artemis at Ephesus, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 108, with n. 1. In all major manuscripts except one the last sentence translated here is followed by one more, based on but not matching Thucydides' own markers of summer and winter, and certainly a later interpolation: 'When the winter after this summer ends, the twenty-first year is completed'. On the abrupt ending of Thucydides' history, see Introduction, p. xxv.

NOTES ON THE GREEK TEXT

No scribe at any date is likely to have copied a substantial portion of the text in front of him without making errors of his own, and perhaps also emending (whether correctly or incorrectly) what he took to be errors in the text in front of him, so no manuscript copy of Thucydides' text is likely to be identical either with any other copy or with the text which Thucydides himself wrote. It is not always easy for modern scholars to identify and correct their predecessors' errors, and neither we in deciding what text to translate nor any other modern editors are likely to have succeeded at every point in recovering what Thucydides himself wrote (though every editor aims to do that).

Thucydides' text is known to have existed in the ancient world in a number of different versions: our medieval manuscripts transmit a version which divides the text into eight books, but there is no indication of a division made by Thucydides himself, and we know that other versions existed which divided the text into a larger number of books.

Modern texts are based primarily on eight medieval manuscripts, written between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries (each of the other surviving manuscripts is a descendant of one or another of those). In addition we have a number of papyrus fragments, written

between the third century BC and the sixth century AD, which contain parts of the text. We also have indirect evidence for the text of Thucydides. There are places where ancient authors and commentators (themselves transmitted to us by generations of copyists) quote or expound Thucydides, and sometimes their text is different from that of our surviving copies. Lorenzo Valla, who completed a Latin translation of Thucydides in 1452, had access to manuscripts independent of those which now survive; and some independent manuscripts also lie behind the sixteenth-century printed editions of Henri Estienne (Stephanus) and Aemilius Portus.

We have taken as our starting-point the Oxford Classical Text of H. Stuart Jones, equipped with an improved apparatus criticus in 1942 by J. E. Powell (and with an improved index in 1963 by an unidentified scholar); and below we supply textual notes for all points where the text which we translate is different from the OCT, and for some points where we follow the OCT but some current scholars do not. Not all of these divergences have a significant effect on the sense or the detail, but where they do the textual issues are discussed in the Explanatory Notes.

The edition which most authoritatively reports the readings of the manuscripts is that of 1972–2000 by J. B. Alberti (the ‘J’ resulting from the Latinization of ‘Giovanni’). A recent discussion of the manuscripts and attempt at a stemma are given by K. Maurer, *Interpolation in Thucydides*, Mnemosyne Suppl. 150 (1995).

- 1.2.6 Reading μετοικεσίας τὰ ἄλλα (variant in one MS, cf. μετοικήσεις τὰ ἄλλα Ullrich), not μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.
- 1.27.2, 29.1 Retaining with OCT τρισχίλιοι (27), δισχιλίοις (29): probably one is corrupt but we do not know which.
- 1.30.1 Reading (with most MSS) Κερκύρας, not Κερκυραίας.
- 1.57.6 Reading δυοῖν (Busolt) for δέκα, which OCT marks as corrupt.
- 1.61.3 Retaining with OCT Βέροϊαν (MSS: Βρέαν Bergk) Στρέψαν (Pluygers).
- 1.67.3 Reading εἴ τις τι ἄλλοις (Reiske), not εἴ τις τι ἄλλοι.
- 1.90.3 Retaining καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, which OCT deletes.
- 1.103.1 Retaining with OCT δεκάτῳ (τετάρτῳ Krüger, ἕκτῳ Gomme, πέμπτῳ at one time Lewis).
- 1.109.3 Reading Μεγάβυξον (Gomme), not Μεγάβυζον.
- 1.126.6 Reading (with the MSS) θύουσι πολλοὶ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλὰ θύματα, ἐπιχώρια, not πολλὰ (Hermann) ἀλλ' <ἀγνὰ> θύματα (Hemsterhuis).
- 1.128.1 Retaining ἀπὸ Ταινάρου, which OCT deletes.
- 1.134.4 Retaining ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν, οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους εἰώθασιν ἐσβάλλειν (OCT deletes οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους εἰώθασιν).
- 1.136.4 Reading ἀσθενέστερος (with some MSS), not ἀσθενεστέρου.
- 1.141.4 Reading ναῦς πληροῦν (Herwerden), not ναῦς πληροῦντες.

2.2.1 Retaining with OCT δύο μῆνας (τέσσαρας Krüger) . . . μηνὶ ἑκτῷ (δεκάτῳ Gomme).

2.4.2 Reading προσβαλλόντων (with some MSS), not προσβαλόντων.

2.4.5 Reading αἱ πλησίον θύραι (with some MSS), not αἱ θύραι.

2.13.3 Retaining with OCT the MSS text: see Explanatory Note.

2.15.4 Reading τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ <τὰ ἀρχαιότατα> (Gomme after Stahl)
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς τε Ἀθηνᾶς (correction in some MSS)
καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν: OCT marks as corrupt.

Retaining τῇ δωδεκάτῃ, which OCT deletes.

2.16.1 Deleting μετεῖχον (Driessen).

2.20.4 Retaining with OCT τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὀπλῖται (πολίται Polle,
χίλιοι καὶ διακόσιοι, i.e. XHH for XXX, Whitehead after Gomme).

2.22.3 Reading Πειράσιοι (with a papyrus), not Παράσιοι (MSS), which
OCT deletes.

2.40.2 Retaining with OCT ἑτέροις (ἑτέροις <ἕτερα> Richards). Reading
αὐτοὶ ἦτοι κρίνομέν (with some MSS), not οἱ αὐτοί.

2.42.4 Reading ἀφίεσθαι (Poppo), not ἐφίεσθαι.

2.44.1 Reading ἐπίστασθε (Herwerden), not ἐπίστανται..

2.52.2 Reading <καὶ> ἀποθνήσκοντες (Gomme).

2.65.12 Reading ὀκτὼ (Shilleto) μὲν ἔτη for τρία, which OCT marks as
corrupt.

2.65.13 Deleting αὐτὸς (Gomme), which OCT retains.

- 2.73.2 Retaining Πλαταιῆς, which OCT deletes.
- 2.75.3 Reading ἑπτακαίδεκα (Steup) for ἑβδομήκοντα, which OCT marks as corrupt.
- 2.77.6 Retaining ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (omitted by some MSS), which OCT deletes.
- 2.80.5 Reading (with the MSS) Φώτυος, not Φώτιος.
- 2.89.5 Reading τοῦ παραλόγου (Steup), not τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ.
- 2.89.9 Reading (with most MSS) τῶν πολεμικῶν, not τῶν πολεμίων.
- 2.90.1 Reading (with some MSS) παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, not ἐπὶ.
- 2.90.2 Reading πλέοντες (Dobree), not πλέοντα (which Croiset deleted).
- 2.96.1 Retaining ἐς τὸν Εὐξεινὸν τε πόντον καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, which OCT deletes.
- 2.97.3 Reading ὅσωνπερ ἤρξαν (Dobree), not ὅσον προσῆξαν .
- 2.100.4 Reading Βοττίαν (Rhodes), not Βοττιαίαν.
- 2.102.4 Reading τοῦ μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι (Poppo), not τῷ μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι which OCT deletes.
- 3.9.2 Reading ἐπινοία(Hude), not εὐνοία.
- 3.10.4 Reading ἐπειγομένους (Ross), not ἐπαγομένους.
- 3.10.5 Reading ἀμύνεσθαι (with some MSS), not ἀμύνασθαι.
- 3.12.1 Deleting πίστιν (Classen), which OCT retains.
- 3.17 Bracketing this chapter as an interpolation (with OCT).

- 3.23.5 Retaining ἡ βορέου, which OCT deletes.
- 3.26.1 Deleting δύο καὶ (Krüger), which OCT retains.
- 3.30.4 Retaining with OCT τὸ κενὸν (τὸν καιρὸν Schulz).
- 3.38.1 Deleting ὃν after ἀντίπαλον (Haase), which OCT retains.
- 3.39.6 Reading ἡμῖν (with one MS), not ὑμῖν.
- 3.44.2 Reading <οὐδ'> (Gomme) ἔαν (Lindau) for ἔαν, which OCT marks as corrupt.
- 3.45.4 Reading ἐκάστη (Duker), not ἐκάστη.
- 3.52.2 Reading κολλάσειν (Krüger), not κολλάζειν.
- 3.53.1 Retaining ἡ ὑμῖν, which OCT deletes.
- 3.56.7 Reading ἔχουσι (Heilmann), not ἔχωσι.
- 3.58.5 Reading ἐρημώσετε (Herwerden), not ἐρημοῦτε.
- 3.61.1 Reading οὗτοι (Hude), not αὐτοί.
- 3.62.5 Reading ἵππον (Cobet), not ἵππους.
- 3.64.3 Reading ὑμῶν (with some MSS), not ἡμῶν.
- 3.65.3 Reading φιλίους, οὐ πολεμίους, (Steup), not φιλίως, οὐ πολεμίως.
- 3.67.5 Reading <αν> ἀνταποδόντες (Dobree).
- 3.68.1 Deleting α̃ after ὕστερον (Heilmann), which OCT retains.
- 3.70.1 Reading ὀγδοήκοντα (Rhodes), not ὀκτακοσίων.
- 3.82.5 Reading τυχών τε (Dion. Hal.), not τυχών.
- 3.84 Bracketing this chapter as an interpolation (with OCT).

- 3.92.1 Retaining ἐν Τραχινίᾳ (with MSS and OCT), but for consistency with other passages we translate ‘in Trachis’.
- 3.94.2 Reading ῥαδίως τ’ ἂν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι πόλεώς τε (with some MSS), not ῥαδίως γ’ ἂν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι καὶ πόλεως.
- 3.94.3 Reading ἡπειρωτικὸν (e.g. Classen and Steup), not Ἡπειρωτικὸν.
- 3.102.5 Deleting τὴν after Αἰολίδα (Steup) and ἐς before τὰ ταύτη (Herwerden), which OCT retains.
- 3.104.3 Punctuating with comma after Ἐφέσια (Fraser), where OCT has no punctuation.
- 3.107–13 For Olpe/Olpae see Explanatory Note to 3.105–14.
- 3.111.2 OCT marks part of the text as corrupt, but the general sense is clear.
- 3.112–3 For Idomene/Idomenae, see Explanatory Note to 3.112.
- 3.113.4 Punctuating with question mark after μαχομένων ἐστίν, not full point.
- 4.2.3 Reading προεπεπλεύκεσαν (Classen), not παρεπεπλεύκεσαν.
- 4.4.1 Retaining with OCT τοὺς στρατιώτας (deleted Köstlin).
- 4.8.6 Reading ὀκτὼ ἢ ἐννέα <σταδίων> (Bauslaugh). Reading πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίου (Burrows), not πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίου.
- 4.9.1 Reading προεσταύρωσε (Bloomfield), not προσεσταύρωσε.
- 4.13.2 Reading πεντήκοντα (with some MSS), not τεσσαράκοντα.

- 4.19.2 Reading πολεμίου (Stahl), not πολέμου.
- 4.25.2 Deleting ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Πηγίῳ (Steup), which OCT retains.
- 4.25.8 Reading προσέβαλλον (Poppo), not ἐσέβαλλον.
- 4.25.9 Reading οἱ Σικελοὶ <οἱ> (Krüger).
- 4.27.3 Reading Θεογένους (with most MSS), not Θεαγένους (cf. 5.19.2, 24.1).
- 4.28.4 Reading <καὶ> τοξότας (Portus).
- 4.29.3 Reading <καὶ> πολλοὶ γὰρ (Wilamowitz) (πολλὰ γὰρ without <καὶ> Gomme), not πολλῶ γὰρ without <καὶ>.
- 4.30.3 Reading αὐτοὺς (Bauer), not αὐτοῦ. Reading ὥστε (Gomme), not τότε, and placing ὥστε . . . ποιεῖσθαι after ἐσπέμπειν (with the MSS), not after οὔσαν (OCT after Krüger).
- 4.32.3 Reading τὰ μετέωρα καταλαβόντες (Spratt), not τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες Reading ἔχουσι (with most MSS), not ἔχωσι.
- 4.40.2 Reading ἀπιστούντων (Gomme), not ἀπιστοῦντές.
- 4.41.3 Reading ἀπαθεῖς (Stephanus), not ἀμαθεῖς.
- 4.42.4 Reading αὐτῶν (Poppo), not αὐτῶν..
- 4.43.1 Reading ξυνέβαλλεν (with most MSS), not ξυνέβαλεν.
- 4.44.2 Reading τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ (de Romilly), not τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
- 4.44.4 Reading καὶ ὥς ἔγνωσαν, where OCT (with some MSS) deletes ὥς.

- 4.45.2 Retaining ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μεθώνη ἐστί, which OCT after Stahl deletes.
- 4.46.1 Reading <ταῖς> ναῦσιν (Hammond after Gomme).
- 4.46.4 Reading αὐτοὺς ἐλθόντας (Poppo), not τοὺς ἐλθόντας.
- 4.47.3 Reading προσιόντας (with most MSS), not προϊόντας (one MS, cf. Duker).
- 4.50.2 Reading τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (Cobet), not πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.
- 4.52.3 Reading τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν (Poppo), not τῇ ἄλλῃ σκευῇ.
- 4.54.1 OCT (with the MSS) reads δισχιλίαις Μιλησίων ὀπλίταις, but the numeral is almost certainly corrupt, and we have omitted it.
- 4.56.1 Reading <γενόμενοι> ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ (Dobree), which yields sense; but more words may have dropped out (Gomme).
- 4.59.4 Reading βουλόμενοι (with some MSS), not βουλευόμενοι.
- 4.62.2 Reading οὐχ ἡσυχία μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμος (with the MSS), not ἡσυχίαν . . . πόλεμον (Herwerden),
τὸ μὲν παύσειεν . . . τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασώσειε (Steup), not παῦσαι . . . ξυνδιασῶσαι.
- 4.62.3 Reading δυνάμει τι (Krüger), not δυνάμει τινί.
- 4.63.1 Reading τοὺς ἤδη (Reiske), not τὸ ἤδη, which OCT marks as corrupt. Reading ἕκαστός τις (with one MS), not ἕκαστός τι.
- 4.67.3 Reading ἐκδρομή (Gomme), not φυλακή.
- 4.69.2 Reading διελομένη <ἦγεν> (Madvig).

- 4.72.4 Reading τελευτήσαντες <ἐπεκράτησαν>, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίθησαν οἱ μὲν; (Bernadakis), not τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν, which does not give a satisfactory sense.
- 4.73.2 Reading ἐπειδὴ τε . . . [καὶ] αὐτοῖς (Gomme), not ἐπειδὴ γε . . . καὶ αὐτοῖς.
- 4.73.4 OCT (with the MSS) reads τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, which is difficult, and possibly corrupt, but the general sense is clear.
- 4.75.2 Reading Κάληκα (with the MSS), not Κάλητα.
- 4.76.2 Reading ἐκ Θεσπιῶν (a variant in some MSS), not ἐκ Θηβῶν.
- 4.77.2 Reading Οἰνιάδας τε ὑπὸ Ἀκαρνάνων (one MS, cf. Poppo), not Οἰνιάδας δὲ ὑπὸ τε Ἀκαρνάνων.
- 4.78.1 Reading Τορύμβας (Masson), not Τορύλαος.
- 4.80.3 Reading νεότητα (with most MSS), not σκαιότητα.
- 4.85.7 Reading νηϊτήν (Hude), not νηϊτή.
- 4.93.2 Reading Ἱπποκράτει <ἔτι> ὄντι (Rutherford).
- 4.94.1 Reading ἄοπλοι τε <οἱ> πολλοὶ (Krüger).
- 4.96.3 Reading κυκλωθέντων <αὐτῶν> (Gomme).
- 4.98.2 Reading πρὸ τοῦ (Stahl), not πρὸς τοῖς.
- 4.102.4 Retaining διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτήν, which OCT after Dobree deletes.
- 4.108.1 Deleting with OCT (after Kistemaker) ἐνόμιζεν.

- 4.108.4 Reading ἐψευσμένοι (with one MS), not ἐψευσμένοις.
- 4.113.1 Reading ταῦτα (Classen), not ταῦτα.
- 4.117.2 Reading ἕως ὅτε (schol. on Ar., *Pax* 479), not ὡς ἔτι; but the text and the sense are difficult, and there may be wider corruption (possibly some words have dropped out: Steup).
- 4.118.5 Deleting τάλαντα (Wallinga), which OCT retains.
- 4.118.10 Reading ἐκελεύετε (Kirchhoff), not κελεύετε.
- 4.118.11 Reading ἔδοξεν <τῇ βουλῇ καὶ> τῷ δήμῳ (Gomme).
- 4.118.14 We follow Kirchhoff in supposing that some words have dropped out between εἰρήνης and βουλεύσασθαι. The translation supplies what is likely to have been the sense of the missing words. Reading εἶπη (Gomme), not ἐσίη.
- 4.119.1 Deleting with OCT (after Kirchhoff) καὶ ὤμοσαν.
- 4.120.1 The MSS reading ἐπήρχοντο, retained by OCT, is probably corrupt (Gomme), but the required sense is clear.
- 4.123.2 Deleting καὶ before καταβιασμένων (Classen), which OCT retains.
- 4.124.1 Reading αὐτοῦ (Poppo), not αὐτοῦ.
- 4.129.3 ξύμπαντες [δὲ] (deletion by OCT after Krüger)
ἐπτακόσιοι ὀπλίται is probably corrupt: the numeral is suspect (too few), and there may be a lacuna in which a number was given for light-armed troops also.
- 5.1 Reading διεγένοντο (Canfora), not διελέλυντο.

- 5.5.2 Deleting τοῖς before κομιζομένοις (Dobree), which OCT retains.
- 5.7.3 Reading περιέμενεν (Marshall), not περιέμενεν.
- 5.15.1 OCT marks ὁμοίως as corrupt, but the general sense is clear.
- 5.15.2 Reading οὕπω (with some MSS), not οὕπως.
- 5.16.1 Reading οἱ ἐν ἑκατέρα (with some MSS), not ἑκατέρα.
- 5.18.5 With Steup reading τάς<δε> δὲ πόλεις not τὰς δὲ πόλεις and punctuating with a full point after ἔχοντας and a colon after εἶναι, not a colon after ἔχοντας and a full point after εἶναι.
- 5.19.2 Reading (with the MSS) Θεογένης not Θεαγένης (cf. 4.27.3); also in 5.24.1 (where the MSS have Θεαγένης).
- 5.20.1 Deleting ἡ ἐσβολή ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ (Müller), which OCT retains.
- 5.22.1 Reading αὖθις (Lloyd-Jones), not αὐτοί.
- 5.22.2 Reading Ἀργείους <ἐπιέναι> . . . <καὶ> [νομίσαντες] (Gomme), where OCT retains the MSS text.
- 5.23.6 Reading ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, εὖορκον εἶναι (Herwerden), not ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ, εὖορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.
- 5.31.2 Reading καταλυσάντων (Krüger), not καὶ λυσάντων.
- 5.31.6 Reading <τὰ> ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων (Haase), not ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων (which seems, wrongly, to take περιορώμενοι as passive).
- 5.35.1 Reading ἐν τῇ Ἀθωῖδι Ἀκτῇ Διῆς (Meineke), not ἐν τῇ Ἀθῶ Ἀκτῇ Διῆς (OCT after Didot) or ἐν τῇ Ἀθῶ Δικτηδιῆς or

variations (MSS).

- 5.36.1 Reading *παραينوῦντες ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτά* (Reiske)
τε γινώσκειν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι Βοιωτοὺς <πείθειν> (Hude) ...
αὖθις μετὰ Κορινθίων (Ullrich) ... no parentheses ... *ἡγουμένους*
(some MSS), not *ταῦτα . . . μετὰ Βοιωτῶν . . .*, then *οὕτω . . . γενέσθαι*
in parentheses, then *ἡγούμενοι* (OCT with most MSS).
- 5.38.3 Reading *μετ' αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* (Stahl), not
μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.
- 5.40.2 Retaining with OCT *καθελεῖν*, not *παραδοῦναι* (Gomme).
- 5.42.1 Reading *Ἀνδρομέδης* (with most MSS) and *Ἀνδρομέδην* (with
some MSS), not *Ἀνδρομένης . . . Ἀνδρομένη*.
- 5.46.5 Ending the parenthesis at *Ἀλκιβιάδου* (Steup), not at *ξύμμαχοι*.
- 5.47.7 Reading *αὐτῆς* (Duker), not *αὐτῆς* (OCT) or *αὐτῇ* (MSS).
- 5.49.3 Reading *παρ' αὐτοῖς* (printed without comment by many
editors), not *παρ' αὐτοῖς*.
- 5.53 Retaining with OCT *βοταμίων* (*παραποταμίων* some MSS): see
Explanatory Note.
- 5.55.1 Reading *ἐφ' ἑκατέρων* (correction in one MS), not *ἀφ' ἑκατέρων*.
- 5.55.4 Reading *στρατηγός, πυθόμενοι* (with one MS) [*δὲ*] (Portus) ...
ἀπῆλθον (most MSS), not *στρατηγός· πυθόμενος* (most MSS)
δὲ . . . ἀπῆλθεν ... *ἀπῆλθον* (some MSS).
- 5.58.4 Reading *ὄρθριον* (with most MSS), not *ὄρθιον*.

5.62.2 Reading αὐτῶν Τεγεατῶν (with the MSS), not αὐτῶν τῶν (OCT after Stahl).

5.63.4 Reading ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας (Haase), not ἐκ τῆς πόλεως: see Explanatory Note.

5.65.4 Retaining τοὺς Ἀργεῖους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, which OCT after Haacke deletes.

5.66.2 Punctuating with a colon after ἐξεπλάγησαν and a full point after ἐγίγνετο (Andrewes), not a full point after ἐξεπλάγησαν and a comma after ἐγίγνετο.

5.76.1 Retaining with OCT ἐπειδὴ τὰ Κάρνεια ἤγαγον (deleted Krüger, perhaps correctly: see Explanatory Note).

5.77, 79 The text of the treaties in these two chapters is given in the Laconian dialect. Dialect being particularly liable to corruption, there are several uncertainties of text and meaning: we have followed OCT except at 5.79.4, where we read διακριθῆμεν <ᾗδε>· αἱ [δέ] τις ... (Dover *ap.* Andrewes), not διακριθῆμεν. αἱ δέ τις . . .

.83.4 OCT marks ἀπάραντος as corrupt: the sense required is clear, and among the suggested emendations Andrewes cites ἀποστάντος (Poppo).

5.110.2 Deleting καὶ before γῆς (Duker), which OCT retains.

6.2.3 Retaining with OCT Φωκέων (Φρυγῶν Ridgeway, perhaps correctly; Φωκαιῶν Pais, cf. 5.4.4): see Explanatory Note.

6.4.1 Retaining with OCT *προδόντος* (*παραδόντος* Classen, and perhaps a sign of disturbance in one MS).

6.4.2 Reading *Πάμμilon* (with some MSS: cf. Hdn. 1.162), not *Πάμιλλον*, retained by OCT, *LGPN* iii.A and Hornblower (who remarks that *Πάμμilon* may be the correct form of the name but the text here should not be emended).

Myscus or Euthydemus should be inserted as the subject of *ξυγκατώκισεν* (Hornblower, cf. *SEG* xliii 630): see Explanatory Note.

6.6.1 Reading *προγεγενημένοις* (with some MSS), not *προσγεγενημένοις*.

6.9.2 Reading *νῦν ἄλλα ἢ ἂν* (Stahl after Valla), not *νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν*.

6.11.4 Retaining the MSS order (OCT after Rauchenstein places *εἰ δὲ σφαλείημέν . . . ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο* after ... *τῆς δόξης δόντα*): see Explanatory Note.

6.12.1 Omitting *εἶναι* after *ἐνθάδε* (with one MS), which OCT retains.

6.15.4 Reading *διαθέντος* (correction in one MS, cf. Herwerden), not *διαθέντι* (OCT with correction in one MS) or *διαθέντα* (MSS).

6.25.2 Reading *αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων* (*ὧν ἔσεσθαι . . . δοκῶσι*), καὶ ἄλλας . . . *εἶναι* (correction in one MS), not (*αὐτῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων ἔσεσθαι . . . εἶναι*).

6.26.1 Retaining *Ἀθηναίοις*, which OCT deletes.

6.31.1 Punctuating with comma after *τῇ ὄψει* (Dover), not after *ἑώρων*. Reading *αὕτη <ή> πρώτη* (Dobree).

6.38.4 Reading *πειθὼν τοὺς [δὲ] τὰ τοιαῦτα μηχανομένους κολάζειν* (Weil), not *πειθὼν, τοὺς δὲ . . . κολάζων*.

- 6.39.2 Reading εἰ <γὰρ> μὴ μανθάνετε (Gomme).
- 6.40.1 Reading ὧνπέρ (Dover after a scholiast) τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος,
not ἥπερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος, which OCT after Krüger deletes.
- 6.49.4 Reading ἐφορμισθέντας (Schaefer) or ἐφόρμησιν τὰ (Böhme), not
ἐφορμηθέντας.
- 6.54.5 Reading ἐπαχθεῖς ἦσαν . . . κατεστήσαντο (Hude), not
ἐπαχθὲς ἦν . . . κατεστήσατο.
- 6.62.5 Reading περιέπεμψαν (correction in one MS), not περιέπλευσαν.
- 6.69.3 Reading ξυγκαταστρεψάμενοι . . . ὑπακούσονται (correction in one
MS), not ξυγκαταστρεψανένοις . . . ὑπακούσεται.
- 6.82.2 Reading [καὶ] παροικοῦντες (Classen), not καὶ παροικοῦσιν.
- 6.87.4 Reading ἀδεῆς (Reiske), not ἀδεεῖ (OCT after Krüger) or ἀδεεῖς
(MSS).
- 6.88.4 Reading οὐ πολλοὶ (Canter), not οἱ πολλοὶ.
- 6.88.6 Reading πλινθεῖα (Dover after a scholiast), not πλινθία.
- 6.89.6 Reading ὅσω καὶ μέγιστα ἠδίκημαι, λοιδορήσαιμι (Stephanus after
a scholiast and Valla), not ὅσω καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι.
- 6.97.1 Reading νυκτὸς <ῥ> (Madvig)
τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένη ἡμέρᾳ ἐξητάζοντο ἐκεῖνοι (Classen), not
νυκτὸς τῇ . . . ἐξητάζοντο καὶ.
- 6.100.1 Reading πυραμίδα (with two MSS), not πυλίδα.
- 6.101.1 Reading <πρὸς> τὸν κρημνὸν (Stahl).

6.104.2 Retaining with OCT καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνανεωσάμενος πολιτείαν (one MS and Valla), not κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ποτε πολιτείαν (most MSS).

7.1.3 Reading στρατιᾷ (with most MSS), not πανστρατιᾷ.

7.2.4 Deleting τοῦ κύκλου (Dover), which OCT retains.

7.7.1 Deleting μέχρι (Dover), which OCT retains.

7.7.3 Reading ὅπως οὖν (Hude), not ὅπως ἂν.

7.13.2 Retaining τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν μὲν, where OCT after Poppo deletes the second τῶν.

7.21.3 Retaining αὐτοῖς before φαίνεσθαι, which OCT after Badham deletes.

7.22.1 Reading παρεσκεύαστο (with some MSS), not παρεσκευάσατο.

7.27.4 Retaining with OCT ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἴσης φρουρᾶς καταθεούσης τὴν χώραν, but it is probably corrupt: see Explanatory Note.

7.27.5 Reading τούτων πολὺ μέρος (with most MSS), not τούτων τὸ πολὺ μέρος.

7.28.2 Reading που (with one MS), not ποιούμενοι, which OCT marks as corrupt.

7.32.2 Reading ἐνός του Κορινθίου (Herwerden), not ἐνός τοῦ Κορινθίου.

7.48.6 Reading ῥ (correction in one MS), not ῶν.

7.49.2 Reading τρίβειν αὐτούς (with the MSS), not τρίβειν αὐτοῦ (OCT after Krüger).

7.57.5 Reading καὶ ἄντικρυς (Böhme), not καταντικρὺ.

- 7.70.7 Punctuating with comma after *ποτε*, not after *αὐθις*.
- 7.75.4 Reading *πολλῶν ἐπιθειαςμῶν* (Poppo, cf. Valla), not *ὀλίγων ἐπιθειαςμῶν*.
- 7.76 Reading *αἰί τι μᾶλλον* (Weidgen), not *ἔτι μᾶλλον*.
- 8.10.1 Reading *ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ αἱ σπονδαί* (with one MS and a papyrus, cf. Valla), not just *ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ*.
- 8.18.3 Reading *ἔστωσαν* twice (with the MSS), not *ὄντων* (OCT after Tucker).
- 8.19.2 Deleting *καί* before *ὅτι Ἀμόργης* (Poppo after Valla).
- 8.19.4, 20.2 Reading *Αἰράς, Αἰράς* (Rubinstein), not *Αἰράς, Αἰράς* (OCT after Hude); the MSS have *ερας vel sim*.
- 8.22.1 Reading *πλήθει παρόντων* (Wilamowitz), not *πλήθει παρόντες*.
- 8.23.4 Reading *ἀποστήσας, καὶ τοὺς . . . νεῶν ὀπλίσας* (Powell, cf. a papyrus), not *ἀποστήσας καὶ ὀπλίσας, καὶ τοὺς . . . νεῶν ὀπλίτας*.
- 8.27.2 Retaining *ἔξεστιν*, which OCT after Dobree deletes.
- 8.38.3 Reading *ἐς ὀλίγον* (with the MSS), not *ἐς ὀλίγους* (OCT after Dobree).
- 8.39.3 Reading *προσέβαλλον* (with one MS), not *προσέβαλον*. Reading *τῆς Καρίας* (Wilamowitz, cf. Valla), not *τῆς Ἀσίας*.
- 8.43.3 Reading *ἐνεῖναι* (OCT after Bekker), not *ἐνῆν* (MSS): see Explanatory Notes.
- 8.44.4 Retaining with OCT *ὀγδοήκοντα*, not *πεντήκοντα* (Wilamowitz at one time) or *τεσσαράκοντα* (Pritchett): see Explanatory Note.

8.45.3 Reading στρατηγὸς ὧν (with one MS) after Ἑρμοκράτης.

8.46.3 Retaining with most MSS (cf. Valla) τῶν βαρβάρων, which OCT deletes.

Reading πη before ἐξέλωσι (Goodhart and Tucker), not μὴ.

8.53.1 Retaining with the MSS καὶ before ἀφικόμενοι, which OCT deletes.

8.56.4 (OCT, but most edd. begin a new §5 here) Reading with one MS ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἄπορα, where after οὐκέτι most MSS add τι and OCT marks a lacuna.

8.68.2 Omitting with some MSS μετέστη . . . κατέστη, which OCT retains but marks as corrupt, suspecting that alternative versions of the text have been conflated.

8.73.4 and subsequently Reading the correct Θράσυλλος / -ον / -ω (Stahl, with one MS in every instance except this first), not Θράσυλος / -ον / -ω.

8.77 Retaining οἱ δέκα πρεσβευταὶ, which OCT after Herwerden deletes (cf. 8.86.1).

8.82.1 Deleting τε before παρόντας (Goodhart).

8.86.1 Retaining πρεσβευταί, which OCT after Herwerden deletes (cf. 8.77).

8.86.9 Retaining with one MS πεμπτοὺς, not πέμπουσι, which OCT after Bekker reads and deletes.

8.89.2 Reading στρατηγούντων (Bergk), not στρατηγῶν τῶν, of which OCT after Classen deletes στρατηγῶν, and Reeve *ap.* Andrewes further deletes τῶν.

Deleting with OCT and some MSS ἔπεμπον after πρεσβευομένους.

Reading ὦντο (Delebecque) ἀπαλλάξείιν (Abresch), not οὐ τὸ ἀπαλλάξειν (MSS): OCT prints οὐ τὸ †ἀπαλλάξείιν, but the obelus ought rather to have been attached to οὐ τὸ (cf. Andrewes).

8.92.6 Retaining with OCT πλὴν before ὅσοις, which Haase deleted and a papyrus omits: see Explanatory Note.

8.94.1 Retaining ἐν Διονύσου, which OCT after Goodhart deletes.

Reading with Arnold and one MS πᾶς τις τῶν πολλῶν, where other MSS add ὀπλιτῶν after πολλῶν, and OCT after Stahl deletes τῶν πολλῶν ὀπλιτῶν.

8.99.1 Retaining ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρήει, which OCT after Hude deletes.

8.100.5 Reading with one MS καὶ αἱ Μηθυμναῖαι, where OCT reads καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι (most MSS) <πέντε> (Dobree).

8.109.2 Bracketing as an interpolation with OCT ὅταν ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο ... ἔτος πληροῦται (which one MS omits): see Explanatory Note.

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References are to Book and chapter (e.g. 2.68 refers to Book 2, chapter 68): the chapters are indicated in the text by marginal numbers.

Where relevant, the entry for a place or a country should be understood to include the inhabitants of that place or country. Actions taken by ‘the Peloponnesians’ are indexed under ‘Sparta/Spartans’ when the Spartans are also involved.

The headings of the more important entries are given in bold capitals, and references of particular relevance or importance are printed in bold. Where a date is given in bold, it has continued application until the next indication of date in that entry or paragraph. All dates are BC. (Dates from 431 on given in the form, e.g., ‘428/7’ denote the winter season, late 428 to early 427: ‘428’ denotes the summer season of 428.) The headings of a number of general topics are given in italics.

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jealousy of Spartans 4.108, cf. 4.117

character and effectiveness **4.81**, 4.108, 4.121, 4.123

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3.76, 3.79

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—(431) at Methone 2.25

(429) speech at Rhium 2.87

(429/8) proposed attack on Peiraeus 2.93
(425) at Pylos 4.11–12 (wounded, 4.12, and loses shield)
(424) at Megara/Nisaea 4.70–4, 4.85, 4.108
(424–423) expedition to Thraceward region (through Thessaly, 4.78), 4.70, 4.74, **4.78–88**, **4.102–16**, **4.120–9**, 4.132, 4.135
(424) speech at Acanthus 4.85–7, cf. 4.120
(**424/3**) achieves surrender of Amphipolis and makes attempt on Eïon (1) 4.103–7
propaganda about Athenian refusal to fight at Nisaea 4.85, 4.108
calls for reinforcements from Sparta, refused 4.108
at Torone/Lecythus 4.110–16
speech to Toronaeans 4.114, cf. 4.120
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speech to his troops at Lyncus 4.126
appoints governors of Amphipolis and Torone 4.132
(423/2) attempt on Potidaea 4.135
(**422**) fails to relieve Torone 5.2–3

at Amphipolis 5.6–11

killed 5.10

funeral and honours in Amphipolis (adopted as founder) 5.11

(421) Helots who fought under Brasidas freed by Spartans
5.34

(418) Brasidas' veterans at battle of Mantinea 5.67, 5.71–2

Brauro, wife of Pittacus, helped to assassinate him 4.107

Bricinniae, fort in Leontinian territory 5.4

Brilessus, mountain in Attica 2.23

Bronze House, goddess of 1.128, 1.143 (precinct)

Byzantium, city on Bosphorus: 2.97

(478) won from Persian control 1.94, 1.128

Pausanias (1) forced out of Byzantium by Athenians 1.131

(440–439) revolts from Athens 1.115, 1.117 (returned to
subject status)

(411) revolts from Athens, and minor sea-battle 8.80 (the 8
Byzantine ships captured by Athenians 8.107)

cabals/fraternities at Athens 8.48, **8.54**, 8.65, 8.81, 8.92

Cacyparis, river in Sicily 7.80

Cadmeïs, previous name of Boeotia 1.12

Caeadas, ravine used for disposal of criminals in Sparta 1.134

Caïcinus, river in territory of Locri 3.103

Calchedon, Megarian colony at mouth of Black Sea 4.75

Calex, river in territory of Heracleia (2) 4.75

Callians, Aetolian tribe 3.96

Callias (1), Athenian general 1.61–3

killed at Potidaea 1.63

Callias (2), father of Callicrates 1.29

Callias (3), father of Hipponicus 3.91

Callias (4), father-in-law of Hippias 6.55

Callicrates, Corinthian commander 1.29

Calligeitus, Megarian exile, agent of Pharnabazus 8.6, 8.8, 8.39

Callirrhoe, previous name of fountain Enneacrounos 2.15

Calydon, city in Aeolis (2) 3.102

Camarina, Dorian city in Sicily: founded by Syracusans, and subsequent refoundations 6.5

allied to Leontini in 427: 3.86

pro-Syracusan party 4.25

(424) truce with Gela, leading to
conference of Gela 4.58; 4.65

(422) won over by Phaeax 5.4

(415) refuse to admit Athenians 6.52

(415/4) support Syracuse with small force 6.67

Athenians and Syracusans bid for their support in assembly
6.75–88

(413) send reinforcements to Syracuse 7.58; 7.80

Cambyzes, son of Cyrus, King of Persia (530–522) 1.13, 1.14

Cameirus, city in Rhodes 8.44

Canastraeum, cape at tip of Pallene peninsula (Chalcidice) 4.110

Carcinus, Athenian general 2.23

Cardamyle, in Chios 8.24

Caria 1.4, 1.8 (pirates, colonized Delos), 1.116, 2.9 (coastal Caria tribute-paying region of Athenian empire), 2.69, 3.19 (Athenian money-collecting force destroyed, 428/7), 8.5, 8.39

Carneia, Spartan festival 5.75–6

Carneius, sacred month in Dorian calendar 5.54

Carteria, harbour in territory of Phocaea 8.101

Carthage: sea-battle with Phocaeans 1.13

- Alcibiades' ambition to conquer Carthage 6.15
- Athenian ambitions against Carthage (Alcibiades) 6.90
- possible source of help for Sicily 6.33
- for Athenians 6.88
- short sea passage to Sicily 6.2
- trading-post Nea Polis 7.50

Caryae, in Laconia 5.55

Carystus, city in Euboea: of Dryopian race 7.57

- (470s) forced to capitulate by Athenians 1.98
- (425) with Athenians in Corinthiad 4.42–3
- subject allies, with Athenians in Syracuse 7.57

(411) some Carystians support Four Hundred 8.69 (cf. 8.65)

Casmenae, city in Sicily: founded by Syracusans 6.5

CATANA: city in Sicily, under Mt Aetna (partial destruction in eruption of 426/5: 3.116): founded by Thucles and Chalcidians 6.3

pro-Syracusan party 6.50–1, 6.64

(415) expected to side with Athens on kinship grounds 6.20

first refuse, then accept Athenians and form alliance 6.50–1

Catanaean assembly 6.51

(415–414) Catana as Athenian base 6.51–2, 6.62, 6.63–5, 6.71–2, 6.74–5, 6.88, 6.94, 6.97, 7.42

(415/4) Syracusans ravage territory and burn Athenian camp 6.75

(414) provide horses for Athenian cavalry 6.98

one of the Athenians' 'remaining allies' (Nicias) 7.14, 7.57

(413) Demosthenes advocates move from Syracuse to Thapsus or Catana 7.49, 7.60

Catana providing food to Athenians at Syracuse 7.60

first aim of Athenian retreat 7.80

refuge for escaped or kidnapped Athenians 7.85

Caulonia, in Italy 7.25

Caunus, in Caria 1.116, 8.39, 8.41–2, 8.57, 8.88, 8.108

cavalry: Peloponnesian cavalry provided by Boeotia, Phocis, Locris 2.9

cavalry pay 5.47

cavalrymen's attendants 7.25

cavalry battles 2.22, 4.72, 4.124, 6.98

Cecrops, legendary king of Attica 2.15

Cecryphaleia, small island off Aegina 1.105

Cenaeum, cape in Euboea 3.93

Cenchreae, port in Corinthiad 4.42, 4.44, 8.10, 8.20, 8.23

Centoripa, Sicel town: (414) capitulates to Athenians 6.94; 7.32

Ceos, Aegean island: subject ally of Athens, with Athenians at Syracuse 7.57

Cephalenia, W. Greek island: 1.27, 2.7 (envoys from Athens at start of war), 2.30 (won over by Athenians), 2.33 (failed Corinthian attempt, 431/0), 2.80

(426) join Athenians and Acarnanians against Leucas 3.94, and Athenians against Aetolia 3.95

5.35 (Helots from Pylos settled there), 7.31, 7.57 (with Athenians in Sicily as independent ally)

Cerameicus, district of Athens 6.57–8

Cercina, mountain in Macedonia 2.98

Cerdylium, high ground opposite Amphipolis 5.6, 5.8, 5.10

Ceryces, Athenian clan with oversight of Eleusinian Mysteries 8.53

Cestrine, in Epirus 1.46

Chaereas, fervent Athenian

democrat: (411) brings to Samos exaggerated account of regime of Four Hundred 8.74, 8.86

Chaeroneia, in Boeotia 1.113, 4.76, 4.89

Chalce, E. Aegean island 8.41, 8.44, 8.55, 8.60

Chalcideus, Spartan commander: (413/2) replaces Melanchridas as admiral 8.6

(412) commands expedition to Chios and Ionia 8.8, 8.11–12, 8.14–17, 8.32

with Alcibiades secures revolts of Chios (8.14), Erythrae (8.14), Clazomenae (8.14), Teos (8.16), Miletus (8.17, 8.25, 8.28)

with Tissaphernes negotiates 1st treaty between Sparta and Persia 8.17–18, 8.36, 8.43

killed at Panormus (3) 8.24, 8.45

CHALCIDIANS in Thraceward

region: (432) persuaded by Perdiccas to uproot to Olynthus 1.58

—(432 on) in revolt from and at war with Athens 1.56–9, 1.61–5, 2.29, 2.58, 2.79 (defeat Athenians at Spartolus, 429)

(425) drive Athenians out of Eïon (2) 4.7

(424) invitation and arrival of Brasidas 4.79–82

at Acanthus 4.84–8

(424/3) Argilus 4.103, Amphipolis 4.103–8, Torone 4.110–14

(422) Cleon's expedition 5.2–3, 5.6–11; 5.26, 5.30, 5.83

(Athenian expedition under Nicias aborted, 417), 6.10 (still in revolt, 415)

supported by Corinth 1.56, 1.60–6, 5.30

in Brasidas' army 4.123–4 (423), 5.6 (422)

—(429/8) Sitalces' campaign against Chalcidians 2.95, 2.101

(422/1) provision in Peace of Nicias 5.18

(421) refuse compliance with Peace of Nicias 5.21, 5.26, 5.35

join Argive alliance 5.31

(421/0) frustrated in attempt to bring Boeotia into the alliance
5.38

(418/7) alliance confirmed with Argos and Sparta 5.80

(417) Dium secedes to Chalcidians 5.82

(416/5) refuse Spartan request to support Perdiccas against
Athenians 6.7

10–day truce with Athenians 6.7

—Chalcidian cavalry 2.79, 4.124, 5.10

Chalcidice 1.65, 2.58, 2.70, 2.101, 4.79, 4.103, (4.110, 4.123)

Chalcis (1), city in Euboea: first Greeks to colonize Sicily 6.3

founded Naxos (2), Leontini, Catana (6.3), Zancle (6.4),
Himera (6.5)

founded Cumae in Opicia (Italy) 6.4

Chalcidian (i.e. Ionian) cities in Sicily 3.86, 4.25, 4.61, 4.64,
6.3–5, 6.76, 6.79, 6.84, 7.57

early war with Eretria 1.15; 7.29, 8.95

subject ally of Athens, with Athenians in Sicily 7.57

Chalcis (2), Corinthian dependency in Aetolia: (456) captured by
Athenians, 1.108; 2.83

Chaleium, in Ozolian Locris 3.101

chance/the incalculable 1.78, 1.84, 1.122, 1.138, 1.140, 1.142, 2.11, 2.44, 2.61, 2.64, 2.87, 3.59, 4.18, 4.55, 4.62–4, 4.65, 5.16, 5.46, 5.75, 5.102, 6.23, 6.78, 7.61, 7.71, 8.24

Chaonians, barbarian tribe in Epirus: political structure 2.80

(430) join Ambraciots against Amphilochia 2.68

(429) against Acarnania 2.80–2

Charadrus, watercourse outside Argos, site of courts martial 5.60

Charicles, Athenian general 7.20, 7.26

Charminus, Athenian general 8.30, 8.41

(411) colluded with oligarchic conspirators in Samos 8.73

Charoeades, Athenian general: (427) commanded in 1st Athenian expedition to Sicily 3.86

(426) killed in battle with Syracusans 3.90

Charybdis, strait between Sicily and Italy 4.24

Cheimerium, in Thesprotia 1.30, 1.46, 1.48

Chersonese 1.11, 8.62, 8.99, 8.102, 8.104

Chersonesus, in Corinthiad 4.42–3

CHIOS, E. Aegean island: supposed birthplace of Homer 3.104

rich land, unravaged from Persian War to 412: 8.24, 8.45

combined prosperity with stability 8.24

dense slave population 8.40

ships, not tribute 1.19, 6.85, 7.57

ship-providing allies of Athens 1.116–17, 2.9, 2.56 (cf. 6.31),
4.13, 4.129, 5.84, 6.43, 7.20, cf. 8.9

with Athenians in Sicily 7.57

‘autonomy’ in Athenian empire 3.10

(427) prisoners held by Alcidas released 3.32

(425/4) Athenian suspicions, walls demolished 4.51

—revolt from and war with Athens (413/2–411): (413/2)

apply to Sparta, alliance made 8.5–8, without knowledge of
common people 8.9, 8.14

(412) Athenians get wind 8.9–10, 8.15

revolt, and reaction in Athens 8.14–15

with Spartans, promote revolt elsewhere 8.16–17, 8.19, 8.22–
3 (Lesbos), 8.28

defeated by Athenians at Mytilene 8.22–3

Athenians wage war from Lesbos, Chians defeated and country
ravaged 8.24, 8.38

pro-Athenian elements 8.24, 8.31, 8.38

Pedaritus sent as Spartan governor 8.28, 8.32

(412/1) Athenian expedition against Chios 8.30, 8.33–4, 8.38,
8.40, 8.55–6, 8.61

offend Astyochus 8.32–3

Athenians fortify Delphinium 8.34, 8.38, 8.40

Chians appeal to Astyochus 8.38, 8.40, 8.60, Tissaphernes
(rejected) 8.45, Peloponnesians at Rhodes 8.55

defeated by Athenians, Pedaritus killed, blockade tightened,
famine in Chios 8.55–6, 8.61

(411) Leon comes as new governor, with ships 8.61

Chians break out, and sea-battle with Athenians 8.61, 8.63

Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, paid by Chians 8.99–101

lose eight ships at Cynossema 8.106

Choerades, Iapygian islands off Taras 7.33

Chromon, Messenian, guide to Athenians in Aetolia (426) 3.98

Chrysippus, murdered by Atreus 1.9

Chrysis, priestess at Argos 2.2

(423) accidentally burns down temple of Hera 4.133

Cilicia 1.112

Cimon (1), son of Miltiades (1.98 etc.), Athenian general: (470s)
captures Eion (1) 1.98

(?469) defeats Persians in battles of Eurymedon 1.100

(?462) brings Athenian force to help Spartans in Helot revolt
1.102

(451) leads expedition to Cyprus, dies there 1.112

Cimon (2), father of Lacedaemonius 1.45

Cithaeron, mountain in Boeotia 2.75, 3.24

Citium, city in Cyprus 1.112

civil strife (stasis): 1.2, 1.12, 1.23, 1.24, 1.115, 1.126, 2.65 (Athens)
3.2, 3.27 (Mytilene)

3.34; 3.62, 4.92 (Boeotia)

3.68, 4.66 (Megara)

4.1, 4.130, 5.4, 5.5, 7.33, 7.46, 7.50, 8.21, 8.92–6 (Athens)

in Corcyra (427–5), **3.70–81**, [3.84], 4.2, **4.46–8**

in the Greek world, **3.82–3**, [3.84]

Clarus, in Ionia 3.33

Clazomenae, in Ionia: **(412)** revolts from Athens and fortifies

Polichna 8.14; 8.16, 8.22

Polichna captured by Athenians, Clazomenians rejoin Athenian alliance 8.23

(412/1) failed attack by Astyochus 8.31

property in off-lying islands looted by Astyochus' fleet 8.31

Cleænētus, father of Cleon: 3.36 etc.

Cleandridas, father of Gylippus 6.93

Thurian citizenship conferred on him 6.104

Clearchus, son of Rhamphias (8.8 etc.), Spartan commander 8.8, 8.39, 8.80

Clearidas, Spartan appointed governor of Amphipolis (423) 4.132

(422) in battle for Amphipolis 5.6, 5.8–10

(421) refuses to hand back Amphipolis after Peace of Nicias 5.21

brings back troops from Thraceward region after peace 5.34

Cleinias (1), father of Alcibiades: 5.43 etc.

Cleinius (2), father of Cleopompus: 2.26 etc.

Cleippides, Athenian general 3.3

Cleoboulus, Spartan ephor, opposed to peace treaty 5.36–8

Cleombrotus, father of Pausanias (1) 1.94 etc., and of Nicomedes 1.107

Cleomedes, Athenian general at Melos (416) 5.84

Cleomenes (1), Spartan king 1.126

Cleomenes (2), brother of Pleistoanax, regent for his nephew

Pausanias (2): (427) leads 4th Peloponnesian invasion of Attica 3.26

CLEON, son of Cleainetus (3.36 etc.), Athenian demagogue (3.36)

and general: the Athenian most opposed to peace 5.16

‘more sensible elements’ want to be rid of him 4.28

character **3.36**, **4.21**, 5.7, 5.10, 5.16

enmity for Nicias 4.27–8

Cleon on democracy 3.37

on empire 3.37, 3.40

—(**427**) carries 1st motion to execute Mytilenaeans 3.36

speech in ‘Mytilenean debate’ 3.37–40

carries motion to execute Mytilenaeans sent to Athens 3.50

(**425**) persuades Athenians to reject Spartan offer of peace 4.21–2

forced into accepting Pylos command 4.27–8

at Pylos 4.30–9, cf. 5.7

(423) carries motion for destruction of Scione 4.122

(422) recaptures Torone 5.2–3, and Galepsus, but fails at
Stagirus 5.6

at Amphipolis **5.6–10**

disaffection of his troops 5.7

killed 5.10

Cleonae (1), in Argolid: (418) in battle of Mantinea 5.67, 5.72, 5.74

6.95 Cleonae (2), city on Acte peninsula (Chalcidice) 4.109

Cleopompus, Athenian general 1.26, 2.58 (at Potidaea)

Cnemus, Spartan admiral: (430) campaign against Zacynthus 2.66

(429) campaign against Acarnania 2.80–2, 2.84

Spartan commissioners sent to advise him 2.85

speech at Rhium 2.87

(429/8) proposed attack on Peiraeus 2.93

Cnidus, E. Aegean peninsula: colonized Aeolus islands 3.88

sanctuary of Apollo at Triopium 8.35

(412/1) revolts from Athens 8.35

attacked and ravaged by Athenians from Samos 8.35; 8.41

whole Peloponnesian fleet gathered at Cnidus 8.42–4, 8.52

(411) expulsion of Persian garrison 8.109

Coloniae, in Troad 1.131

colonies, colonization 1.12, 1.24–7, 1.34, 1.38, 1.56

colonization of Cyclades by Minos 1.4

of islands by Carians and Phoenicians 1.8

of Ionia 1.2, 1.12, 2.15

of Italy and Sicily by Peloponnesians 1.12

of Sicily 6.3–5

consultation of Delphi 3.92

invitation of volunteers 1.27, 3.92

relations of colonies and mother-cities: 1.25, 7.57

(Corcyra/Corinth); 1.56

5.104, 5.106 (Melos/Sparta)

6.6 (Syracuse/Corinth)

Colonus, outside Athens:

sanctuary of Poseidon, site of assembly in 411: 8.67

Colophon, in Ionia: (430) captured by Persians 3.34

(427) Notium restored to Colophonians by Paches 3.34

Conon, Athenian commander at Naupactus (413) 7.31

consular representatives (proxenoi) 2.29, 2.85, 3.2, 3.52, 3.70, 4.78,
5.43, 5.59, 5.76, 6.89, 8.92

Copae, in Boeotia 4.93

Copaïs, lake in Boeotia 4.93

CORCYRA, W. Greek island: on route to Italy and Sicily, 1.36, 1.44

colonized Epidamnus 1.24

early sea-battle with Corinthians 1.13

early use of triremes 1.14

Themistocles a benefactor 1.136
previous isolationist policy 1.31, 1.32, 1.37
wealth 1.25
naval power 1.25, 1.33, 1.35, 1.36, 1.44, 1.68, 3.77, 3.82
ship-providing allies of Athens 2.9, 2.25, 3.94, 7.31, 7.57
relations with Corinth 1.25, 7.57
assemblies 3.70–1
council 3.70
—sanctuaries of Zeus and Alcinous 3.70
temple of Hera (Heraeum) 1.24, 3.75, 3.79, 3.81
sanctuary of Dioscuri 3.75
temple of Dionysus 3.81
Hyllaic harbour 3.72, 3.81
island facing Heraeum 3.75, 3.79
promontory of Leucimne 1.30, 1.47, 1.51, 3.79
—(435) besiege Epidamnus, defeat Corinthians in sea-battle of
Leucimne 1.26–30
(433) apply to join Athenian alliance 1.31–6 (speech at Athens
1.32–6)
defensive alliance with Athens 1.44–5, 3.70
with Athenian help, worst Corinthians in sea-battle of Sybota
1.47–55
Corcyraean prisoners and their return 1.55, 3.70

(431) envoys from Athens at start of war 2.7

(415) muster-station for Sicilian expedition 6.30, 6.32, 6.34,
6.42–4, 7.26

(413) hoplites and ships raised to support Athenians in Sicily
7.31, 7.57

—**civil war (427–425) 3.70–81, [3.84], 4.2, 4.46–8: (427)**
envoys from Athens, Corinth, and Sparta at start of civil war
3.70, 3.72

oligarchic envoys to Athens arrested 3.72

democratic refugees in Athens 3.70–2

oligarchic coup kills Peithias and others 3.70

oligarchic, then democratic victory 3.72–4

arrival of Athenian ships from Naupactus 3.75

naval engagement with Peloponnesians 3.77–8, and arrival of
further Athenian fleet 3.80–1

murder and suicide of oligarchs 3.81

(425) oligarchs cross from mainland and harass city from Mt
Istone (3.85), 4.2

Peloponnesian fleet to support them recalled to Pylos 4.2–3

famine in city 3.85, 4.2

oligarchs defeated by Athenians and democrats, and wiped out
(murder and suicide) 4.46–8

CORINTH: situation, and wealth 1.13

original inhabitants Aeolians 4.42

Isthmian festival 8.9–10

colonized Ambracia (2.80), Apollonia (1.26), Corcyra (1.24–5, 7.57), Leucas (1.30), Potidaea (1.56), Sollium (2.30), Syracuse (6.3, cf. 6.88)

builders of first triremes 1.13

early sea-battle with Corcyraeans 1.13

relations with Corcyra 1.25, 7.57

loaned ships to Athenians against Aegina 1.41

defeat Athenians at Halieis, defeated by Athenians in Megarid (460–459), 1.105–6

Corinthian Chalcis captured by Athenians (456) 1.108

aid revolt of Megara (446) 1.114

opposed Peloponnesian intervention in revolt of Samos (440–439) 1.10–11

ship-providing allies of Sparta 2.9, 7.58, 8.3

—(435) support Epidamnus, defeated by Corcyraeans in sea-battle of Leucimme 1.25–31

(435–433) build up navy thereafter 1.31, (1.36)

(433) speech at Athens 1.37–43

worsted by Athenians and Corcyraeans in sea-battle of Sybota 1.46–55

take Anactorium 1.55

anger against Athens 1.55–7, 1.103

approaches by Perdiccas 1.57

Corinthian force at Potidaea 1.60–6
(432) summon allies to Sparta 1.67
speeches at Sparta 1.68–71, 1.120–4
(431) Sollium captured by Athenians 2.30
(431/0) expedition to Acarnania and Cephallenia 2.33
(430/29) Phormio at Naupactus to prevent traffic to/from
Corinth, 2.69
(429) defeated by Phormio in Gulf 2.80, 2.83–4, 2.90–2
(429/8) starting point for attack on Peiraeus/Salamis 2.93–4
(427) send envoys to Corcyra at start of civil war 3.70, 3.72
(426/5) install garrison in Ambracia 3.114, 4.42
(garrison in Leucas 4.42, cf. 3.7, 3.94)
(425) battle with Athenians attacking Corinthiad 4.42–4
lose Anactorium to Athenians and Acarnanians 4.49
(424) hoplites in Brasidas' army at Megara 4.70
(424/3) hoplites supporting Boeotians at Delium 4.100
(423) signatories of one-year truce 4.119
—(422/1) dissent from treaty and alliance with Athens 5.17,
5.22, 5.25, 5.35
(421) urge Argives to set up defensive alliance 5.27, 5.32, and
join it 5.31
Spartan complaints 5.30
seek truce with Athens 5.32

(421/0) Spartan-inspired proposals for alliance of Boeotia with Corinth and Argos come to nothing 5.36–8

secede from Sparta 5.38 (cf. 5.30)

(420) abstain from Athens/Argos alliance and incline to Sparta 5.48

Argives and allies ask Corinthians to join them 5.50

(419) prevent Alcibiades fortifying Rhium 5.52

(418) in Peloponnesian expedition against Argos 5.57–60

summoned to assist Spartans at Mantinea 5.64

request countermanded 5.75

(417/6) do not join Peloponnesians against Argos 5.83 (nor in 416/5: 6.7)

(416) unspecified clash with Athenians 5.115

(415/4) vote to support Syracuse, and send envoys to Sparta 6.88, 6.93

(414) send two ships to Italy/Sicily 6.93, 6.104

to follow with more ships 6.104, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7 (escape interception), 7.58

troops requested for Sicily 7.7, cf. 7.12 (Nicias), 7.17, 7.18

(414–413) fleet opposing Athenians at Naupactus 7.17, 7.19, 7.31, 7.34 (sea-battle)

(413) send hoplites to Sicily 7.17, 7.19, 7.31, 7.58

in final sea-battle in Great Harbour 7.70

only allies to send both fleet and land force to Sicily 7.58

return of ships (412) 8.13

(413/2) required to build ships for Peloponnesian League 8.3

(412) League conference at Corinth 8.8, Corinthians hold up
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Gela, Dorian city in Sicily: founded from Rhodes and Crete 6.4, 7.57

Geloans founded Acragas 6.4, and Camarina 6.5

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(422) reject approach by Phaeax 5.4

(415/4) support Syracuse with cavalry 6.67

(414) give support to

Gylippus 7.1

(413) send reinforcements to Syracuse 7.33; 7.58; 7.80

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—(428/9) general fear of Thracian army 2.101

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(426) volunteers invited for Spartan colony of Heracleia (1) 3.92

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Grestonia, district of Macedonia 2.99, 2.100, 4.109 (‘Crestonia’)

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GYLIPPUS, son of Cleandridas (6.93, cf. 6.104), Spartan commander in Sicily: (415/4) appointed, and first arrangements made 6.93

(414) takes four ships to Italy 6.104, then to Sicily 7.1

gathers army in Sicily and marches on Syracuse 7.1

joins Syracusans on Epipolae, captures Labdalum 7.2–3

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(414–413) raises troops in Sicily 7.7, cf. 7.12 (Nicias), 7.21, 7.46, 7.50

(413) with Hermocrates, advises adoption of naval warfare
7.21

captures Athenian forts at Plemmyrium 7.22–4

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Nicias surrenders to him 7.85, 7.86

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(412) ships serving with him in Sicily return, escaping
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Habronichus, Athenian delegate to Sparta with Themistocles 1.91

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Athenian general: (439) against Samos 1.117

(430) against Potidaea 2.58, 6.31

(429/8) with Sitalces 2.95

(437/6) founder-colonist of Amphipolis 4.102

(422) stripped of founder's honours 5.11

(422/1) signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

Haliartus, in Boeotia: (424/3) at battle of Delium 4.93

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Harmodius, with Aristogeiton assassin of Hipparchus (514) 1.20, 6.53–9

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capture Sestos with Athenians 1.89

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—(413/2–411) Pharnabazus wants Spartans to send fleet to
Hellespont 8.6, 8.8, 8.39, 8.62, 8.80, 8.99

(412) Peloponnesians plan to progress from Aegean to
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(411) Dercylidas sent overland to Hellespont 8.61–2

Sestos fortified by Athenians as guard on Hellespont 8.62

Strombichides recalled from Hellespont to join Athenian fleet
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—(425) at Pylos/Sphacteria 4.8, 4.26

(424) in Brasidas' army 4.80

(421) Helots who fought under Brasidas freed and settled in
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Athenians withdraw Helots from Pylos 5.35

(419/8) brought back to Pylos at insistence of Argives 5.56

(418) in Spartan expedition against Argos 5.57

in Spartan expedition to Mantinea 5.64

(413) constitute Spartan force sent to Sicily 7.19, 7.58

Hephaestus, god: thought to have his forge on Hieria 3.88

Hera, goddess: temple at Argos, burned down (423), 4.133

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Heracleia (1), Spartan colony in Trachis: on route to Thrace 3.92, cf. 4.78, 5.12

(426) established 3.92–3;

threat to Euboea never materializes 3.93

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(422) some Spartan reforming of the system 5.12;

(420/19) defeated in battle by neighbouring tribes 5.51

(419) taken over by Boeotians 5.52

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Heracleides (1), Syracusan general: (415/4) elected 6.73

(414) deposed 6.103

Heracleides (2), Syracusan general: (414) elected 6.103

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Hermaeondas, Theban envoy to Mytilene (428) 3.5

Hermes, god: temple outside Mycalessus 7.29

Hermione, in SE Argolid: 1.128, 1.131

(435) helps Corinth against Corcyra 1.27

(430) land ravaged by Athenians 2.56

(413/2) required to build ships for Peloponnesian League 8.3

(412/1) a ship in Spartan fleet 8.33

HERMOCRATES, son of Hermon (4.58 etc.), leading Syracusan
6.72

(424) at Conference of Gela, 4.58–65

(415) speech urging action in view of Athenian expedition
6.32–4

(**415/4**) speech recommending structural reforms 6.72–3

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speech in assembly at Camarina 6.76–80

(414) advises counter-walls 6.99

(**413**) speech advising adoption of naval warfare 7.21

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(412) instigates participation of Sicilian ships in Peloponnesian
war effort 8.26

(**412/1**) protests at Tissaphernes'

cut in pay for Peloponnesian fleet 8.29, 8.85

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(411) hostility of Tissaphernes, goes to Sparta to expose him
8.85

exiled from Syracuse and replaced as commander of Syracusan
ships at Miletus 8.85

Hermon (1), father of Hermocrates: 4.58 etc.

Hermon (2), commander of border-guards at Mounichia 8.92

Herms: (415) mutilation of Herms in Athens, and reaction 6.27–9,
6.53, 6.60–1

Hesiod, poet 3.96

Hestiaea, city in Euboea: (446) dispossessed by Athenians after
Euboean revolt 1.114, and Athenians settled there (in Athenian
army at Syracuse 7.57)

subsequently called Oreus (8.95, only city in Athenian control
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Hestiodorus, Athenian general 2.70

Hiera, one of the Lipara islands, supposed forge of Hephaestus 3.88

Hieramenes, Persian, party to 3rd treaty with Sparta (412/1) 8.58

Hierophon, Athenian general 3.105

Himera, city in Sicily: colonized from Zancle 6.5

only Greek city on N. side of Sicily 6.62, 7.58

(426/5) attacked by Athenians and Sicels 3.115

(415) refuse to welcome Athenians 6.62

(414) provide arms and troops for Gylippus 7.1
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Himeraeum, in Thrace, near Amphipolis 7.9

Hippagretas, 2nd Spartan commander at Sphacteria 4.38

Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus (1), assassinated by Harmodius and
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Hippias (1), son of Peisistratus (1), tyrant of Athens 1.20, **6.54–9**

(511/0) deposed, given refuge in Lampsacus and then with
Darius (1) 6.59

(490) with Persians at Marathon 6.59

Hippias (2), commander of Arcadian mercenaries at Notium (427)
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Hippocles, Athenian commander 8.13

Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus 6.59

Hippocrates (1), Athenian general: (**424**) at Megara 4.66–73

with Demosthenes, plans expedition against Boeotia 4.76–7

(**424/3**) commands in Delium campaign 4.89–97

killed in battle of Delium 4.101

Hippocrates (2), tyrant of Gela 6.5

Hippocrates (3), Spartan commander 8.35, 8.107

(411) in Phaselis, warns Mindarus of Tissaphernes' duplicity
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Hipponicus, son of Callias (3), Athenian general: (426) leads full levy against Tanagra 3.91

Hipponium, in Italy: Locrian colony, at war with Locri (422) 5.5

Hipponoïdas, Spartan polemarch, disgraced after battle of Mantinea (418) 5.71–2

Homer, epic poet 1.3 (his date, and his names for the Greeks), (1.5), 1.9, 1.10 (Catalogue of Ships), (1.13), 2.41

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Hyaeans, people in Ozolian Locris 3.101

Hybla Geleatis, town in Sicily 6.62–3, 6.94

Hyblon, Sicel king 6.4

Hyccara, town in Sicily: (415) captured by Athenians, and Sicanian inhabitants enslaved 6.62, 7.13

Hylas, river in Italy 7.35

Hyllaia harbour in Corcyra 3.72, 3.81

Hyperbolus, Athenian demagogue, ostracized: (411) murdered by oligarchic conspirators in Samos 8.73

Hysiae (1), in Boeotia 3.24

Hysiae (2), in Argolid: (417/6) captured by Peloponnesians and men executed 5.83

Ialysus, city in Rhodes 8.44

Iapygia, promontory at heel of Italy 6.30, 6.34, 6.44, 7.33

Iapygian islands (Choerades) 7.33

(413) dynast Artas provides javelin-men for Athenians 7.33

Iasian Gulf: 8.26

Iasus, in Caria: (412) sacked by Peloponnesians and handed over to Tissaphernes 8.28–9, 8.36, 8.54

Iberia: original home of Sicanians 6.2

potential mercenaries 6.90

Icaros, Aegean island 3.29, 8.99

Ida, mountain in Troad 4.52, 8.108

Idacus, on Chersonese 8.104

Idomene, in Amphilochia: (426/5) battle, Ambraciots defeated by Demosthenes 3.112–13

Ietae, Sicel fort captured by Gylippus (414) 7.2

Illyrians 1.24, 1.26, **4.124–8** (in Lyncus campaign, 423)

Imbros, N. Aegean island: Athenian colony 7.57

(428) support Athens in Lesbian revolt 3.5

(425) in Cleon's army at Pylos 4.28

(422) in Athenian army at Amphipolis 5.8

with Athenians in Sicily 7.57; 8.102, 8.103

Inaros, king of Libyans 1.104, 1.110

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Iolaus, Perdiccas' deputy at Potidaea (432) 1.62

IONIA: colonized from Athens/Attica 1.2, 1.12, 1.95, (2.15), 6.82

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Ionians at earlier Delian festival, and Ephesian festival 3.104

early naval power 1.13

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tribute-paying region of Athenian empire 2.9

Ionian cities unwallled 3.33, cf. 8.14, 8.16

Persian deputy governor of Ionia 8.31

—(427) Ionian exiles with Spartan expedition to Mytilene 3.31

(426) excluded from Spartan colony of Heracleia (1) 3.92

(413/2) Spartan expedition to Ionia agreed, 8.6–7

(412) Chians lead revolt of Ionia, 8.7–28

(412/1) whole of Ionia as price for Persian support of Athenians 8.56

(411) would be lost if Athenians at Samos sailed against Athens 8.86, or to help Athens 8.96

Ionian Gulf 1.24, 2.97, 6.13, 6.30, 6.34, 6.44, 6.104, 7.33, 7.57

Ionians: generic racial term 1.124, 2.15, 3.104, 6.77

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Ipnea, in Ozolian Locris 3.101

Irians, division of population of Malis 3.92

Isarchidas, Corinthian commander 1.29

Ischagoras, Spartan commander: 4.132

(422/1) signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

envoy to Thraceward region after Peace of Nicias 5.21

Isocrates, Corinthian general 2.83

Isthmian festival at Corinth 8.9–10

Isthmus, Corinthian 1.13, 1.108, 2.9, 3.15, 3.16, 3.18, 3.89, 4.42, 6.61

(431) Peloponnesian forces gathered at Isthmus before invasion of Attica 2.10, 2.13, 2.18

record of Peace of Nicias to be set up at Isthmus 5.18

slipways for transport of ships across Isthmus, 3.15, 8.7–8

—Leucadian isthmus, Peloponnesian ships transported across
3.81, 4.8; 3.94

Methana isthmus 4.45

Potidaea isthmus 1.62, 1.64, 4.120

Thapsus isthmus 6.97

Istone, mountain in Corcyra occupied by oligarchs (427–425) 3.85,
4.2, 4.46

Isus, in Ozolian Locris 3.101

Italus, Sicel king giving name to Italy 6.2

ITALY: named from Sicel king Italus 6.2

colonies founded by Peloponnesians 1.12

Corcyra on route to Italy and Sicily 1.36, 1.44

Athenian ambition to subjugate Greeks in Italy (Alcibiades)
6.90–1

(431) Spartan adherents required to build ships and provide
money 2.7

(422) mission of Phaeax 5.4–5

(415–413) Athenians' reception in Italy 6.34, 6.42, 6.44, 6.88,
7.33, 7.35, 7.57

supplies for Athenians from Italy 6.103, 7.14

Italian allies of Athenians at Syracuse 7.57 (imprisoned with
Athenians 7.87)

(415/4) Syracusan approaches to Italian Greeks 6.34, 6.88

(414) Gylippus in Italy 6.104, 7.1

(411) Italian ships with Spartan fleet 8.91

—cities: *see* Croton, Cumae, Locri, Metapontium, Rhegium, Taras

Itamenes, Persian, captured Colophon (430) 3.34

Ithome, mountain in Messenia: occupied by the Helots in revolt (465 on) 1.101–3, 3.54

Itys 2.29

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Ionian 1.95, 3.86, 6.6, 6.20, 6.44, 6.46, 6.50, 6.76, 6.79, 7.57

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Aeolian/Boeotian 3.2, 3.65, 7.57, 8.5, 8.100

Labdalum, Athenian fort on Epipolae 6.97–8, 7.3

Lacedaemonius, Athenian general 1.45

Laches, Athenian general: (427) leads 1st Athenian expedition to Sicily 3.86, 3.88, 6.1, 6.6, 6.75

in sole command after death of Charoeades 3.90, 3.103

(426/5) superseded in Sicily 3.115

(423) formal proposer of one-year truce 4.118

(422/1) negotiator (5.43, with Nicias) and signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

(418) leads Athenian force in support of Argos 5.61

killed in battle of Mantinea 5.74

Lacon, Plataean spokesman (427) 3.52

Laconia 2.25, 2.27, 2.56, 3.7, 4.3, 4.12, 4.16, 4.53–7, 5.35, 6.105,
7.19, 7.20, 8.6, 8.91

Sciritis region 5.33

(413) Athenian fort established opposite Cythera 7.26, 7.31,
8.4 (abandoned, 413/2)

Lade, island facing Miletus: (412) Athenian blockade of Miletus
from Lade 8.17, 8.24

Laeaeans, Paeonian tribe 2.96, 2.97

Laespodias, Athenian general 6.105

(411) envoy of Four Hundred to Sparta 8.86

Laestrygonians, supposed original inhabitants of Sicily 6.2

Lamachus, Athenian general: (424) loses ships at river Calix 4.75

(422/1) signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

(415) appointed to Sicilian command 6.8

at conference of generals 6.49–50

(414) killed in battle outside Syracuse 6.101, 6.103

Lamis, Megarian founder of colonies in Sicily 6.4

Lampsacus, city on Hellespont: Hippocles tyrant of Lampsacus 6.59

refuge of Hippias 6.59

given to Themistocles 1.138

(411) revolts from Athens, and recaptured 8.62

Laodoceium, in Arcadia: battle between Mantinea and Tegea
(423/2) 4.134

Larisa (1), in Thessaly 2.22, 4.78

Larisa (2), town in Troad 8.101

Las, port in Laconia 8.91, 8.92

Laureium, Athenians' silver mines 2.55, 6.91

Learchus, Athenian envoy to Sitalces (430) 2.67

Lebedus, in Ionia: (412) revolts from Athens 8.19

Lectum, SW promontory of Troad 8.101

Lecythus, headland off Torone: (424/3) Athenian fort there captured
by Brasidas 4.113–16

sanctuary of Athena 4.116

Lemnos, N. Aegean island: once inhabited by Etruscans 4.109

Athenian colony 7.57

hit by plague 2.47

(428) support Athens in Lesbian revolt 3.5

(425) in Cleon's army at Pylos 4.28

(422) in Athenian army at Amphipolis 5.8

with Athenians in Sicily 7.57; 8.102

Leocoreium, shrine in Athens 1.20, 6.57

Leocrates, Athenian general 1.105

Leon (1): (426) Spartan founder-colonist of Heracleia (1) 3.92

(420) envoy to Athens 5.44–6

Leon (2), Athenian signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance (422/1)
5.19, 5.24

Leon (3), Athenian general: (412) commands a fleet in E. Aegean
8.23 (recaptures Mytilene), 8.24

(412/1) sent as replacement general to Samos 8.54–5

(411) supports Samian democrats 8.73 Leon (4), father of
Pedaritus

Leon (4), father of Pedaritus 8.28

Leon (5), Spartan replacing Pedaritus as governor of Chios (411)
8.61

Leon (6), place on coast near Epipolae 6.97

LEONTINI, city in Sicily: founded from Chalcis in Euboea 6.3–4,
6.76

of Ionian descent 3.86, cf. 6.6

part of city called Phocaeae 5.4

fort of Bricinniae 5.4

(427) war with Syracuse, allies on either side, help sent by
Athenians 3.86, cf. 6.6

(425) campaign against Messana with Athenians 4.25

(422 on) the people driven out of Leontini, and war with
Syracuse 5.4, 6.6, 6.8, 6.19, 6.86

(415) Leontinian exiles press case for support at Athenian
assembly 6.19

—restoration of Leontinians a reason/pretext for Athenian expeditions to Sicily 3.86, 6.6, 6.8, 6.12, 6.19, 6.33, 6.44, 6.46–8, 6.50, 6.63, 6.76–7, 6.84

Leotychidas, Spartan king at battle of Mycale (479) 1.89

Lepreum, in Elis: **(421)** cause of quarrel between Elis and Sparta 5.31, 5.34, 5.49–50

freed Helots settled there 5.34

(418) Eleans fail to persuade Argive alliance to attack Lepreum 5.62

Leros, E. Aegean island 8.26–7

LESBOS, E. Aegean island: related to Boeotians 3.2 (cf. 3.5, 3.13), 7.57

‘autonomy’ in Athenian empire 3.10–11, 3.39

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(412) Peloponnesians plan to proceed from Chios to Lesbos to Hellespont 8.7, 8.22, with Chians secure revolt of Methymna and Mytilene 8.22

Athenians recapture Mytilene 8.23

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(412/1) proposals for another revolt welcomed by Astyochus but rejected by allies and Chians 8.32

(411) Athenian fleet begins siege of Eresus 8.100 (abandoned, 8.103)

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(435, 433) support Corinth against Corcyra 1.26, 1.27, 1.46

(435) ravaged by Corcyraeans 1.30

(429) base for Peloponnesian attack on Acarnania 2.80, 2.84
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(428) repel Athenian attack under Asopius (2) 3.7

(426) attacked and ravaged by Athenians and Acarnanians, but not besieged **3.94**, 3.95 (cf. 3.102)

(414–3) provide ships in support of Syracuse 6.104, 7.7, 7.58

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(422/1) Spartan envoy to Argos 5.22

(420) given public beating at Olympic games 5.50

(412/1) one of commissioners sent to advise Astyochus 8.39,
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(411) invited to accompany Tissaphernes to Aspendus, 8.87

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(425) with Syracuse, capture Messana 4.1

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(422) Locrian settlers take over Messana, then expelled 5.5

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(415) refuse Athenian expedition any access 6.44

(411) provide ships for Peloponnesian fleet 8.91; 7.4, 7.25,
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(431) allies of Sparta 2.9

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(424/3) support Boeotians at Delium 4.96

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(456/5) Athenians capture Naupactus from Locris 1.103

(426) allies of Athens, support campaign against Aetolia 3.95,
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(418) summoned to assist Spartans at Mantinea 5.64

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(416/5) ravaged by Athenians from Methone (2) 6.7

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Machaon, Corinthian commander 2.83

Maeander, river in Caria 3.19, 8.58

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(420) with Elis and Argos make alliance with Athens 5.43–8

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(419) conference at Mantinea summoned by Athenians 5.55

(418) support Argives against Spartans 5.58, 5.61

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Massalia, in S. Gaul: colonized by Phocaeans 1.13

Mecyberna, in Chalcidice: (422/1) provision in Peace of Nicias 5.18

(421/0) captured by Olynthians 5.39

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Thapsus, Megara Hyblaea, Selinus (6.4, 7.57)

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Athenians build long walls to Nisaea 1.103

(446) revolt from Athens 1.114

(?early 430s on) barred from Athenian market 1.67, 1.139, 1.140, 1.144

(435, 433) support Corinth against Corcyra 1.27, 1.46, 1.48

(431) invaded by Athenians, and twice every year to 424: 2.31, 4.66

Athenian ships at Boudorum prevent traffic in or out 2.93, 3.51

(429/8) propose attack on Peiraeus 2.93–4

(427) Athenians capture and fortify island of Minoa 3.51
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 (424) depredations from Pegae by oligarchs 4.66
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 (412/1) Megarian ship in Spartan fleet 8.33; 8.94
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Megara Hyblaea, in Sicily: founded by Megarian colonists from Thapsus, later removed by Gelo 6.4, 6.94

(415) deserted, and proposed by Lamachus as station for Athenian fleet 6.49

(415/4) fort built there by Syracusans 6.75, 6.94 (attacked by Athenians); 6.97; 7.25

Meidius, river near Abydos 8.106

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Meleas, Spartan envoy to Mytilene (428) 3.5

Melesandrus, Athenian general: (430/29) killed in Lycia 2.69

Melesias, envoy of Four Hundred to Sparta (411) 8.86

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Melos, Aegean island: Spartan colony 5.84, 5.89, 5.104, 5.106

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(426) Athenian expedition fails to subdue Melos 3.91, 3.94, cf. 5.84

(416) Athenian expedition against Melos, and siege 5.84, 5.114–16

Melian dialogue 5.85–113

(416/5) fate of Melian population 5.116

(412/1) Spartan fleet at Melos on way to Miletus 8.39, 8.41

Memphis, city in Egypt 1.104, 1.109

Menandrus, Athenian commander: (414/3) appointed co-commander with Nicias in Sicily 7.16

(413) in assault on Epipolae 7.43

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Menas, Spartan: (422/1) signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

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Mende, city on Pallene peninsula (Chalcidice): Eretrian colony 4.123

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Menedaius, Spartan commander against Naupactus (426) and then Amphilochia (426/5) 3.100, 3.109

Menon, Thessalian commander 2.22

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Arcadian 3.34, 7.19, 7.57–8

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Cretan 7.57

Iapygian 7.57

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Peloponnesian 1.31, 1.60, 4.52, 4.76, 4.80, 6.22, 8.28

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8.55, 8.100

Messana, city in Sicily: originally called Zancle 6.4

(426) forced to submit by Athenians 3.90

(425) captured by Syracusans and Locrians, defects from
Athens 4.1

base for Syracusan fleet, naval and land engagements with
Athenians 4.24–5

attack Naxos (2), defeated 4.25

(424–422) internal strife, taken over by settlers from Locri,
subsequently expelled 5.5

(415) Alcibiades fails to win over Messana 6.48, 6.50

pro-Syracusan party there, 6.74

(415/4) Athenian attempt on Messana frustrated, plans
betrayed by Alcibiades 6.74; 3.88; 7.1

Messapia, in Ozolian Locris 3.101

Messapians, tribe in heel of Italy 7.33

MESSENIANS: original inhabitants of Messenia in Peloponnese enslaved, and name ‘Messenians’ given to all Helots 1.101, cf. 4.3, 4.41

(456/5) after Helot revolt, settled by Athenians in Naupactus 1.103

—‘**Messenians in Naupactus**’: allies of Athens 2.9, 2.25, 2.90, 2.102, 3.75, 3.81, 4.3, 4.9, 4.32, 4.36, 4.41, 7.31, 7.57
usefulness of their Doric dialect 3.112, 4.3, 4.41

(426) persuade Demosthenes to attack Aetolia 3.94–5, 3.97

(426/5) with Demosthenes in Amphilochoia against the Ambraciots 3.107–12

(425) at Pylos/Sphacteria (4.3), 4.9, 4.32, 4.36

form garrison at Pylos, and raid Laconia 4.41, cf. 7.57

(421) withdrawn from Pylos 5.35

Argives demand their return 5.56

(413) with the Athenians at Syracuse 7.31, 7.57

Metapontium, city in Italy: (413) supplies troops and ships to Athenians 7.33, 7.57

Methana, peninsula between Epidaurus and Troezen: (425) isthmus fortified by Athenians 4.45

(422/1) to be restored to Sparta under Peace of Nicias 5.18

Methone (1), in Laconia 2.25

Methone (2), on Thermaic Gulf 4.129, 6.7

Methydrium, in Arcadia 5.58

Methymna, city in Lesbos: Aeolian city, colonized from Boeotia 7.57

Athenian ally contributing ships 6.85, 7.57, cf. 8.100

with Athenians in Sicily 7.57

did not join revolt of Lesbos (428–427) 3.2, 3.5, 3.50

(428) attacked by Mytilenaeans, attack Antissans and defeated 3.18

(412) revolt from Athens 8.22–3

(411) Methymnaean exiles fail in attack on Methymna, secure revolt of Eresus 8.100

metics, resident aliens in Athens 1.143, 2.13, 2.31, 3.16, 4.90, 6.28, **7.63** ('honorary Athenians')

Metropolis, in Acarnania 3.107

Miciades, Corcyraean commander 1.47

MILETUS, city in Ionia: colonized Abydos 8.61

Aristagoras attempted to colonize Nine Ways (496/5) 4.102

ally of Athens 4.42, 4.53–4, 7.57 (at Syracuse)

(440–439) war with Samos 1.115–16

(412) revolt from Athens 8.17

Athenian blockade from Lade 8.17, 8.24

defeated by Athenian expedition 8.25

Athenians prepare to wall off city 8.25–6, but withdraw on arrival of Peloponnesian fleet 8.27;

Spartan Philippus installed as governor 8.28

(412/1) Athenian naval attacks on Miletus 8.30, 8.38

(412–411) Peloponnesian fleet based in Miletus 8.29, 8.33,
8.36, 8.38, 8.39; (returned) 8.60–3, 8.78–9, 8.83–5, 8.99

(411) Milesian infantry support Peloponnesian fleet at Mycale
8.79

capture Tissaphernes' fort in Miletus 8.84, 8.85, 8.109

send envoys to Sparta to denounce Tissaphernes 8.85

Peloponnesian fleet moved from Miletus to Hellespont 8.99,
8.108

Miltiades, father of Cimon (1): 1.98 etc.

Mimas, mountain to N. of Erythraean peninsula 8.34

Mindarus, Spartan commander: **(411)** succeeds Astyochus as
admiral-in-chief 8.85

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Chios 8.99–103

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Athenian silver mines at Laureium 2.55, 6.91

Minoa, island in front of Megara 3.51, 4.67, 4.118

Minos 1.4, 1.8

‘Minyan’, older name for Boeotian Orchomenus 4.76

Molossians, people in Epirus 1.136, 2.80

Molycrium, on N. side of mouth of Corinthian Gulf: Corinthian colony, subject to Athens 3.102

(426) captured by Spartans 3.102; 2.84

Molycrian Rhium 2.86

Morgantina, city in Sicily 4.65

Motya, Phoenician settlement in Sicily 6.2

Mounichia, harbour in Athens 2.13, 8.92, 8.93 (theatre of Dionysus)

Mycale, mainland promontory opposite Samos: battle of, in Persian War (479) 1.89

(411) Peloponnesian fleet at, 8.79

Mycalessus, city in Boeotia: (413) attack and massacre by Thracian mercenaries 7.29–30

temple of Hermes 7.29

Mycenae 1.9, 1.10

Myconos, Aegean island 3.29

Mygdonia, region of Macedonia 1.58, 2.99, 2.100

Mylae, in territory of Messana: (426) forced to submit by Athenians 3.90

Myletidae, Syracusan clan, exiled and joined foundation of Himera 6.5

Myonessus, in territory of Teos in Ionia 3.32

Myonia, district of Ozolian Locris 3.101

Myronides, Athenian general 1.105; 1.108, 4.95 (wins battle of Oenophyta, 457)

Myrcinus, city in Edonia (Thrace): (424/3) goes over to Brasidas 4.107

(422) in Brasidas' army at Amphipolis 5.6, 5.10

Myrrhine, wife of Hippias 6.55

Myscon, Syracusan commander: (411) sent to fleet at Miletus 8.85

Mysteries: (415) allegations of profanation 6.28, 8.53

reaction and inquiry at Athens 6.53, 6.60–1

MYTILENE, main city of Lesbos: **(428)** attempting to force political union of Lesbos 3.2

civil strife 3.2, 3.27

triremes impounded at Athens 3.3

attack on Methymna 3.18

(428–427) revolt from and war with Athens 3.3–6, 3.18, 3.25, 3.27–8, 3.35–6, 3.50

send envoys to Athens and Sparta 3.4–5

presentation of case to Peloponnesian League at Olympia 3.8–15

alliance with Sparta 3.15

besieged by Athenians 3.18, 3.25, 3.27–8 (capitulation)

Spartans send Salaethus, 3.25, then 40 ships 3.26 (delayed and ineffective, 3.29–33)

Mytilenaeen debate in Athens (Cleon and Diodotus) **3.36–49**

second trireme countermands death penalty 3.49

execution of Mytilenaeans sent to Athens by Paches, and
settlement imposed 3.50

(424) Mytilenaeans plan offensive from mainland and
take Antandrus 4.52

recaptured by Athenians 4.75

(412) revolt again 8.22, and Mytilene recaptured by Athenians
8.23

(411) Athenian garrison in Mytilene defeats Methymnaean
exiles attacking Methymna 8.100

Myus, in Caria 3.19

given to Themistocles 1.138

Naucleides, leader of pro-Theban party in Plataea 2.2

NAUPACTUS, in Ozolian Locris: temple of Apollo 2.91

(456/5) captured by Athenians, and Helots from Messenia
settled there 1.103

‘the Messenians in Naupactus’ allies of Athens, 2.9 etc. (*see*
MESSENIANS)

(430/29) Phormio based there with 20 ships 2.69, 2.80, 2.81,
2.83, 2.84, 2.90–2, 2.102–3

(427) 12 ships there under Nicostratus 3.69, intervene in
Corcyra 3.75

(426) Aetolians hostile to Naupactus 3.94, 3.100

Demosthenes stays in Naupactus area after failure in Aetolia
(3.96), 3.98

Spartan expedition against Naupactus 3.100–2

saved by Acarnanian support at request of Demosthenes 3.102

(425) some of garrison ships go to Pylos 4.13;

Athenians at Naupactus capture Anactorium 4.49

(424) Demosthenes at Naupactus raising troops for Boeotian
expedition 4.76–7

(414–413) Corinthian fleet in opposition to Athenian squadron
at Naupactus 7.17, 7.19, 7.31, 7.34

(sea-battle)

(413) Demosthenes recruits Messenians at Naupactus for Sicily
7.31

Naxos (1), Aegean island: (470s) revolt from Athens and
subjugation 1.98; 1.137

Naxos (2), city in Sicily: first Greek colony, from Chalcis, in Sicily
6.3

altar of Apollo Archegetes 6.3

(425) defeat Messanans, with aid of Sicels 4.25

(415) expected to side with Athens on kinship grounds 6.20

admit Athenian expeditionary force, 6.50

(415/4) Athenians camp there for the winter 6.72, 6.74–5

(414) send cavalry to Athenians 6.98

one of the Athenians' 'remaining allies' (Nicias) 7.14, 7.57

Nea Polis, Carthaginian trading-post 7.50

Nemea (1), in Ozolian Locris: sanctuary of Zeus 3.96

Nemea (2), in Argolid 5.58–60

Nericus, in Leucas 3.7

Nestus, river in Thrace 2.96

Nicanor, leader of Chaonians 2.80

Niceratus, father of Nicias (1): 3.51 etc.

Niciades, chairman of prytaneis for Athenian assembly resolving one-year truce (423) 4.118

NICIAS (1), son of Niceratus (3.51 etc.), Athenian general: wealth 7.86

good fortune 5.16, 6.17, 7.77

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hostility of and to Alcibiades 5.43, 5.45–6, 6.12–13, 6.15–16

Spartan good will 7.86

Nicias on Athenian character 6.9, 7.48

communication with/from enemy 4.54 (Cythera), 7.48–9, 7.73, 7.86 (Syracuse); agony of command 7.16, 7.69

Thucydides' assessment 7.86

—**in Athens:** (427) leads expedition to Minoa 3.51

(426) leads expedition to Melos, Tanagra, Locris 3.91

(425) resigns Pylos command to Cleon 4.27–8

leads expedition to Corinthiad 4.42–5

(424) leads expedition to Cythera and Laconia 4.53–7

(423) signatory of one-year truce 4.119

in command against Scione/Mende 4.129–33

asks Perdiccas for evidence of reliability 4.132

(422/1) main Athenian proponent of peace 5.16, 5.46

with Laches negotiates peace of Nicias 5.43, 5.46, 7.86 (on its fragility 6.10); signatory of Peace and alliance 5.19, 5.24

(420) fruitless embassy to Sparta 5.46

(417) in command of aborted expedition to Thraceward region 5.83

(415) appointed, against his will (cf. 6.23–4, 6.34), to Sicilian command 6.8

speeches in assembly about Sicilian expedition 6.9–14, 6.20–3

pressed to specify forces required 6.25

generals given absolute discretion 6.26

doubts reality of supposed Egestan funds 6.22, 6.46

—**in Sicily:** (415) in conference of generals at Rhegium 6.47

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Sadocus, son of Sitalces: (431) given Athenian citizenship 2.29

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Salaethus, Spartan sent to aid of Mytilene (428/7) 3.25, 3.27, 3.35–6

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Scolus, in Chalcidice: provision in Peace of Nicias (422/1) 5.18

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(431) support Athens with cavalry 2.22

(429/8) fear of Thracian army 2.101

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(425) Athenians driven out of Eïon (2) 4.7

(423) Athenian campaigns against Scione and Mende 4.122–3,
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(422) against Torone 5.2–3, and Amphipolis 5.6–12

(422/1) refuse compliance with Peace of Nicias 5.21, 5.35

(421) Spartan troops withdrawn after Peace 5.34–5

(411) Diitrephes appointed to Athenian command in region
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Thrasyboulus, Athenian trierarch: **(411)** with Thrasyllus, leader of counterrevolution against oligarchy in Samos 8.73, 8.75

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Thrasycles, Athenian general: (422/1) signatory of Peace of Nicias and alliance 5.19, 5.24

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Thrasyllus, Athenian: **(411)** with Thrasyboulus, leader of counterrevolution against oligarchy in Samos 8.73, 8.75

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Thria/Thriasian plain, in Attica 1.114, 2.19–21

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THUCYDIDES (1), son of Olorus (4.104), Athenian general and historian: goldmining rights, and influence, in Thrace 4.105

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Thucydides (3), consular representative for Athens in Pharsalus:
(411) helps restore calm in Athens 8.92

Thuria, district of Messenia 1.101

Thurii, city in Italy: (415) Alcibiades escapes escort at Thurii 6.61,
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(414) dismissive of Gylippus 6.104

(413) anti-Athenian party expelled 7.33

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(412–411) Thurian ships in Spartan service 8.35, 8.61, 8.84

Thyamis, river on border of Thesprotia 1.46

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Thymochares, Athenian general 8.95

Thyrea, in Cynouria (5.41): (431) offered by Spartans as home for
expelled Aeginetans 2.27, 4.56–7

(424) captured by Athenians 4.57

(414) invaded by Argives 6.95

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(421) Athenian ally, captured by people of Dium (2) 5.35

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
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
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





















⁶ Cf. e.g. Xen., *Hell.* 2.2.20.

⁷ R. S. Stroud, 'Thucydides and Corinth', *Chiron*, 24 (1994), 267–304.

¹⁴ Hdt. 1, preface.

¹⁶ Diyllus *FGrH* 73 F 3; Eusebius, under 446/5 in the Armenian version, under 445/4 in Jerome's version.

¹⁷ *IG* i³ 83 = Tod 72.

¹⁸ *IG i*³ 948 = ML 11, translated Fornara 37.

¹⁹ Cf. ML 27, translated Fornara 59.

²⁰ *IG* i³ 364 = ML 61, translated Fornara 126.

²¹ Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 43 and Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 136
(the two translated Fornara 148), *Ath. Pol.* 29.2.

²² Direct speech is lacking from 5.25–83 and from 8 (except 53), but Hornblower (*Commentary*, vol. iii, 32– 5), stresses that indirect speech is not. What is said here about speeches presumably applies also to Nicias' letter to Athens, 7.11–15.

²³ e.g. de Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 7–16.

²⁴ *CIL* xiii 1688 = *ILS* 212 = Smallwood, *Docs* *Gaius*, 369;
Tac., *Ann.* 11.24; Tacitus and inscription translated N. Lewis and M.
Reinhold, *Roman Civilization: Selected Readings* (New York:
Columbia University Press, ³1990), 52–5.

²⁵ Perhaps the most extreme attack on his honesty is by Badian, 'Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War'.

²⁶ The phrase is borrowed from the title of a book by V. J. Hunter (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973). For an extreme approach to Thucydides' history as a work of literature, noting that he did not always get the facts right and not asking how far he tried to get them right or believed that he had got them right, see A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm; Portland, Ore.: Areopagitica, 1988), 1–69 ch. 1.

²⁷ Connor, *Thucydides*, 6.

²⁸ This aspect of early Greek literature is stressed by H. D. F. Kitto in *Poiesis* (Sather Classical Lectures, 36; University of California Press, 1966): he notes that the author 'relies on his reader to read with that degree of imaginative cooperation that makes direct statement unnecessary and the result more effective' (p. 249, referring at that point to Plato).

²⁹ Cf. P. J. Rhodes, 'In Defence of the Greek Historians', *G&R*² 41 (1994), 156–71, at pp. 161–6.

³⁰ De Jong, :
(Amsterdam: Gruner, 1987; London:
Duckworth (Bristol Classical Press, ²2004)), followed by
(Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Hornblower, 'Narratology and Narrative
Techniques in Thucydides', in Hornblower (ed.),
(Oxford University Press, 1994), 131–66, and in
his ; Rood,
(Oxford University Press, 1998).

³² L. Kallet-Marx, *Calculus*, 1–5.24 (University of California Press, 1993); L. Kallet, *Calculus* (University of California Press, 2001).

³³ A list of distinctive features of Thucydides' language may be found in K. J. Dover's small editions of [Books 6](#) and [7](#) (Oxford University Press, 1965), [pp. xiii–xviii](#), [xiii–xvii](#), respectively.

³⁵ Some Thucydidean rings are set out in Connor, ,
apps. 1, 2, 6, 7, 9.

³⁶ Cf. J. H. Finley, *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Harvard University Press, 1967), 1–117 chs. 1–2.

³⁷ Xenophanes, *Vorsokr.* 21 B 11–12, 14–16, 23–6; Heracleitus, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 42, 128.

³⁸ Protagoras, *Vorsokr.* 80 B 1, 4.

³⁹ Critias, *Vorsokr.* 88 B 25.

⁴⁰ Hdt. 7.129.

⁴¹ See G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'Herodotus', *G&R*² 24 (1977), 130–48.

⁴² On the Greeks' interest in recording natural disasters see E. Gabba, 'True History and False History in Classical Antiquity', *JRS* 71 (1981), 50–62, at 56. It is important to notice that Thucydides' attitude to religious matters is not uniformly unbelieving: see S. I. Oost, 'Thucydides and the Irrational: Sunday Passages', *CPhil* 70 (1975), 186–96; N. Marinatos, 'Thucydides and Oracles', *JHS* 101 (1981), 138–40; K. J. Dover, *The Greeks and their Legacy*, Collected Papers, ii: *Prose Literature, History, Society, Transmission, Influence* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 65–73.

⁴³ e.g. Protagoras in Pl., *Prt.* 320c–322d, 326c–e.

⁴⁴ e.g. Antiphon the Sophist, *Vorsokr.* 87 B 44. 12–34.

⁴⁵ Thrasymachus, Pl., *Resp.* 1.336B–354C; Callicles, Pl., *Grg.* 481B–522B.

⁴⁶ But 3.84 is probably an interpolation (see note).

⁴⁷ For the contrary view, see especially G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', *Hist.* 3 (1954–5), 1–41.

⁴⁸ *FGrH* 556 TT 15–17.

⁴⁹ Diod. Sic. 14.70.4–71.

⁵⁰ Cf. J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford University Press, 1981), 107–8, 122, 138–9, 152.

⁵¹ Polyb. 9.2; and similar remarks elsewhere.

⁵² On Phylarchus, Polyb. 2.56; on Timaeus, 12.25^b, cf. 25ⁱ.

⁵³ Polyb. 22.18, cf. 3.6.

⁵⁴ Polyb. 12.25^e.

⁵⁵ Polyb. 3.33.

⁵⁶ Polyb. 3.47–8.

⁵⁷ Polyb. 16.12.

⁵⁹ Joseph., *BJ* 1.30.

⁶⁰ See in general the last four chapters in Rengakos and Tsakmakis (eds.), (pp. 721–837, by L. Canfora, D. R. Reinsch, M. Pade, and F. M. Pires), to which I owe much of the information in this section.

⁶¹ See Hornblower, 'The Fourth-Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides', 115 (1995), 47–68.

⁶² Plataea, Aen. Tact. 2.3–6, cf. Thuc. 2.2–6; Amphipolis, Aen. Tact. 32.8, cf. Thuc. 5.9.

⁶³ Lucr. 6.1090–1286, cf. Thuc. 2.47–54.

⁶⁴ Not a model for orators, Cic., *De Or.* 2.56, *Brut.* 287–8, *Orat.* 30–2; source for fifth-century oratory, *De Or.* 2.93, *Brut.* 28–9.

⁶⁵ Sall., *Cat.* 50–5, cf. Thuc. 3.36–49.

⁶⁶ Livy *ap.* Sen. *Controv.* 9.1.13–14, Vell. Pat. 2.36.2, Quint., *Inst.* 10.1.101, 2.17.

⁶⁷ In addition to the passages cited in the previous note, see Quint., *Inst.* 9.4.16, 78, 10.1.33, 73–4.

⁶⁸ Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 42.

⁶⁹ Procop., *De bello Persico*, 2.22–3.

⁷⁰ De Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 26–8 with 28 n. 54, found much of Hobbes's political doctrine distasteful, but suggested that Hobbes may have derived from Thucydides what de Ste. Croix himself found in Thucydides, 'the belief that a system of ethics applicable inside a political community can have no relevance in dealings between sovereign States'.

⁷¹ B. G. Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, i (Berlin: Reimer, 1847), 205–6 = *Lectures on Ancient History*, trans. L. Schmitz, i (London: Taylor, Walton & Maberly, 1852), 169–70.

⁷² ‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen’, L. von Ranke, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535* (Leipzig and Berlin: Reimer, 1824), vol. i, p. vi; cf. p. vii; Thucydides at Leipzig, Ranke, ed. A. W. Dove, *Zur eigenen Lebensgeschichte* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1890), 30; Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, i. 2 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, ²1881), 42–52, esp. 47–8 = *Universal History* [i], ed. G. W. Prothero (London: Kegan Paul Trench, 1884), i. 314–22, esp. 318.

⁷³ T. B. Macaulay, *Edinburgh Review*, 94 (May 1828) (published anonymously), 336–42, quoting 341 = *Life and Works of Lord Macaulay*, Edinburgh Edition (London: Longmans, 1897), v. 128–33, quoting 133; letter of 11 February 1835, in *The Letters of T. B. Macaulay*, ed. T. Pinney, iii (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 137; cf. other letters of that year.

⁷⁴ T. Arnold, *The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides* (Oxford: Parker, 1830–5), vol. iii, pp. vi–xiv on the ‘archaeology’ in Book 1, cf. vol. i, pp. xi–xii in praise of Niebuhr.

⁷⁵ G. Grote, *History of Greece*, esp. ('new edn.' in 12 vols., 1869/84) vi. 126–30 (on Pylos), 252–5 (on Amphipolis) = ('new edn.' in 10 vols., 1888), v. 264–7, 385–400.

⁷⁶ F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London: Arnold, 1907).

⁷⁷ ‘An ideal of absolute and rigidly tested truth’, Finley, *Thucydides* (Harvard University Press, 1942), 105; ‘un soin et une impartialité universellement reconnus’, de Romilly, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956), 12; ‘his singular truthfulness’, Wade-Gery, ‘Thucydides’, OCD3, 1516–19 at 1519 (repeated from previous editions).

⁷⁸ e.g. J. P. Sullivan, 'Editorial', *Arethusa*, 8 (1975), 6.

⁷⁹ e.g. H. V. White, *Metahistory* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

⁸⁰ Connor, *Thucydides*, 6–7, quoting Schell, ‘Quang Ngai and Quang Tin’, *New Yorker*, 9 March 1968, 37; 250, quoting Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 408–9.

⁸¹ G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), 162.

⁸² <http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp?>

⁸³ Reported by D. Macintyre, *The Independent*, 27 April 2007, 33.

¹See R. A. Bauslaugh, 'The Text of Thucydides 4.8.6 and the South Channel at Pylos', *JHS* 99 (1979), 1–6.

